Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 21STCV44036, Date: 2024-11-13 Tentative Ruling
DEPARTMENT 40 - JUDGE ANNE RICHARDSON - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
The Court issues tentative rulings on certain motions.The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) email Dept 40 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (smcdept40@lacourt.org) with a copy to the other party(ies) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no email is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call.
Case Number: 21STCV44036 Hearing Date: November 13, 2024 Dept: 40
21STCV44036
Lazaro Cid and Maria Cidl v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
[TENTATIVE] ORDER
I.
BACKGROUND
The third amended
complaint alleges that Defendant issued a written warranty to Plaintiffs
pertaining to Plaintiffs’ purchase of a 2018 Honda Odyssey vehicle that
subsequently developed defects in various systems. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant failed to
comply with its obligations under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (the
“SBA”). The parties settled this action on April 23, 2024.
Plaintiffs request a
fee award of $70,203 enhanced by a 1.35 multiplier (+$24,571.05), $1,191.88 in
costs and expenses and an additional $4,000 to review the opposition to this
motion and prepare a reply brief. Plaintiffs accepted a Code Civ. Proc., § 998
offer for repurchase of the vehicle for $90,000 but rejected the $30,000 offer
for attorney’s fees. Plaintiffs assert they are prevailing parties entitled to
statutory attorney’s fees and costs.
In opposition,
Defendant argues that the court should reduce the fees to $16,717.50 for the
entire case given that the case was straightforward, involved little
substantive legal work and basic discovery. Plaintiffs rely on templated
discovery requests.
In reply, Plaintiffs
argue that the billing records are presumed credible, and Defendant’s
speculation is insufficient to rebut the credibility of the records. The
requested award is not unreasonably excessive.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Objections
The court overrules Defendant’s
objections to Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice of other court records
showing the results of fee applications. The court is entitled measure and compare
attorneys’ fees with what
other attorneys with similar experience and ability has charged for the same
services. (Shaffer v. Superior Court (1995)
33 Cal.App.4th 993, 1002.)
The court does not consider Defendant’s objections to the
declaration of Christian Castro that recite the events that resulted in
Plaintiffs’ filing of this action. The court has not considered the declaration
as none of it is relevant to the court’s determination of a reasonable fee.
Defendant’s objections
to the declaration of Payam Shahian, Plaintiffs’ counsel’s managing partner, are
overruled. Mr. Shahian attests to the work done, the experience and background
of each timekeeper, and the authenticity of the billing records, which are all
relevant factors that the court must consider and are expressly based on
personal knowledge.
Plaintiffs’ objections
to the declaration of opposing counsel, Kevin D. Zipser, are sustained as to #1
and #2. Counsel’s opinions on what transpired are irrelevant. The court
considers evidence relevant to all of the factors necessary to consider an
appropriate fee award. Objections #3 and #4 are overruled, as defense counsel’s
statements and accompanying spreadsheet are relevant the court’s determination of
a fair and reasonable fee award.
B. Analysis
A
prevailing buyer in an action under the SBA “shall be allowed by the court” to
recover the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, “including attorney’s fees
based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably
incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of
such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794 subd.(d).) A prevailing buyer
has the burden of showing that the fees incurred were allowable, reasonably
necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.
(Pulliam v. HNL Automotive Inc. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th
396, 405.) The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the
community for similar work. (Id.)
Ultimately, the trial court “is the best
judge of the value of professional services rendered in its court” and its
determination will not be disturbed unless it is “clearly wrong.” (Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79
Cal.App.4th 1127, 1134.)
A reasonable fee can be measured by the
marketplace by analyzing the quality and necessity of services and then
comparing that cost with what other attorneys with similar experience and
ability charge for the same services. (Shaffer v. Superior Court (1995)
33 Cal.App.4th 993, 1002.) In “lemon law” cases,
the court applies the lodestar method in calculating attorney’s fees, including
the use of fee multipliers where applicable. (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006)
144 Cal.App.4th 785, 818.) The court determines a lodestar figure
“based on a careful compilation of the actual time spent and reasonable hourly
compensation for each attorney.” (Robertson at 819.)
The lodestar
may be augmented or diminished “by taking various relevant factors into account
including (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the
skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the
litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; and (3) the contingent
nature of the fee award, based on the uncertainty of prevailing on
the merits and of establishing eligibility for the award.” (Robertson at 819.) The multiplier is a risk
enhancement based on the probability of loss. (Robertson at 821.)
The
court has considered the foregoing factors and finds that this action did not
concern novel or complex issues and does not warrant a lodestar enhancement.
Accordingly, the request for a 1.5 multiplier is DENIED.
The
prevailing party is entitled to “’compensation for all the hours reasonably
spent‘ in litigating the action to a successful conclusion. (Ibid.,
italics in original.) “Reasonably spent” means that time spent in the form of
inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 394.)
The
court may rely on his or her own experience and is given broad discretion in
calculating reasonable attorney’s fees. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24
Cal.4th 1122, 1132 ["The experienced trial
judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his
court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be
disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.”])
The court has considered all of the
relevant factors including the nature of the case, which in the court’s view did
not involve novel or difficult questions of law and resolved with some
dispositive motion practice, although most of the motions were motions in
limine. The court also considers the
outcome of the case, which resulted in a monetary settlement for repurchase of
the vehicle.
The
court has considered the billing record, the declarations of counsel, and
justification for their hourly rates. The court finds that a number of the
itemized tasks are unreasonable, inefficient, and at times duplicative among
the numerous individuals who worked on this case. Plaintiffs’ counsel is
entitled to reasonable compensation; however, “‘padding’ in the form of
inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation." (Ketchum v. Moses (2001)
24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)
The Court is permitted to make “across the
board cuts and apply a negative multiplier” where it determines that the case
was not complex. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 41
[permitting a negative multiplier of 33% to the lodestar fee request of
$351,055.26, resulting in a fee award of $115,848.24].)
Proper
factors to consider in applying a negative reduction are the lack of
complexity, that the matter did not go to trial, that name partners were doing
work that could have been done by lower-billing attorneys, and that all the
attorneys were doing work that could have been done by paralegals, thus
applying a 39% reduction in the lodestar. (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America
(2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 41.) These
factors are applicable here and warrant reduction.
The procedure for obtaining
costs is governed by California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700, which requires
service and filing of a cost memorandum, ordinarily within 15 days from entry
of judgment. (CA ST CIVIL RULES Rule 3.1700.) However, the premature
filing of a cost memorandum is a “mere irregularity at best.” (Pamela W. v. Millsom (1994) 25
Cal.App.4th 950, 952). The court will consider the request for
costs pursuant to a cost memorandum, which gives opposing counsel the
opportunity to challenge the request if necessary. (CA
ST CIVIL RULES Rule 3.1700.)
IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the
foregoing, the court awards reduced fees of $56,161.43. The court also awards
additional fees of $1,980.00 ($495 x 4 hours) incurred to prepare this motion,
review the opposition, prepare a reply brief and to appear.