Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 20STCV47489, Date: 2023-04-20 Tentative Ruling
DEPARTMENT 40 - JUDGE ANNE RICHARDSON - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
The Court issues tentative rulings on certain motions. The tentative ruling will not become the
final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)]. If the parties wish to
submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must
agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) call
Dept 40 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (213/633-0160) and state
that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of
the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative
ruling, then no telephone call is necessary and all parties should appear at
the hearing in person or by Court Call. 
Case Number: 20STCV47489 Hearing Date: April 20, 2023 Dept: 40
| 
   SAMUEL KIM, an individual; and CALI BLUE SKY INVESTMENT, INC., a
  California Corporation,                         Plaintiff,             v. UNITED HEALTH AND CARE CENTER, a California corporation; JRJS,
  LLC, an Alaska limited liability company; CHANGO CLUB, INC., a Delaware
  corporation; JAFAR RASHID, an individual; VIKRAM SOOD, an individual; VIBHA
  PATEL, an individual; SANJIV PATEL, an individual; LORRAINE LUGO, an
  individual; MOHAMMED KHALID, an individual; ZAHID BUTT, an individual; and
  DOES 1 – 50, inclusive,                         Defendants.  ______________________________________ JRJS, LLC, an Alaska limited liability company,                         Cross-Complainants,             v. SAMUEL KIM, an individual; and CALI BLUE SKY INVESTMENT, INC., a
  California Corporation; and ROES 1 through 100, inclusive,                         Cross-Defendants.  | 
  
    Case No.:          20STCV47489  Hearing Date:   4/20/23  Trial Date:         N/A  [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Defendants United
  Health and Care Center (UHCC), JRJS, LLC, Jafar Rashid, Vikram Sood, Vibha
  Patel, Sanjiv Patel, Mohammed Khalid, and Zahid Butt’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Cross-Complaint and Answer to
  Complaint.  | 
 
On December 11, 2020, Plaintiff/Cross-Defendants
Samuel Kim and Cali Blue Sky Investment, Inc. (CBSI) initiated LASC Action No.
20STCV47489 alleging claims of (1) Statutory Trademark
Infringement/Counterfeiting, (2) Dilution of Famous Mark, (3) Common Law
Trademark Infringement, (4) Unfair Competition, and (5) Deceptive Business
Practices against UHCC, JRJS, LLC, Chango Club, Inc., Jafar Rashid, Vikram
Sood, Vibha Patel, Sanjiv Patel, Lorraine Lugo, Mohammed Khalid, Zahid Butt,
and Does 1-50. The claims arise from allegations that Samuel Kim owns the
trademarks for five ‘Big Chief Marks’ for pre-filled vaporizer cartridges,
disposable pens containing cannabis extract, cannabis flower, and related
products, and that in December 2018, Kim granted UHCC and JRJS the nonexclusive
right to manufacture and distribute cannabis vape cartridges bearing the Big
Chief Marks, with Kim revoking the license on June 23, 2019 amid a fallout
between the parties, only for Defendants to continue using the marks thereafter
without authorization from Kim or Kim’s new licensee, CBSI.
On February 5, 2021, JRJS, LLC
filed a Cross-Complaint, with the operative July 28, 2021 First Amended
Cross-Complaint (FAXC) alleging claims of (1) Declaratory Relief, (2) Trademark
Infringement, (3) Cancellation of Registration for Trademark [Assignment], and
(4) Cancellation of Registration for Trademark [Abandonment] against Samuel
Kim, CBSI, and Roes 1 through 10. The claims arise from allegations that JRJS
became the rightful owner of the common law Big Chief Marks with respect to
cannabis products following Kim’s oral assignment of those rights to JRJS, and
that it is Kim and CBSI who have infringed on JRJS’s rights by continuing to
use the Big Chief Marks, where JRJS is entitled to a cancellation of the Big
Chief Marks’ registrations, either on assignment or abandonment grounds.
On March 24, 2023, Defendants—except
for Defendants Lugo and Chango Club, Inc.—filed a motion for leave to amend JRJS’s
FAXC and Defendants’ Answer to Cross-Complaint in this action. The motions are
made on the ground that depositions of Samuel Kim and CBSI have led to the
uncovering of previously undiscovered facts that fundamentally alter the bases
and legal theories of Defendants’ crossclaims and defenses.
On April 7, 2023, Kim and CBSI
opposed the motion for leave to amend.
On April 13, 2023, Defendants filed
a reply to the April 7th opposition.
The motion is now before the Court.
The Court DECLINES to take judicial
notice of the State of California and United States Patent and Trademark Office
registrations for the Big Chief Marks because the Court does not rely on such registrations
in the disposition of this motion. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (h), 453.)
Legal Standard
California Code of Civil Procedure
section 473, subdivision (a)(1) provides, in relevant part: “The court may, in furtherance
of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any
pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by
correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect;
and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer. The court
may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon
any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other
particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time
limited by this code.”
A motion to amend a pleading must:
(1) Include a copy of the proposed
amendment or amended pleading, which must be serially numbered to differentiate
it from previous pleadings or amendments;
(2) State what allegations in the
previous pleading are proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page,
paragraph and line number, the deleted allegations are located; and
(3) State what allegations are
proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page,
paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located.
(Cal. Rules of Court Rule, rule
3.1324, subds. (a)(1)-(3).)
The motion must also attach a
separate declaration specifying:
(1) The effect of the amendment;
(2) Why the amendment is necessary
and proper;
(3) When the facts giving rise to
the amended allegations were discovered; and
(4) The reasons why the request for
amendment was not made earlier.
(Cal. Rules of Court Rule, rule
3.1324, subds. (b)(1)-(4).)
“This discretion should be
exercised liberally in favor of amendments, for judicial policy favors
resolution of all disputed matters in the same lawsuit.” (Kittredge Sports
Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1047.) Ordinarily, the
court will not consider the validity of the proposed amended pleading in ruling
on a motion for leave since grounds for a demurrer or motion to strike are
premature; however, the Court does have discretion to deny leave to amend where
a proposed amendment fails to state a valid cause of action as a matter of law
and the defect cannot be cured by further amendment. (See California
Casualty General Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 274, 281,
overruled on other grounds by Kransco v. American Empire Surplus Lines Ins.
Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 390, 403-06; see also Kittredge Sports Co. v.
Superior Court, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 1048 [“[E]ven if the
proposed legal theory is a novel one, ‘the preferable practice would be to
permit the amendment and allow the parties to test its legal sufficiency by
demurrer, motion for judgment on the pleadings or other appropriate
proceedings’” (quoting California Casualty General Ins. Co. v. Superior
Court, supra, at p. 280)].)
However, leave to amend may also be
properly denied when “the insufficiency of the proposed amendment is
established by controlling precedent and . . . [can]not be cured by further
appropriate amendment.” (California Casualty General Ins. Co. v. Superior
Court, supra, 173 Cal.App.3d at pp. 280-81; see, e.g., Foxborough
v. Van Atta (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 217, 231 [not an abuse of discretion to
deny leave to amend when “proposed amendment would have been futile because it
was barred by the statute of limitations” with no indication of relating back
to the original complaint].) 
Further, if a good amendment is
proposed in proper form, a long, unwarranted and unexcused delay in presenting
it may be a good reason for denial. (Roemer v. Retail Credit Co. (1975)
44 Cal.App.3d 926, 939-40.) In most cases, the factors for timeliness are: (1)
lack of diligence in discovering the facts or in offering the amendment after
knowledge of them; and (2) the effect of the delay on the adverse party. (Id.
at p. 940.) If the party seeking the amendment has been dilatory, and the delay
has prejudiced the opposing party, the judge has discretion to deny leave to
amend. (Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490.)
Prejudice exists where the amendment would require delaying the trial,
resulting in loss of critical evidence, or added costs of preparation such as
an increased burden of discovery. (Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996)
48 Cal.App.4th 471, 486-88.)
Analysis
I. Procedural
Requirements
Defendants’ motion for leave to
amend JRJS’s FAXC into a Second Amended Cross-Complaint (SAXC) and Defendants’
Answer to Complaint into a First Amended Answer satisfies California Rules of
Court, rule 3.1324, subdivision (a)(1) by attaching to the Atabek declaration
copies of the proposed SAXC and First Amended Answer. (Mot., Atabek Decl., Ex.
5 [proposed SAXC], Ex. 7 [proposed First Amended Answer].)
Defendants’ motion for leave to
amend JRJS’s FAXC into a SAXC and Defendants’ Answer to Complaint into a First
Amended Answer also satisfies California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324,
subdivisions (a)(2)-(3) by attaching to the Atabek declaration redline copies
of the proposed SAXC and First Amended Answer, differentiating these from the
original FAXC and Answer to Complaint respectively. (Mot., Atabek Decl., Ex. 6
[proposed SAXC redlines], Ex. 8 [proposed First Amended Answer redlines].)
Defendants’ motion for leave to
amend also satisfies California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324, subdivisions
(b)(1)-(4) by providing an attached declaration that:
(1) Incorporates the effect of
amendment through redline copies of the proposed SAXC and First Amended Answer
(Mot., Atabek Decl., ¶¶ 18, 20, Exs. 6, 8);
(2) Explains why the amendment is
necessary by referencing a past hearing at which “Defendants advised the Court
and Plaintiffs of Defendants’ intention to seek leave to amend Defendants’
Answer and FAXC based, in pertinent part, on the newly discovered information
provided during Kim’s deposition” (Mot., Atabek Decl., ¶ 13);
(3) Explains that the facts giving
rise to the amended allegations were discovered on March 8, 2023 and March 15,
2023 at depositions of Samuel Kim (Mot., Atabek Decl., ¶¶ 9, 16); and
(4) Provide sufficient information
for the Court to determine that the amendments were not made earlier because the
grounds underlying amendment were discovered only recently (Mot., Atabek Decl.,
¶¶ 9, 16).
Samuel Kim and CBSI’s opposition does
not appear to argue the motion is procedurally defective. (See Opp’n, pp. 1-15
[arguments relegated to sham pleading and trademark law].)
Under these circumstances, the
Court finds that Defendants’ motion for leave to amend is procedurally
compliant.
II. Substantive
Discussion
Defendants further argue that their
motion is timely and that Plaintiffs will not suffer prejudice as a result of
amendment because:
(1) “The previous May 9, 2023 trial
date has been vacated and no trial date is currently pending”;
(2) “Plaintiffs have personal
knowledge of the new information necessitating Defendants’ amended pleadings,”
for which reason they “will not suffer prejudice as a result of Defendants’
amended pleadings … [which incorporate] testimony elicited a[t] [Samuel] Kim’s
deposition[s]”;
(3) “Discovery is still open”; and
(4) “Plaintiffs can always propound
further discovery or take further depositions as they feel are warranted based
on the new (but previously known to them) facts being alleged in the proposed
Second Amended Cross-Complaint.”
(Mot., p. 6.)
In opposition, Samuel Kim and CBSI
argue two points. First, Kim and CBSI argue that the proposed SAXC and First
Amended Answer are sham pleadings supported by misleading facts and
manufactured to avoid summary judgment because “[m]ore than two years after
Defendants repeatedly disavowed any license it had with Plaintiff Kim, and
adamantly allege[d] instead that [Kim] assigned Defendants the Big Chief Marks,
Defendants now want to plea [sic] they had an irrevocable license due to
Defendant Rashid’s immense financial investment in the Big Chief products, or
that they had prior use of the trademarks, although they knew about these
allegations since December 2020.” (Opp’n, p. 7; see Opp’n, pp. 7-12.) Kim and
CBSI further argue that the proposed amendments alleging prior use of the Big
Chief Marks by Defendants contravenes trademark law on several grounds. (Opp’n,
pp. 12-15.)
In reply, Defendants argue four
points: Defendants did not wrongfully wait to amend their FAXC because the
bases for amendment were only recently discovered, Plaintiffs cannot
demonstrate prejudice, the proposed amendments are not sham pleadings, and the
legality of the prior use allegations are an issue to be determined at trial,
not at the pleadings stage. (Reply, pp. 2-6.)
The Court finds that Kim and CBSI’s
opposition arguments are insufficient to overcome the liberality with which
courts approach requests to amend pleadings. (Kittredge Sports Co. v.
Superior Court, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 1047.) First, the Court finds
that Defendants were not dilatory in moving to amend the FAXC and Answer to
Complaint. Contrary to Kim and CBSI’s arguments, the Court is satisfied with
Defendants’ explanations that the facts supporting the requested amendments
were only recently discovered at Samuel Kim’s depositions. (Mot., Atabek Decl.,
¶¶ 9, 16.) Second, the Court finds that Kim and CBSI’s other sham pleadings and
trademark law arguments are better left to tests of legal sufficiency by
demurrer, motion for judgment on the pleadings, or other appropriate
proceedings because the preferable practice would be to permit the amendment (Kittredge
Sports Co. v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 1048), particularly where
the Court does not find that the proposed amendments are fatally deficient as a
matter of law because the pleadings do not appear to be a sham and the
trademark questions raised in the papers are based on conflicting legal
positions (California Casualty General Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, supra,
173 Cal.App.3d at pp. 280-281).
Defendants’ motion for leave to
amend is therefore GRANTED.
Defendants United Health and Care Center (UHCC), JRJS, LLC, Jafar Rashid, Vikram Sood, Vibha Patel, Sanjiv Patel, Mohammed Khalid, and Zahid Butt’s Motion for Leave to Amend First Amended Cross-Complaint and Answer to Complaint is GRANTED because it satisfies California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324, subdivisions (a)-(b) and because Samuel Kim and CBSI’s arguments as to why this motion should not be granted do not present proper grounds for denial.