Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 21STCV44036, Date: 2024-11-13 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 40 - JUDGE ANNE RICHARDSON - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
The Court issues tentative rulings on certain motions.The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) email Dept 40 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (smcdept40@lacourt.org) with a copy to the other party(ies) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no email is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. 




Case Number: 21STCV44036    Hearing Date: November 13, 2024    Dept: 40

21STCV44036 Lazaro Cid and Maria Cidl v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

Wednesday, November 13, 2024 at 8:30 a.m.

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

 

I.        BACKGROUND

       The third amended complaint alleges that Defendant issued a written warranty to Plaintiffs pertaining to Plaintiffs’ purchase of a 2018 Honda Odyssey vehicle that subsequently developed defects in various systems.  Plaintiffs allege that Defendant failed to comply with its obligations under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (the “SBA”). The parties settled this action on April 23, 2024.

       Plaintiffs request a fee award of $70,203 enhanced by a 1.35 multiplier (+$24,571.05), $1,191.88 in costs and expenses and an additional $4,000 to review the opposition to this motion and prepare a reply brief. Plaintiffs accepted a Code Civ. Proc., § 998 offer for repurchase of the vehicle for $90,000 but rejected the $30,000 offer for attorney’s fees. Plaintiffs assert they are prevailing parties entitled to statutory attorney’s fees and costs.

       In opposition, Defendant argues that the court should reduce the fees to $16,717.50 for the entire case given that the case was straightforward, involved little substantive legal work and basic discovery. Plaintiffs rely on templated discovery requests.

       In reply, Plaintiffs argue that the billing records are presumed credible, and Defendant’s speculation is insufficient to rebut the credibility of the records. The requested award is not unreasonably excessive.

II.   DISCUSSION

A.      Objections

       The court overrules Defendant’s objections to Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice of other court records showing the results of fee applications. The court is entitled measure and compare attorneys’ fees with what other attorneys with similar experience and ability has charged for the same services. (Shaffer v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 993, 1002.)

       The court does not consider Defendant’s objections to the declaration of Christian Castro that recite the events that resulted in Plaintiffs’ filing of this action. The court has not considered the declaration as none of it is relevant to the court’s determination of a reasonable fee.

       Defendant’s objections to the declaration of Payam Shahian, Plaintiffs’ counsel’s managing partner, are overruled. Mr. Shahian attests to the work done, the experience and background of each timekeeper, and the authenticity of the billing records, which are all relevant factors that the court must consider and are expressly based on personal knowledge.

       Plaintiffs’ objections to the declaration of opposing counsel, Kevin D. Zipser, are sustained as to #1 and #2. Counsel’s opinions on what transpired are irrelevant. The court considers evidence relevant to all of the factors necessary to consider an appropriate fee award. Objections #3 and #4 are overruled, as defense counsel’s statements and accompanying spreadsheet are relevant the court’s determination of a fair and reasonable fee award.

B.   Analysis

       A prevailing buyer in an action under the SBA “shall be allowed by the court” to recover the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, “including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794 subd.(d).) A prevailing buyer has the burden of showing that the fees incurred were allowable, reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.
(Pulliam v. HNL Automotive Inc. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 396, 405.) The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work. (Id.)

       Ultimately, the trial court “is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in its court” and its determination will not be disturbed unless it is “clearly wrong.” (Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1134.)

       A reasonable fee can be measured by the marketplace by analyzing the quality and necessity of services and then comparing that cost with what other attorneys with similar experience and ability charge for the same services. (Shaffer v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 993, 1002.) In “lemon law” cases, the court applies the lodestar method in calculating attorney’s fees, including the use of fee multipliers where applicable. (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 818.) The court determines a lodestar figure “based on a careful compilation of the actual time spent and reasonable hourly compensation for each attorney.” (Robertson at 819.)

       The lodestar may be augmented or diminished “by taking various relevant factors into account including (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; and (3) the contingent nature of the  fee award, based on the uncertainty of prevailing on the merits and of establishing eligibility for the award.” (Robertson at 819.) The multiplier is a risk enhancement based on the probability of loss. (Robertson at 821.)  

       The court has considered the foregoing factors and finds that this action did not concern novel or complex issues and does not warrant a lodestar enhancement. Accordingly, the request for a 1.5 multiplier is DENIED.

       The prevailing party is entitled to “’compensation for all the hours reasonably spent‘ in litigating the action to a successful conclusion. (Ibid., italics in original.) “Reasonably spent” means that time spent in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 394.)

       The court may rely on his or her own experience and is given broad discretion in calculating reasonable attorney’s fees. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132 ["The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.”])

       The court has considered all of the relevant factors including the nature of the case, which in the court’s view did not involve novel or difficult questions of law and resolved with some dispositive motion practice, although most of the motions were motions in limine.  The court also considers the outcome of the case, which resulted in a monetary settlement for repurchase of the vehicle.

       The court has considered the billing record, the declarations of counsel, and justification for their hourly rates. The court finds that a number of the itemized tasks are unreasonable, inefficient, and at times duplicative among the numerous individuals who worked on this case. Plaintiffs’ counsel is entitled to reasonable compensation; however, “‘padding’ in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation." (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

        The Court is permitted to make “across the board cuts and apply a negative multiplier” where it determines that the case was not complex. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 41 [permitting a negative multiplier of 33% to the lodestar fee request of $351,055.26, resulting in a fee award of $115,848.24].)

       Proper factors to consider in applying a negative reduction are the lack of complexity, that the matter did not go to trial, that name partners were doing work that could have been done by lower-billing attorneys, and that all the attorneys were doing work that could have been done by paralegals, thus applying a 39% reduction in the lodestar. (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 41.) These factors are applicable here and warrant reduction.

       The procedure for obtaining costs is governed by California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700, which requires service and filing of a cost memorandum, ordinarily within 15 days from entry of judgment. (CA ST CIVIL RULES Rule 3.1700.) However, the premature filing of a cost memorandum is a “mere irregularity at best.” (Pamela W. v. Millsom (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 950, 952). The court will consider the request for costs pursuant to a cost memorandum, which gives opposing counsel the opportunity to challenge the request if necessary. (CA ST CIVIL RULES Rule 3.1700.)

 

IV.    CONCLUSION

       Based on the foregoing, the court awards reduced fees of $56,161.43. The court also awards additional fees of $1,980.00 ($495 x 4 hours) incurred to prepare this motion, review the opposition, prepare a reply brief and to appear.