Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 22STCV05119, Date: 2023-10-09 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 40 - JUDGE ANNE RICHARDSON - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
The Court issues tentative rulings on certain motions.The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) email Dept 40 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (smcdept40@lacourt.org) with a copy to the other party(ies) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no email is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. 

Case Number: 22STCV05119    Hearing Date: October 9, 2023    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

Background

Plaintiff Raul Rullan sued Defendants Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC, Galpin Jaguar Lincoln, Inc., and Does 1 through 50 pursuant to a February 9, 2022 Complaint alleging three California Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (SBA; lemon law) claims.

On March 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed a notice of settlement with the Court.

On March 28, 2023 the Court set an Order to Show Cause hearing (OSC) re Dismissal (Settlement) for June 13, 2023.

On June 13, 2023, the Court continued the OSC to August 9, 2023.

On August 2, 2023, Plaintiff moved for attorney’s fees and costs in this action.

On August 9, 2023, the Court continued the OSC to October 9, 2023.

On September 26, 2023, Defendants opposed Plaintiff’s motion.

On September 29, 2023, Plaintiff replied to the opposition.

Plaintiff Rullan’s motion for attorney’s fees is now before the Court.

Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs

Legal Standard 

A prevailing party is entitled to recover costs as a matter of right. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subds. (a)(4), (b).) Attorney’s fees are also recoverable as costs when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).) A prevailing buyer in a Song-Beverly Act action is entitled to recover their attorney’s fees and costs under the Act’s express terms. (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d); see Goglin v. BMW of North America, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 462, 464, 471.)

The Court begins this inquiry “with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) From there, the “lodestar figure may then be adjusted [according to a multiplier enhancement] based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (Ibid.) Relevant multiplier factors include “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

No specific findings reflecting the court’s calculations for attorney’s fees are required; the record need only show that the attorney’s fees were awarded according to the “lodestar” or “touchstone” approach. (Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1344, 1349, disagreed with on other grounds in In re Marriage of Demblewski (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 232, 236, fn. 7 [disagreement as to statement of decision requirements].) The Court has broad discretion to determine the amount of a reasonable attorney’s fee award, which will not be overturned absent a “manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence.” (Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1393-1394.)

Order Granting Attorney’s Fees and Costs: GRANTED.

Plaintiff seeks an order awarding him $35,446 in attorney’s fees and $1,322.56 in costs as a prevailing buyer in this SBA action. (See Mot., p. 9; see also Mot., Notice, p. 1.)

I. Reasonable Fee Rate

Plaintiff seeks fee rates of $695 per hour for counsel Michael Saeedian, $425 per hour for counsel Chistopher Urner, and $250 per hour for law clerk Jorge Acosta. Plaintiff supports his request by filing a declaration from Mr. Saeedian, who provides a brief academic and professional background for Messrs. Saeedian, Urner, and Acosta. The Saeedian declaration also supports the requested fee rates by referencing the Laffey Matrix. (Mot., p. 5; Mot., Saeedian Decl., ¶¶ 2-5, 11-12.)

In opposition, Defendants argue that a flat rate of $430 to $450 per hour should be assigned to Plaintiff’s counsel. (The Court briefly notes that Defendants appear to direct this argument at counsel Saeedian alone because the fee rates sought by Plaintiff for counsel Christopher Urner and law clerk Jorge Acosta are smaller than the rate proposed by Defendants.) Defendants rely on a Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey Report to support this fee range. (Opp’n, p. 5.)

In reply, Plaintiff argues that the Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey Report is six years old and outdated and otherwise supports his requested fee rates. (Reply, pp. 1-2.)

The Court finds in favor of Plaintiff.

The rate of $695 per hour for Mr. Saeedian appears reasonable based on comparable fee rates in the Los Angeles area and based on Mr. Saeedian’s 14 years’ experience as an attorney. (Mot., Saeedian Decl., ¶¶ 2-3.) Defendants make insufficient arguments to justify a position that Mr. Saeedian’s fee rate should be reduced based on substandard performance or other metrics meriting such a reduction.

Because the rates requested for Messrs. Urner and Acosta were not challenged by Defendants, the Court accepts fee rates of $425 per hour and $250 per hour for these individuals, as supported by the Saeedian declaration. (Mot., Saeedian Decl., ¶¶ 4-5.)

II. Reasonable Hours

Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to all costs and expenses (including fees) expended by counsel up through a determination on this motion. The Saeedian declaration attaches verified billing records showing that Plaintiff’s requested fees of $35,446 are supported by 65.9 hours expended by counsel in this action. (Mot., pp. 7, 8-9; Mot., Saeedian Decl., Ex. A.)

Defendants argue that recovery for certain hours should be prohibited or reduced. Defendants argue that the fees sought by Plaintiff are unreasonable based on a comparison of Plaintiff’s requested fees and Defendants’ own legal fees, which amount to $9,896.54. Defendants also argue that the hours are excessive for an action with no depositions, no law and motion, no expert designations or depositions, and no trial preparation. More specifically, Defendants attack the amounts billed by Plaintiff’s counsel in relation to filing the Complaint, “rote” discovery served on Defendants, discovery responses made by Plaintiff, time spent by counsel reviewing discovery, drafting meet and confer letters, preparing a mediation brief, and hours expended by counsel after a settlement was reached by the parties, including the filing of this motion. (Opp’n, pp. 5-8.)

In reply, Plaintiff supports each category of challenged hours. Plaintiff does not seek any adjustment to recovery based on the hours expended on reply work for this motion. (Reply, pp. 2-10; Reply, Urner Decl., ¶ 6.)

The Court finds in favor of Plaintiff Rullan.

The Court’s review of the verified billing records shows that the hours expended by counsel were reasonable as set forth in those records. (See Mot., Saeedian Decl., Ex. B; see also Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 397 [“[T]rial court abused its discretion in rejecting wholesale counsels’ verified time records” where “verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous”].)

III. Multiplier enhancement

No multiplier enhancement award is sought by Plaintiff Rullan, for which reason the Court does not further discuss this topic. (See Opp’n, p. 8 [arguing that the Court should deny any multiplier enhancement].)

IV. Costs

Plaintiff Rullan attaches a memorandum of costs to his attorney’s fees motion, which seeks $1,322.56 in costs related to this action. The costs relate to “filing the complaint, service of process, and electronic filing of documents and motions.” (Mot., pp. 7-8; Mot., Saeedian Decl., ¶ 19, Ex. B [memo of costs].)

Defendants’ opposition does not mention costs, instead solely seeking to reduce the requested fees by $14,926. (See Opp’n, p. 8.)

Accordingly, the Court accepts the costs represented by Plaintiff, which are reasonable based on their small amount in relation to this litigation, which was settled approximately one year after Defendants were served with the Complaint.

V. Total Award

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff Rullan’s motion and AWARDS him $35,446 in attorney’s fees and $1,322.56 in costs, for a total recovery of $36,768.56. 

Conclusion

Plaintiff Raul Rullan’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees for Time Actually Expended and Reasonably Incurred [and Costs] is GRANTED in the amount of $36,768.56.

Defendants Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC and Galpin Jaguar Lincoln, Inc. are jointly and severally ORDERED to remit these fees and costs to Plaintiff Raul Rullan within 30 days of this ruling.

The Court will set an OSC re: dismissal of this action at a time convenient to both parties.