Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 20STCV07262, Date: 2023-07-24 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 40 - JUDGE ANNE RICHARDSON - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
The Court issues tentative rulings on certain motions.The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) email Dept 40 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (smcdept40@lacourt.org) with a copy to the other party(ies) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no email is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. 

Case Number: 20STCV07262    Hearing Date: January 8, 2024    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

Background

Pleadings

Plaintiffs Nirmal S. Sehmbey (“Sehmbey”), Ronak Singh Bhatha, and Sukjoodh Singh Johal, as successor in interest for the estate of Baldev Singh Johal, sue Defendant Dr. Amarjit Singh Marwah and Does 1 through 50 pursuant to a June 6, 2021 First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleging claims of (1) Libel Per Se, (2) Slander Per Se, (3) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and (4) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress.

The FAC alleges the following, among other things. On or about April 22, 2018, the defendants published an email that stated that decedent Baldev Singh Johal (“Decedent”) and Plaintiff Sehmbey were felons, criminals, and had been jailed for kidnapping children and murder, among other things. (FAC, ¶ 10; Exhibit B – a copy of the email.) The Sikh Study Circle, Inc. is an entity connected with the development, maintenance, and day-to-day operations of the Sikh Temple. (FAC, ¶  12.) On or about August 11, 2019, the defendants republished that document (i.e., Exhibit B of the FAC) and published another (Exhibit C) to the Sikh Temple congregation during a day of religious service and worship. (FAC, ¶ 20.) Those two documents subjected Plaintiffs to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or disgrace, or caused them to be shunned and avoided. (FAC, ¶ 21.) The statements in those documents were either false, partially false, or misleading as they pertained to Plaintiffs. (FAC, ¶ 22.) The publication and republication were seen and read on or about August 2019, and continue to be seen and read by individuals involved in the Sikh Study Circle, Inc., members of the Sikh Temple, and members of the Sikh community at large. (FAC, ¶ 23.) As a direct and proximate result of the above-described publication, Plaintiffs have suffered (among other things) loss of their reputation, shame, mortification, and injury to their feelings. (FAC, ¶ 24.) Decedent specifically “suffered pre-death injuries, e.g., loss of his reputation, shame, mortification, and injury to his feelings.” (FAC, ¶ 24.)

On July 28, 2021, Defendant Dr. Amarjit Singh Marwah (“Defendant”) filed his Answer to the FAC.

On December 11, 2023, Defendant filed the instant motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to claims brought by Plaintiff Sukjoodh Singh Johal (“Successor Plaintiff”) as the successor in interest of Decedent’s estate. 

As of January 6, 2024, no opposition or reply brief has been filed. A facially valid proof of service was attached to the motion.

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings: GRANTED.

Legal Standard

A motion for judgment on the pleadings has the same function as a general demurrer, but may be made after the time to demur has expired. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (f).)

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when the ‘complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii).)” (Stevenson Real Estate Services, Inc. v. CB Richard Ellis Real Estate Services, Inc. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1219 (“Stevenson”).)

“Like a demurrer, the grounds for the motion [for judgment on the pleadings] must appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Civic Partners Stockton, LLC v. Youssefi (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1005, 1013; Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (d).)

“A trial court’s determination of a motion for judgment on the pleadings accepts as true the factual allegations that the plaintiff makes” (Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 515), “but [the court] does not consider conclusions of law or fact, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or facts that are judicially noticed” (Stevenson, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1219-1220).

Meet and Confer

“Before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion for judgment on the pleadings for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the claims to be raised in the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (a).)

“As part of the meet and confer process, the moving party shall identify all of the specific allegations that it believes are subject to judgment and identify with legal support the basis of the claims. The party who filed the pleading shall provide legal support for its position that the pleading is not subject to judgment, or, in the alternative, how the pleading could be amended to cure any claims it is subject to judgment.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (a)(1).)

“The parties shall meet and confer at least five days before the date a motion for judgment on the pleadings is filed.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (a)(2).)

“The moving party shall file and serve with the motion for judgment on the pleadings a declaration stating either of the following: ¶ (A) The means by which the moving party met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading subject to the motion for judgment on the pleadings, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the claims raised by the motion for judgment on the pleadings. ¶ (B) That the party who filed the pleading subject to the motion for judgment on the pleadings failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the moving party or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (a)(3).)

“A determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to grant or deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (a)(4).) 

The Court finds that Defendant has satisfied the meet and confer requirement. (Declaration of Josephine N. Baurac, filed on December 11, 2023, ¶¶ 5-9.) 

Discussion

Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Successor Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action for libel per se, slander per se, intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), and negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) against Defendant. Specifically, Defendant argues that as a matter of law, Successor Plaintiff can bring neither a defamation claim nor a cause of action for emotional distress on behalf of a deceased relative. 

“Defamation … may occur by means of libel or slander. (Civ. Code, § 44.)” (Shively v. Bozanich (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1230, 1242.) “‘Slander is a false and unprivileged publication, orally uttered, and also communications by radio or any mechanical or other means.’ [Citation.] ‘Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye ....’ [Citation.]” (Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 869, 893 [italics removed].)

As Defendant argues, “‘[d]efamation of a deceased person does not give rise to a civil right of action at common law in favor of the surviving spouse, family, or relatives, who are not themselves defamed. A libel on the memory of a deceased person is not deemed to inflict on the surviving relatives of the deceased any such legal damage as will sustain a civil action for the defamation. [Citations.] The defamatory matter must be published concerning the plaintiff.” (Flynn v. Higham (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 677, 680 (“Flynn”).) “‘As a matter of sound public policy, the malicious defamation of the memory of the dead is condemned as an affront to the general sentiments of morality and decency, and the interests of society demand its punishment through the criminal courts, but the law does not contemplate the offense as causing any special damage to another individual, though related to the deceased, and, therefore, it cannot be made the basis for recovery in a civil action.’” (Ibid.)

Here, Successor Plaintiff’s defamation allegations against Defendant are based on Defendant’s alleged statements concerning Decedent, not Successor Plaintiff. (FAC, ¶¶ 10, 19, 20, 27.) Indeed, Successor Plaintiff alleges he is bringing his defamation claims only as successor in interest of the Decedent’s estate. (See FAC, ¶ 3 [“Plaintiff, the estate of Baldev Singh Johal (‘Johal’) is represented by and through its successor-in-interest, Sukjodh Singh Johal, son of decedent Baldev Singh Johal, and as such, Sukjodh Singh Johal (‘Successor’) is decedent’s Successor-in-interest pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.11”].)

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Successor Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action for libel per se or slander per se against Defendant.

“‘The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress were summarized in [citation], as follows: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.”’ [Citation.]” (Flynn, supra, 149 Cal.App.3d at p. 681.)

“[T]he ‘“negligent causing of emotional distress is not an independent tort but the tort of negligence....” [Citation.] “The traditional elements of duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages apply.”’ [Citation.] The basic inquiry is ‘“whether the plaintiff’s interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant’s conduct.... [D]uty is ... an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.”’ [Citation.]” (Eriksson v. Nunnink (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 708, 729 [italics removed].)

Here, Successor Plaintiff has not alleged what duty, if any, Defendant personally owed and breached towards him such that he could maintain a NIED claim against Defendant.

In addition, Successor Plaintiff cannot maintain an IIED claim against Defendant. As Defendant points out, in Flynn, the California Court of Appeal explained that “to allow an independent cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the same acts which would not support a defamation action, would allow plaintiffs to do indirectly that which they could not do directly.” (Flynn, supra, 149 Cal.App.3d at p. 682.)

Accordingly, the Court also finds that Successor Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action for IIED and NIED against Defendant.

To obtain leave to amend, Successor Plaintiff has the burden of showing how the FAC could be amended and how the amendment would change the legal effect of the complaint to state a cause of action for defamation and emotional distress against Defendant. (The Inland Oversight Committee v. City of San Bernardino (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 771, 779 [“When a court sustains a demurrer without leave to amend, the plaintiff has the burden of proving how an amendment would cure the defect”]; Community Cause v. Boatwright (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 888, 902 [“When the court has sustained a demurrer without leave to amend, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate how he can amend his complaint, and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading”].)

Here, Successor Plaintiff did not file any opposition and, therefore, has failed to meet his burden for leave to amend.

Accordingly, the motion is granted.

Conclusion

The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED. The claims in the First Amended Complaint brought by Plaintiff Sukjoodh Singh Johal, as successor in interest for the estate of Baldev Singh Johal, against Defendant Dr. Amarjit Singh Marwah, are hereby dismissed with prejudice.