Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 22STCV25524, Date: 2023-03-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV25524    Hearing Date: March 29, 2023    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

MOVING PARTY:              Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

OPPOSITION:                      Plaintiff Crystal Nasha Rodgers.

Background Allegations

Pro per Plaintiff Nasha Rodgers sues Defendants iMortgage Inc. and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. et al. pursuant to a single claim of Breach of Contract seeking to challenge the enforceability of a home loan (“Loan”) she received in relation to the real property otherwise known as 610 W. Cypress St., Compton, CA 90220 (“Property”), in part because it was held by iMortgage and then transferred to Wells Fargo without her authorization, leading to threats of foreclosure against Plaintiff Rodgers.

Defendant Wells Fargo demurs to the Complaint’s sole cause of action on the grounds that: “(i) plaintiff has failed to name a necessary party—co-borrower Roberto Bueno; (ii) the cause of action is barred, in whole or in part, by res judicata; and (iii) the complaint does not state sufficient facts to state a cause of action. C.C.P. § 430.10(d), (e).”

The demurrer was unopposed by Plaintiff Rodgers as of the original hearing date of March 13, 2023.

At the March 13, 2023 hearing, Plaintiff Rodgers represented to the Court her intention to provide an oral opposition to the demurrer. The Court received her argument and continued the hearing on the demurrer to March 29, 2023 to provide Plaintiff with time to file and serve her opposition in writing.

Plaintiff Rodgers filed her opposition on March 15, 2023.

Defendants have not made a responsive filing.

Request for Judicial Notice

The Court TAKES Judicial Notice of the Deeds of Trust, Docket for United States District Court, Central District Case No. 2:19-cv-08811-DSF-AFR (“Central District Case”), the Complaint, FAC, SAC, Motion to Dismiss the SAC, Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, and Judgment in the Central District Case. (Demurrer, RJN; Evid. Code, §§ 452, subds. (d), (h), 453.)

Demurrer: SUSTAINED, With Prejudice.

Legal Standard

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747; see Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) This device can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a [general] demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) In testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-67.) A demurrer, however, “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228, disapproved on other grounds, Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1162.) The face of the complaint includes exhibits attached to the complaint. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.) If facts appearing in the exhibits contradict those alleged, the facts in the exhibits take precedence. (Holland v. Morse Diesel Intern., Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1447.)

Analysis

In relevant part, Wells Fargo demurs to the Complaint in this action on the grounds that an identical lawsuit was filed by Plaintiff Rodgers on July 23, 2019, removed to federal court, and there was dismissed with prejudice upon a motion to dismiss made by Wells Fargo. (Demurrer, 9:16-10:20.)

“Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them.” (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896.) A cause of action is composed of a primary right— “the plaintiff’s right to be free from the particular injury suffered”—which is distinguished from the legal theory or relief alleged. (Id. at p. 904.) The doctrine applies “if (1) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; (2) the present proceeding is on the same cause of action as the prior proceeding; and (3) the parties in the present proceeding or parties in privity with them were parties to the prior proceeding.” (Federation of Hillside & Canyon Associations v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 126 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1202.) “Upon satisfaction of these conditions, claim preclusion bars ‘not only issues that were actually litigated but also issues that could have been litigated.’” (Planning and Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water Agency (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 210, 226 [quoting Federation of Hillside & Canyon Associations, supra, at p. 1202; Villacres v. ABM Industries Inc. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 562, 576.) The party asserting it must establish these elements. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.)

A general demurrer lies where claim preclusion applies. (See Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 788, 792 [plaintiff’s wrongful death action barred by her prior voluntary dismissal of loss of consortium action against same defendant]; Shine v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1070, 1076-77 [court properly took judicial notice of “pleading, settlement agreement, and stipulated judgment of dismissal” in earlier class action to sustain demurrer on res judicata grounds in new class action].)

Wells Fargo argues that “[t]he crux of this action is the same as the crux of the First Action”—i.e., the Central District Case—because “[i]n both suits, Plaintiff has sued Wells Fargo claiming that it cannot enforce the Loan” and because “the primary right in this suit and the First Action [Central District Case] concerned enforcement of the Loan and foreclosure of the Property.” (Demurrer, 9:18-21, 10:15-20 [citing pages 27 and 28 of the Complaint in this action]; Demurrer, RJN, Exs. F [SAC in Central District Case], H [dismissal order, with prejudice], I [judgment in Central District Case].)

Plaintiff Rodgers’s March 15, 2023 opposition fails to address these points, instead focusing its Argument section on whether the Complaint states the elements for a breach of contract claim as premised on California Commercial Code section 3311, subdivision (a). (See Opp’n, 14:5-16 [breach of contract elements argument]; see also Opp’n generally [no mention of res judicata, and no mention of whether dismissal with prejudice functions as judgment on the merits for the purpose of res judicata other than quote at page 12, lines 18 to 21, stating “[a]ny comment, brief, request, or notice made by an attorney are statements of counsel in brief or in argument are not sufficient to dismiss nor for summary judgment, nor can a BAR Attorney represent a registered piece of paper or legal fiction Artificial person corporation such as a bank as a foreign agent, because the Attorney is either a Foreign BAR Attorney or a hearsay third party witness” (emphasis removed)].)

The Court agrees with Wells Fargo and finds Plaintiff’s oppositions fails to advance grounds for the Court to find otherwise.

First, the dismissal of the Central District Case was final and on the merits. (See Demurrer, RJN, Ex. H; see also Kim v. Reins Int’l Cal., Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 91 [“A dismissal with prejudice is considered a judgment on the merits preventing subsequent litigation between the parties on the dismissed claim”].)

Second, the instant case involves the same causes of action—i.e., primary rights—as the Central District Case. Though difficult to parse through, the Complaint in this action essentially alleges breach of contract harm to Plaintiff Rodgers based on the sale of a Loan, which was originated by iMortgage Inc. and later sold to Wells Fargo, leading to threats of foreclosure against her on the Property. (Complaint, pp. 2-5, § 2, ¶¶ 1-7 [transfer of Loan] & p. 28, ¶¶ 30, 32 & p. 51, Affidavit of Denial, ¶ 13 [foreclosure].) The SAC filed in the Central District Case concerns the same issues under claims of fraud and breach of contract. (See Demurrer, RJN, Ex. 6, ¶¶ 16 [fraud by way of Wells Fargo accepting deed of trust for the Property and eventual foreclosure due to lack of alleged notice of transfer of debtor’s responsibilities], 23-25 [harm by way of transfer of Loan from iMortgage to other entities, leading to foreclosure].) These similarities in pleading connote the same “primary right” because the Complaint in this action and the SAC in the Central District Case involve allegations related to Plaintiff Rodgers’s right to be free from harm resulting from the transfer of her Loan from iMortgage to Wells Fargo and foreclosure proceedings arising thereafter. To the extent the tangential claims are raised in the Complaint for this action, those issues should have been brought in the Central District Case in the first instance. (Planning and Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water Agency, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 226 [“[C]laim preclusion bars ‘not only issues that were actually litigated but also issues that could have been litigated’”].)

Third, the lawsuits involve the same parties. (Compare Complaint, 1:11-17 [Rodgers suing Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. in addition to iMortgage], with Demurrer, RJN, Ex. G, SAC in Central District Case [Rodgers suing Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, a division of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.].)

These findings lead the Court to conclude that res judicata bars the bringing of this action by Plaintiff Rodgers, for which reason the Court SUSTAINS Wells Fargo’s Demurrer, With Prejudice. Nothing in Plaintiff’s opposition leads the Court to conclude otherwise, particularly where the opposition fails to argue res judicata.

Conclusion

Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint is SUSTAINED, With Prejudice, because principles of res judicata bar Plaintiff Nasha Rodgers from bringing her Complaint in this action.