Case Number: 21STCV06547    Hearing Date: March 27, 2023    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

Background

On February 18, 2021, Plaintiff Henrietta Boyd sued Defendants Clare | Matrix and Does 1 through 20 pursuant to sixteen causes of action: (1)(3), (5)-(6) five FEHA claims; (7) a Declaratory Judgment claim related to FEHA violations; (8) a Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy claim; (4), (9)-(14) seven Labor Code claims; (15) an individual and representative PAGA claim; and (16) an Unfair Competition claim pursuant to the Business and Professions Code, section 17200.

On November 2, 2022, Defendant Clare | Matrix (“Clare Matrix”) moved to compel arbitration of the instant action pursuant to an arbitration agreement between the parties covering the individual claims made by Plaintiff Boyd against Defendant Clare Matrix and requesting dismissal of the representative PAGA claims.

Plaintiff Boyd opposed the motion to compel arbitration on March 14, 2023, to which Clare Matrix replied on March 20, 2023.

A jury trial is scheduled in this action on the same day as the hearing on the motion to compel arbitration.

Evidentiary Objections

Plaintiff Boyd’s Evidentiary Objections

Objection to Entire Declaration of Kevin Ralph: OVERRULED; declarant provides facts establishing sufficient foundation for matter set forth therein.

Motion to Compel Arbitration: GRANTED, in Part.

Procedural Requirements

“A petition to compel arbitration or to stay proceedings pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1281.2 and 1281.4 must state, in addition to other required allegations, the provisions of the written agreement and the paragraph that provides for arbitration.¿ The provisions must be stated verbatim or a copy must be physically or electronically attached to the petition and incorporated by reference.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.)

Clare Matrix includes a copy of the relevant arbitration agreement as Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Kevin Ralph, thus satisfying this requirement. (Mot., Ralph Decl., Ex. 1.)

Legal Standard

A party to an arbitration agreement may seek a court order compelling the parties to arbitrate a dispute covered by the agreement. (Code Civ. Proc.,¿§¿1281.2.) On a petition to compel arbitration, the court must grant the petition unless it finds (1) no written agreement to arbitrate exists, (2) the right to compel arbitration has been waived, (3) grounds exist for revocation of the agreement, or (4) litigation is pending that may render the arbitration unnecessary or create conflicting¿rulings on common issues. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2; see Condee¿v. Longwood Management Corp.¿(2001) 88 Cal.App.4th¿215,¿218-19.) The party seeking arbitration has the “burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 842.) Once that burden is satisfied, the party opposing arbitration must prove by a preponderance of the evidence any defense to the petition.” (Lacayo v. Cataline Restaurant Group Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 244, 257.) “The trial court sits as the trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, and any oral testimony the court may receive at its discretion, to reach a final determination.” (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc., supra, at p. 842.)

In determining the enforceability of an arbitration agreement, the court considers “two ‘gateway issues’ of arbitrability: (1) whether there was an agreement to arbitrate between the parties, and (2) whether the agreement covered the dispute at issue.” (Omar v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2004)¿118 Cal.App.4th 955, 961.) If these issues are satisfied in favor of the movant, (3) the party opposing arbitration must prove by a preponderance of the evidence any defense to the petition. (Lacayo v. Cataline Restaurant Group Inc., supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 257.)

Whether Arbitration Agreement Exists

“Parties are not required to arbitrate their disagreements unless they have agreed to do so. [Citation.] A contract to arbitrate will not be inferred absent a¿’clear agreement.’ [Citation.] When determining whether a valid contract to arbitrate exists, we apply ordinary state law principles that govern contract formation. [Citation] In California, a¿’clear agreement’¿to arbitrate may be either express or implied in fact. [Citation.]” (Davis v. Nordstrom, Inc. (9th Cir. 2014) 755¿F.3d¿1089, 1092-93 [applying California law].) The court is only required to make a finding of the agreement’s existence, not an evidentiary determination of its validity. (Condee¿v. Longwood Management Corp., supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 219.)

In its motion, Clare Matrix argues that “[o]n or about November 12, 2019, Plaintiff Henrietta Boyd and [Clare Matrix]’s representative signed an Arbitration Agreement, a copy of which is attached to the Ralph Declaration as Exhibit 1.” (Mot., 2:15-17, Ralph Decl., Ex. 1.) Clare Matrix also presents Plaintiff Boyd’s supplemental response to a request for admission admitting that she signed the arbitration agreement between the parties. (Mot., 3:11-4:3, Escobedo Decl., Ex. 8.)

Plaintiff Boyd’s opposition does not argue that there is not an arbitration agreement between the parties. (See Opp’n, 1:2-5:23.) Her declaration instead merely argues that she “was presented a 2-page document to sign [that] was not explained to” her, that “ she “was not told of the effect that writing [her] name on this document and signing it would have,” that she “did not understand what [she] was signing and no one explained what [she] was signing,” that she “did not know or understand that by signing this document, [she] would be giving up an important legal right to jury trial,” and that “[n]o representative or agent of Defendant ever discussed with [her] the advantages or disadvantages of agreeing to binding arbitration, or that by signing this document, [she] was giving up [her] Constitutional right to a jury trial for any of my potential claims” and “los[ing] [her] ability to be part of a class action.” (Opp’n, Boyd Decl., ¶¶ 3-8.) These declarations focus on defenses to arbitration and do not address the existence of the arbitration agreement presented by Clare Matrix.

Clare Matrix’s reply does not address the existence of an arbitration agreement, instead focusing on rebutting Plaintiff Boyd’s points in opposition to arbitration. (See Reply, 2:5-3:22.)

The Court’s review of the arbitration agreement (Mot., Ralph Decl., Ex. 1; Opp’n, Boyd Decl., Ex. A) and Plaintiff’s admission to having signed the arbitration agreement (Mot., Escobedo Decl., Ex. 8) compel the conclusion that on November 12, 2019, the parties entered into a binding arbitration agreement.

Scope of the Arbitration Agreement

“[T]he decision as to whether a contractual arbitration clause covers a particular dispute rests substantially on whether the clause in question is ‘broad’ or ‘narrow.’” (Bono v. David (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1055, 1067.) “‘A “broad” clause includes those using language such as “any claim arising from or related to this agreement”‘ [Citation] or ‘arising in connection with the [a]greement’ [Citation.]” (Rice v. Downs (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 175, 186 [italics omitted].) “But clauses requiring arbitration of a claim, dispute, or controversy ‘arising from’ or ‘arising out of’ an agreement, i.e., excluding language such as ‘relating to this agreement’ or ‘in connection with this agreement,’ are ‘generally considered to be more limited in scope than would be, for example, a clause agreeing to arbitrate “‘any controversy … arising out of or relating to this agreement[.]’” [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 186-87 [italics omitted].) “Several Ninth Circuit cases have held that agreements requiring arbitration of ‘any dispute,’ ‘controversy,’ or ‘claim’ ‘arising under’ or ‘arising out of’ the agreement are intended to encompass only disputes relating to the interpretation and performance of the agreement.” (Id. at p. 187.)

In its motion, Clare Matrix argues that the claims brought against it by Plaintiff Boyd are within the scope of the arbitration agreement between the parties because they arise from or are related to Plaintiff’s employment. (Mot., 2:18-3:1, Escobedo Decl., Ex. 1 [copy of Complaint].)

The opposition fails to address the scope of the arbitration agreement, instead focusing on defenses thereto. (See Opp’n, 1:2-5:23, Boyd Decl., ¶¶ 3-8.)

Clare Matrix’s reply does not address the scope of the arbitration agreement, instead focusing on rebutting Plaintiff Boyd’s points in opposition to the motion to compel arbitration. (See Reply, 2:5-3:22.)

The Court finds that the arbitration agreement encompasses all of Plaintiff’s claims against Clare Matrix except for the representative PAGA claims claimed therein. (See Complaint, ¶¶ 161, 165-66 [showing PAGA claim made individually and on behalf of all other aggrieved employees]; Williams v. Superior Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 642, 649 [A plaintiff “cannot be compelled to submit any portion of his representative PAGA claim to arbitration, including whether he [or she] was an ‘aggrieved employee’”]; see also Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 384, abrogated on other grounds in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 142 S. Ct. 1906, 1924-25 [“[A]n employment agreement [that] compels the waiver of representative claims under the PAGA … is contrary to public policy and unenforceable as a matter of state law”].)

The arbitration agreement encompasses “any and all claims arising out of or related to [Plaintiff’s] employment that could be filed in a court of law, including but not limited to, claims of unlawful harassment or discrimination, wrongful demotion, defamation, wrongful discharge, failure to pay wages, breach of contract, [and] invasion of privacy or class action.” (Mot., Ralph Decl., Ex. 1, § 1.) Such language is broad under the precedent of Rice v. Downs, supra, and therefore is afforded wide scope. The claims advanced in the Complaint are (1)-(3), (5)-(6) Discrimination, Retaliation, Failure to Prevent the same, Failure to Reasonably Accommodate, and Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process in violation of FEHA, (7) Declaratory Judgment as to FEHA claims, (8) Wrongful Termination, (4), (9)-(14) Retaliation, Failure to Pay Wages, Failure to Pay Minimum Wages, Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation, Failure to Provide Meal and Rest Periods, Failure to Provide Itemized Wage and Hour Statements, and Waiting Time Penalties in violation of the Labor Code, (15) an individual and representative PAGA claim, and (16) Unfair Competition in violation of the Business and Professions Code. (See Complaint.) To the extent such claims are individual to Plaintiff Boyd, these claims undoubtedly arise from or are related to her employment with Clare Matrix and are thus within the scope of the arbitration agreement.

Defenses to the Arbitration Agreement

A “party opposing arbitration must prove by a preponderance of the evidence any defense to the petition” to compel arbitration in the matter. (Lacayo v. Cataline Restaurant Group Inc., supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 257.)

In opposition to the motion to compel arbitration, Plaintiff Boyd argues that (1) Clare Matrix has waived arbitration by being dilatory and engaging in judicial proceedings for an extended period of time before moving to compel arbitration (Opp’n, 2:6-3:17) and (2) Plaintiff has a right to a judicial determination of her claims (Opp’n, 3:18-28). Plaintiff Boyd’s declaration also makes clear that she argues that no one ever explained to her that she was signing an arbitration agreement waiving her right to a court action for the determination of her claims, if any, against Clare Matrix. (Opp’n, Boyd Decl., ¶¶ 3-8.)

I. Waiver by Clare Matrix

Plaintiff Boyd first argues that, in line with Guess?, Inc. v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 553, 557, Clare Matrix has waived the right to compel arbitration because this lawsuit was filed on February 18, 2021, and between then and March 2023, Clare Matrix appeared in this case by filing an Answer to Complaint, engaged in discovery as to the arbitration agreement, and delayed moving for arbitration until November 2, 2022, i.e., a year and a half of delay, where the court in Guess? considered a three-month delay to be unreasonable in those circumstances. (Opp’n, 2:7-3:11.) Plaintiff also argues that she would be prejudiced by the granting of the motion because of the expense of attending case management conferences, responses to discovery, and multiple meet and confer efforts, undercutting the efficiencies Plaintiff would have gained in arbitration. (Opp’n, 3:12-17.)

In reply, Clare Matrix argues that “from the filing of the complaint to the filing of this motion, Defendant was engaged in targeted discovery regarding arbitrability, and more specifically, discovery was focused on whether Ms. Boyd would admit that she signed the arbitration agreement,” and “[o]nce Plaintiff finally admitted that she signed the arbitration agreement … and … it [became] clear that Plaintiff was still going to refuse to submit to arbitration … Defendant filed this motion.” (Reply, 2:10-26.)

The Court finds no waiver of arbitration.

A judge may deny a petition for arbitration when the petitioner has waived the right to compel arbitration. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2, subd. (a); Spracher v. Paul M. Zagaris, Inc. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1135, 1137.) It is immaterial whether the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S. Code 1 et seq.) or the California Arbitration Act (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1280 et seq.) applies to the arbitration agreement at issue, because the same standards apply in determining waiver under both acts. (Fleming Distribution Co. v. Younan (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 73, 79 fn. 5.)

Although no single test delineates the nature of the conduct that will constitute a waiver of arbitration, the California Supreme Court has identified six factors relevant for consideration: (1) whether the party’s actions are inconsistent with the right to arbitrate; (2) whether the litigation machinery has been substantially invoked and the parties were well into preparation of a lawsuit before the party notified the opposing party of an intent to arbitrate; (3) whether a party either requested arbitration enforcement close to the trial date or delayed for a long period before seeking a stay; (4) whether a defendant seeking arbitration filed a crossclaim without asking for a stay of the proceedings; (5) whether important intervening steps [e.g., taking advantage of judicial discovery procedures not available in arbitration] had taken place; and (6) whether the delay affected, misled, or prejudiced the opposing party. (Spracher v. Paul M. Zagaris, Inc., supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 1138 [citing to St. Agnes Med. Ctr. v. PacifiCare of Cal. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1187, 1195-96 (quotations omitted)].)

A waiver of the right to arbitrate may not be lightly inferred; rather, the party seeking to establish a waiver has a heavy burden of proof. (St. Agnes Med. Ctr. v. PacifiCare of Cal., supra, 31 Cal.4th 1187, 1195; Fleming Distribution Co. v. Younan, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 80.) Close judicial scrutiny of any claim of waiver is required. (St. Agnes Med. Ctr. v. PacifiCare of Cal., supra, at p. 1195.) A judge, not an arbitrator, generally resolves the issue of whether a party petitioning to compel arbitration has waived the right to arbitrate by the party’s litigation conduct. (Hong v. CJ CGV Am. Holdings, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 240, 243 [rejecting defendant’s contention that arbitrator should have decided waiver by litigation conduct issue because case was subject to Federal Arbitration Act].)

Here, the factors provided by the California Supreme Court support non-waiver by Clare Matrix. First, even the opposition shows that Clare Matrix’s conduct was not inconsistent with the right to arbitrate because most of its delay in filing to compel arbitration related to discovery from Plaintiff Boyd seeking an admission that she did indeed sign the arbitration agreement and was tied thereto. (See Opp’n, 3:5-8; see also Mot, Escobedo Decl., ¶¶ 5-13 [explaining the steps taken by Clare Matrix to obtain admissions from Plaintiff Boyd supporting arbitration].) In light of this finding, the Court also finds that (2) the litigation machinery was not sufficiently invoked other than to secure discovery from Plaintiff Boyd admitting to arbitrability of her claims as between the parties and, (5) no important intervening steps have taken place in this litigation disfavoring arbitration, and (6) Clare Matrix has not misled or prejudiced Plaintiff Boyd where Boyd has known since at least May 19, 2021 that Clare Matrix sought to compel arbitration (Opp’n, 3:5-6). Further, (4) Clare Matrix has moved for arbitration consistent with the first affirmative defense stated in its Answer. (Answer, 2:2-12 [affirmative defense invoking arbitration agreement against Plaintiff’s claims]; Mot., 2:1-11 [making argument as to affirmative defense]; Mot., Escobedo Decl., Ex. 2 [copy of Answer].) The only factor to some degree weighing against arbitration is (3) whether Clare Matrix moved to compel arbitration close to the trial date or after a delayed period of time, under circumstances where this motion was filed on November 2, 2022, to be heard on March 27, 2023, with trial originally scheduled for February 7, 2023, later continued to May 30, 2023 on January 4, 2023, and then advanced to March 27, 2023 on March 9, 2023. (See docket generally.) However, because the delay in filing for arbitration involved Clare Matrix’s discovery from Plaintiff Boyd as to whether there was an agreement to arbitrate between the parties (Opp’n, 3:5-8; see also Mot, Escobedo Decl., ¶¶ 5-13), the Court finds this factor favors arbitration as much as it disfavors it.

On the balance, the Court finds that no waiver of arbitration has been shown given the circumstances in this case, thus failing to provide Plaintiff Boyd an adequate defense to arbitration on waiver grounds.

II. Right to Judicial Action

In her opposition, and without comparing the facts of this case to the legal precedent cited, Plaintiff Boyd cites to case law noting that “[a]lthough California has a strong policy favoring arbitration [citations], our courts also recognize that the right to pursue claims in a judicial forum is a substantial right and one not lightly to be deemed waived” and that “[b]ecause the parties to an arbitration clause surrender this substantial right, the general policy favoring arbitration cannot replace an agreement to arbitrate.” (Opp’n, 3:18-27.)

In reply, Clare Matrix argues that “[t]his one paragraph argument section fails to explain Plaintiff’s position, and fails to explain what ‘CBA’ means or why it was mentioned” where “[t]he cases cited by Plaintiff in this argument section appear to deal with situations where an employee is not a party to an arbitration agreement” but where “Plaintiff now admits she is a party to the agreement because she signed it,” making the cited cases distinguishable. (Reply, 3:1-8.)

The Court agrees with Clare Matrix. The cases cited by Plaintiff relate to the nexus between the policy favoring arbitration and the need for an arbitration agreement. (Opp’n, 2:23-28 [citing to Young v. Horizon West, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1128 [quoting Marsch v. Williams (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 250, 254] and County of Contra Costa v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 237, 245].) Here, such an arbitration agreement exists. (Mot., Ralph Decl., Ex. 1; Opp’n, Boyd Decl., Ex. A.) As such, these grounds for defense against arbitration are unavailing.

III. Failure to Explain Arbitration Agreement to Plaintiff Boyd

The Court briefly notes that Plaintiff Boyd’s declaration argues that she “was presented a 2-page document to sign [that] was not explained to” her, that “ she “was not told of the effect that writing [her] name on this document and signing it would have,” that she “did not understand what [she] was signing and no one explained what [she] was signing,” that she “did not know or understand that by signing this document, [she] would be giving up an important legal right to jury trial,” and that “[n]o representative or agent of Defendant ever discussed with [her] the advantages or disadvantages of agreeing to binding arbitration, or that by signing this document, [she] was giving up [her] Constitutional right to a jury trial for any of my potential claims” and “los[ing] [her] ability to be part of a class action.” (Opp’n, Boyd Decl., ¶¶ 3-8.)

Numerous cases have held that such grounds do not amount to a valid defense against a motion to compel arbitration because “ordinarily one who signs an instrument which on its face is a contract is deemed to assent to all its terms” such that “[a] party cannot avoid the terms of a contract on the ground that he or she failed to read it before signing….” (Metters v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 696, 701 [quotations omitted]; see also 24 Hour Fitness, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1199, 1215 [“‘Reasonable diligence requires the reading of a contract before signing it. A party cannot use his own lack of diligence to avoid an arbitration agreement’” (quotation omitted)]; Pinnacle v. Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236 [“A party’s acceptance of an agreement to arbitrate may be express, as where a party signs the agreement”].) These failure-to-explain grounds therefore do not support a valid defense against arbitration.

Arbitration Conclusion

The motion to compel arbitration by Clare Matrix is GRANTED because Clare Matrix has shown that an arbitration agreement between the parties exists and covers all individual claims advanced by Plaintiff Boyd against Clare Matrix and because Plaintiff failed to raise a valid defense.

Request for Stay and Dismissal

In its motion, Clare Matrix asks for a stay of this action as to Plaintiff’s individual claims (Mot., 4:23-5:5) and dismissal of the representative PAGA claims in light of Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, supra. (Mot., 5:6-19).

In opposition, Plaintiff Boyd argues, inter alia, that the PAGA representative claim should not be stayed because, pursuant to cited case law, “a PAGA claim is representative and does not belong to an employee individually [such that] an employer should not be able dictate how and where the representative action proceeds.” (Opp’n, 4:11-14; see Opp’n, 4:1-5:23 generally.)

In reply, Clare Matrix argues that “the United States Supreme Court very recently held [in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, supra, that]: ‘… [T]he FAA preempts the rule of Iskanian insofar as it precludes division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate.’” (Reply, 3:16-19; see Reply, 3:9-22 generally.)

The Court STAYS arbitration of the individual claims advanced by the Complaint’s sixteen causes of action “until an arbitration is had in accordance with the order to arbitrate or until such earlier time as the court specifies” given these claims have been ordered to arbitration. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4.)

As to the representative PAGA claims advanced by the Complaint’s fifteenth cause of action, the Court also STAYS litigation related thereto, declines Clare Matrix’s request to dismiss such claims, and declines Plaintiff Boyd’s request to permit litigation as to the representative PAGA claim to proceed.

As explained by Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC (2023) __ Cal.Rptr.3d ___, 2023 WL 2212196 *1, *8, “a plaintiff’s PAGA standing does not evaporate when an employer chooses to enforce an arbitration agreement.” (See also Galarsa v. Dolgen California, at p. *7 fn. 3 [acknowledging publication of this decision pending superseding decision in Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc.] (Apr. 11, 2022, G059860) [nonpub. opn.] 2022 WL 1073583, 2022 Cal.App.Unpub. Lexis 2170, review granted (July 20, 2022, S274671) 2022 Cal.Lexis 4066.) This is because an “aggrieved employee” has standing to sue under PAGA. (Labor Code, § 2699, subd. (a).) An “aggrieved employee” is defined as someone “who was employed by the alleged violator” and “against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed.” (Labor Code, § 2699, subd. (c).) This does not require an employee to actually maintain a claim against the employer to have standing because “[t]he remedy for a Labor Code violation, through settlement or other means, is distinct from the fact of the violation itself.” (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 84.) “The Legislature defined PAGA standing in terms of violations, not injury. [Plaintiff] became an aggrieved employee, and had PAGA standing, when one or more Labor Code violations were committed against [her]. (See Labor Code § 2699(c).) Settlement [would] not nullify these violations.” (Ibid.) By the same logic, arbitration of the individual claims in this action does not nullify violations of the Labor Code against Plaintiff, and therefore do not nullify her standing to bring representative PAGA claims.

The Court also points out that while the majority opinion in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, supra, advocated for dismissal of representative PAGA claims, the concurrence thereto by Justice Sonia Sotomayor made clear that while the Supreme “Court reason[ed], based on available guidance from California courts, that Moriana lack[ed] ‘statutory standing’ under PAGA to litigate her ‘non-individual’ claims separately in state court,” “if [the Supreme] Court’s understanding of state law [was] wrong, California courts, in an appropriate case, [would] have the last word” (compare Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, supra, 142 S. Ct. 1906, 1925 [majority opinion as to dismissal], with ibid. (Sotomayor concurring) [quoted language]).  Indeed, the California Supreme Court has recently granted review in Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. supra., to decide whether an aggrieved employee who has been compelled to arbitrate claims under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) that are premised on Labor Code violations actually sustained by the aggrieved employee maintains statutory standing to pursue PAGA claims arising out of events involving other employees in court or in any other forum the parties agree is suitable.  In the interim, this Court will follow the reasoning in Galarsa, supra.

Conclusion

Defendant Clare | Matrix’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED as to Plaintiff Boyd’s Complaint’s sixteen causes of action insofar as they alleged individual claims against Defendant Clare Matrix because Clare Matrix has shown that an arbitration agreement between the parties exists and covers all individual claims advanced by Plaintiff Boyd against Clare Matrix and because Plaintiff failed to raise a valid defense to arbitration.

Further, this action—including its representative PAGA claims not sent to arbitration—is STAYED until an arbitration is had in accordance with this order to arbitrate or until such earlier time as the Court specifies.