Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 21STCV21246, Date: 2024-02-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV21246    Hearing Date: March 11, 2024    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

I. Pleadings

A. Pleadings

Plaintiff S.C., by and through his guardian ad litem, Sergio Cardenas Sr. (S.C.’s father), sues Defendants County of Los Angeles (L.A. County) through its Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), College Hospital, Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD), ABC Unified School District (ABC Unified), William Gee (Gee), and Does 1 through 10 pursuant to an October 23, 2023 First Amended Complaint (FAC).

This action, as framed by the initial June 7, 2021 Complaint, was removed to federal court on or around August 3, 2021 and was remanded from federal court on August 18, 2023. While LAUSD argues that this is the third amended pleading in the actions between the parties, the Court refers to the operative pleading in this state action as the FAC.

The operative FAC alleges claims of (1) Negligence against Defendants L.A. County and Does 1 through 10, (2) Negligence against Defendants ABC Unified, Gee, and Does 1 through 10, (3) Negligence against Defendants LAUSD and Does 1 through 10, (4) Negligence against Defendants College Hospital and Does 1 through 10, (5) Violation of California Government Code § 11135 against Defendants L.A. County, College Hospital, ABC Unified, and LAUSD, and (6) Violation of California Education Code §§ 200, 220 against Defendants ABC Unified and LAUSD.

The claims arise from the following and other allegations contained in the FAC. Since age two, S.C. has been under the supervision of one or more of the Defendants. S.C. has relied upon the agencies of California including the child welfare system, social service agencies, and educational institutions for his care, to keep him safe from harm, and to provide developmental, educational, and disability services.

Defendants’ collective actions caused S.C. to be placed in fifteen inappropriate foster care placements, and sixteen of the most restrictive psychiatric placements. While at these placements. S.C. frequently ran away, resulting in physical injuries and emotional distress, sexual assault of S.C. once during his care, and once during an elopement from care. Each loss of placement and each restrictive psychiatric placement resulted in the deterioration of S.C.’s mental health and further institutionalization.

Defendants’ collective failures culminated in S.C.’s over three-year abandonment at the locked psychiatric setting of College Hospital at age 15, between October 2017 and February 16, 2021, for the sole reason that each Defendant refused to fund an appropriate therapeutic placement. Specifically, at various Individualized Education Program (IEP) meetings, ABC Unified and Gee refused to make recommendations for educational placement or services for S.C., arguing that LAUSD needed to make those determinations as S.C.’s school district of residence, and LAUSD argued that S.C. was outside of LAUSD’s geographic boundaries and that it would not be responsible for S.C. until he was physically released from College Hospital, thus resulting in S.C.’s long-term abandonment at College Hospital. Both districts also initially refused to fund S.C.’s placement at a Texas county school, with LAUSD later offering to fund the placement if ABC Unified recommended that S.C. be transferred, which ABC Unified refused to do.

In December 2019, S.C. filed an administrative due process complaint with the California Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), which was directed against ABC Unified and LAUSD and sought a determination as to each agency’s responsibilities regarding offering and securing placement for S.C. On July 21, 2020, the OAH found, among other things, that ABC Unified violated S.C.’s rights under the Individual with Disability Education Act by refusing to evaluate and considering S.C.’s educational placement. The OAH ordered ABC Unified to hold an IEP for S.C. within 30 days and that LAUSD need not attend IEP meetings but would need to find S.C. appropriate care after release from College Hospital. ABC Unified and Gee did not comply with the OAH’s orders within the specified 30 days.

At some point after the OAH’s July 21, 2020, order, LAUSD took responsibility for locating a residential treatment for S.C. Thereafter, in October 2020, ABC Unified and Gee held an IEP meeting and offered S.C. a placement in Massachusetts, an offer that ABC Unified forwarded to LAUSD, and which would include intensive mental health and behavioral services for S.C. After various complications arose and were resolved—e.g., College Hospital’s failure to provide a discharge date, thus delaying the placement—in January 2021, S.C. was placed in Massachusetts. There, he has for the first time received 24-hour disability related care and has been stable, safe, and making progress.

S.C.’s special education eligibility ends on June 29, 2024, upon his reaching age 22, at which time S.C. anticipates a return to California, where the South Central Los Angeles Regional Center (SCLARC) is now planning for S.C.’s services and placement needs in anticipation of his return to California.

S.C. claims (1) injuries to his civil rights, denial of access to services, discrimination, exclusion/denial of access to all aspects of society, unjustifiable isolation and segregation, and violations of his rights under the U.S. and California Constitutions, (2) pain and suffering including physical injuries, exacerbation of his condition, causing new disabilities, permanent loss of developmental opportunities and functional impairment, (3) emotional distress in the form of serious emotional distress, trauma, and humiliation, (4) special damages and economic losses including denial of access to his social security income and other public benefits, and (5) loss of earning capacity, loss of future earnings and future medical and mental health costs. S.C. prays for nominal, special, general, and compensatory damages, as well as equitable and injunctive relief tailored to each Defendant.

B. Demurrer by Defendant L.A. County

On December 7, 2023, L.A. County filed a demurrer against the FAC’s first and fifth causes of action as alleged against it.

On February 27, 2024, S.C. filed an opposition to L.A. County’s demurrer.

On March 4, 2024, L.A. County filed a reply to S.C.’s opposition.

L.A. County’s demurrer is now before the Court.

II. Demurrer

A. Legal Standard

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747; see Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) This device can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) To sufficiently allege a cause of action, a complaint must allege all the ultimate facts—that is, the facts needed to establish each element of the cause of action pleaded. (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 212, superseded by statute as stated in Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235, 242.) Thus, “[t]o survive a [general] demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) In testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-67.) A demurrer, however, “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228, disapproved on other grounds, Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1162.) The face of the complaint includes exhibits attached to the complaint. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.) If facts appearing in the exhibits contradict those alleged, the facts in the exhibits take precedence. (Holland v. Morse Diesel Intern., Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1447, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in White v. Cridlebaugh (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 506, 521.)

B. Demurrer, FAC, First Cause of Action, Negligence: OVERRULED.

1. Relevant Law

“‘The elements of a cause of action for negligence are … “(a) a legal duty to use due care;¿(b) a breach of such legal duty;¿[and] (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.”’” (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917, citations omitted.)

A public entity cannot be held directly liable for a common law tort. (Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 899, citing Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a).) This includes a claim for abuse of process. (Yee v. Superior Court (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 26, 33.) However, pursuant to Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (a), a “public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee.” (Ibid.)

Moreover, in the absence of an explicit provision of statutory liability against a public entity, a plaintiff can pursue a claim that the entity failed to perform a mandatory duty imposed on it by law. Section 815.6 provides that “[w]here a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment … the public entity is liable for an injury … proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty ….” The enactment at issue must be “obligatory, rather than merely discretionary or permissive … [i.e.,] it must require rather than merely authorize or permit that a particular action be taken or not taken.” (Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 498.) “It is not enough, moreover, that the public entity or officer have been under an obligation to perform a function if the function itself involves the exercise of discretion.” (Id.)

In turn, Government Code section 820.2 provides that “a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.” An exercise of discretion within the meaning of section 820.2 means a “conscious balancing of risks and benefits.” (Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972, 983 (Caldwell).) Where “individual [government employees] will be making assessments of the situation and of the relevant considerations and dangers in determining the best outcome”, the actions are discretionary. (Recchia v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Animal Services (9th Cir. 2018) 889 F.3d 553, 564.)

Government Code section 821.6 provides that “[a] public employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously or without probable cause.” Section 821.6 is not limited to conduct occurring during formal proceedings. “[I]t also extends to actions taken in preparation for formal proceedings. Because investigation is ‘an essential step’ toward the institution of formal proceedings, it is also cloaked with immunity.” (Javor v. Taggart (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 795, 808 (Javor), disapproved on other grounds in Leon v. County of Riverside (Jun. 22, 2023) 14 Cal.5th 910, 931 (Leon) [disapproved string of case law including Javor that went contrary to the interpretation that section 821.6 is limited to protecting public employees from liability only for the initiation or prosecution of an official proceeding].) The policy behind section 821.6 is to encourage state employees to investigate and prosecute matters “without fear of reprisal from the person or entity harmed thereby. Protection is provided even when official action is taken maliciously and without probable cause.” (Shoemaker v. Myers (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1424.) “Although section 821.6 primarily has been applied to immunize prosecuting attorneys and similar individuals, the section is not restricted to legally trained personnel but applies to all employees of a public entity.” (See Lawrence v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 513, 526.)

2. Analysis

The FAC’s first cause of action alleges negligence against L.A. County and Does 1 through 10 pursuant to allegations located at paragraphs 54-120, 191-193, and 201-203 of the FAC. Those paragraphs allege that the County, through DCFS, owed various duties of care to juvenile dependents in its charge, and that the County, through DCFS, “has a history of placing S.C. without providing him with specialized supports and with caregivers, group homes and institutionalized settings that were not equipped or specially trained to meet his individual needs”—e.g., placing S.C. in fifteen inappropriate foster care placements, and sixteen of the most restrictive psychiatric placements, and subsequently placing S.C. at College Hospital Cerritos, where S.C. languished for over three years before being placed in a Massachusetts care facility—thus causing emotional distress and other injuries to S.C. The claim premises liability against L.A. County under Government Code sections 815.2 and 815.6, based on breaches of mandatory duties owed to S.C. by the County through the conduct of DCFS and other personnel. (FAC, ¶¶ 54-120, 191, 193, 201-203, 204-226 [statutory scheme at ¶ 214, specific breaches of mandatory duties at ¶¶ 215-217 under specific statutory schemes].)

In its demurrer, L.A. County argues that the FAC fails to allege breach of a specific mandatory duty pursuant to Government Code section 815.6, for which reason the negligence claim fails. L.A. County also argues that it is entitled to immunity pursuant to Government Code sections 820.2 and 821.6. (Demurrer, pp. 4-7.)

In opposition, Plaintiff S.C. argues that the first cause of action sufficiently alleges alternate liability premised on Government Code sections 815.2 and 815.6. Plaintiff S.C. also argues that section 821.6 immunities do not apply to a section 815.2 claim, that the FAC does not allege a basis to find that section 820.2 and 821.6 immunities exist, and that 820.2 immunity is the exception to the rule, which should not be applied here based on a comparison of the FAC’s allegations and various authorities. (Opp’n, pp. 4-12.)

In reply, L.A. County argues that no liability is stated pursuant to Government Code section 815.2 where the FAC merely alleges a vague statutory scheme that does not identify with reasonable particularity the facts supporting a violation of the specified obligatory statutes, ordinances, policies, and regulations. L.A. County also argues that the statutes identified in the opposition do not impose mandatory duties on L.A. County, as supported by various cited authorities, thus undercutting liability pursuant to section 815.6.

The Court finds in favor of SC.

First, at the least, the FAC alleges vicarious liability of certain Division 31 Regulations imposing a mandatory duty. (FAC, ¶¶ 217-217(l).) This is because social workers “do not have discretion regarding compliance with regulations” by not complying with the minimum standards required by those regulations, e.g., monthly home visits to children in foster care. (Scott v. County of Los Angeles (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 125, 144 (Scott).) The Court notes that although Scott involved a total omission (making monthly visits) rather than negligence in making those visits, for the purposes of the sufficiency of the first cause of action, the Court is satisfied that Scott stands for the proposition that a social worker does not have the discretion to act below the minimum standard of care imposed by applicable regulations. The FAC pleads this type of failure by alleging DCFS’s employee(s) failure to abide by a minimum standard of care imposed by regulations applicable to S.C. The Court notes that L.A. County’s reply does not address Scott at all, merely focusing on the “statutory scheme” argument in the opposition. (Reply, p. 2.) The negligence claim thus sufficiently arises from allegations of section 815.2 vicarious liability against L.A. County through, at the very least, the cited conduct by DCFS.

The Court therefore need not discuss liability pursuant to section 815.6.

Second, immunity pursuant to Government Code section 821.6 is not applicable where Scott—an authority not distinguished in the reply, as discussed above—held that “a county and its employees are not immune under Government Code sections 815.2 and 821.6 for negligence in the performance of … functions” “performed by a [public agency] pursuant to [its applicable statutory regulatory framework].” (Scott, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 135.)

Moreover, the claim involves breaches of various regulations, not all of which arise from allegations that can be construed as the initiation or prosecution of an official proceeding, undercutting the applicability of this immunity defense to various portions of the first cause of action. (Leon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 931.)

Third, immunity pursuant to Government Code section 820.2 is inapplicable where a review of the FAC as a whole alleges a string of placements by L.A. County that were harmful to S.C. and do not rise to a “conscious balancing of risks and benefits” of the duties owed to Plaintiff S.C. as a charge of the County. (Caldwell, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 983; FAC, ¶¶ 54-120, 191, 193, 201-203, 204-226.)

Last, even if the FAC states improper bases for liability for negligence against L.A. County, there are some proper bases for liability alleged, as discussed above. For this reason, the Court cannot sustain a demurrer to the first cause of action assuming, arguendo, those deficiencies exist. (Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1047 [“A demurrer cannot rightfully be sustained to part of a cause of action or to a particular type of damage or remedy]; see Code Civ. Proc., § 430.50, subd. (a) [A demurrer can be made to an entire complaint or individual causes of action therein]; Pierson v. Sharp Memorial Hospital, Inc. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 340, 342 [A motion to strike is generally used to reach defects in a pleading that are not subject to demurrer].)

L.A. County’s demurrer to the first cause of action is thus OVERRULED.

C. Demurrer, FAC, Fifth Cause of Action, Violation of California Government Code § 11135: SUSTAINED, with leave to amend.

Plaintiff S.C. concedes the fifth cause of action is not sufficiently stated against Defendant L.A. County (Opp’n, p. 16), thus MOOTING the analysis of the demurrer as to this claim. The Court will accordingly SUSTAIN the demurrer as to this claim. 

III. Conclusion

Defendant County of Los Angeles’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint [CRS# 4712] is OVERRULED in part and SUSTAINED in part as follows:

(1) OVERRULED as to the First Amended Complaint’s first cause of action; and

(2) SUSTAINED, with leave to amend, as to the First Amended Complaint’s fifth cause of action insofar as it relates to the County of Los Angeles.