Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 21STCV15720, Date: 2024-05-14 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 40 - JUDGE ANNE RICHARDSON - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
The Court issues tentative rulings on certain motions.The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) email Dept 40 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (smcdept40@lacourt.org) with a copy to the other party(ies) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no email is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. 

Case Number: 21STCV15720    Hearing Date: May 14, 2024    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

I. Background

A. Pleadings

Plaintiff Harutyun Shatarevyan (Plaintiff) sues Defendants FCA US, LLC (FCA) and Does 1 through 30 pursuant to an April 26, 2021, Complaint alleging claims of (1) Breach of Written Warranty Pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Act; (2) Breach of Implied Warranty Pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Act; (3) Breach of Written Warranty Pursuant to the California Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (SBA); and (4) Breach of Implied Warranty Pursuant to the SBA.

The Complaint’s claims arise from the following allegations. Plaintiff leased a 2020 Jeep Wrangler manufactured by FCA and sold by its authorized dealer, non-party Huntington Beach Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram (Huntington Beach Chrysler). FCA issued and supplied several written warranties to Plaintiff, including a five-year, 100,000-mile factory warranty. During the warranty period, various defects arose in the Subject Vehicle, namely a defective steering wheel that could not be repaired after three attempts by FCA.  Plaintiff Shatarevyan revoked acceptance of the Subject Vehicle on January 5, 2021, which Defendant FCA failed to accept. This suit followed.

B. Motion Before the Court

On November 6, 2023, at a status conference regarding alternative dispute resolution, Plaintiff’s counsel represented to the Court that the case was settled and that the parties were currently negotiating attorney’s fees. The Court vacated the status conference, as well as the jury trial in this action, and set an order to show cause (OSC) re Dismissal (Settlement) hearing for March 6, 2024.

On March 6, 2024, the Court held the OSC, at which time the Court noted that a motion for attorney’s fees was scheduled for hearing on June 12, 2024, and continued the OSC to June 12, 2024.

On March 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs as the prevailing buyer in this lemon law action. According to the proof of service for this motion, the moving papers and attachments were served on FCA’s counsel that same day via email and regular mail.

On May 2, 2024, after FCA failed to file an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion, Plaintiff filed a motion a notice of non-opposition. Plaintiff also filed a proposed order the motion for attorney’s fees and costs.

Plaintiff’s motion is now before the Court.

II. Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs: GRANTED.

A. Attorney’s Fees

1. Legal Standard

A prevailing buyer in a Song-Beverly Act action is entitled to recover their attorney’s fees and costs under the Act’s express terms. (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d); see Goglin v. BMW of North America, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 462, 464, 471.)

The Court begins this inquiry “with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (PLCM Group).) From there, the “lodestar figure may then be adjusted [according to a multiplier enhancement] based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (Ibid.) Relevant multiplier factors include “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

The Court is considered “an expert in the matter of attorney fees” since “[t]he value of attorney’s services is a matter with which a judge must necessarily be familiar.” (Excelsior Union High Sch. Dist. of L.A. Cnty. v. Lautrup (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 434, 448.) Accordingly, “[w]hen the court is informed of the extent and nature of such services, its own experience furnishes it with every element necessary to fix their value.” (Ibid.)

The Court has broad discretion to determine the amount of a reasonable attorney’s fee award, which will not be overturned absent a “manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence.” (Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1393-1394.)

2. Analysis

Plaintiff files this motion seeking $105,885 in attorney’s fees and $5,449.10 in costs. The fees are comprised of $11,440 in fees for work performed by Plaintiff’s counsel Armen Margarian, $58,240 in fees for work performed by Plaintiff's counsel Hovanes Margarian, a 1.5 multiplier enhancement award of $34,840, and assistant fees in the amount of $1,365.

Plaintiff’s motion is unopposed.

a. Reasonable Fee Rate

i. Relevant Law

The lodestar calculation begins with a determination of the “reasonable hourly rate,” i.e., the rate “prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095; see, e.g., Stratton v. Beck (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 483, 496 [finding no abuse of discretion in court setting attorney’s hourly rate based on comparison of rates from similarly experienced attorneys in same field and area].)

Counsel’s actual hourly rate is strong presumptive evidence of the reasonableness of that rate. (Mandel, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 761 [“The value of an attorney’s time generally is reflected in his normal billing rate”].)  However, there is no requirement that the reasonable market rate mirror the rate actually billed by counsel. (Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 700-703.) The determination is instead framed around the reasonable market value of the services. (See, e.g., Serrano, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 640-643 [discussing arguments and determining trial court did not abuse discretion by applying fee rates for public interest counsel according to reasonable market value, not the “normal billing rate” for public interest attorneys suggested by defendants].)

ii. Court’s Determination

Plaintiff seeks confirmation of rates of $650 per hour for Plaintiff’s counsel Hovanes Margarian and $550 per hour for Armen Margarian. These are the rates charged by counsel for contingency cases, whereas their rates for retainer cases are $550 and $450 per hour respectively. The requested fee rates are supported by declarations from counsel, which detail their academic and professional background. (Mot., pp. 11-14; Mot., A. Margarian Decl., ¶¶ 2-3, 10-19; H. Margarian Decl., ¶¶ 2, 4, 12-23.)

No opposition appears in the record.

The Court finds in favor of Plaintiff.

Regarding Hovanes Margarian, the rate of $650 per hour is reasonable for a 17-year practitioner with substantial litigation experience in SBA consumer law matters, primarily dealing with cases on pure contingency terms. Counsel’s experience in this action also factors into this determination.

The rate of $550 per hour for Armen Margarian is reasonable. While Armen Margarian is only a seven-year practitioner, Mr. Margarian provides a detailed basis for supporting the requested fee rate, including extensive litigation experience in consumer law matters, primarily dealing with the SBA, and on a contingency basis. (Mot., A. Margarian Decl., ¶¶ 16-19.) Counsel’s experience in this action also factors into this determination.

Last, regarding Elmira Oganyan—an Assistant of counsel, whose work was also billed and is included in this motion—the Court determines that, although not explicitly raised in the moving papers, the rate of $150 per hour is reasonable for a legal assistant in the Los Angeles legal community.

The Court confirms the requested rates as reasonable on these grounds.

b. Reasonable Hours Expended

i. Relevant Law

“Under the lodestar method, a party who qualifies for a fee should recover for all hours reasonably spent unless special circumstances would render an award unjust.” (Vo v. Las Virgenes Mun. Water Dist. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 440, 446, citing Serrano, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 632-633.) Time spent solely relating to the fee award is also compensable. (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1133.)

Because the court’s focus in evaluating the facts should be to provide a fee award reasonably designed to completely compensate attorneys for the services provided, the starting point for this determination is the attorney’s time records. (Horsford, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 395-397 [verified time records entitled to credence absent clear indication they are erroneous].)

ii. Court’s Determination

Plaintiff seeks recovery for 110.4 hours spent by counsel litigating this case, with those hours supported by verified time records attached to the Hovanes Margarian declaration. (Mot., pp. 9-11; Mot., H. Margarian Decl., Ex. A.)

No opposition appears in the record.

The Court finds in favor of Plaintiff, with one deduction.

Here, verified time records are attached to the moving papers and are entitled to deference absent a clear indication that the records are erroneous. (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1132-1133.)

A review of the records fails to show a clear indication that the records are erroneous. Instead, these records describe with great specificity the tasks undertaken by counsel in this litigation. The records describe who performed the billed work, the nature of the work, and the time expended on that work. A comparison between the work performed and the time expended on that work shows that the time expended is generally reasonable within the context of the task performed. The declaration of Armen Margarian states that he is not seeking all of the time actually spent and engaged in billing judgment. The declaration of Hovanes Margarian specifies the hours spent by task, which appears reasonable. The only deduction necessary would be time that was projected to review the opposition and to draft and file a reply, since no opposition was filed in this case. As broken down in the spreadsheet, Hovanes estimated a total of 7 hours for these tasks at his rate of $650 for this task, or $4,550.

Absent an opposition challenging specific time entries, the Court determines that the hours expended on this action by counsel are otherwise reasonable; or $11,440 for Armen, $58,240 - $4550 = $53,690 for Hovanes, and $1365 for the legal assistant.

c. Multiplier Enhancement

i. Relevant Law

The “lodestar figure may then be adjusted [according to a multiplier enhancement] based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (Ibid.) Relevant multiplier factors include “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132.)

ii. Court’s Determination

Plaintiff argues that the novelty of the questions in this action, the skill displayed by counsel, the fact that counsel took this case on to the preclusion of other work, and the contingency nature of the award support a 1.5 multiplier enhancement award. (Mot., pp. 15-17.)

No opposition appears in the record.

The Court finds in favor of Plaintiff, to a reduced degree.

The Court agrees that the skills displayed in this action (partly under the prior judicial officer for this Department), the preclusion of other work, and the contingency of the nature of representation here support a multiplier enhancement. (See Mot., H. Margarian Decl., ¶¶ 20-24.) On the other hand, as noted above, Plaintiff’s counsel have already increased their fees $100 per hour to account for their contingency rate. In order to avoid duplicate consideration of this factor, the Court will award a reduced multiplier of 1.2 to the lodestar of the two attorneys ($11,440 for Armen and $53,690 for Hovanes = $65,130 x 1.2 = $78,156.)

d. Disposition

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion as to fees in the amount of $78,156 + $1,365 = $79,521.

B. Costs

1. Legal Standard

In general, the “prevailing party” is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs for suit in any action or proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (b); Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 606; Scott Co. Of Calif. v. Blount, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1103, 1108.) Assuming the “prevailing party” requirements are met, the trial court has no discretion to order each party to bear his or her own costs of suit. (Michell v. Olick (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1198; Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 129.)

A verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services therein listed were necessarily incurred. (Rappenecker v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 256, 266 (Rappenecker).)

“A prematurely filed memorandum of costs is ‘“a mere irregularity at best” that does not constitute reversible error absent a showing of prejudice’ and is treated ‘as being timely filed.’” (Lowry v. Port San Luis Harbor District (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 211, 221 (Lowry) [affirming award of costs even though judgment was entered after memorandum of costs was filed]; accord. Haley v. Casa Del Rey Homeowners Assn. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 863, 880 [finding no reversible error where memorandum of costs was filed after jury returned special verdict but arguably before entry of judgment]; Lange v. Fisher (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 113, 118 [reversing trial court order striking costs memorandum filed prior to entry of judgment because “the cost bill was timely served and filed and the trial court erred in granting plaintiff’s motion to strike it”].)

2. Analysis

Plaintiff has filed a pre-judgment (premature) memorandum of costs detailing $5,449.10 in costs, including $661.90 in filing and motion fees, $150 in jury fees, $3,611 in witness fees, $25.75 in interpreter fees, and $1,001.45 in “other fees” relating to the reservation fee for the motion for attorney’s fees and to the cancellation of reporting services. (Memo of Costs, MC-010, p. 1 & MC-011, pp. 1-4.)

No opposition appears in the record.

The Court finds in favor of Plaintiff.

While this memo of costs was filed prior to judgment in this action, the Court considers it to be timely filed and properly before the Court. (Lowry, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 221.) Moreover, though no exhibits are attached to the memo of costs—e.g., receipts—supporting the claimed costs, a verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services therein listed were necessarily incurred. (Rappenecker, supra, 93 Cal.App.3d at p. 266.) As such, the memo of costs is itself prima facie evidence of these costs. Last, the Court finds that the claimed costs of $5,449.10 are eminently reasonable in relation to a more than three-year litigation.

The Court thus GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion as to costs in the amount of $5,449.10. 

III. Conclusion

Plaintiff Harutyun Shatarevyan’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs, and Expenses is GRANTED in the amount of $79,521 for fees and $5,449.10 in costs.