Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 22STCV13653, Date: 2023-09-28 Tentative Ruling
DEPARTMENT 40 - JUDGE ANNE RICHARDSON - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
The Court issues tentative rulings on certain motions.The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) email Dept 40 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (smcdept40@lacourt.org) with a copy to the other party(ies) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no email is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call.
Case Number: 22STCV13653 Hearing Date: September 28, 2023 Dept: 40
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CALIFORNIA RENT-A-CAR, INC., Plaintiff, v. SIMON’S CATERERS INC., a California corporation; SIMON COHEN, an
individual; and DOES 1 to 25, Defendants. ______________________________________ SIMON’S CATERERS INC., Cross-Complainant, v. CALIFORNIA RENT-A-CAR, INC. and ROES 1 to 10, Cross-Defendants. |
Case No.: 22STCV13653 Hearing Date: 9/28/23 Trial Date: 4/9/24 [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant
California Rent-a-Car’s Demurrer to Cross-Complaint. |
Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant
California Rent-a-Car, Inc. (Cal Rent-a-Car) sues Defendant/Cross-Complainant
Simon’s Caterers Inc. (SCI), Simon Cohen (SCI’s owner), and Does 1 to 25 pursuant
to claims of (1) Breach of Contract against Simon’s Caterers Inc. and (2)
Negligence against Simon’s Caterers Inc. and Simon Cohen.
The claims arise from allegations
that Cal Rent-a-Car made a written agreement with Simon Caterers Inc. for the
rental of a vehicle and that, “[w]hile last in possession of the Plaintiff’s
vehicle …, [D]efendant Simon Cohen, left the vehicle’s ignition key in the
ignition, interior door, or trunk when the vehicle was unoccupied” and “failed
to close all windows and lock all doors,” resulting in the “vehicle … [being]
stolen by a third party …, causing damages [to Plaintiff] … [including]
Property Damage to the vehicle in the amount of $25,361.17,” “Graphic Repair
charges of $807.08, Lift Gate repair charges of $280.00, Towing and storage
charges of $310.00, and loss of rental use of $7,425.00,” for “[t]otal
[damages] of $34,183.25.”
In turn, Defendant/Cross-Complainant
SCI sues Cal Rent-a-Car pursuant to a June 1, 2023 Cross-Complaint alleging
claims of (1) Fraud, (2) Violation of Penal Code § 496, (3) Unfair Business
Practice, and (4) Common Counts – Money Had and Received.
The claims arise from allegations
that, among other things, Cal Rent-a-Car took payments from SCI for damage
waiver insurance coverage related to a vehicle rental and that Cal Rent-a-Car
never intended to honor that type of coverage, thereby damaging SCI when the
vehicle SCI had rented from Cal Rent-a-Car was vandalized by third parties and Cal
Rent-a-Car refused to apply the damage waiver insurance to cover damages.
On June 30, 2023, Cal Rent-a-Car
demurred to SCI’s Cross-Complaint.
On September 15, 2023, rather than
oppose the demurrer, SCI filed a First Amended Cross-Complaint.
Cal Rent-a-Car’s demurrer is now
before the Court.
Preliminary
Note
The
Court initially notes that the September 15, 2023 First Amended Cross-Complaint
(FAXC) filed by SCI was not properly filed and therefore does not supersede
SCI’s original June 1, 2023 Cross-Complaint.
A
party may file a superseding pleading in response to a demurrer provided that
such superseding pleading is filed nine court days prior to the hearing on the
demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 472, subd. (a), 1005, subd. (b).)
When
taking into account Native American Day—September 22, 2023—nine court days
before this hearing was September 14, 2023. SCI filed and served its FAXC on
September 15, 2023, one court day too late. The FAXC was therefore not filed as
a matter of course (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 472, subd. (a), 1005, subd. (b)) and was
filed without leave of court or by stipulation of the parties (Code Civ. Proc.,
§§ 472, subd. (a)).
The
FAXC is therefore STRICKEN. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a) [“The court may
… at any time in its discretion … [s]trike out all or any part of any pleading
not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state”].)
The
Court now proceeds with a substantive discussion of Cal Rent-a-Car’s demurrer.
Demurrer
Sufficiency Standard
A
demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.
(Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747; see Code Civ. Proc., §
430.10, subd. (e).) This device can be used only to challenge defects that
appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the
pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39
Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a [general] demurrer, the complaint need only
allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that
might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A.
v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) In
testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth
of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist.
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-67.) A demurrer, however, “does not admit
contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab
Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.) When considering demurrers, courts read the
allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept.
of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228, disapproved on other
grounds, Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th
1158, 1162.) The face of the complaint includes exhibits attached to the
complaint. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.) If facts
appearing in the exhibits contradict those alleged, the facts in the exhibits
take precedence. (Holland v. Morse Diesel Intern., Inc. (2001) 86
Cal.App.4th 1443, 1447, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in White
v. Cridlebaugh (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 506, 521.)
Cross-Complaint,
First Cause of Action, Fraud: OVERRULED.
“[T]he
elements of an action for fraud and deceit based on a concealment are: (1) the
defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant
must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the
defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the
intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of
the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or
suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the
fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage.” (Boschma v. Home Loan
Center, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 230, 248; see also Roddenberry v.
Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 665-666.)
Allegations
of fraud “must be pled with more detail than other causes of action.” (Apollo
Capital Fund, LLC v. Roth Capital Partners, LLC (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 226,
240.) “Every element of the cause of action for fraud must be alleged …
factually and specifically[,] and the policy of liberal construction of the
pleadings … will not ordinarily be invoked to sustain a pleading defective in
any material respect. [Citations.]” (Committee on Children’s Television,
Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216, superseded by
statute as stated in Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn. (2006)
39 Cal.4th 235, 242.) “[G]eneral and conclusory allegations do not suffice.” (Small
v. Fritz Cos., Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184 [citations omitted].) A
plaintiff pleading fraud must plead facts showing “how, when, where, to whom,
and by what means” the allegedly fraudulent representations were tendered. (Lazar
v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.)
The
Cross-Complaint’s first cause of action alleges that on March 25, 2022, SCI
rented a car from Cal Rent-a-Car, which was rented subject to an optional
damage waiver insurance that Cal Rent-a-Car never intended to honor. The
Cross-Complaint alleges that the reason for refusing to honor the damage waiver
was that SCI had rented the vehicle as a “commercial hire.” Cal Rent-a-Car
refused to honor that damages waiver when on March 28, 2022, a car SCI had
rented from Cal Rent-a-Car was vandalized by third parties. A copy of the
parties’ rental contract is not attached to the Cross-Complaint. (Cross-Complaint,
¶¶ 7-12.)
In
its demurrer, Cal Rent-a-Car first argues that the optional Collision Damage
Waiver (CDW) was not applied to the March 28, 2022 incident because “SCI
breached the rental agreement by failing to close all windows and leaving the
keys in the vehicle unattended.” Second, Cal Rent-a-Car argues that “no other
specific facts alleged in the Cross-Complaint support the finding of [Cal
Rent-a-Car]’s intent to defraud SCI and no facts are pled that would establish
any fraudulent representations or intent to deceive” and that “[t]he mere
allegation of offering an optional CDW on the rental agreement is not
sufficient to show [Cal Rent-a-Car’s] fraudulent intent.” (Demurrer, pp. 5-6.)
No
opposition or reply are before the Court.
The
Court finds in favor of SCI.
The
Court first determines that the argument relating to SCI leaving the vehicle
unattended goes beyond the pleadings before the Court, for which reason the
Court does not consider this argument.
The
Court next determines that the Cross-Complaint sufficiently alleges intent to
defraud and concealment. The concealment is alleged as a failure to “disclose
to SCI that [Cal Rent-a-Car] would not honor damage waiver coverage in light of
SCI’s commercial hire.” (Cross-Complaint, ¶ 9.) The intent to defraud is
alleged as Cal Rent-a-Car issuing a damage waiver insurance for which “[Cal
Rent-a-Car] … collected fees under false pretenses and/or for inapplicable or
nonexistent services.” (Cross-Complaint, ¶ 10.) Otherwise stated, the
Cross-Complaint alleges that, for the purpose of making a profit, Cal
Rent-a-Car charged SCI for a damage waiver it never intended to honor, thus
sufficiently alleging intent to defraud.
Last,
the Court determines that Cal Rent-a-Car’s argument that “[t]he mere allegation
of offering an optional CDW on the rental agreement is not sufficient to show [its]
fraudulent intent” is not availing based on the reasoning in the preceding
paragraph.
Cal
Rent-a-Car’s demurer to the first cause of action is thus OVERRULED.
Cross-Complaint,
Second Cause of Action, Violation of Penal Code § 496: SUSTAINED,
Without Leave to Amend.
The
Cross-Complaint’s second cause of action alleges Cal Rent-a-Car received stolen
property by “obtain[ing] money from SCI by theft under false pretenses.”
(Cross-Complaint, ¶ 14.) The claim incorporates prior allegations, from which
the Court determines that the false pretenses were Cal Rent-a-Car issuing
damage waiver insurance coverage that it never intended to honor.
(Cross-Complaint, ¶¶ 9, 13.)
In
its demurrer, Cal Rent-a-Car argues that “under §496(a), a principal may not be
convicted of both receiving stolen property and of the theft of the same
property.” Cal Rent-a-Car also argues that “when the property in question comes
into the defendant’s hands, it must already have the character of having been
stolen.” (Demurrer, p. 6.)
No
opposition or reply are before the Court.
The
Court finds in favor of Cal Rent-a-Car.
“‘[W]hen
the [stolen] property in question comes into the defendant’s hands, it must
already have the character of having been stolen.’ [Citation.]” (Lacagnina
v. Comprehend Systems, Inc. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 955, 971, emphasis in
original.) Here, the Cross-Complaint alleges that SCI paid its own money to Cal
Rent-a-Car for the purpose of securing a certain type of insurance coverage.
(Cross-Complaint, ¶¶ 8, 13.) The second cause of action is therefore fatally
defective as stated.
Cal
Rent-a-Car’s demurrer to the second cause of action is thus SUSTAINED, Without
Leave to Amend.
Cross-Complaint,
Third Cause of Action, Unfair Business Practice: OVERRULED.
To
state a cause of action for unfair business practices, a plaintiff must
establish defendant engaged in “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or
practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” (Bus. &
Prof. Code, § 17200.) This section establishes three types of unfair
competition, prohibiting “practices that are either ‘unfair,’ or ‘unlawful,’ or
‘fraudulent.’” (Pastoria v. Nationwide Ins. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1490,
1496.) Thus, “[a]n act or practice may be actionable as “unfair” under the
unfair competition law even if it is not ‘unlawful.’” (Chavez v. Whirlpool
Corp. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 363, 374.) A violation of other laws is deemed
independently actionable under the UCL. (See Law Offices of Mathew Higbee v.
Expungement Assistance Servs. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 544, 554.) “‘Virtually
any law—federal, state or local—can serve as a predicate for a section 17200
action.’” (Ibid., quoting Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2009) 171
Cal.App.4th 1305, 1335.)
Despite
the broad scope of Business and Professions Code section 17200, its remedies
are limited to equitable relief and damages are not recoverable. (Korea
Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1144.)
The
Cross-Complaint’s third cause of action seeks restitution of the fees paid to
Cal Rent-a-Car for damage waiver insurance based on Cal Rent-a-Car’s alleged
unfair and deceptive practice of using “contradictory and/or vague and
ambiguous clauses” that “are designed to prevent or have the effect of
preventing customers from realizing the true nature of damage waiver insurance
offered by [Cal Rent-a-Car].” (Cross-Complaint, ¶¶ 23, 26.)
In
its demurrer, Cal Rent-a-Car argues that “SCI cannot provide enough facts or
evidence to show that [Cal Rent-a-Car] violates any laws by offering the
optional CDW in the rental agreement” because “[t]he facts pled in the
Cross-Complaint are not sufficient to show that [Cal Rent-a-Car] did not intend
to honor the CDW or any intent to deceive SCI at the time the contract was
executed.” (Demurrer, p. 7.)
No
opposition or reply are before the Court.
The
Court finds in favor of SCI.
The
Court adopts its determination as to the concealment claim to determine that
Cal Rent-a-Car is sufficiently alleged to have participated in the unfair
practice of offering a type of insurance coverage that it did not intend to
honor, in relation to which SCI seeks restitution of monies paid for that type
of coverage.
Cal
Rent-a-Car’s demurrer to the third cause of action is thus OVERRULED.
Cross-Complaint,
Fourth Cause of Action, Common Counts – Money Had and Received: OVERRULED.
“‘A cause of action for money had
and received is stated if it is alleged the defendant “is indebted to the
plaintiff in a certain sum ‘for money had and received by the defendant for the
use of the plaintiff.”’ [Citation.]” (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Zerin
(1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 445, 460.)
The Cross-Complaint’s fourth cause
of action alleges money had and received based on Cal Rent-a-Car receiving
“money, via fees charged for damage waiver insurance, intended to benefit SCI,”
and which “was not used for SCI’s benefit,” with “[Cal Rent-a-Car] pocket[ing]
the money and … [failing to] return[] it to SCI.” (Cross-Complaint, ¶¶ 28-30.)
In its demurrer, Cal Rent-a-Car
argues that “SCI voluntarily opted to pay for the optional CDW in the rental
agreement for its own interest” and “[t]he money paid for the CDW was used for
protecting SCI from paying for the collision damages to the rented vehicle.”
Cal Rent-a-Car also argues that “SCI could have chosen not to accept the CDW,
but it voluntarily chose to purchase it for its own benefit,” and that “the
rental agreement clearly excludes damage to the vehicle in circumstances such
as those present in this case.” (Demurrer, p. 8.)
No opposition or reply are before
the Court.
The Court finds in favor of SCI.
The Cross-Complaint alleges that
SCI paid Cal Rent-a-Car monies for the benefit of damage waiver insurance
coverage, which Cal Rent-a-Car never intended to honor and did not honor when
the vehicle rented by SCI from Cal Rent-a-Car was vandalized by third parties.
(Cross-Complaint, ¶¶ 7-12, 27-30.)
Cal Rent-a-Car’s demurrer to the fourth cause of action is thus OVERRULED.
Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant
California Rent-a-Car’s Demurrer to Cross-Complaint is SUSTAINED, Without Leave
to Amend, as to the second cause of action, but OVERRULED as to the first,
third, and fourth causes of action.
Plaintiff is given fourteen calendar
days’ leave to amend the pleadings.