Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 22STCV26281, Date: 2023-03-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV26281    Hearing Date: March 14, 2023    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

Background

Plaintiffs Lorena Flores Briones, Melvin Ramirez Fuentes, Digna Estefania Ramirez, Melvin Ricardo Ramirez, Angie Loreizy Ramirez, and Dylan Isaac Ramirez (“Plaintiffs”) bring this habitability suit against Defendant Jose Torres pursuant to Plaintiffs’ operative August 25, 2022 First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleging seven claims against Defendant Torres: (1) Tortious Breach of Warranty of Habitability; (2) Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment; (3) Nuisance [Negligence]; (4) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; (5) Negligent Maintenance of the Premises; (6) Nuisance [Intentional Tort]; and (7) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. The claims are premised on allegations that the Plaintiffs—a family of five with three minors—reside in premises rented from Defendant Torres and located at 8704 South Central Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90002 (the “Subject Property”), property which contains numerous health and safety violations that include, but are not limited to, vermin infestations including cockroaches, bedbugs, and rats, as well as mold, which have caused injuries and damages to Plaintiffs, and which have been reported to Defendant Torres, who has either, intentionally or negligently, responded ineffectively or not at all to these concerns.

Now before the Court is Defendant Torres’ opposed (1) Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint’s seven causes of action on sufficiency and uncertainty grounds and (2) Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint related to allegations of and prayers for punitive damages and attorney’s fees.

Demurrer: OVERRULED in part and SUSTAINED in part.

Sufficiency Standard [Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (e)]

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747; see Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) This device can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a [general] demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) In testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-67.) A demurrer, however, “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228, disapproved on other grounds, Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1162.) The face of the complaint includes exhibits attached to the complaint. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.) If facts appearing in the exhibits contradict those alleged, the facts in the exhibits take precedence. (Holland v. Morse Diesel Intern., Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1447.)

Uncertainty Standard [Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (f)]

A demurrer to a pleading lies where the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (f).) “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) As a result, a special demurrer for uncertainty is not intended to reach failure to incorporate sufficient facts in the pleading but is directed only at uncertainty existing in the allegations already made. (People v. Taliaferro (1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 822, 825.) Where complaint is sufficient to state a cause of action and to apprise defendant of issues he is to meet, it is not properly subject to a special demurrer for uncertainty. (See ibid.; see also Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643 [“[a] special demurrer [for uncertainty] should be overruled where the allegations of the complaint are sufficiently clear to apprise the defendant of the issues which he is to meet”].)

First Cause of Action, Tortious Breach of Warranty of Habitability: SUSTAINED, With Leave to Amend.

The elements of an affirmative cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability are (1) a material defective condition affecting the habitability of the premises, (2) notice to the landlord within a reasonable time after the tenant’s discovery of the substandard condition, (3) the landlord was given a reasonable time to remedy the condition, and (4) resulting damages. (Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1297; Quevedo v. Braga (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 7-8.)

The FAC’s first cause of action alleges breach of warranty of habitability against Defendant Torres on the grounds that the Subject Property is infested with vermin, including cockroaches, bedbugs, and rats, as well as mold, that these conditions have been reported to Defendant Torres, that Defendant Torres has failed to remediate these conditions, and that the Plaintiffs have suffered damages therethrough. (FAC, ¶¶ 18 [defective conditions], 27 [incorporation], 28-33 [habitability cause of action and elements].)

In his demurrer, Defendant Torres argues that this claim is defectively pleaded because the FAC merely contains “boilerplate conclusory allegations and nothing else,” i.e., “Plaintiffs do not … state basic facts such as when the alleged issues began, when Defendant was notified and when Defendant responded,” where the Plaintiffs’ “allegations that Defendant ‘responded ineffectively’ suggests that Defendant did in fact respond,” but where such pleadings “cannot discern what was ineffective about Defendant’s response” or inform “whether Defendant was given a reasonable amount of time to correct the alleged problems because Plaintiffs do not include any information about this.” (Demurrer, 5:9-15.)

In opposition, the Plaintiffs argue that the FAC adequately pleads “an ongoing cockroach infestation, a bedbug infestation, and a rat infestation of the subject property, all of which are uninhabitable conditions in breach of California Civil Code§ 1941.l(a)(6),” as well as “complaints to Defendant about the vermin infestations and Defendants’ failure to respond effectively or at all” with “Defendant ha[ving] both actual and constructive knowledge of the infestation.” (Opp’n to Demurrer, 6:7-12.)

In reply, Defendant Torres argues that the FAC is pleaded conclusorily as to all claims—including, of necessity, habitability—and that the FAC does not contain sufficient factual detail to determine, for example, the amount of vermin on premises or whether Torres was given a reasonable amount of time to cure the deficiencies. (Reply for Demurrer, 2:3-20.)

The Court finds that the FAC’s first cause of action is sufficiently pleaded because the factual detail that Defendant seeks can be obtained by discovery and there is no contention that this cause of action requires heightened pleading, such as a fraud claim. For this reason, the demurrer is OVERRULED as to this claim.

Second Cause of Action, Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment: OVERRULED.

The implied covenant of quiet enjoyment implies a term in a contract, and breach of the covenant gives rise to an action in contract. (Ginsberg v. Gamson (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 873, 896.) The implied covenant of quiet enjoyment is breached when there is an eviction, actual or constructive, of the tenant. (Marchese v. Standard Realty & Dev. Co. (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 142, 148.) Actual eviction occurs when there is an expulsion or ouster of the tenant by the landlord. (Giraud v. Milovich (1938) 29 Cal.App.2d 543.) Constructive eviction occurs when there is a substantial and material interference with the tenant’s beneficial use and enjoyment of the premises, causing the tenant to either vacate the premises (Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903), or elect to stand upon the lease, remain in possession, and sue for breach of contract damages as well as injunctive relief (Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 578, 590). Minor inconveniences and annoyances are not actionable. (Id. at pp. 589-90.)

The second cause of action pleads breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment based on the presence of vermin and mold in the Subject Property, which Defendant Torres was aware of and failed to remedy, thus interfering with the Plaintiffs’ quiet enjoyment of their rental property and causing Plaintiffs damages. (FAC, ¶¶ 18 [vermin and mold allegations], 36 [incorporation], 38-41 [cause of action and elements].)

In his demurrer, Defendant Torres argues that the second cause of action fails to adequately state a quiet enjoyment claim because Plaintiffs “have … presented [no] … [alleged] facts” “showing how the conditions of the subject property were so pervasive and existed for such a time that [Plaintiffs] could be actually or constructively evicted.” (Demurrer, 5:24-27.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the FAC sufficiently pleads allegations that “[l]iving with long-term cockroach, bedbug, and rat infestations with cockroaches in their food, their refrigerator, crawling across their bodies at night; with bedbugs biting them, with rats invading their home, causing Plaintiffs emotional distress, depression, [and] anxiety [did] not allow Plaintiffs [to have] ‘quiet enjoyment and possession of the premises.’” (Opp’n to Demurrer, 7:9-13.) (The Court briefly notes that the FAC does not allege the presence of vermin in the Plaintiffs’ food or refrigerator, or that such vermin crawled on the Plaintiffs’ bodies at night.)

In reply, Defendant Torres argues that the FAC is pleaded conclusorily as to all claims—including, of necessity, quiet enjoyment—and that the FAC does not contain sufficient factual detail to determine, for example, the amount of vermin on premises or whether Torres was given a reasonable amount of time to cure the deficiencies. (Reply for Demurrer, 2:3-20.)

The Court finds that the FAC’s second cause of action is sufficiently pleaded because an infestation of vermin or mold within a rental property that the landlord fails to rectify could adequately be described as “a substantial and material interference with the tenant’s beneficial use and enjoyment of the premises.” For this reason, the demurrer is OVERRULED as to this claim.

Third Cause of Action, Nuisance [Negligence]: OVERRULED.

“A nuisance may be either a negligent or an intentional tort.” (Stoiber v. Honeychuck, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at p. 920.) In order to state a claim for private nuisance, Plaintiff must allege (1) “an interference with his use and enjoyment of his property,” (2) “the invasion of the plaintiff’s interest in the use and enjoyment of the land must be substantial, i.e., that it causes the plaintiff to suffer substantial actual damage,” and (3) “the interference with the protected interest must not only be substantial, but it must also be unreasonable [], i.e., it must be of such a nature, duration or amount as to constitute unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the land.” (Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners, LLC (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 248, 262-63 [brackets, emphasis, and quotation marks omitted].)

The third cause of action alleges negligent nuisance against Defendant Torres by alleging that the conditions of vermin and mold substantially and unreasonably interfered with the Plaintiffs’ use of the Subject Property. (FAC, ¶¶ 18 [vermin and mold allegations], 42 [incorporation], 46-51 [cause of action and elements].)

In his demurrer, Defendant Torres argues that the negligent (and intentional) nuisance claim fails because the FAC fails to plead, beyond conclusions of fact, when, between April 2020—when the Plaintiffs moved in to the Subject Property—and August 2022—when the original complaint for this action was filed—the deficiencies in the rental arose, how the deficiencies arose such given that the Plaintiffs could have been the source of the vermin and mold infestations, or when and how Defendant Torres was informed about and intentionally or negligently failed to respond to the deficiencies. (Demurrer, 6:10-7:3.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the third cause of action is properly pleaded because the FAC alleges “Defendant breached his duties and implied covenant of quiet enjoyment by failing to repair harmful and injurious conditions at the subject property,” “that as an actual and proximate result of these breaches, Plaintiffs suffered illness, physical injuries, mental stress, property damage, and further damages that constitute a substantial interference with Plaintiffs’ comfortable enjoyment of the property,” and “that the interference is unreasonable in its duration, nature, and amount.” (Opp’n to Demurrer, 7:23-8:2.)

In reply, Defendant Torres argues that the FAC is pleaded conclusorily as to all claims—including, of necessity, nuisance by negligence—and that the FAC does not contain sufficient factual detail to determine, for example, the amount of vermin on premises or whether Torres was given a reasonable amount of time to cure the deficiencies. (Reply for Demurrer, 2:3-20.)

The Court finds that the third cause of action is sufficiently pleaded. The presence of vermin that mold in the Subject Property and Defendant Torres’s negligent failure to remedy such deficiencies can reasonably be construed as a substantial and unreasonable interference with the Plaintiffs’ enjoyment of the Subject Property. For this reason, the demurrer is OVERRULED as to this claim.

Fourth Cause of Action, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: SUSTAINED, Without Leave to Amend.

The parties agree that the FAC’s fourth cause of action is duplicative of its fifth. (Mot., 7:4-19; Opp’n, 8:4-12.) The Court therefore SUSTAINS the demurrer as to the FAC’s NIED claim, without leave to amend.

Fifth Cause of Action, Negligent Maintenance of the Premises: OVERRULED.

“The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: [1] a legal duty of care, [2] breach of that duty, and [3] proximate cause [4] resulting in injury. Premises liability ‘“is grounded in the possession of the premises and the attendant right to control and manage the premises”‘; accordingly, ‘“mere possession with its attendant right to control conditions on the premises is a sufficient basis for the imposition of an affirmative duty to act.”‘ But the duty arising from possession and control of property is adherence to the same standard of care that applies in negligence cases. In determining whether a premises owner owes a duty to persons on its property, we apply the Rowland [Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561]] factors. Indeed, Rowland itself involved premises liability.’” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1159 [citations omitted].)

The fifth cause of action alleges negligent maintenance of the premises against Defendant Torres on the grounds that Defendant Torres owed a duty to the Plaintiffs as their landlord, breached that duty by failing to remedy the vermin and mold infestations in the Subject Property, and thereby caused the Plaintiffs damages, including illness, physical injury, mental stress, emotional distress, anxiety, annoyance, discomfort, and property damage. (FAC, ¶¶ 18 [vermin and mold allegations], 59 [incorporation], 60-64 [cause of action and elements].)

In his demurrer, Defendant Torres argues that this claim is insufficiently pleaded because “we do not even know [through the pleadings] what Defendant’s actions or inactions were” where the FAC “offers no [pleaded] facts for when plaintiffs first discovered the deficiencies, when they notified Defendant, when Defendant responded, or what the response was,” “[w]ithout which information, it cannot be said that Defendant negligently maintained the premises.” (Demurrer, 8:1-4.)

In opposition, the Plaintiffs argue that “Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendant owes a duty of care under common law and California Civil Code§ 1714 in the management of the subject property to avoid unreasonable risk of harm to others, “ “Defendant[] breach[ed] … that duty by failing to correct the substandard conditions at the subject property and by failing to supervise those who operate and maintain the building,” and Plaintiffs sustained damages “in the value of their leasehold,” as well as “suffering emotional distresses, and in sustaining property damage.” (Opp’n to Demurrer, 8:17-24.)

In reply, Defendant Torres argues that the FAC is pleaded conclusorily as to all claims—including, of necessity, negligent maintenance of the premises—and that the FAC does not contain sufficient factual detail to determine, for example, the amount of vermin on premises or whether Torres was given a reasonable amount of time to cure the deficiencies. (Reply for Demurrer, 2:3-20.)

The Court finds that the fifth cause of action is sufficiently pleaded because the claim pleads a landlord-tenant relationship, where Defendant Torres was informed about and negligently failed to remedy conditions of vermin and mold in the Subject Property, thereby causing damages to the Plaintiffs. For this reason, the demurrer is OVERRULED as to this claim.

Sixth Cause of Action, Nuisance [Intentional Tort]: SUSTAINED, With Leave to Amend.

“A nuisance may be either a negligent or an intentional tort.” (Stoiber v. Honeychuck, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at p. 920.) In order to state a claim for private nuisance, Plaintiff must allege (1) “an interference with his use and enjoyment of his property,” (2) “the invasion of the plaintiff’s interest in the use and enjoyment of the land must be substantial, i.e., that it causes the plaintiff to suffer substantial actual damage,” and (3) “the interference with the protected interest must not only be substantial, but it must also be unreasonable [], i.e., it must be of such a nature, duration or amount as to constitute unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the land.” (Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners, LLC, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th 248, 262-63 [brackets, emphasis, and quotation marks omitted].)

The sixth cause of action in the FAC pleads intentional nuisance on the grounds that the presence of vermin and mold in the Subject Property and Defendant Torres’s intentional failure to remedy the deficiencies substantially and unreasonably interfered with the Plaintiffs’ enjoyment of the Subject Property. (FAC, ¶¶ 18 [vermin and mold allegations], 65 [incorporation], 66-76 [cause of action and elements].)

In his demurrer, Defendant Torres argues that the intentional (and negligent) nuisance claim fails because the FAC fails to plead, beyond conclusions of fact, when, between April 2020—when the Plaintiffs moved in to the Subject Property—and August 2022—when the original complaint for this action was filed—the deficiencies in the rental arose, how the deficiencies arose given that the Plaintiffs could have been the source of the vermin and mold infestations, or when and how Defendant Torres was informed about and intentionally or negligently failed to respond to the deficiencies. (Demurrer, 6:10-7:3.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the FAC sufficiently pleads intentional nuisance on the grounds that the third and sixth causes of action are not duplicative because the mental state required for each tort is different, because the sixth cause of action relies on intentional conduct allegations, and because the remedies for intentional and negligent nuisance differ. (Opp’n to Demurrer, 9:2-20.)

In reply, Defendant Torres argues that the FAC is pleaded conclusorily as to all claims—including, of necessity, intentional nuisance—and that the FAC does not contain sufficient factual detail to determine, for example, the amount of vermin on premises or whether Torres was given a reasonable amount of time to cure the deficiencies. (Reply for Demurrer, 2:3-20.)

The Court finds that the sixth cause of action is not sufficiently pleaded because the allegations in the FAC do not sufficiently explain how Defendant Torres intentionally failed to remedy the infestations of vermin and mold in the Subject Premises. For this reason, the Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the intentional nuisance claim, With Leave to Amend.

Seventh Cause of Action, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: SUSTAINED, With Leave to Amend.

“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.’ A defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ And the defendant’s conduct must be ‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-51.)

In his demurrer, Defendant Torres argues that the FAC’s IIED claim is not sufficiently pleaded because of the contradiction in pleading negligence and intentional tort causes of action based on the same facts, because the FAC fails to demonstrate Defendant Torres acted intentionally in failing to remedy any vermin infestation in the Subject Property, because the FAC is full of conclusions of fact rather than facts explaining how Defendant Torres intended to cause the conditions complained of, and because the FAC is vague and uncertain as to Defendant Torres’s response to Plaintiffs’ complaints of vermin and mold infestation in the Subject Premises. (Demurrer, 8:8-11, 8:28-9:14.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the seventh cause of action is sufficiently pleaded because Plaintiffs may plead inconsistent causes of action, because the FAC’s allegations that Defendant Torres abused his position as landlord by failing to abate the deficient conditions—i.e., vermin and mold in the Subject Property—is outrageous conduct, and because the FAC pleads intentional conduct. (Opp’n to Demurrer, 9:24-10:12, 11:14-21.)

In reply, Defendant Torres argues that the FAC is pleaded conclusorily as to all claims—including, of necessity, IIED—and that the FAC does not contain sufficient factual detail to determine, for example, the amount of vermin on premises or whether Torres was given a reasonable amount of time to cure the deficiencies. (Reply for Demurrer, 2:3-20.)

The Court finds that the seventh cause of action is insufficiently pleaded because the FAC does not sufficiently plead beyond conclusions of fact how Defendant Torres intentionally failed to remedy the deficient conditions alleged in the Subject Property. For this reason, the Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the IIED claim, With Leave to Amend.

Motion to Strike: GRANTED, in Full.

Legal Standard

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz¿(1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].) However, Courts have noted that a motion to strike should be applied cautiously and sparingly because it is used to strike substantive defects. (PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1682-83.) A party cannot use a motion to strike as a “line-item veto.” (Id. at p. 1683 [“We emphasize that such use of the motion to strike should be cautious and paring” and “have no intention of creating a procedure ‘line-item veto’ for the civil defendant”].)

For the purposes of a motion to strike pursuant to Sections 435 to 437 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the term “pleading” means a demurrer, answer, complaint, or cross-complaint, (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (a)), and an immaterial allegation or irrelevant matter in a pleading entails (1) an allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense, (2) an allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense, or (3) a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subds. (b)(1)-(3)).

Punitive Damages Allegations and Prayer: GRANTED.

The FAC contains allegations supporting, and prayers related to, punitive damages, which Defendant Torres seeks to strike. (See Strike Mot., Notice, pp. 2-3, ¶¶ 1, 3-10, 17.)

In support of this position, Defendant Torres argues that: (1) “[t]he allegations that plaintiffs experienced bed bugs in their apartment during their tenancy at the subject property, without further factual allegations (rather than conclusions) to support a claim for punitive damages, falls far short of the requirement to plead reprehensible or despicable conduct”; (2) “plaintiffs still have not offered any facts supporting their position that defendants knowingly or willingly engaged in conduct to harm plaintiffs”; (3) “Plaintiffs have not pled facts to establish that defendant was actually aware of a bedbug issue or any other issue before plaintiffs complained of the issue,” (4) “[t]he alleged failure to remedy mold problems amounts to negligence, at most”; (5) “Plaintiffs cannot invent facts by merely inserting boilerplate language claiming that something is malicious or oppressive”; and (6) “there are no allegations demonstrating intent of any kind to injure plaintiffs.” (Strike Mot., 2:5-4:28.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the claims of breach of warranty of habitability, intentional nuisance, and IIED support punitive damages. (Opp’n to Strike Mot., 5:9-6:17.)

In reply, Defendant Torres generally argues that Plaintiffs’ FAC fails to state any facts showing intentional, oppressive, or malicious conduct supporting punitive damages. (Reply for Strike Mot., 2:1-23.)

The Court finds that the FAC fails to plead sufficient grounds for punitive damages because the three possible grounds for such relief—breach of habitability, intentional nuisance, and IIED claims—failed on demurrer (see discussion ante) and thus cannot support allegations of or prayers for punitive damages. Defendant Torres’s motion to strike is thus GRANTED as to the challenged punitive damages allegations and prayers. (See Strike Mot., Notice, pp. 2-3, ¶¶ 1, 3-10, 17.)

Attorney’s Fees Allegations and Prayer: GRANTED.

The FAC contains allegations supporting, and prayers related to, attorney’s fees, which Defendant Torres seeks to strike. (See Strike Mot., Notice, pp. 2-3, ¶¶ 2, 11-16, 18.)

Defendant Torres moves to strike such pleadings and prayers on the grounds that the FAC fails to cite a contract, statute, or law entitling Plaintiffs to attorney’s fees in this action. (Strike Mot., 5:4-8.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the rental agreement between the parties—which Plaintiffs admit they failed to include in the FAC—provides for attorney’s fees in the event of legal proceedings between the Plaintiffs and Defendant Torres. (Opp’n to Strike Mot., 6:18-26, Ex. 1.)

In reply, Defendant Torres reiterates that the FAC fails to plead an adequate basis for fees but does not dispute the rental agreement attached to the opposition. (Reply for Strike Mot., 3:2.)

The Court finds that the FAC failed to properly plead that the parties’ rental agreement allows for the recovery of attorney’s fees in the event of a lawsuit between the parties. The Court also finds that Plaintiffs’ failure to attach the rental agreement to the FAC or file an errata notice amending the FAC to attach the rental agreement thereto fatally undercuts the position that the FAC, either its pleadings or attached exhibits, supports allegations and prayers for attorney’s fees. Defendant Torres’s motion to strike is thus GRANTED as to attorney’s fees allegations and prayers made in the FAC. (See Strike Mot., Notice, pp. 2-3, ¶¶ 2, 11-16, 18.)

Conclusion

Defendant Jose Torres’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint is OVERRULED in Part and SUSTAINED in Part:

(1) OVERRULED as to the FAC’s first, second, third, and fifth causes of action;

(2) SUSTAINED, With Leave to Amend, as to the FAC’s sixth and seventh causes of action; and

(3) SUSTAINED, Without Leave to Amend, as to the FAC’s fourth cause of action.

Defendant Jose Torres’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint is GRANTED in Full as to the FAC’s allegations and prayers related to attorney’s fees and punitive damages.