Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 22STCV08893, Date: 2024-05-17 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 40 - JUDGE ANNE RICHARDSON - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
The Court issues tentative rulings on certain motions.The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) email Dept 40 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (smcdept40@lacourt.org) with a copy to the other party(ies) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no email is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. 

Case Number: 22STCV08893    Hearing Date: May 17, 2024    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

I. Background

A. Pleadings

Plaintiff Sashae Garcia sues Defendant Molina Healthcare, Inc. (MHI), Marlene Grosch, and Does 1-20 pursuant to a March 14, 2022, Complaint alleging claims of (1) Discrimination on the Basis of Medical Condition and/or Disability in Violation of FEHA, (2) Retaliation for Complaining of Discrimination on the Basis of Medical Condition and/or Disability in Violation of FEHA, (3) Failure to Prevent Discrimination and Retaliation in Violation of FEHA, (4) Failure to Accommodate, (5) Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process, (6) Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy, and (7) Violation of California Labor Code Section 203 (Waiting Time Penalties).

The claims arise from the following allegations. Around November 2014, MHI hired Plaintiff to work as a clerk. Around 2018, Plaintiff was promoted to the position of coordinator. Throughout Plaintiff’s employment, MHI was aware that Plaintiff had mental health disabilities and suffered from bipolar disorder. To that end, Plaintiff needed accommodations from time to time to take care of her mental health, including requesting medical leave. Plaintiff was on medical leave from on or around August 25, 2021, to January 20, 2022. On or around January 4, 2022, a mere 16 days prior to her scheduled return, MHI claimed that it could no longer hold Plaintiff’s position until her return on January 20, 2022, and informed Plaintiff that it had backfilled her position. MHI then terminated Plaintiff’s employment on January 6, 2022, despite the absence of any hardship in keeping the position open, and in retaliation against Plaintiff due to her taking disability and request for reasonable accommodations by way of taking medical leave.

Furthermore, Plaintiff claims MHI failed to engage in a good faith interactive process and failed to provide reasonable accommodations by failing to offer or give Plaintiff her position back, failing to offer or provide Plaintiff with any comparable or equivalent positions, and failing to provide Plaintiff preferential consideration for other vacant comparable positions.

Last, at the time of Plaintiff’s termination, MHI failed to provide all wages due, including her unused vacation and PTO hours.

B. Motion Before the Court

On March 1, 2024, MHI filed a motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of the FAC’s seven claims.

On May 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition to MHI’s motion.

On May 10, 2024, MHI filed a reply to Plaintiff’s opposition.

MHI’s motion is now before the Court.

II. Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication: GRANTED in part; DENIED in part.

A. Legal Standard

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact for trial or that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A party may also seek summary adjudication of select causes of action, affirmative defenses, claims for damages, or issues of duty, which may be made by a standalone motion or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and proceeds in all procedural respects like a motion for summary judgment, but which must completely dispose of the challenged cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for damages, or issue of duty. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (f)(1)-(2), (t).) The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make prima facie showing no triable material fact issues. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) This burden on summary judgment or adjudication “is more properly one of persuasion rather than proof, since he must persuade the court that there is no material fact for a reasonable trier of fact to find, and not to prove any such fact to the satisfaction of the court itself as though it were sitting as the trier of fact.” (Id. at p. 850, fn. 11.) If the moving party meets this burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a rebuttal prima facie showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Id. at p. 849.) “[I]n ruling on motions for summary judgment courts are to ‘“liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”’ [Citations].” (Cheal v. El Camino Hospital (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 736, 760.)

B. Analysis

1. FAC, First Cause of Action, Discrimination on the Basis of Medical Condition and/or Disability in Violation of FEHA: DENIED.

a. Relevant Law

California courts apply the burden-shifting formula set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792, 802, under which a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing: (1) that he or she was a member of a protected class, (2) that he or she was qualified for and performing competently in the position she held, (3) that he or she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) conduct by the employer suggesting that it is more likely than not that the adverse employment action was due to a discriminatory motive. (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355.) It is sufficient to show that one of the employer’s motives was to discriminate, even if the employer had other lawful motives in causing the adverse employment action. (University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar (2013) 570 U.S. 338, 343.) If the plaintiff establishes this prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption of discrimination by offering a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. (Ibid.) If the employer meets this burden, the presumption of discrimination disappears, and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence that the employer’s reasons for the adverse employment action were a mere pretext for discrimination. (Id. at p. 356.)

“On a defense motion for summary judgment against a disparate treatment claim, the defendant must show either that one of these elements cannot be established or that there were one or more legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons underlying the adverse employment action.” (Jones v. Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1379.)

b. Court’s Determination

The Court finds in favor of Plaintiff Garcia.

The first cause of action alleges FEHA discrimination based on Plaintiff’s mental condition and disability (bipolar disorder), MHI’s knowledge thereof, and disparate treatment (termination) based on that condition, resulting in harm to Plaintiff. (FAC, ¶¶ 6-10, 11-17.)

In its motion, MHI argues that evidence attached to the moving papers shows a lack of triable issues as to the first cause of action for two reasons: (1) evidence shows Plaintiff was unable to perform her job duties at all relevant times; and (2) evidence shows MHI had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to terminate Plaintiff’s employment, i.e., Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s doctor failed to provide any kind of return date for Plaintiff, MHI incurred temporary worker costs beyond budget based on Plaintiff’s absence, Plaintiff’s absence impacted Plaintiff’s team at MHI, and MHI’s corporate leadership decided in December 2021 to no longer authorize the use of temporary workers business-wide, not solely as to Plaintiff’s position. (Mot., pp. 17-20, citing FAC, ¶¶ 11-17 [first cause of action] & Mot., Separate Statement (Sep. St.), Undisputed Material Fact (UMF) Nos. 34-38, 41 [legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for termination], 46-50, 52-53 [unable to perform job duties].)

No objections to this evidence appear in the record.

The Court’s review of UMF Nos. 34-38 and 41 shows references to the declarations of Marlene Grosch (Supervisor Utilization Management II / Manager, Healthcare Services at MHI) (UMF Nos. 34-36), Nicole Considine (Director, Employee Relations at MHI) (UMF Nos. 37-38), and Sharon Medellin (counsel for MHI) (UMF Nos. 41).

The declaration of Marlene Grosch is cited for the purpose of showing evidence that Plaintiff had engaged in a pattern of extended leaves of absence without properly submitting medical documents in support of her leave and that those leaves increased the burden on Plaintiff’s team and left MHI unsure as to its staffing needs. (Mot., Grosch Decl., ¶¶ 9-10.)

The declaration of Nicole Considine is cited for the purpose of showing evidence that Plaintiff’s absence caused MHI to go over budget on replacement worker costs, that hiring a replacement worker for Plaintiff cost more than $107.60 per day, and that MHI’s corporate leadership decided to phase out temporary workers companywide in December 2021. (Mot., Considine Decl., ¶¶ 5-7.)

The declaration of Sharon Medellin is cited for the purpose of showing Plaintiff’s termination letter and its content, as confirmed by business records served by MHI on Plaintiff’s counsel. (Mot., Medellin Decl., ¶ 24, Ex. 22.)

The Court concludes that for summary judgment/adjudication purposes, this evidence carries MHI’s burden of showing a lack of triable issues as to a legitimate, non-pretextual reason for Plaintiff’s termination: MHI exceeding its replacement worker budget, with Plaintiff on an undetermined leave of absence and MHI eliminating replacement worker positions, thus necessitating that Plaintiff’s position be backfilled prior to her return.

In turn, the Court’s review of UMF Nos. 46-50 and 52-53 show references to doctor’s notes from Plaintiff’s doctor indicating that she was “unable to work” or “unable to perform her job duties” between August 25, 2021, to January 20, 2022. The evidence also refers to Plaintiff’s deposition testimony where she testified to never correcting her doctor’s assessment to MHI or Matrix (the leave request system), to not being sure why she did not do so, and to the fact that her doctor never identified any modifications that would allow Plaintiff to perform her job duties prior to her return date in January 2022.

A review of the UMF Nos. 46-50 evidence confirms the attachment of the four referenced doctor’s notes or certifications detailing Plaintiff’s inability to work or perform her job duties, with no qualifications to those statements indicating a partial ability to perform job duties. (Mot., Medellin Decl., Exs. 3 [8/26/21 note], 18 [12/21/21 note], 23 [10/16/21 certification form], 24 [12/21/21 certification form].)

 A review of the UMF Nos. 51-52 evidence shows Plaintiff testified that she did not inform MHI or Matrix that her doctor’s notes were incorrect as to her ability to work, that Plaintiff does not know why she did not correct this misunderstanding, and that none of her doctor’s notes indicated she was able to return to work with modifications. (Mot., Medellin Decl., Ex. 14, 70:2-13 [never informed MHI of disagreement with doctor’s assessment; did not raise disagreement with doctor either; not sure why did not raise disagreement], 144:4-14 [doctor did not identify modifications that would have allowed Plaintiff to perform job, and Plaintiff recalls no conversations with doctor regarding this issue].)

The Court concludes that for summary judgment/adjudication purposes, this evidence shows a prima facie lack of triable issues regarding the second element of this claim: Plaintiff’s (in)ability to perform the job.

Either of these grounds carries MHI’s burden.

The burden thus shifts to Plaintiff.

In response to UMF Nos. 34-38 and 41 re: the alleged legitimate, non-pretextual reason for terminating Plaintiff’s employment—high replacement worker cost to employer and staffing needs—Plaintiff cites various pieces of evidence to show that Shawn Bastian—the replacement worker hired to perform Plaintiff’s job during her absence in late 2021—rarely ever worked overtime, completed his job on time, had time to help other departments, and was paid $22 per hour, only a few dollars more than Plaintiff, who was paid $19.55 per hour. The evidence also represents MHI as a company earning net income of $1.8 million per year, such that the difference between Plaintiff’s wages and Mr. Bastian’s pay only amounted to $19.60 per day, a negligible difference. (Opp’n, Sep. St., Responses to UMF Nos. 34.)

The Court’s review of this evidence confirms the proposition for which it stands. (Opp’n, Comp. of Evid., Ex. 9, Responses to FROGs, Nos. 201.5, 201.6(a), (c) [Shawn Bastian performed duties] & Ex. 11, Responses to SROGs, Nos. Nos. 34, 37, 40, 43, 46, 49, at 88-95 [same] & Ex. 12, Responses to RFAs, No. 1 at 104, 142 & Ex. 17, Bastian Depo. 43:9-13, 56:3-16, 70:14-71:12, 73:14-19; at pp. 327-331 [testimony as to Bastian’s duties and work conditions, including hourly wage of $22 per hour]; Mot., Considine Decl., ¶ 6 [Plaintiff’s hourly wage; hourly wage for replacement allegedly $33 per hour].)

No objections were raised to this evidence.

The Court determines that this evidence shows triable issues as to pretext. This is because the difference between what Shawn Bastian testified that he was paid per hour ($22) and Plaintiff’s wage ($19.55 per hour) is not a substantial amount, and Shawn Bastian has testified to having limited duties such that his regular hours did not include regular overtime.

In response to UMF Nos. 46-50 and 52-53, Plaintiff cites to her own deposition testimony to highlight the fact that she testified that she was able to work the essential functions of her job during the time that she was on extended leave in late 2021. (See, e.g., Opp’n, Sep. St., Response to UMF No. 46, citing Opp’n, Comp. Evid., Garcia Depo., 63:19-64:9; 71:21-72:7; 132:6-15, at pp. 237, 241-242, 247.)

The Court determines that this evidence shows triable issues as to ability to perform the essential job functions. Plaintiff’s own deposition testimony explains the state of mind grounds that Plaintiff has for believing she was capable of performing her duties. Though the reply argues that this is self-serving evidence concocted after the fact to create a triable issue, the Court disagrees. Instead, the parties have different pieces of evidence that may show that Plaintiff has acted inconsistently as to her ability to perform her job functions, e.g., taking leave based on the doctor’s notes but failing to inform her employer or doctor that the notes were wrong in stating she could not wholesale perform her job functions (no restrictions in any note). Such evidence can be used for impeachment purposes at trial. But the Court does not weigh the evidence here, instead simply noting evidence exists to support both sides. (Carlsen v. Koivumaki (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 879, 885 [court may not weigh the admitted summary judgment evidence as though sitting as a trier of fact but must determine what any evidence or inference could show or imply to a reasonable trier of fact].) The Court similarly determines that any testimony from Plaintiff to the effect that she remained on leave simply because she was afraid of getting fired is impeachment evidence going to triable issues, not evidence show a lack of triable issues for the purposes of this motion.

Because Plaintiff carries her burden on the first cause of action, summary judgment is DENIED and summary adjudication of the first cause of action is also DENIED.

2. FAC, Second Cause of Action, Retaliation for Complaining of Discrimination on the Basis of Medical Condition and/or Disability in Violation of FEHA:

a. Relevant Law

“[I]n order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FEHA, a plaintiff must show (1) he or she engaged in a ‘protected activity,’ (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the employer’s action.” (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042 [internal citations omitted].) “Once an employee establishes a prima facie case, the employer is required to offer a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action. If the employer produces a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action, the presumption of retaliation ‘“‘drops out of the picture,’” and the burden shifts back to the employee to prove intentional retaliation.” (Ibid.) “The protected activity element may be established by evidence that the plaintiff threatened to file a discrimination charge, by a showing that the plaintiff mistakenly, but reasonably and sincerely believed he was opposing discrimination, or by evidence an employer believed the plaintiff was a potential witness in another employee’s FEHA action.” (Rope v. Auto-Chlor System of Washington, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 635, 652.) “A plaintiff … need only prove that a retaliatory animus was at least a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment decision” to prevail on her claim. (George v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1475, 1492.)

b. Court’s Determination

The Court finds in favor of Plaintiff Garcia.

The second cause of action alleges FEHA retaliation based on Plaintiff Garcia taken medical leave for a mental condition and disability, as a result of which she was ultimately terminated from her employment. (FAC, ¶¶ 6-17, 18-24.)

In its motion, MHI argues that the second cause of action fails on summary judgment or adjudication for two reasons. MHI first contends that there is no evidence for a causal link between Plaintiff’s termination and her need for leave, particularly where MHI has many times before granted leave in favor of Plaintiff, and where MHI worked with Plaintiff to ensure that Plaintiff was informed of the documents that she needed to submit in relation to the requested leave. Second, MHI contends that even if there is a causal link between some protected activity and termination, there was a legitimate, non-pretextual reason for termination, as discussed in relation to the first cause of action.

The Court finds that the latter argument—legitimate, non-pretextual reason for termination—fails on summary adjudication because both parties carried their burden on this issue, as discussed above in relation to the first cause of action.

The Court also relies on the first cause of action discussion above to determine that Plaintiff has shown evidence to support a triable issue of a causal link between her medical condition/disability/leave requests and her termination.

Summary adjudication of the FAC’s second cause of action is thus DENIED.

3. FAC, Third Cause of Action, Failure to Prevent Discrimination and Retaliation in Violation of FEHA: DENIED.

a. Relevant Law

Government Code section 12940(k) provides that it is an unlawful employment practice “[f]or an employer, labor organization, employment agency, apprenticeship training program, or any training program leading to employment, to fail to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring.” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (k).) To establish this claim, a plaintiff must establish the defendant’s legal duty of care, breach of duty, legal causation, and damages to the plaintiff. (See Trujillo v. North County Transit District (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 280, 286-287.)

b. Court’s Determination

Because the first and second causes of action have survived summary judgment and adjudication, the Court DENIES relief as to the FAC’s derivative third cause of action.

4. FAC, Fourth Cause of Action, Failure to Accommodate: DENIED.

a. Relevant Law

Government Code section 12940, subdivision (m) makes it unlawful for “an employer or other [covered] entity … to fail to make reasonable accommodation for the known physical or mental disability of an applicant or employee.” A claim for failure to accommodate requires a showing that (1) plaintiff had a disability, (2) the employer was aware of the alleged disability, and (3) failed to make a reasonable accommodation for plaintiff. (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (m).) Generally, “[t]he employee bears the burden of giving the employer notice of the disability. [Citation.]” (Raine v. City of Burbank (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1222.)

b. Court’s Determination

The Court finds in favor of Plaintiff Garcia.

The FAC’s third cause of action alleges a failure to accommodate Plaintiff’s need for medical leave based on bipolar disorder based on a failure to keep Plaintiff’s position for her return, failing to offer Plaintiff and equivalent or comparable position, and failure to provide preferential consideration for vacant positions. (FAC, ¶¶ 6-10, 33-38.)

In its motion, MHI argues that the fourth cause of action fails on summary adjudication because evidence shows a lack of triable issues as to the facts that: (1) Plaintiff’s medical documentation established she could not perform the essential functions of her job; (2) MHI accommodated Plaintiff’s requests for leaves of absence, using the leave system (Matrix) to request documents supporting leave from Plaintiff prior to denying leave based on lack of proper documentation; and (3) further accommodation was not possible based on hardship to MHI’s business.

The Court has discussed the first and third of these points in relation to the first cause of action—triable issues as to ability to perform job functions and hardship to business—and found that relief is not merited as to those points. Conflicting evidence as to whether Plaintiff recognized her own responsibility in her employment termination does not eliminate the fact that Plaintiff has advanced evidence to show a prima facie case for these issues. Instead, conflicting evidence goes to impeachment or other purposes that involve weighing evidence, which is not the purpose of this motion.

As to point (2)—MHI accommodated the leave requests by having Plaintiff submit documents using Matrix only for Plaintiff to file deficient documentation, resulting in denial of leave, and ultimately, her termination—the Court finds that MHI carries its burden.

MHI presents undisputed evidence showing that Plaintiff has admitted that MHI accommodated her by placing her on ADA leave from August 25, 2021, to November 16, 2021. (Mot., p. 23, citing Mot., Sep. St., UMF No. 14; see Opp’n, Sep. St., Response to UMF No. 14 [undisputed].) MHI also presents evidence to show that in response to Plaintiff requesting further leave through December 21, 2021, and then through January 20, 2022, MHI’s leave system Matrix requested further information from Plaintiff, which Plaintiff did not submit in due time, resulting in a denial of the leave request, and her termination as a result of backfilling, where Plaintiff was informed of the possibility that her position could be backfilled around December 29, 2021. (Mot., pp. 23-24, citing Mot., Sep. St., UMF Nos. 25-28, 39.)

The Court finds that this evidence carries MHI’s burden as to this claim. If MHI requested that Plaintiff properly support her late-2021 leave requests, and if Plaintiff failed to properly submit documents evidencing the need for a medical leave, then MHI engaged in a good faith effort to accommodate Plaintiff’s requests for leave at the end of 2021.

The Court next determines Plaintiff carries her responsive burden.

In opposition, Plaintiff presents evidence to show that even if she failed to submit the correct documentation, MHI had decided to terminate Plaintiff’s employment prior to backfilling her position, without consideration of further documentation. (Opp’n, Sep. St., Additional Material Fact (AMF) No. 49, citing Julie Moore email to decision maker Nicole Considine [“We cannot accommodate”; “PLEASE let us know when we can replace her”].) Plaintiff also cites internal MHI emails to show that MHI did not comply with its policy of informing an employee of the need to return to work by a certain date lest the employee’s position be backfilled. And here it is undisputed that MHI’s applicable agent (Nicole Considine, Director, Employee Relations, MHI) did not notify Plaintiff that she had to specifically return to work by December 29, 2021, or else her position would be backfilled. (Reply, Sep. St., Response to AMF No. 52 [“Undisputed, immaterial. …”].)

The Court determines that this evidence shows triable issues as to failure to accommodate the leave requests in late 2021 based on the above evidence raising triable issues as to whether MHI’s December 2021 efforts to reasonably accommodate Plaintiff were merely superficial and the decision already had been made to terminate Plaintiff’s employment.

The Court rejects the reply argument that Julie Moore was not the decision maker, thus making the Moore-Considine email referenced above in essence irrelevant. (Reply, Sep. St., Response to AMF No. 49.) Considine appears to have been one of the decisionmakers here. None of the above evidence was objected to, with MHI merely arguing for a different interpretation than Plaintiff. Under these circumstances, we have MHI staff (including Considine) discussing the need to get rid off Plaintiff, with Considine two days later failing to inform Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s need to return to work by December 29, 2024, which in part results in Plaintiff’s position being backfilled. Such evidence and chain of inference show a prima facie case for failure to accommodate.

Summary adjudication of the FAC’s fourth cause of action is thus DENIED.

5. FAC, Fifth Cause of Action, Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process: DENIED.

a. Relevant Law

Government Code section 12940, subdivision (n) requires employers to engage in a good faith interactive process to determine effective reasonable accommodations, if any, “in response to a request for reasonable accommodation by an employee … with a known physical or mental disability ….” (Raine v. City of Burbank, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 1222.) A claim for failure to engage in a good faith interactive process must allege facts to support a finding that (1) plaintiff suffered from a disability, (2) the employer was aware of the alleged disabilities, and (3) the employer failed to engage in a good faith process to identify reasonable accommodations for the Plaintiffs. (See Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (n).) Generally, “[t]he employee bears the burden of giving the employer notice of the disability. [Citation.]” (Raine v. City of Burbank, supra, at p. 1222.)

b. Court’s Determination

The Court adopts its discussion in relation to the fourth cause of action to determine that because triable issues remain as to whether MHI properly followed its procedures for backfilling Plaintiff’s position—e.g., failing to inform Plaintiff of her exact return date—triable issues remain as to whether MHI properly engaged in the interactive process regarding Plaintiffs’ late-2021 requests for medical leave through January 2022.

Summary adjudication of the FAC’s fifth cause of action is thus DENIED.

6. FAC, Sixth Cause of Action, Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy: DENIED.

a. Relevant Law

“The elements of a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy are (1) an employer-employee relationship, (2) the employer terminated the plaintiff’s employment, (3) the termination was substantially motivated by a violation of public policy, and (4) the discharge caused the plaintiff harm.” (Yau v. Allen (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 144, 154.)

b. Court’s Determination

The Court adopts its discussion of the first and second causes of action to determine that because triable issues remain as to whether Plaintiff’s termination was a violation of the FEHA based on discrimination and retaliation, triable issues remain as to the FAC’s wrongful termination claim.

7. FAC, Seventh Cause of Action, Violation of California Labor Code Section 203 (Waiting Time Penalties): GRANTED.

a. Relevant Law

California Labor Code section 203 levies a waiting time penalty on employers who willfully withhold the final paychecks from employees who are terminated or quit. The penalty is equal to the employee’s daily wage for each day the final paycheck goes unpaid, up to 30 days.

b. Court’s Determination

The FAC’s seventh case of action alleges that as of the date the FAC was filed, Plaintiff had not been paid all wages due to her at the time of termination. (FAC, ¶¶ 51-55.)

The FAC alleges a termination date of February 6, 2022. (FAC, ¶ 8.)

In its motion, MHI argues that no triable issues remain as to this claim where evidence shows that Plaintiff has testified that she received all wages owed to her as of January 4, 2022. (Mot., p. 27, citing Mot., Sep. St., UMF No. 44.)

A review of the cited evidence confirms MHI’s position. (Mot., Sep. St., UMF No. 44, citing Mot., Medellin Decl., Ex. 5, Response to RFAs Nos. 15-16.)

Indeed, this evidence is undisputed by Plaintiff. (Opp’n, Sep. St., Response to UMF No. 44.)

The UMF even clarifies that Plaintiff has acknowledged that her owed wages were paid by MHI but has nevertheless failed to dismiss this claim despite having agreed to do so. (Mot., Sep. St., UMF No. 44; Opp’n, Sep. St., Response to UMF No. 44 [undisputed].)

The above evidence thus carries MHI’s burden on the FAC’s seventh cause of action and shows Plaintiff cannot carry her responsive burden.

Summary of the FAC’s seventh cause of action is thus GRANTED. 

III. Conclusion

Defendant Molina Healthcare, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:

(1) DENIED as to the First Amended Complaint’s first to sixth causes of action; and

(2) GRANTED as to the First Amended Complaint’s seventh cause of action.