Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 21STCV17747, Date: 2023-03-21 Tentative Ruling
DEPARTMENT 40 - JUDGE ANNE RICHARDSON - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
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Case Number: 21STCV17747 Hearing Date: March 21, 2023 Dept: 40
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LAKHBIR KAUR DHATT, an individual, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSAL STUDIOS, INC., a business entity of unknown form; OTIS
ELEVATOR COMPANY, a business entity of unknown form; and DOES 1 through 50
inclusive, Defendants. |
Case No.: 21STCV17747 Hearing Date: 3/21/23 Trial Date: N/A [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Defendant
Universal City Studios LLC’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint. |
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Universal
City Studios LLC.
OPPOSITION: Plaintiff
Lakhbir Kaur Dhatt.
REPLY: Defendant
Universal City Studios LLC.
Plaintiff Lakhbir Kaur Datt sues Defendants Universal City
Studios LLC—sued as Universal Studios, Inc. and hereafter “Universal City”—Otis
Elevator Company (“Otis”), Universal Studios Hollywood (Doe 1), and Does 2
through 50 pursuant to claims of (1) Common Carrier Liability against Universal
City and Does, (2) Negligence against Universal City, Otis, and Does, (3)
Negligence-Premises Liability against Universal City and Does, and (4) Strict
Products Liability, (5) Negligent Products Liability, and (6) Breach of Express
and Implied Warranties against Otis and Does. The claims are grounded in
allegations that on or about May 19, 2019, plaintiff was lawfully on the
premises located at 100 Universal City Plaza, Universal City, CA 91608 and
that, as Plaintiff was riding an escalator on the premises that was
negligently, carelessly, recklessly, or in some other actionable manner,
trained, operated, controlled, entrusted, managed, maintained, repaired,
tested, such that the escalator was caused to and did suddenly and without
warning malfunction and shake with plaintiff standing on it, causing him to plaintiff
down, and proximately causing the resulting injuries and damages to Plaintiff
Dhatt.
Universal City’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint—filed
June 27, 2022—is now before the Court and challenges the third cause of action
on two grounds: the premises liability claim is duplicative of the negligence
claim because the claims are both grounded in negligence and because the claims
involve the same primary right.
Plaintiff Dhatt opposed the demurrer on September 1, 2022
and Universal City replied thereto on October 7, 2022.
Legal Standard
A general demurrer for sufficiency may be sustained against
duplicative claims. (Palm Springs Villas II Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Parth
(2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 268, 290 [“a cause of action for breach of governing
documents [that] appear[ed] to be duplicative of [a] cause of action for breach
of fiduciary duty” is “recognized … as a basis for sustaining a demurrer”]; Rodrigues
v. Campbell Industries (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 494, 501 [finding demurrer was
properly sustained without leave to amend as to cause of action that contained
allegations of other causes and “thus add[ed] nothing to the complaint by way
of fact or theory of recovery”]; see also Award Metals, Inc. v. Superior Court
(1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1128, 1135 [demurrer should have been sustained as to
duplicative causes of action].)
Analysis
Universal City challenges the second cause of action in a
sufficiency demurrer by arguing that the Premises Liability claim is
duplicative of the Negligence claim because the claims are both grounded in
negligence and because the claims involve the same primary right. (Demurrer,
4:9-6:8 [duplicative negligence claims], 6:9-25 [primary rights].)
I. Duplicative as to
Negligence
For support on the first position—second and third causes of
action are duplicative claims grounded in negligence, making the third claim superfluous—Universal
City argues that: “[t]he elements of Plaintiff’s premises liability claim are
essentially the same as her negligence claim” as grounded in the same
allegations “that Universal allegedly failed to maintain the subject escalator
on its premises, and that such alleged failure caused and contributed to
Plaintiff’s injuries[] ([c]ompare Compl. ¶¶ 19–27 with Compl. ¶¶ 28–36[])”
(Demurrer 4:19-5:10); “[b]oth claims also require Plaintiff to provide
sufficient facts related to the elements of duty, breach, causation and damages”
and the Complaint in fact pleads identical facts toward duty and damages at
paragraphs 22, 25 to 27 and 29, 34 to 36 (Demurrer, 5:11-25); and “Plaintiff’s
premises liability claim … adds nothing of value or difference to the Complaint”
because the Complaint “does not provide any specific facts to demonstrate the
manner in which the premises liability claim differs from Plaintiff’s
negligence claim,” with both claims alleging “an … unspecified malfunction with
the subject escalator allegedly caused Plaintiff to fall” (Demurrer, 5:26-6:2).
In opposition, Plaintiff Dhatt argues, in relevant part, that:
“[n]egligence and premises liability are two separate and distinct causes of
actions that cannot be considered duplicative nor superfluous” because
“[g]eneral negligence focuses on the non-delegable duties landowners and
landlords have on their land,” which “differs significantly from [p]remises
liability[,] which specifically focuses on specific situations where the owner
has a duty to exercise ordinary care in the management of the premises to avoid
exposing individuals to an unreasonable risk,” for which reason “it cannot
logically … that ‘Plaintiff’s premises liability claim is subject to demurrer
because it is wholly duplicative of Plaintiff’s negligence claim.’” (Opp’n, 6:2-8
[quoting Demurrer, 2:7-8]; see Opp’n, 2:22-6:16 generally); and “[a]ssuming
arguendo the causes of action are duplicative, Defendant’s argument goes
against the well-established rule of pleading rule that alternative or even
inconsistent legal theories are permissible in a complaint” (Opp’n, 6:17-23.)
In reply, Universal City argues that: “Plaintiff’s
negligence and premises liability claims are factually identical—both claims
assert that Universal allegedly failed to maintain the subject escalator on its
premises, and that such alleged failure caused and contributed to Plaintiff’s
injuries” (Reply, 3:8); “[w]hile the [o]pposition tries to draw a distinction
between the factual allegations associated with the duty element for both
claims, this assertion is contradicted by the Complaint[] (Compare Compl. ¶[] 22
with Compl. ¶ 29[])” (Reply, 3:11-14); [s]imilarly, the factual allegations associated
with the causation are virtually the same because the Complaint notes that an
alleged, unspecified malfunction with the subject escalator allegedly caused
Plaintiff to fall[] (Compare Compl. ¶ 24 with Compl. ¶ 31[])” (Reply, 3:14-16);
and “Plaintiff[‘s] … attempt to distinguish these two claims” “is unconvincing
because both causes of action rely on the same theory of liability (i.e.,
negligence)” (Reply, 3:17-24).
The Court agrees with Universal City.
In Palm Springs Villas II Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Parth,
supra, the court of appeal found that “the cause of action [therein
pleaded] for breach of governing documents appear[ed] to be duplicative of the
cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty,” supporting a finding that “the
trial court properly sustained [a] demurrer” to the breach of governing
documents claim, particularly where “[t]he [the pleading party] d[id] not
address [the demurring party’s] argument or explain how its document claim
differ[ed] from the fiduciary breach claim.” (Palm Springs Villas II
Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Parth, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 290.)
A review of Parth also shows that “[t]he cause of
action for breach of fiduciary duty alleged that [the demurring party] had
breached her duties to comply with the governing documents and to avoid causing
harm to the [pleading party] by, among other things, refusing to submit bids or
contracts to the Board, ‘unilaterally terminating’ PPM, and signing the
contract with Desert Protection” and that “[t]he breach of governing documents
cause of action identified CC&R and bylaw provisions and identified actions
taken by [the demurring party] in breach of these provisions, including the
termination of PPM and entering into the Desert Protection contract.” (Id.
at p. 277.)
Consistent with Parth’s guidance, the Court reaches
the same conclusion: the third cause of action for Negligence-Premises
Liability is duplicative of the second cause of action for Negligence. Indeed,
like in Parth, both claims are premised on the same violations of duty: a
“duty to exercise reasonable care for the health and safety of persons on the
[subject elevator] including, but not limited to, supervising and maintaining
said premises and providing adequate and safe escalators, personnel and/or
facilities on said premises to protect persons legally on said premises,
including plaintiff”; breach thereof by “negligently and/or recklessly
instructing, entrusting, hiring, supervising and/or controlling their
co-defendants, employees, subcontractors, and/or agents, who negligently and/or
recklessly owned, operated, managed, supervised, maintained, and/or otherwise
provided inadequate escalators at the premises”; and through such actions,
allowing the “escalator [to] malfunction[] causing plaintiff to fall down the
[subject escalator,] proximately inflicting serious, severe, and permanent
injuries to said plaintiff’s person.” (Compare Complaint, ¶¶ 22-24 [quoted
language], with ¶¶ 29, 31 [essentially identical language].)
Though the Complaint adds to the third cause of action
allegations that Defendants “failed to warn plaintiff of said dangerous,
defective and/or unsafe condition on said premises although said defendants,
and each of them, knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care, should have known
of said dangerous condition” (Complaint, ¶ 32), the factual grounds for
pleading premises liability and negligence in the Complaint are the same.
(Compare Complaint, ¶¶ 22-24, with ¶¶ 29, 31.)
The Court recognizes that negligence and premises liability
claims are partly based on different elements that must be established to show
the violation alleged. (See Opp’n, 6:2-8.) However, the jury instructions are virtually
identical, save for the addition of the element that the defendant owned/leased/occupied/or
controlled the land. (Compare CACI Jury
Instruction 400 with 1000.) In Parth, the claims for breach of governing
documents and breach of fiduciary duty also involved somewhat different elements,
and the breach of governing documents claim still nevertheless failed where the
injury to the pleading party in that claim was based on the same facts alleged in
the breach of fiduciary duty claim. (Palm Springs Villas II Homeowners
Assn., Inc. v. Parth, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 277.)
Last, though a pleading may state alternative or even
inconsistent legal theories (Rader Co. v. Stone (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d
10, 29; see Opp’n, 8:2-15), where one of those legal theories “adds nothing to
the complaint by way of fact or theory of recovery,” a demurrer may properly be
sustained, without leave to amend, as to that claim. (Rodrigues v. Campbell
Industries, supra, 87 Cal.App.3d at p. 501.)
Universal City’s demurrer to the third cause of action is
thus SUSTAINED, Without Leave to Amend.
II. Primary Rights
Based on the foregoing discussion, the Court need not reach
the primary rights arguments advanced in the Demurrer. (Demurrer, 6:9-25; see Opp’n,
6:26-7:27; Reply, 4:1-5:4)
Defendant Universal City Studios LLC’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s
Complaint is SUSTAINED, Without Leave to Amend, as to the Complaint’s third
cause of action for Negligence-Premises Liability.
Plaintiff is granted 14 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND the Complaint to
state either the negligence or premises liability claim, but not both,
consistent with the Court’s discussion ante.