Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 22STCV15285, Date: 2023-04-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV15285    Hearing Date: April 4, 2023    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

MOVING PARTY:              Defendant Cha Hollywood Medical Center, L.P. [sued as Cha Hollywood Medical Center, LP., Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center].

OPPOSITION:                      Plaintiffs Am Chung, Peter Chung, Paul Chung, and Hannah Ahn.

REPLY:                                 Defendant Cha Hollywood Medical Center, L.P.

Background

Plaintiffs Am Chung— individually and as successor-in-interest for Hwa Sik Chung—Peter Chung, Paul Chung, and Hannah Ahn (collectively, “Plaintiffs” and surviving children of Hwa Sik Chung) sue Defendant Cha Hollywood Medical Center, L.P.—dba Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center (hereafter “Hollywood Presbyterian”)—pursuant to a Complaint alleging three causes of action: (1) Elder Abuse; (2) Wrongful Death (CCP §377.60); and Negligence (CCP §377.20). The claims are grounded in allegations that on February 4, 2021, while in Hollywood Presbyterian’s care, due to her dysphagia and specifically as a result of her difficulty swallowing, a speech language pathologist ordered that Ms. Hwa Sik Chung’s alimentation be comprised of a puree of thick honey liquid fed only one time per day, but, “[d]ue to the complete understaffing, undertraining, and lack of any oversight or supervision of the nursing staff, on or around February 4, 2021, a registered nurse at Hollywood Presbyterian … was permitted to change the diet order for [Hwa Sik Chung] … to three times a day” “without any input from a doctor or the pathologist,” with “the increased feedings combin[ing] with Ms. Chung’s [pre-existing] dysphagia [to] cause[] aspiration[,] … an inability to clear oral secretions” and “cardiopulmonary arrest … for 15 minutes,” leading to Ms. Chung’s intubation, brain damage, and eventual death on February 26, 2021.

The Complaint also alleges that (1) Ms. Chung began developing sacral pressure ulcers and wounds on February 14, 2021 as a result of not being changed regularly or rotated by the understaffed or undertrained staff at Hollywood Presbyterian, (2) on the day of Ms. Chung’s death on February 26, 2021, Hollywood Presbyterian ignored Ms. Chung’s family’s pleas for their mother to pass away with some level of dignity, instead providing Ms. Chung with morphine to die while the hospital refused to speak with the family, who were waiting at a nearby café for updates, and (3) Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center refused to provide the family with Ms. Chung’s medical records in violation of federal and state law, ultimately falsely providing only 31 pages of records as the complete chart for Ms. Chung’s medical care.

On August 30, 2022, Hollywood Presbyterian demurred to the Complaint’s Elder Abuse claim on sufficiency of pleading grounds without challenging the Complaint’s second and third cause of action. On the same day, Hollywood Presbyterian made a motion to strike claims punitive and exemplary damages from the Complaint. The demurrer and motion to strike were originally scheduled for hearing on October 12, 2022.

On September 29, 2022, Plaintiffs opposed the demurrer and motion to strike.

On October 3, 2022, Hollywood Presbyterian filed a reply to the September 29th opposition.

On October 7, 2022, Department 30 of the Spring Street Courthouse transferred and reassigned the action to Department 45 of the Stanley Mosk Courthouse, providing that any pending motions or hearings would be reset, continued, or vacated by Department 45.

On November 1, 2022, Hollywood Presbyterian refiled the demurrer and motion to strike for hearing with Department 45 on September 13, 2023.

On December 27, 2022, Department 1 of the Stanley Mosk Courthouse reassigned the action from Department 45 to Department 12 of the Stanley Mosk Courthouse.

On January 9, 2023, the action was transferred from Department 12 to Department 40 of the Stanley Mosk Courthouse.

On February 22, 2023, Hollywood Presbyterian refiled the demurrer and motion to strike for hearing with Department 40 on April 4, 2023.

Demurrer: OVERRULED.

Legal Standard

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747; see Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) This device can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a [general] demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) In testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-67.) A demurrer, however, “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228, disapproved on other grounds, Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1162.) The face of the complaint includes exhibits attached to the complaint. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.) If facts appearing in the exhibits contradict those alleged, the facts in the exhibits take precedence. (Holland v. Morse Diesel Intern., Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1447, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in White v. Cridlebaugh (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 506, 521.)

First Cause of Action, Elder Abuse [Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.57, subd. (b)]:

I. Allegations and Demurrer Overview

Plaintiffs’ Elder Abuse claim is grounded in Welfare & Institutions Code section 15610.57, subdivision (b)(3), i.e., a failure to protect Ms. Hwa Sik Chung from health and safety hazards related to her alimentation while under the care of Hollywood Presbyterian staff. (See Complaint, ¶¶ 10-17, 28.)

Defendant Hollywood Presbyterian demurs to this claim on two grounds: (1) the facts as pleaded do not amount to acts of egregious misconduct necessary for an Elder Abuse claim under Welfare & Institutions Code section 15610.57 (Demurrer, 4:11-7:6); and (2) the facts as pleaded do not impute Hollywood Presbyterian’s authorization or ratification of the conduct of the registered nurse who changed Hwa Sik Chung’s diet order (Demurrer, 7:8-8:21), conduct which the Complaint attributes as the cause of death for Ms. Chung (Complaint, ¶¶ 11-17).

II. Neglect Defined

“Neglect” is defined in Welfare & Institutions Code section 15610.57 as either (1) the negligent failure of any person having the care or custody of an elder or a dependent adult to exercise that degree of care that a reasonable person in a like position would exercise or (2) the negligent failure of an elder or dependent adult to exercise that degree of self-care that a reasonable person in a like position would exercise. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.57, subds. (a)(1)-(2).) In form, “neglect” includes, but is not limited to:

(1) Failure to assist in personal hygiene, or in the provision of food, clothing, or shelter;

(2) Failure to provide medical care for physical and mental health needs where a person shall not be deemed neglected or abused for the sole reason that the person voluntarily relies on treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone in lieu of medical treatment;

(3) Failure to protect from health and safety hazards;

(4) Failure to prevent malnutrition or dehydration;

(5) Substantial inability or failure of an elder or dependent adult to manage their own finances; and

(6) Failure of an elder or dependent adult to satisfy any of the needs specified in paragraphs (1) to (5), inclusive, for themselves as a result of poor cognitive functioning, mental limitation, substance abuse, or chronic poor health.

(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.57, subds. (b)(1)-(6); see Smith v. Ben Bennett, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1517.)

Thus, “neglect” within the meaning of Welfare & Institutions Code section 15610.57 covers an area of misconduct distinct from professional negligence. (Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771, 783.) As used in the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act, Welfare & Institutions Code sections 15600 et seq., “neglect” refers not to the substandard performance of medical services but, rather, to the failure to provide medical care. (Ibid.; Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 396, 404 [“Thus, when the medical care of an elder is at issue, ‘the statutory definition of “neglect” speaks not of the undertaking of medical services, but of the failure to provide medical care’”].) Otherwise stated, claims under the Elder Abuse Act are not brought against health care providers in their capacity as providers but, rather, against custodians and caregivers that abuse elders and that may or may not, incidentally, also be health care providers. (Id. at p. 786.)

“To recover the enhanced remedies available under the Elder Abuse Act from a health care provider, a plaintiff must prove more than simple or even gross negligence in the provider’s care or custody of the elder.” (Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 405.) Instead, “the Legislature … [has] concluded that the high standard imposed by section 15657 [requires] clear and convincing evidence of (i) liability and (ii) recklessness, malice, oppression[,] or fraud [as to] adequately protect[] health care providers from liability under the statute for acts of simple or even gross negligence.” (Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 785.) Recklessness for these purposes is defined as “a ‘deliberate disregard’ of the ‘high degree of probability’ that an injury will occur.” (Delaney v. Baker (1999) 20 Cal.4th 23, 31 [citation omitted].)

There are “several factors that must be present for conduct to constitute neglect within the meaning of the Elder Abuse Act and thereby trigger the enhanced remedies available under the Act. The plaintiff must allege (and ultimately prove by clear and convincing evidence) facts establishing that the defendant: (1) had responsibility for meeting the basic needs of the elder or dependent adult, such as nutrition, hydration, hygiene[,] or medical care [citations]; (2) knew of conditions that made the elder or dependent adult unable to provide for his or her own basic needs [citations]; and (3) denied or withheld goods or services necessary to meet the elder or dependent adult’s basic needs, either with knowledge that injury was substantially certain to befall the elder or dependent adult (if the plaintiff alleges oppression, fraud or malice) or with conscious disregard of the high probability of such injury (if the plaintiff alleges recklessness) [citations]. The plaintiff must also allege (and ultimately prove by clear and convincing evidence) that [4] the neglect caused the elder or dependent adult to suffer physical harm, pain or mental suffering. [Citations.] Finally, [5] the facts constituting the neglect and establishing the causal link between the neglect and the injury ‘must be pleaded with particularity,’ in accordance with the pleading rules governing statutory claims.” (Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 406-07.)

III. Egregious Misconduct

In its demurrer, Hollywood Presbyterian first argues that “[w]hat is alleged [in the Complaint] is not elder abuse, but a single act of alleged negligence wherein a nurse changed the decedent’s diet order.” (Demurrer, 5:21-23.) More specifically, Hollywood Presbyterian argues that “[i]t is unclear from the facts whether the nurse who entered this diet order on February 4, 2021 for three meals a day was even aware that a diet order for one meal a day consisting of the puree had been entered by the speech language pathologist” where it instead “seems likely that ‘wires were crossed’ and that the nurse entered her [diet] order without having been aware of the order by the speech language pathologist.” (Demurrer, 5:24-27.) This conduct, argues Hollywood Presbyterian, “does not rise to a level of egregious misconduct constituting elder abuse as opposed to an act of alleged negligence” where a finding that “this was elder abuse would [amount] to eras[ure] the clear distinction between elder abuse and negligence established by the Legislature and the courts ….” (Demurrer, 5:28-6:3.)

Hollywood Presbyterian also argues that “although the plaintiffs allege that the decedent developed pressure ulcers beginning on February 14, 2021, this contention is set forth in a single sentence at paragraph 16 of the complaint and does not elaborate or set forth the type of specificity needed to constitute elder abuse.” (Demurrer, 6:4-7.)

Hollywood Presbyterian next argues that “[n]onspecific allegations at paragraph 18 that the family’s request for help were ignored are too conclusory to give rise to a claim for elder abuse, and do not demonstrate that there was any causal connection between the family’s (unspecified) requests and injury to the decedent” “after ‘it was determined that Ms. Chung had irreversible brain damage.’” (Demurrer, 6:8-13.)

Hollywood Presbyterian last argues that “allegations that the family was not provided with the decedent’s complete medical records do not give rise to a claim for elder abuse” because (1) “such allegations occurred after the decedent’s death” and thus “could not have caused harm to the decedent” and (2) “withholding records, or even the destruction of records, is[,] [according to Hollywood Presbyterian,] not tortious” pursuant to Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1, 8-13 and Rosen v. St. Joseph Hospital (2011) 193 Cal. App.4th 453, 456, 462. (Demurrer, 6:14-7:6.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that “Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts constituting elder abuse and neglect on the part of Defendant” by comparing the facts alleged in this action with the facts in Samantha B. v. Aurora Vista Del Mar, LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 85, 94, where the court of appeal found that a hospital engaged in neglect when it failed to adequately hire, monitor, or supervise one of its medical assistants, who ended up raping one of the patient residents who qualified as a dependent adult. (Opp’n to Demurrer, 4:11-5:10.)  The Opposition also points to the case of Fenimore v. Regents of University of California (2016) 245 Cal.App.4^th 1339, 1348.

The opposition then distinguishes cases cited by Hollywood Presbyterian in its demurrer (Opp’n to Demurrer, 5:11-6:20) before arguing that “the very detailed facts … alleged [in the Complaint] contain more than enough to support a cause of action for elder abuse” because “Defendant recklessly failed to protect Decedent from a nurse who was unilaterally permitted to change orders due directly to Defendant’s understaffing and one-size-fit-all mentality,” after which “Defendant concealed what occurred from the family in violation of regulations while Decedent was still alive and fighting for her life,” thus “robb[ing] [Ms. Chung’s family of] the opportunity to transfer Decedent to a hospital that could actually take care of her,” under circumstances where “Defendant allowed Decedent to develop pressure ulcers and wounds due to neglectfully failing to tend to her needs” prior to her death (Opp’n to Demurrer, 6:21-27).

In reply, and in relevant part, Hollywood Presbyterian argues that, beyond inflammatory arguments raised in the opposition, “[t]he actual facts [pleaded] in the complaint are that on February 4, 2021, a nurse changed a diet order from what had been ordered by the speech pathologist that day, resulting in the decedent’s difficulty breathing and cardiopulmonary arrest the following day,” that “[s]tarting on February 14, 2021, the decedent developed sacral pressure ulcers and wounds,” and that “[t]he decedent died on February 26, 2021,” allegations which “simply do not amount to the egregious misconduct needed to constitute elder abuse.” (Reply to Opp’ns to Demurrer and Strike Mot., 2:26-3:9.)

While this is a close case, the Court ultimately agrees with Plaintiff.

Taking the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, as it must, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for Elder Abuse.  In Fenimore, supra, the appellate court found that facts similar to those alleged here could constitute recklessness sufficient to state a claim for Elder Abuse.  Specifically, that court held that allegations that the Hospital “had a pattern and knowing practice of improperly understaffing to cut costs” was sufficient, if proved, to provide a basis for “reckless neglect.”  (245 Cal.App.4th at p. 1349.)  At minimum, the Complaint states a similar contention here. (Complaint, ¶ 33.)

Under these circumstances, the Court OVERRULES Hollywood Presbyterian’s demurrer to the Complaint’s first cause of action.  Whether Plaintiff can provide proof is another matter to be tested at a later point in time.

IV. Authorization or Ratification

For the same reasons, the Court overrules the demurrer on Defendant’s alternate ground that plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege corporate policy or neglect by alleging authorization or ratification. (See Demurrer, 7:8-8:21.)  As noted above, the Complaint alleges, at minimum, that Defendants underfunded and understaffed the medical center in order to decrease expenses, and that they implemented cost cutting measures which included failing to “maintain the required number of nurses for their units,” and that this was done intentionally.  (Complaint at ¶¶ 33-38.)  Again, taking the allegations as true, this Court will OVERRULE the demurrer.

Motion to Strike: GRANTED, With Leave to Amend.

Legal Standard

The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subds. (a)-(b).) For the purposes of a motion to strike pursuant to Sections 435 to 437 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the term “pleading” means a demurrer, answer, complaint, or cross-complaint, (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (a)), and an immaterial allegation or irrelevant matter in a pleading entails (1) an allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense, (2) an allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense, or (3) a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subds. (b)(1)-(3).)

Punitive/Exemplary Damages:

I. Overview

By way of its motion to strike, Defendant Hollywood Presbyterian seeks to strike allegations and prayers for punitive damages from the Complaint on the grounds that (1) the facts alleged in the Complaint do not constitute oppression, fraud, or malice on the part of Hollywood Presbyterian (Strike Mot., 4:12-7:15) and (2) Plaintiffs have failed to plead facts constituting authorization or ratification (Strike Mot., 7:17-9:4).

II. Malice, Oppression, Fraud Defined

“Malice” is defined by the Civil Code as conduct that is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Civil Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “Oppression” is defined by the Civil Code as despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights. (Civil Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) “Fraud” is defined by the Civil Code as an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. (Civil Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(3).)

III. Malice, Oppression, Fraud Analysis

Hollywood Presbyterian first argues, in relevant part, that the allegations in the Complaint do not amount to malice, oppression, or fraud to support punitive damages for reasons reading the same as the arguments on demurrer: (1) “[i]t is unclear from the facts whether the nurse who entered th[e] diet order on February 4, 2021 for three meals a day was even aware that a diet order for one meal a day consisting of [a thick honey liquid] puree had been entered by the speech language pathologist,” where it instead “seems likely that ‘wires were crossed’ and that the nurse entered her [diet] order without having been aware of the order by the speech language pathologist,” conduct which, argues Hollywood Presbyterian, “does not rise to a level of egregious misconduct constituting malice, oppression, or fraud as opposed to an act of alleged negligence” (Strike Mot., 6:6-12); (2) “although the plaintiffs allege that the decedent developed pressure ulcers beginning on February 14, 2021, this contention is set forth in a single sentence at paragraph 16 of the complaint and does not elaborate or set forth the type of specificity needed to a claim for punitive damages” (Strike Mot., 6:13-16); (3) “[n]onspecific allegations at paragraph 18 that the family’s request for help were ignored are too conclusory to give rise to a claim for elder abuse, and do not demonstrate that there was any causal connection between the family’s (unspecified) requests and injury to the decedent” “after ‘it was determined that Ms. Chung had irreversible brain damage’” (Strike Mot., 6:17-22); and (4) “allegations that the family was not provided with the decedent’s complete medical records do not give rise to a claim for elder abuse” because (a) “such allegations occurred after the decedent’s death” and thus “could not have caused harm to the decedent” and (b) “withholding records, or even the destruction of records, is[,] [according to Hollywood Presbyterian,] not tortious” pursuant to Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1, 8-13 and Rosen v. St. Joseph Hospital (2011) 193 Cal. App.4th 453, 456, 462 (Strike Mot., 6:23-7:15).

In opposition and in relevant part, Plaintiffs argue that the Complaint sufficiently pleads grounds for punitive damages where the Complaint alleges that: (1) Hollywood Presbyterian was understaffed and had a one-size-fits-all instruction to save money, leading Hollywood Presbyterian to violate the speech pathologist’s order and kill Hwa Sik Chung through the change in diet order (Opp’n to Strike Mot., 2:5-3:15); (2) Hollywood Presbyterian allowed Hwa Sik Chung to remain unattended, resulting in pressure ulcers and wounds (Opp’n to Strike Mot., 3:16-28); and (3) in violation of regulations, Hollywood Presbyterian fraudulently concealed from Hwa Sik Chung’s family the reasons for Ms. Chung’s decline in health prior to her death (Opp’n to Strike Mot., 3:29-5:5).

In reply, Hollywood Presbyterian argues that “[p]ursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code section 15657, a cause of action for elder abuse must be based on a pleading of ‘reckless[ness], oppression, fraud[,] or malice,’” such that “even if the Court determines that the plaintiffs have ple[ade]d facts amounting recklessness for purposes of alleging elder abuse, it is still not sufficient to assert a claim of punitive damages.” (Reply to Opp’ns to Demurrer and Strike Mot., 4:22-5:5 [italics and bolding omitted]; see Strike Mot., 8:13-20 [raising this argument for the first time, such that the reply is not the first paper in which Plaintiffs faced this argument].)

The Court agrees with Hollywood Presbyterian and finds that the Complaint fails to plead malice, oppression, and fraud related to any of the three causes of action alleged therein.

With regard to the allegations that a registered nurse failed to follow the speech pathologist’s orders relating to the alimentation of Hwa Sik Chung, Ms. Chung’s development of ulcers, and requests by the family to be informed of Ms. Chung’s status on the day of her death (Complaint, ¶¶ 11-18 [these pleadings in first cause of action], 46, 58 [incorporation of pleadings into second and third causes of action]), the Court finds that these allegations do not connote (1) conduct that is intended to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct that is carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others, (2) despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights, or (3) an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury (Civil Code, § 3294, subds. (c)(1)-(3)) because the pleadings amount to, as pleaded, no more than gross negligence on the part of Hollywood Presbyterian’s staff, insufficient to support a prayer for punitive damages. (See Demurrer discussion supra [failing to find pleadings of recklessness, let alone malice, oppression, or fraud by incorporation of discussion here]; see also Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 450, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Regents of University v. Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 890, 903 [“California statutes and decisions … have been interpreted to bar the recovery of punitive damages in a wrongful death action”]; Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (d) [punitive damages allowed for death resulting only from a felony homicide for which defendant was convicted]; Bell v. Sharp Cabrillo Hosp. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1044 [“[T]o establish malice [or oppression or fraud], ‘it is not sufficient to show only that the defendant’s conduct was negligent, grossly negligent or even reckless’”]; Flyer’s Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1155 [same].)

With regard to the allegations that Hollywood Presbyterian withheld records from Hwa Sik Chung’s family to cover up the reasons for the death of Ms. Chung, the Court notes that such allegations—even if sufficient to plead malice, oppression, or fraud pursuant to Civil Code section 3294—are not the foundation for any of the Complaint’s three causes of action (see Complaint, ¶¶ 6-45, 46-57, 58-61; see also Complaint, ¶ 44 [only paragraph of three causes of action requesting damages based on malice, oppression, or fraud]), such that these allegations are unmoored from a legal theory upon which relief can be granted.

Under these circumstances, the Court cannot but GRANT Hollywood Presbyterian’s motion to strike punitive and exemplary damages from the Complaint, With Leave to Amend.

IV. Authorization or Ratification

Having granted the motion to strike on alternate grounds, the Court does not reach Hollywood Presbyterian’s authorization or ratification arguments on motion to strike. (See Strike Mot., 7:17-9:4.)

Conclusion

Defendant Cha Hollywood Medical Center, L.P.’s Demurrer to Complaint is OVERRULED.

Defendant Cha Hollywood Medical Center, L.P.’s Motion to Strike Punitive and Exemplary Damages from Complaint is GRANTED, With Leave to Amend, because the Complaint’s three causes of action, as pleaded or by operation of law, do not provide adequate grounds for such an award.

Plaintiffs Am Chung— individually and as successor-in-interest for Hwa Sik Chung—Peter Chung, Paul Chung, and Hannah Ahn are provided FOURTEEN (14) DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND the Complaint.