Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 21STCV04472, Date: 2023-03-07 Tentative Ruling
DEPARTMENT 40 - JUDGE ANNE RICHARDSON - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
The Court issues tentative rulings on certain motions. The tentative ruling will not become the
final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)]. If the parties wish to
submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must
agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) call
Dept 40 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (213/633-0160) and state
that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of
the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative
ruling, then no telephone call is necessary and all parties should appear at
the hearing in person or by Court Call.
Case Number: 21STCV04472 Hearing Date: March 7, 2023 Dept: 40
|
GEORGE WILSON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants. |
Case No.: 21STCV04472 Hearing Date: 3/7/23 Trial Date: 7/18/23 [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Defendant City of Los
Angeles’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication. |
MOVING PARTY: Defendant City of Los Angeles.
OPPOSITION: Plaintiff George
Wilson.
REPLY: Defendant
City of Los Angeles.
Plaintiff George Wilson sues the City of Los Angeles and
Does 1 through 10 pursuant to claims of (1) FEHA Disability Discrimination, (2)
FEHA Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process, (3) FEHA Failure to Grant
Reasonable Accommodation, (4) FEHA Retaliation, and (5) FEHA Failure to Prevent
Discrimination and Retaliation.
Now before the Court is the City of Los Angeles’s opposed Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the
Alternative, Summary Adjudication of these five causes of action.
For the foregoing
reasons, the Court:
(1) GRANTS summary
adjudication as to the Complaint’s first, second, and third causes of action;
(2) DENIES summary
adjudication as to the Complaint’s fourth cause of action;
(3) GRANTS summary
adjudication, in Part, as to the Complaint’s fifth cause of action insofar as
the claim is premised on the City’s failure to prevent discrimination against Plaintiff
George Wilson; and
(4) DENIES summary
adjudication, in Part, as to the Complaint’s fifth cause of action insofar as
the claim is premised on the City’s failure to prevent retaliation against
Plaintiff George Wilson.
Plaintiff started his employment with the City of Los
Angeles (“the City”) through the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) on
February 20, 1996. Plaintiff graduated from the Police Academy on August 29,
1996, and started his career as Police Officer I. After Plaintiff’s 1-year
probationary period was over, he was upgraded to a Police Officer II, and
transferred to Hollenbeck Division where he was assigned to Hollenbeck Patrol.
In 2005, Plaintiff was diagnosed with a tumor on his brain.
On April 11, 2005, Plaintiff had surgery to remove the tumor. As a result of
the surgery, Plaintiff lost the hearing in his right ear.
On March 9, 2006, after returning to work, Plaintiff was
placed on light duty status – indefinite desk duty—per the LAPD Medical Liaison
under the advice of Dr. Staley, assigned to the City of Los Angeles Personnel
Department - Medical Services Division. On April 24, 2007, the City through Dr.
Staley also unilaterally imposed another restriction on Plaintiff,
specifically: “Not to be placed in a position for which essential tasks include
the ability to localize sounds or to understand speech in quiet settings or
when there is background noise.” The City stated that this was a permanent
restriction.
As a result of the imposed restrictions, Plaintiff was
assigned to Hollenbeck Division Subpoena Control. However, at various times
between 2006 and 2015, Plaintiff was assigned to the Hollenbeck Detectives from
Hollenbeck Patrol to assist with the detective workload. Plaintiff started
carrying his own caseload, which involved investigating cases in the field and
arresting suspects. At the time that Plaintiff was assigned to the Detectives
Section, his rank and pay remained that of a Police Officer II despite
performing the same work as a Hollenbeck Detective.
After January 2015, Plaintiff was never re-assigned back to
Subpoena Control or to Hollenbeck Patrol. Instead, Plaintiff was only assigned
to work Hollenbeck Detectives. Plaintiff’s duties included interviewing
victims, witnesses, and suspects; performing follow-up investigations in the
field; collecting and preserving evidence to support his cases; writing and
enforcing search warrants and arrest warrants; assisting in the training of new
detectives; participating in the Mobile Field Force Cadre; and, working as a
liaison with other law enforcement agencies regarding the investigation of
criminal activity. Plaintiff performed these duties despite his rank as Police
Officer II and despite Memoranda of Understanding between Plaintiff’s union and
the City prescribing that a lower ranking officer could work in a higher
ranking position for no more than 168 consecutive calendar days and that compensation
should be commensurate with the duties performed by the lower ranking officer.
On September 15, 2016, Plaintiff was prescribed a Phonak
Audio V-90 312 RIC, Asl, CROS-2 BTE Binaural fitting (Bicros) Hearing Aid to
improve his hearing and ability to communicate by allowing his bad right ear to
transmit sound to his receiver good ear (left).
On October 2, 2018, Plaintiff completed the Selection
Process Requirements necessary for the promotion to detective. On or about
October 22, 2018, Plaintiff received verification from the LAPD Informing him
that based on his examination score, the LAPD ranked him in the Band 5
promotion group.
On February 12, 2019, Lieutenant Mayberry, LAPD Hollenbeck
Division Detective Commanding Officer directed Plaintiff to contact Medical
Liaison to request reconsideration to remove the Light Duty Restrictions (desk
duty only) to enable Plaintiff to meet the criteria for promotion to detective.
That same day, Plaintiff contacted Sgt. Derwin Henderson of the LAPD Medical
Liaison Unit – Return-to-Work Section, and Plaintiff explained, in substance,
that Plaintiff could not be promoted until his restriction was removed and that
Plaintiff needed an appointment with Medical Services Division to remove his
restriction.
To appeal his restrictions, on March 1, 2019, Plaintiff
successfully completed a Hearing in Noise Test (HINT) at the Audiology and
Speech Pathology Unit, Veterans Administration Loma Linda Hospital. The test
was administered without the use of Plaintiff’s prescribed hearing aids.
On or about March 5, 2019, Plaintiff submitted his appeal to
be formally returned to full duty.
On March 14, 2019, Plaintiff received a letter from Arthur
Manoukian, MD Medical Services Division acknowledging receipt of his Letter of
Appeal and specifying that Plaintiff could retake the HINT Exam with hearing
aids. Also on March 14, 2019, Plaintiff received a phone call from Natalie
Bakirci of the City of Los Angles Personnel Department, recommending that
Plaintiff perform the HINT Test as part of the letter of the appeal, at Plaintiff’s
expense. Plaintiff declined to take the exam due either to the risk of
distorting the results with hearing aids (Plaintiff’s position) or on the
grounds that the test “was not the right test for his disability” (Defendant’s
position).
In or around March or April 2019, Hollenbeck Sergeant Amelia
Martinez, Lieutenant Mayberry’s Adjutant, told Plaintiff he was no longer
allowed to perform investigative duties in the field. Plaintiff was also told
that he could not interview suspects, victims, and witnesses at the station. Sergeant
Martinez told Plaintiff that these directives came from the LAPD Medical
Liaison.
In spite of this directive, Plaintiff’s supervisors continued
to send him out to the field to perform investigative duties or to work on Hollenbeck
Detective cases.
Plaintiff made continued efforts to have the LAPD’s
unilateral restriction removed so he could be taken off desk-duty status and be
eligible for a promotion to detective, working through legal counsel, Larry
Hanna, to contact senior members of LAPD Command Staff to assist him in getting
the restriction removed. Through this effort, on April 24, 2019, Mr. Hanna
received an email, consisting of an email chain in which Hollenbeck supervisors
discussed Plaintiff Wilson being taken out of the field due to his
restrictions.
On or about September 4, 2019, the Director of the Office of
Support Services sent an Intradepartmental Correspondence entitled, “Order to
Cooperate with the City Personnel Department Medical Evaluation Process” to Captain-3
Richard Stabile, Hollenbeck Area Commanding Officer. This document was directed
to Plaintiff for review and signature. In substance, Plaintiff was directed to
comply with Medical Services’ Division’s request for a hearing test to
determine his fitness for duty. Plaintiff was to complete the hearing test by September
30, 2019.
On September 16, 2019, Plaintiff performed the first part of
the HINT Exam. On September 30, 2019, Plaintiff returned to take the HINT Exam.
After Plaintiff took the HINT test, the results were forwarded to Carolyn
Alvarez of the City of Los Angeles Medical Services Division.
On October 10, 2019, a Notice 12.3.1 from the Commanding
Officer Personnel and Training Bureau posted the Police Detective Promotional
List Band 5. The list number started at candidate number 111 and ended at
candidate number 161. Plaintiff was listed as Candidate No. 153. (Plaintiff
argues the low ranking left him at a loss in light of his academic background
and professional certifications in law enforcement training.)
On February 20, 2020, Plaintiff filed his DFEH Complaint
alleging that because of his disability, he was discriminated and denied hire
or promotion.
On February 4, 2021, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against
the City of Los Angeles and Does 1 through 10 pursuant to claims of (1) FEHA
Disability Discrimination based on failure to promote Plaintiff to detective due
to hearing disability in spite of performing detective duties from 2013 onwards,
(2) FEHA Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process regarding failure to
promote Plaintiff in spite of his hearing disability, (3) FEHA Failure to Grant
Reasonable Accommodation allowing for Plaintiff’s promotion to detective in
spite of his hearing disability, (4) FEHA Retaliation by forcing Plaintiff to
take a hearing test as pretext for not promoting Plaintiff to detective and
stripping Plaintiff of his field duties, and (5) FEHA Failure to Prevent
Discrimination and Retaliation.
On June 6, 2021, Plaintiff was promoted to the rank of
Detective I and was re-assigned to LAPD Central Division.
On November 18, 2021, Plaintiff Wilson was deposed by the
City, at which time he testified to various matters, including assertions that
Plaintiff was not passed over for promotion when Wilson was promoted on June 6,
2021, and had not been promoted around the time of the defund the police
movement, in part, because of a departmental freeze in promotions at the time,
with Plaintiff eventually being promoted commensurate to his position on the
promotion list.
On June 7, 2022, Plaintiff retired from the LAPD.
Now before the Court is City of Los Angeles’s opposed
October 14, 2022 Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary
Adjudication of the Complaint’s five causes of action. While Defendant contends that Plaintiff
voluntarily agreed to dismiss the second and third causes of action, Plaintiff
neither confirms nor denies that in his Opposition. Accordingly, the Court will
reach all five causes of action.
Per the request of the City of Los Angeles, the Court takes judicial
notice of the DFEH Complaint and City of Los Angeles Charter pursuant Evidence Code
sections 452, subdivisions (c) and (h), and 453.
Plaintiff George Wilson’s Evidentiary Objections
Objection to Kadomatsu Decl., ¶ 9: OVERRULED.
Defendant City of Los Angeles’s Evidentiary Objections
SUSTAINED: Objection Nos. 5-9, 14-15, 17-18.
OVERRULED: Objection Nos. 1-4, 10-13, 16.
Legal Standard
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers
submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Code of Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (c).) A party may also seek summary adjudication of an entire a cause
of action or, under certain circumstances, parts thereof, which may be made by a
standalone motion or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and proceeds
in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., §
437c, subds. (f)(1)-(2), (t); see Lilienthal & Fowler v. Superior Court
(1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1848, 1854-55; see also Public Utilities Com. v. Superior
Court (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 364, 380.) The moving party bears the initial burden
of production to make prima facie showing no triable material fact issues. (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) This burden on summary
judgment “is more properly one of persuasion rather than proof, since he must persuade
the court that there is no material fact for a reasonable trier of fact to find,
and not to prove any such fact to the satisfaction of the court itself as though
it were sitting as the trier of fact.” (Id. at p. 850, fn. 11.) If the moving
party meets this burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make converse
prima facie showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Ibid.) The evidence
of the moving party is strictly construed, and the evidence of the opposing party
liberally construed. (Crouse v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1988) 67
Cal.App.4th 1509, 1524.) Doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion must
be resolved in favor of the party resisting the motion. (Stationers Corp. v.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 412, 417.)
First Cause of Action, FEHA Disability
Discrimination: GRANTED.
California courts apply the burden-shifting formula set forth
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792, 802, under which
a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing
that: (1) he or she was a member of a protected class, (2) that he or she was qualified
for and performing competently in the position she held, (3) he or she suffered
an adverse employment action, and (4) conduct by the employer suggesting that it
is more likely than not that the adverse employment action was due to a discriminatory
motive. (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355.) It is
sufficient to show that one of the employer’s motives was to discriminate, even
if the employer had other lawful motives in causing the adverse employment action.
(University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar (2013) 570 U.S.
338, 343.) If the plaintiff establishes this prima facie case, the burden shifts
to the employer to rebut the presumption of discrimination by offering a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. (Ibid.) If the
employer meets this burden, the presumption of discrimination disappears, and the
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence that the employer’s reasons
for the adverse employment action were a mere pretext for discrimination. (Id.
at p. 356.) On a defense motion for summary judgment against a disparate treatment
claim, the defendant must show either that one of these elements cannot be established
or that there were one or more legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons underlying
the adverse employment action.” (Jones v. Dep’t of Corrections & Rehabilitation
(2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1379 [internal citations omitted].)
The Complaint’s first cause of action alleges FEHA
Discrimination on the grounds that “Defendants subjected Plaintiff to an
adverse employment action by refusing to promote him to the rank of Detective
even though he ha[d] been competently performing the duties of a Detective in
his assignment to Hollenbeck Detectives Division since 2013” and because “[t]he
acts and conduct of Defendants stated above were on the basis of Plaintiff’s [hearing]
disability.” (Complaint, ¶ 39.) In his brief
in opposition, Plaintiff argues that due to his disability, he was “hounded and
bullied” for seeking promotion and told he would not be given the promotion on
account of his disability; that he was forced to undergo the “fitness-for-duty”
examination and only was granted the promotion after an internal appeal; and
that the promotional exam score was “arguably” the product of a tampered
process motivated by disability discrimination.
(Opp’n, 9:16-21.)
The City of Los Angeles seeks summary adjudication of this
claim on the ground that “the undisputed facts show that Plaintiff’s promotion
to detective was neither denied nor delayed because of his hearing disability” given
that “Plaintiff was promoted to detective along with the other officers with
similar scores on their promotional exams.” (Mot., 6:9-13.)
To support this position, the City provides responses to
special interrogatories by the Plaintiff to show that the Plaintiff Wilson was
promoted to Detective I along with officers who had scored similar percentages
in the Selection Process Requirements for a detective promotion. (Mot.,
Separate Statement, UMF. No. 13 [referring to Mot., Autrey Decl., Ex. 5, (at
Comp. p. 90, showing Plaintiff’s scores for promotion selection process) &
Mot., Autrey Decl., Ex. 4, (at Comp. p. 39, showing response by Plaintiff to
special interrogatory indicating scores for Detective I’s promotion placed
Plaintiff in the “Band 5” promotion group)] & UMF No. 19 [referring to
Mot., Autrey Decl., Ex. 14 (at Comp p. 174-75, showing Plaintiff was placed in
Band 5 promotion category based on scores secured in promotion examination)
& Mot., Autrey Decl., Ex. 15 (at Comp. pp. 177-79, showing Special Transfer
Order No. 6-A, dated May 2021, in which Plaintiff, along with other officers
listed in Band 5, were listed for promotion to Detective I)].)
The Court finds that this evidence carries the City’s prima
facie burden of establishing a nondiscriminatory reason for the delay in
Plaintiff’s promotion to a detective position between October 2018 and June
2021—i.e., the period between Plaintiff’s application and promotion—because the
evidence suggests that Plaintiff was promoted to Detective I at a pace
commensurate with promotions for officers placed in Band 5 of the promotion
list for the LAPD.
In Opposition, Plaintiff Wilson argues that the reasons
given by the City for why there was a delay in Plaintiff’s promotion are
pretextual, as shown by (1) the LAPD violating its “desk duty” policy toward
Plaintiff, where Plaintiff was in practice made to perform the duties of a
Detective and Mobile Field Force cadre member, (2) the City deviating from the
Memoranda of Understanding entered with the Plaintiff’s union by not paying
Plaintiff commensurate to his work with the Hollenbeck Detectives, and (3) the
City finally promoting Plaintiff four months after this lawsuit was filed.
(Opp’n, 16:19-17:10.)
The Court finds that none of these positions, as supported
by the referenced evidence, amount to prima facie evidence showing that
Plaintiff’s non-promotion between October 2018 and June 2021 was not based on
his test scores in the detective’s promotion exam. Plaintiff has thus failed to
show triable issues of material fact relating to whether his promotion delay,
as based on his detective qualification scores, was pretextual. Moreover, given that there is undisputed
evidence of a freeze on promotions during the period in question (Defendant’s Undisputed
Fact number 5), there is no evidence that the Defendant could have promoted
Plaintiff any more quickly.
Plaintiff Wilson alternately argues that the City has
refused to produce discovery related to Plaintiff’s allegations that he was
discriminated against in his promotional exam, i.e., that Plaintiff’s ranking
in the promotional exam was influenced by discrimination against his hearing
disability. (Opp’n, 18:2-23.) For this reason, Plaintiff Wilson requests that
the Court deny this motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c,
subdivision (h)—permitting denial of summary adjudication in favor of a
continuance or other order deemed proper where briefing or affidavits point to
need for further discovery in opposition to summary adjudication. (Opp’n,
17:15-17, 18:24-25.)
In support of this position, Plaintiff points to evidence
showing that he propounded discovery from the City requesting documents
relating to Plaintiff’s “examination for the LAPD Detective position in 2018”
and interrogatory responses identifying the “decision-makers who placed
Defendant in Band 5 to determine if … there were any issues of disability
bias,” as well as evidence showing that the City has refused these requests on
the grounds the discovery sought is “sensitive,” “confidential,” and does “not
relate[] to the subject matter of the litigation.” (Opp’n, 18:9-20; Opp’n,
Brown Decl., Exs. B, SROGS No. 13-14 & Ex. C, RPD No. 31.)
In Reply, the City argues that this motion should not be
denied on these grounds because Plaintiff has failed to propound the discovery
he needs to support his position—e.g., by filing a Pitchess motion for law
enforcement records—or because Plaintiff was dilatory in seeking production of
evidence, making his requests only after this motion was filed. (Reply,
8:27-9:24.)
The Court agrees with the City. The record fails to reflect that
Plaintiff Wilson made a Pitchess motion seeking to obtain his law enforcement
records. The record also fails to reflect that Plaintiff filed a motion to
compel further discovery to the City’s responses to Plaintiff’s special
interrogatories and requests for production, contained as Exhibits B and C of
the Opposition’s Brown Declaration. The City of Los Angeles served responses to
the special interrogatories and requests for production on December 23, 2022.
(Opp’n, Brown Decl., Exs. B & C, Proofs of Service.) A motion to compel
further responses to these discovery requests was due 45 days after December
23, 2022 (Code Civ., Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (c) [interrogatories], 2031.310,
subd. (c) [production]), plus two court days for electronic service (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1010.6, subd. (a)(3)(B) [two additional court days for right or duty
to act where service made electronically].) 45 days after December 23, 2022 was
Monday, February 6, 2023, with two additional court days for electronic service
pushing the final date to compel further responses to Wednesday, February 8,
2023. Plaintiff failed to so compel further responses by February 8th. (See docket.)
Plaintiff has therefore statutorily forfeited the ability to produce further
discovery as to these requests. (Code Civ., Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (c),
2031.310, subd. (c).) The Court therefore lacks grounds to deny this motion and
continue a hearing thereon. (See Davis v. Nadrich (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th
1, 8, mod. May 21, 2009 [Trial court acted within its discretion in failing to
continue hearing on summary judgment motion due to a defendant’s alleged
refusal to appear for a deposition, in an attorney’s action against a law firm
and its partners for intentional and negligent interference with economic
relations, where the plaintiff attorney never requested a continuance and did
not provide reasons that would support such a request].)
Lacking grounds to deny this Motion pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h), the Court concludes that
Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence showing triable issues of material
fact as to whether his non-promotion to Detective I until June 2021 was not
based on his promotional exam scores, but rather, on some discriminatory motive
of the City’s.
Summary adjudication of the Complaint’s first cause of
action is therefore GRANTED.
Second Cause of Action, FEHA Failure to Engage in Interactive
Process: GRANTED.
No triable issues of material fact exist as to the Complaint’s
second cause of action per the material facts provided by the parties. (See Opp’n,
Separate Statement, UMF No. 24 [undisputed that Plaintiff has abandoned Failure
to Engage claim].)
No dismissal of this cause of action pursuant to Civil form CIV-110
appears in the docket.
The Court thus GRANTS summary adjudication as to this claim.
Third Cause of Action, Failure to Grant Reasonable Accommodation:
GRANTED.
No triable issues of material fact exist as to the Complaint’s
third cause of action per the material facts provided by the parties. (See Opp’n,
Separate Statement, UMF No. 25 [undisputed that Plaintiff has abandoned Failure
to Grant Reasonable Accommodation claim].)
No dismissal of this cause of action pursuant to Civil form CIV-110
appears in the docket.
The Court thus GRANTS summary adjudication as to this claim.
Fourth Cause of Action, FEHA Retaliation: DENIED.
“[I]n order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under
the FEHA, a plaintiff must show (1) he or she engaged in a ‘protected activity,’
(2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3)
a causal link existed between the protected activity and the employer’s action.”
(Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042 [internal citations
omitted].) “Once an employee establishes a prima facie case, the employer is required
to offer a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action.
If the employer produces a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action,
the presumption of retaliation ‘“‘drops out of the picture,’” and the burden shifts
back to the employee to prove intentional retaliation.” (Ibid.) “The protected
activity element may be established by evidence that the plaintiff threatened to
file a discrimination charge, by a showing that the plaintiff mistakenly, but reasonably
and sincerely believed he was opposing discrimination, or by evidence an employer
believed the plaintiff was a potential witness in another employee’s FEHA action.”
(Rope v. Auto-Chlor System of Washington, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 635,
652.) “A plaintiff … need only prove that a retaliatory animus was at least a substantial
or motivating factor in the adverse employment decision” to prevail on her claim.
(George v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th
1475, 1492.)
The Complaint’s fourth cause of action alleges FEHA
Retaliation against the City on the grounds that “Plaintiff engaged in legally
protected activities when he reported his concerns that he was being
discriminated against due to his disability” and that the City retaliated
against the Plaintiff by “requiring Plaintiff to take a hearing test not
required by POST guidelines to set him up for failure and to justify its
decision not to promote him” and by “stripping [Plaintiff] of his investigative
duties in the field.” (Complaint, ¶ 62.)
The City moves for summary adjudication of this claim on the
same ground for summary adjudication of the first cause of action: “[T]he
undisputed facts show that Plaintiff’s promotion to Detective was neither
denied nor delayed because of his hearing disability” given that “Plaintiff was
promoted to detective along with the other officers with similar scores on
their promotional exams.” (Mot., 6:9-13.)
The Court finds that this argument fails to carry the City’s
burden on summary adjudication because it misses the points advanced by the
Complaint. The “adverse employment action” the City responds to in its motion
is the failure to promote Plaintiff to a Detective I position—at least prior to
June 2021. (See Mot., 6:9-13.) However, the fourth cause of action is grounded
on different adverse employment actions: The City retaliating against the
Plaintiff by “requiring [him] to take a hearing test not required by
POST guidelines to set him up for failure and to justify its decision not to
promote him” and “stripping [Wilson] of his investigative duties in the
field.” (Complaint, ¶ 62 [emphasis added].) The City’s arguments and
supporting evidence on motion fail to address these points. The City therefore
fails to show a lack of triable issues of material fact as to the FEHA
Retaliation issues alleged in the Complaint.
Summary adjudication of the fourth cause of action is
therefore DENIED.
Fifth Cause of Action, Failure to Prevent FEHA Discrimination
and Retaliation: GRANTED in Part; DENIED in Part.
The fifth cause of action alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint
is derivative of the first and fourth causes of action alleged therein.
(Complaint, ¶¶ 70-71.)
The Court thus (1) adopts its FEHA Discrimination discussion
ante to find that the City of Los Angeles has carried its burden of making a
prima facie showing of lack of triable issues of material fact as to Failure to
Prevent FEHA Discrimination based on Plaintiff’s hearing disability and that
Plaintiff Wilson has failed to make a converse showing and (2) adopts its FEHA
Retaliation discussion ante to find that the City of Los Angeles fails to make
a prima facie showing of lack of triable issues of material fact as to Failure
to Prevent FEHA Retaliation. (See Lilienthal & Fowler v. Superior Court,
supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1854-55 [permitting summary adjudication of
a portion of a cause of action where “a motion for summary adjudication
challeng[es] a separate and distinct wrongful act even though combined with
other wrongful acts alleged in the same cause of action”].)
Defendant City of Los Angeles’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication is:
(1) GRANTED as to the Complaint’s first cause of action
alleging FEHA Discrimination, second cause of action alleging FEHA Failure to
Engage in the Interactive Process, and third cause of action alleging FEHA
Failure to Grant Reasonable Accommodation;
(2) DENIED as to the Complaint’s fourth cause of action
alleging FEHA Retaliation;
(3) GRANTED, in Part, as to the Complaint’s fifth cause of
action alleging FEHA Failure to Prevent Discrimination and Retaliation insofar
as the claim is premised on the City’s failure to prevent discrimination
against Plaintiff George Wilson; and
(4) DENIED, in Part, as to the Complaint’s fifth cause of
action alleging FEHA Failure to Prevent Discrimination and Retaliation insofar
as the claim is premised on the City’s failure to prevent retaliation against
Plaintiff George Wilson.