Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 22STCV05593, Date: 2023-12-04 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 40 - JUDGE ANNE RICHARDSON - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
The Court issues tentative rulings on certain motions.The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) email Dept 40 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (smcdept40@lacourt.org) with a copy to the other party(ies) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no email is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. 

Case Number: 22STCV05593    Hearing Date: December 4, 2023    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

Background

Plaintiff Laura Gonzalez sues Defendants Maria Rosario Villagrana (individually and as Successor Trustee of the Jose G. Gonzalez Living Trust dated December 18, 2006), Jaime Villagrana (spouse of Maria Villagrana), and all other persons claiming title to Plaintiff’s title to the real property otherwise known as 12136 Lowemont Street, Norwalk, CA 90650 (Subject Property) pursuant to an July 25, 2023 Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleging claims of (1) Declaratory Relief for Equitable Reimbursement on Real Property, and (2) Unjust Enrichment.

The claims arise from allegations that Maria Villagrana obtained deeds conveying the Subject Property from Jose Gonzalez (Maria’s deceased father and Laura’s deceased husband, who purchased and secured the Subject Property as sole and separate property prior to marrying Laura) to Maria as Maria’s sole and separate property, thus denying Laura of the community property interest she gained in the Subject Property prior to Jose’s death on February 28, 2021. Due to the grant deeds transferring the Property to Defendant, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant steps in the shoes of Jose Gonzalez and takes the Property subject to Plaintiff’s Reimbursement rights. The Court may refer to the parties by their first names for ease of reference only, no disrespect is intended.

On July 6, 2023, the Court sustained Defendant’s demurrer to the First Amended Complaint with leave to amend only insofar as a new reimbursement claim may be filed in this action.

On July 25, 2023, Plaintiff filed the operative SAC.

On August 25, 2023, Defendant filed the instant demurrer to the SAC with motion to strike.

On November 13, 2023, Plaintiff opposed the motion. On November 27, 2023, Defendant replied.

Request for Judicial Notice

The Court TAKES Judicial Notice of the deeds, substitution of trustee documents, and the Court’s July 6, 2023 minute order filed by Plaintiff in opposition to the demurrer, as attached to the SAC. (Opp’n, RJN, pp. 1-3; see SAC, Exs. A-H; see also Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (c), 453.)

Demurrer

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF FOR EQUITABLE REIMBURSEMENT ON REAL PROPERTY: OVERRULED.

The Court determines that Plaintiff withstands the demurrer on her first claim for declaratory relief.

Defendant argues that there is no independent claim that may be asserted against her or the real property. Defendant states that the only two people who could be parties to this cause of action for equitable reimbursement are Plaintiff and her husband Jose Gonzalez and that there is nothing in the holdings or reasoning of In re Marriage of Moore (1980) 28 Cal.3d 366, 371-372 (Moore) nor In re Marriage of Marsden (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 426, 437 (Marsden) which suggests that anyone other than the spouse owes the other spouse reimbursement of community funds used to pay for a separate property asset. Defendant asserts that equitable reimbursement is a family court claim supported by family law cases only.

            Additionally, Defendant states that Plaintiff’s claim for reimbursement was personal to Jose Gonzalez and is now time-barred because it was not brought against his estate within one year of his death pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 366.2.

            In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s interpretation of the law is incorrect because if there had been a divorce between Plaintiff and Jose after 25 years of marriage as opposed to Jose passing away February 28, 2021, Plaintiff would have been able to make a claim to the Property in the family law Court. Plaintiff argues that she should not be denied an ownership interest in the Property simply because she is now a widow.

            Plaintiff claims she has a valid claim for declaratory relief as she has set forth facts showing the existence of an actual controversy relating to the rights and duties of the respective parties in the situations provided in Code of Civil Procedure Section 1060 and requests that these rights and duties be adjudged by the court. Plaintiff argues that Defendant has failed to cite any legal authority specifically barring Plaintiff’s declaratory relief action.

            In reply, Defendant points out that there is no law that allows a Court to order a third-party to pay the debt owed by Plaintiff’s deceased husband or any law that makes real property subject to spousal reimbursement after the spouse lawfully transferred the property. Further, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to overcome the following: (1) Moore/Marsden is a Family Court holding for calculating how much money one spouse owes another spouse; it does not authorize family court spousal reimbursement claims against third parties (such as Defendant) in civil court; (2) Plaintiff has no right to an equitable lien against the property itself, only against the person that owes her for the reimbursement; and (3) Plaintiff’s claim is time-barred by the applicable Statute of Limitations.

            Code of Civil Procedure section 1060 provides that a person may bring an action for declaratory relief if he or she “desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another, or in respect to, in, over or upon property . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.) To state a declaratory relief claim, the plaintiff must allege a proper subject of declaratory relief and an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to the party’s rights or obligations. (See Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 872, 909.) 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that an actual controversy exists between Plaintiff and Defendant and a question has arisen as to whether Plaintiff is entitled to seek reimbursement of community property assets by way of an equitable lien on the subject real property, or whether Defendant is entitled to a 100% full ownership interest in the property. (Compl. ¶¶ 5-7, 26-30.) The Court finds these allegations to be sufficient to state a declaratory relief cause of action against Defendants. Although Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to provide any case authority allowing recovery of spousal reimbursement from third parties, the Court finds that the Moore/Marsden line of cases may support Plaintiff’s alleged reimbursement rights to the Property via equitable lien.

The Court finds Code of Civil Procedure section 366.2 inapplicable in this context. That statute by its language presumes the existence of a cause of action against a decedent before he dies, and provides a statute of limitations that will apply to his estate upon his death. Here, by contrast, Plaintiff had no basis for a claim against her husband or his estate until the property actually passed upon his death. Even if she had learned about the language of the trust years in advance in which he signalled his intent to pass the property to his daughter, he could have changed his mind; and in any event she would have suffered no damage until the transfer actually occurred.

Though not cited by either party, the court finds the case of Patrick v. Alacer Corp. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1326 (“Patrick”) to be instructive. That case involved the calculation of a wife’s community property interest in a business founded by her husband, who died while the parties were married. While the court there was dealing with the calculation of a community interest in a business along the lines of Pereira v. Pereira (1909) 156 Cal. 1 and Van Kamp v. Van Kamp (1921) 53 Cal.App. 17, the Court finds it equally relevant and helpful for a calculation of a community property interest in a property per Moore/Marsden, supra. The court there rejected the argument that plaintiff’s declaratory relief cause of action was time barred under Code of Civil Procedure section 366.2 or other statutes. Rather, the court found that, as a claim requesting a determination of the rights of ownership in community property under Family Code section 1101, there was no statute of limitations other than laches. (Patrick, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1336-1337.)

The court in Patrick also rejected the argument made by the defendant there and here that the declaratory relief claim is barred by the failure to file a timely creditor’s claim in probate. (Id. at p. 1338-1339.) There, as here, without a dissolution, “plaintiff could not enforce her community interest against [husband] before his death,” and plaintiff had a present existing interest in community property, not a mere money claim; whereas creditor’s claims must be filed for “debts or demands against the decedent as might have been enforced against him in his lifetime by personal actions for the recovery of money and upon which only a money judgment could have been rendered.” (Id.at p. 1338 [cleaned up].) Thus, the court in that case held that no creditor’s claim was necessary for plaintiff to pursue her declaratory relief claim to determine her community property interest in her deceased husband’s business. (Id. at p. 1339.)

Accordingly, the demurrer to the first cause of action for declaratory relief is OVERRULED. 

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT: SUSTAINED.

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff cannot state a claim for unjust enrichment because there was nothing unjust that occurred. Defendant states that Jose lawfully transferred his home to his Trust in 2006, and the Trust thereafter lawfully transferred the Property to Defendant. Indeed, Plaintiff concedes that she is neither a trustee nor beneficiary of the Trust, which means the Property never would have become hers even if had not been transferred prior to her husband’s death.

Plaintiff argues that she has a valid claim for unjust enrichment on account of the fact that Defendant is seeking a 100% ownership interest of the Property at the expense of Plaintiff’s equitable reimbursement lien. Plaintiff argues that Jose cannot grant 100% of the Property to Defendant due to Plaintiff’s equitable reimbursement lien on the Property and that Defendant must take the Property subject to said lien.

In reply, Defendant argues that since Jose lawfully transferred his separate Property to his Trust in 2006, and the Trust thereafter lawfully transferred the Property to Defendant, the Property never would have become Plaintiff’s even if had not been transferred prior to her husband’s death. Thus, nothing unjust occurred and she cannot maintain her claim for unjust enrichment.

In California, there is no cause of action for unjust enrichment. (See Rutherford Holdings LLC v. Plaza Del Rey (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 221, 231; Levine v. Blue Shield of California (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1138.) While unjust enrichment is not a cause of action, courts have stated that unjust enrichment is synonymous with restitution and allowed recovery where the plaintiff asserts a proper basis for recovering restitution. (See Durrell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1370; McBride v. Boughton (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 379, 387-88.) Such bases include quasi-contract, fraud, duress, conversion, or similar conduct. (See Durrell, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at 1370; McBride, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at 387-88.)  

However, here, the Court has already sustained a demurrer as to the original complaint. The Court sustained the demurrer as to the first two causes of action and allowed the Plaintiff leave to amend the third, for declaratory relief. “Following an order sustaining a demurrer . . . with leave to amend, the plaintiff may amend his or her complaint only as authorized by the court’s order.” (Harris v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023.) “The plaintiff may not amend the complaint to add a new cause of action without having obtained permission to do so, unless the new cause of action is within the scope of the order granting leave to amend.” (Ibid.) Here, the new cause of action is not within the scope of the order granting leave to amend.

Accordingly, the demurrer to the second cause of action for unjust enrichment is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. No new causes of action should be added to the complaint without filing a motion for leave to amend.

Motion to Strike

            Defendant requests that the Court strike the following allegations from the SAC:

Paragraph 5(f): Defendant … seeks 100% ownership interest in the Property.

Paragraphs 6, 7, 17, 21, 22, 23, 29, 30, 32, 34(b), Prayer for Relief Number 3.

Paragraph 32: “In addition, community funds were used to pay property taxes and

insurance on the Property.”

Defendant points out in her reply that Plaintiff failed to oppose the motion to strike.

            Despite the lack of opposition, the Court independently reviewed the paragraphs and portions thereof cited above. Given the Court’s ruling above that Plaintiff properly maintains at least her claim for declaratory relief regarding the property, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to strike in full. 

Conclusion

 Defendant Maria Rosario Villagrana’s Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint is OVERRULED as to the first cause of action, and SUSTAINED as to the second cause of action without leave to amend. No new causes of action should be added to the complaint without filing a motion for leave to amend.