Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 22STCV04358, Date: 2023-09-08 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 40 - JUDGE ANNE RICHARDSON - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
The Court issues tentative rulings on certain motions.The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) email Dept 40 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (smcdept40@lacourt.org) with a copy to the other party(ies) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no email is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. 

Case Number: 22STCV04358    Hearing Date: February 27, 2024    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

Background

Pleadings

Plaintiff Karyna Myres brings this habitability suit against Defendants (1) Ernst Hacker, (2) Kape Property Management, Inc. (Kape Property Management), (3) Doe 1 Tamir Hacker, as Successor Co-Trustee of the Survivor’s Trust established under The Hacker Family Trust dated March 24, 1988, and as Successor Trustee of Survivor’s Trust established under the Ernst Hacker and Bila Hacker Trust, restated March 16, 2012, (4) Doe 2 Ronen Hacker, as Successor Co-Trustee of the Survivor’s Trust established under The Hacker Family Trust dated March 24, 1988, (5) Doe 3 Adi Samuel Hacker, as Successor Co-Trustee of the Survivor’s Trust established under The Hacker Family Trust dated March 24, 1988, (6) Doe 4 Niza Hacker, as Successor Trustee of the Ernst Hacker Survivor’s Trust, and (7) Does 5-100.

The operative February 3, 2022 Complaint alleges ten claims against all Defendants: (1) Nuisance; (2) Breach of Contract; (3) Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (4) Negligence; (5) Breach of Statutes; (6) Breach of Warranty of Habitability; (7) Breach of the Covenant Quiet Enjoyment; (8) Constructive Eviction; (9) IIED; and (10) NIED.

The claims arise from allegations that, in February 2020, while a tenant of a residential apartment unit located at 718 North Hayworth Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90046 (Subject Premises), apparently unlicensed contractors performed construction and demolition work on the unit adjacent to Plaintiff Myres’s unit, which caused portions of the ceiling in her unit to collapse, with debris at one point falling on her head, causing Plaintiff injuries and leading to a diagnosis of post-concussion syndrome. The claims also arise from allegations of ongoing harassment by Defendants’ agents—including allegations of unpaid rent by Defendants’ agents and threats to Plaintiff’s person by construction workers—and allegations that the construction and demolition work caused a gas leak at the Subject Premises, leading SoCal Gas to deem the Premises uninhabitable in December 2020, and forcing Plaintiff to move out of her unit.

Motion Before the Court

On December 22, 2023, Kape Property filed a motion to provide undertaking pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1030 on the grounds that Plaintiff Myres is a resident of the State of Nevada and Kape Property can show a reasonable probability of prevailing on the merits.

On February 14, 2024, Plaintiff Myres opposed Kape Property’s motion.

On February 20, 2024, Kape Property replied to Plaintiff’s opposition.

Kape Property’s motion is now before the Court.

Evidentiary Objections

Plaintiff Myres’ Objections to Motion’s Evidence

Objection Nos. 1-6: OVERRULED [No. 1, see Section I, Incorporation discussion below; Nos. 2-6 [personal knowledge; relevance].

No objections sustained.

Motion for Undertaking, Out-of-State Resident

I.

Incorporation of Summary Judgment Motion

California courts have determined the incorporation by reference to papers previously filed is proper in connection to summary judgment and attorney’s fees motions. (Id. at pp. 291-292 [In “the summary judgment context, … courts have long held that documents incorporated by reference are before the court. (See Newport v. Los Angeles (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 229, 234 …] [‘[We must not only look to the face of the affidavit but … must also examine the documents in the file which it incorporates, for it has long been established in this state that an affidavit may incorporate by reference other papers on file in the same action’]; see also Larsen v. Johannes (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 491, 496 …] [‘The notice of motion indicated reliance upon all the files in this action, and the pleadings incorporating the documentation[;] [t]his was sufficient to bring them before the court’]; but see Truslow v. Woodruff (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 158, 164-165 …].) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c now expressly contemplates incorporation by reference in summary judgment papers. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (b)(7).) We see no reason why incorporation by reference would be any less appropriate for a fee motion.”].)

As summarized by the court of appeal:

“Turning to the previously filed documents, we agree the trial court erred in refusing to consider them. Rule 3.1110 addresses the general format for motions. As noted ante, rule 3.1110(d) states that ‘[a]ny paper previously filed must be referred to by date of execution and title.’ Rule 3.1113 provides rules for the memorandum in support of the motion, and rule 3.1113(j) states that ‘[t]o the extent practicable, all supporting memorandums and declarations must be attached to the notice of motion.’ Consistent with these rules, a litigant may incorporate previously filed documents and, where practicable, should file them with the motion. But a litigant is not required to do so absent a rule precluding incorporation by reference. (Cf. rule 3.1345(a) & (c) [requiring separate statement for certain discovery motions and stating ‘[m]aterial must not be incorporated into the separate statement by reference’].)” (Roth v. Plikaytis (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 283, 291 (Roth), footnotes omitted.)

Pursuant to Roth, the Court determines that incorporation by reference is proper in the context of a motion for undertaking pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1030.

However, the Court notes that the standards at issue between a summary judgment motion and this motion are somewhat different. (Compare Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 [triable issues, prima facie standard], with Shannon v. Sims Service Center, Inc. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 907, 913 (Shannon) [reasonable possibility of success on merits].) The summary judgment motion determines whether competing evidence shows triable issues of fact for trial, while a motion for undertaking under section 1030 determines whether substantial evidence supports one party’s reasonable possibility of prevailing on the merits.

II.

Legal Standard

“The purpose of [Section 1030] is to enable a California resident sued by an out-of-state resident to secure costs in light of the difficulty of enforcing a judgment for costs against a person who is not within the court’s jurisdiction.” (Alshafie v. Lallande (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 421, 428.)

Where a plaintiff in an action resides out of the state, the defendant may, at any time, apply to the court for an order requiring the plaintiff to file an undertaking to secure an award of costs and attorney’s fees which may be awarded in the action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1030, subd. (a).)

The motion shall be made on grounds that the plaintiff resides out of the state and there is a reasonable possibility that the moving defendant will obtain judgment in their favor. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1030, subd. (b).)

The motion shall be accompanied by an affidavit in support of the grounds for the motion and setting forth the nature and amount of costs and attorney’s fees the defendant has incurred and expects to incur until the action is concluded. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1030, subd. (b).) The motion must also be accompanied by points and authorities. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1030, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113, subd. (a).)

If the motion is granted, the plaintiff shall file the undertaking no later than 30 days after service of the court’s order requiring it, and if plaintiff fails to file the undertaking within the time allowed, the plaintiff’s action shall be dismissed as to the moving defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1030, subd. (d).)

III.

Order Granting Undertaking: GRANTED.

A. Residency of Non-Movant

A defendant’s “domicile” is the place where she resides with the intent to remain indefinitely. (Noble v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 560, 568.) However, for section 1030 purposes, “residing without the state” refers to actual residence rather than domicile. (Myers v. Carter (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 622, 626.) A person thus may have more than one residence at a time but only one domicile. (See Black’s Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019).)

The finding by the trial court on the question of fact of nonresidence of plaintiff for purposes of security of costs cannot be disturbed on appeal. (See, e.g., Wall v. Hunter (1922) 57 Cal.App. 759, 761.)

Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff Myres lives in Henderson, Nevada. (Mot., Becker Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. B [at Response to Form Interrogatory No. 2.5, identifying Henderson, Nevada as city of present residence]; see Opp’n, pp. 4-9 [basing opposition arguments on reasonable probability of prevailing on merits without discussing residence].)

The first component necessary for section 1030 relief is thus present here.

B. Reasonable Possibility of Prevailing on Merits

To succeed on its motion, a defendant is not required to show there is no possibility the plaintiff can win at trial, or that it is reasonably likely that the defendant will prevail, only that it is reasonably possible that the defendant will win. The court must determine whether there is substantial evidence to support such a determination. (Baltayan, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1432-1433 (Baltayan); see, e.g., Shannon, supra, 164 Cal.App.3d at p. 911 [“Appellant’s claim herein essentially challenges the sufficiency of the evidence,” for which reason the “court’s task is simply to determine whether any substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination”]; see, e.g., Baltayan, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 1433 [arbitration award and evidence support trial court’s determination that respondents had reasonable probability of winning at trial]; Kourtis v. Cameron (2009) 359 Fed.Appx 863, 867 [“At least a reasonable possibility of prevailing was established by the district court’s determination in a prior suit brought by the Kourtises’ hired screenwriter that ‘no reasonable factfinder could find that [the screenplay based on the Kourtises’ concept] and “Terminator 2” are substantially similar under federal copyright law[]’ Green v. Schwarzenegger, 1995 WL 874191, at *1, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14031, at *2 (C.D.Cal. July 17, 1995)[]”].)

Plaintiffs can oppose a motion for security on the grounds that, for example:

(1) Proof that the plaintiff is not a nonresident (see Section III.A. discussion supra);

(2) Showing the plaintiff’s indigency (Code Civ. Proc., § 995.240); and 

(3) Arguing the defendant’s failure to make an adequate prima facie showing of a reasonable possibility of success in the action. 

A plaintiff can also challenge the amount of the costs and attorney fees requested by the defendant. The security can be ordered only for “reasonable” costs, and the defendant must be otherwise entitled to recover those fees by contract or by another statutory provision. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1030, subd. (a).)

1.

Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Causes of Action [Breach of Contract; Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; Breach of Warranty of Habitability; Breach of the Covenant Quiet Enjoyment; Constructive Eviction]

The parties dispute whether substantial evidence supports a reasonable possibility of Kape Property prevailing on the Complaint’s breach of contract claims. (Mot., p. 10.)

The Court finds in favor of Kape Property.

“A contract is a voluntary and lawful agreement, by competent parties, for a good consideration, to do or not to do a specified thing.” (Robinson v. Magee (1858) 9 Cal. 81, 83.) “To prevail on a cause of action for breach of contract, the plaintiff must prove (1) the contract, (2) the plaintiff’s performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damage to the plaintiff.” (Richman v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186.) Implicit in the element of damage is that the defendant’s breach caused the plaintiff’s damage.” (Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1352, italics omitted.)

Kape Property refers to evidence showing that the only rental agreement at issue exists between Defendant Ernst Hacker and Plaintiff Myres, which was attached to the Becker Declaration in support of the motion, Ex. A, MSJ Points and Authorities (P&As), citing MSJ, Separate Statement (Sep. St.), Undisputed Material Facts (UMF) Nos. 1, 6, 8-9; see also MSJ, pp. 15-16 [breach of implied covenant, third cause of action], 18-19 [warranty of habitability confined to Ernst Hacker], 20 [constructive eviction, only Ernst Hacker was landlord], 21 [quiet enjoyment falls on Erns Hacker or Kape Property complied with obligations or was not informed of defects it needed to conform], citing, in relevant part, Mot., Compendium of Evidence (Comp. Evid.), Ex. 1, Complaint, ¶ 11 [Lease with Ernst Hacker and Plaintiff alone], & Ex. 3, Srolovitz Decl., ¶ 4 [Ernst Hacker agreed that he would retain duty of habitability over Kape Property].)

A review of that evidence shows a Lease entered by Plaintiff and Defendant Hacker in 2013 and Kape Property being initially hired in February 2020 to manage repairs and to field resident complaints. (MSJ, Comp. Evid., Ex. 1, Complaint, ¶ 11 [lease entered in 2013 between Plaintiff and Defendant Ernst Hacker] & Ex. 3, Srolovitz Decl., ¶¶ 3, 7 [prima facie evidence of oral agreement between Kape Property and Ernst Hacker for ongoing property management]; see Mark Tanner Constr., Inc. v. HUB Int’l Ins. Servs. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 574, 586 [statements in an opponent’s pleadings are treated as judicial admissions].)

A review of the second cause of action—the breach of contract claim from which many express and implied contractual obligations spring—shows references to the “Lease” (Complaint, ¶¶ 60-63(e)), which the Complaint defines as being entered in 2013 by Plaintiff and Ernst Hacker alone (Complaint, ¶¶ 11, 60 [incorporation]), years prior to Kape Property’s first foray into the world of facts alleged in the pleadings before the Court (MSJ, Comp. Evid., Ex. 3, Srolvoitz Decl., ¶¶ 3, 7).

On this showing, there is, for the strict purposes of section 1030 of the Code of Civil Procedure, substantial evidence of the possibility that Kape Property will prevail on the breach of contract claims based on the argument that the agreement alleged in the Complaint is not enforceable against Kape Property.

Plaintiff’s opposition argument is not entirely clear. (Opp’n, p. 6 [arguing that breach of contract claim against Kape Property is a nuisance claim but failing to explain how such a claim is not duplicative of the first cause of action for nuisance].) While Plaintiff argues that discovery is in its early stages, the Lease is the specific ground for the breach of contract theory against Kape Property (Complaint, ¶ 61), and the pleadings themselves appear to show that, even if Kape Property is alleged as an agent, partner, or joint venture of the other Defendants, Kape Property was not a signatory to the Lease in 2013 or at any specified time thereafter. (See, e.g., Complaint, ¶¶ 3, 10, 27-28, 47.)

While the Complaint alleges that Defendants in this action were the “[a]gent, servant, employee, partner, joint venture, or surety of the other Defendants,” neither party other than cursorily and conclusorily (as to evidence v. ultimate facts in pleadings alone, like a demurrer) addressed this argument in their papers, for which reason the Court similarly does not address the same. (See Opp’n, p. 1 [Representation that discovery as to whether “Defendants are jointly and severally liable” has not yet taken place, in unsworn points and authority, where no declaration from counsel is attached to the opposition]; In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413 [“the unsworn statements of counsel are not evidence”]; South Sutter, LLC v. LJ Sutter Partners, L.P. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 634, 668, fn. 14 [unsworn arguments of counsel in a legal memorandum are not evidence].)

2.

First Cause of Action, Nuisance

“Given ‘the broad definition of nuisance,’ the independent viability of a nuisance cause of action ‘depends on the facts of each case.’ (El Escorial Owners’ Assn. v. DLC Plastering, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1348[] … [(El Escorial)].) ‘Where negligence and nuisance causes of action rely on the same facts about lack of due care, the nuisance claim is a negligence claim.’ (Id. at p. 1349[] ….) The nuisance claim ‘stands or falls with the determination of the negligence cause of action’ in such cases. (Pamela W. v. Millsom [(1994)] 25 Cal.App.4th [950,] 954, fn. 1[] ….)” (Melton v. Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521, 542 (Melton).)

Here, the negligence claim does not allege specific factual grounds to support the claim, instead incorporating prior allegations to support the negligence claim. (Complaint, ¶¶ 68-71.) With a liberal view of the pleadings, it is clear the nuisance claim can be incorporated in full by claiming breaches of duties under the Lease based on “employing unlicensed contractors to perform unpermitted demolition and other work at the Property, and by repeatedly failing to rectify reported gas leaks at the Property and the Premises, thereby creating, and thereafter failing and refusing to immediately and effectively address and ameliorate following actual notice and knowledge, substandard, hazardous and unlivable conditions at the Premises that were in violation of California law as well as the terms, covenants, and conditions of the Lease.” (Complaint, ¶¶ 55, 68.)

The first cause of action is essentially a negligence claim that depends on the sufficiency of the negligence allegations, which are in fact pleaded in the first cause of action and incorporated into the fourth cause of action. (Complaint, ¶¶ 54-59, 68-71.)

After review, the Court finds in favor of Kape Property.

As discussed in Section III.B.3. below, Kape Property shows a reasonable possibility of succeeding on the merits of the negligence claim for section 1030 purposes.

Based on the above authority and reasoning, the same result applies to the nuisance claim. (Melton, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 542, citing El Escorial, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 1348; see Section III.B.3. discussion infra.)

3.

Fourth Cause of Action, Negligence

“‘The elements of a cause of action for negligence are … “(a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.”’” (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917.)

The Complaint’s negligence claim does not allege specific factual grounds to support the claim, instead incorporating prior allegations to support the negligence claim. (Complaint, ¶¶ 68-71.) The first cause of action alleges nuisance based on Defendants “employing unlicensed contractors to perform unpermitted demolition and other work at the Property, and by repeatedly failing to rectify reported gas leaks at the Property and the Premises, thereby creating, and thereafter failing and refusing to immediately and effectively address and ameliorate following actual notice and knowledge, substandard, hazardous and unlivable conditions at the Premises that were in violation of California law as well as the terms, covenants, and conditions of the Lease.” (Complaint, ¶ 55.) This allegation is incorporated into the fourth cause of action. (Complaint, ¶ 68.)

After review, the Court finds in favor of Kape Property

As discussed above in Section III.B.1, the evidence favors Defendant Kape Property’s possible success on the merits of the second and third causes of action, the allegations for which are incorporated into the fourth cause of action. (Complaint, ¶¶ 60-63(e), 64-67, 68.)

Moreover, Kape Property is only once alleged to have hired contractors in relation to the Premises (Complaint, ¶ 9), and Kape Property presents evidence to show that it did not, in fact, have the authority to hire any of the contractors alleged in the Complaint (MSJ, p. 23, citing to MSJ, Sep. St., UMF No. 13, citing in turn Mot., Comp. Evid., Srolovitz Decl., ¶¶ 5-11 [only Ernst hired construction workers; Kape Property had no authority over work by contractors].)

As to the alleged gas leaks (see Complaint, ¶ 55), Kape Property provides evidence to show that it was never notified of the gas leak smell in the Premises, for which reason any duty to act it may have had in this action was never triggered. (MSJ, p. 17, citing Mot., Sep. St., UMF Nos. 21-23, citing in turn Mot., Comp. Evid., Ex. 2, Becker Decl., ¶¶ 2-3 [authenticating Exs. 1-2] & Ex. 3, Srolovitz Decl., ¶¶ 16-18, Sub-Ex. 2 [explanation from Kape Property and supporting email evidence to show no notice of gas leak to Kape Property by Plaintiff Myres].)

The Court has discussed the “partnership,” “joint venture,” and similar allegations above and adopts that discussion here to determine those allegations do not undercut Kape Property’s reasonable possibility of success for section 1030 purposes in relation to this claim. (See Section III.B.1 discussion supra.)

The Court notes that even if Kape Property has acknowledged the foreseeability of damages to a tenant arising from a property manager’s conduct, such an acknowledgement is not an admission of a duty between the parties so much as a general statement of conditions between manager and tenant.

4.

Ninth Cause of Action, IIED

“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.’ A defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ And the defendant’s conduct must be ‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051.)

After review, the Court adopts its discussion as to Sections III.B.1-3 above to determine that the breach of Lease and gas leak allegations supporting the IIED claim have been examined above, and the Court has determined that Kape Property has shown a reasonable possibility of success on the merits for 1030 purposes on those claims.

As, in essence, a derivative claim (Complaint, ¶¶ 96-99), the Court applies the same reasoning to the ninth cause of action.

5.

Tenth Cause of Action, NIED

Regarding whether NIED is an independent cause of action, it “is already the law in California” that “there is no duty to avoid negligently causing emotional distress to another, … that damages for emotional distress are recoverable only if the defendant has breached some other duty[] [Citations[]],” and that the “tort is negligence, a cause of action in which a duty to the plaintiff is an essential element. (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 984-985; see id. at p. 985 [“[U]nless the defendant has assumed a duty to plaintiff in which the emotional condition of the plaintiff is an object, recovery is available only if the emotional distress arises out of the defendant’s breach of some other legal duty and the emotional distress is proximately caused by that breach of duty. Even then, with rare exceptions, a breach of the duty must threaten physical injury, not simply damage to property or financial interests. [Citations.]”].)

The Court applies the same reasoning as Section III.B.4. above to determine that Kape Property has a reasonable possibility of prevailing on the similarly derivative NIED claim. (Complaint, ¶¶ 100-102.)

In the alternative, the Court notes that the Kape Property also makes a valid argument that bystander emotional damages are not available if the plaintiff is not physically injured, and here, while the Complaint alleges physical damages (see, e.g., Complaint, ¶¶ 38, 57(c)), the Court’s discussion in Sections III.B.1-4 above show those damages may be more closely related to Ernst Hacker than to Kape Property as to support a NIED claim. (See Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 879 [negligent mishandling of corpses]; Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1980) 27 Cal.3d 916, 923 [the negligent misdiagnosis of a disease that could potentially harm another]; Burgess v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1076). (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1076 [negligent breach of duty arising out of a preexisting relationship].)

6.

Fifth Cause of Action, Breach of Statutes

The Complaint’s fifth cause of action alleges breaches of Civil Code sections 1941 and 1941.1 and Health and Safety Code 17920.3 against all Defendants based on incorporated allegations. (Complaint, ¶¶ 72-79.)

The lessor of a building intended for the occupation of human beings must, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, put it into a condition fit for such occupation, and repair all subsequent dilapidations thereof, which render it untenantable, except such as are mentioned in section nineteen hundred and twenty-nine. (Civ. Code, § 1941.)

A dwelling shall be deemed untenantable for purposes of Section 1941 if it substantially lacks certain enumerated affirmative standard characteristics or is a residential unit described in Section 17920.3 or 17920.10 of the Health and Safety Code. (Civ. Code, § 1941.1, subd. (a).)

The Court finds in favor of Kape Property.

The Court adopts the discussion in Section III.B.1 above to determine that because substantial evidence shows the lack of a Lease agreement between Kape Property and Plaintiff Myres, there is substantial evidence that the landlord-tenant relationship needed for Civil Code sections 1941 and 1941.1 and Health and Safety Code sections 17920.3 and 17920.10 does not exist.

Conclusion

Defendant Kape Property Management, Inc.’s Motion for Undertaking Pursuant to C.C.P. § 1030 in the Amount of $24,845 is GRANTED.

Plaintiff Karyna Myres is ORDERED to file the undertaking no later than 30 days after service of the Court’s order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1030, subd. (d).)

If Plaintiff fails to file the undertaking within the time allowed, the plaintiff’s action shall be dismissed as to Defendant Kape Property Management, Inc. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1030, subd. (d).)