Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 22STCV28634, Date: 2023-05-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV28634 Hearing Date: May 4, 2023 Dept: 40
RUKLI, INC., a California corporation, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF BALDWIN PARK; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants, ______________________________________ CITY OF BALDWIN PARK, a municipal corporation, Cross-Complainant, v. RUKLI, INC, a California corporation, Cross-Defendants. |
Case No.: 22STCV28634 Hearing Date: 5/4/23 Trial Date: 4/30/24 [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant
Rukli, Inc.’s Motion Pursuant to CCP 473 and CCP Section 2031.300 for Relief
from Waiver of Objections to Request for Production. |
Plaintiff Rukli, Inc. sues
Defendant City of Baldwin Park and Does 1 through 50 pursuant to a September 1,
2022 Complaint seeking declaratory judgment providing that (1) a 2021 settlement
agreement between the parties is void and unenforceable due to the City’s
nonperformance of contractual terms in a 2021 settlement agreement between the
parties—e.g., failure to issue a cannabis cultivation and manufacturing
license—for which reason the parties are returned to the positions they were in
before the 2021 settlement agreement was executed and (2) in light of the City’s
nonperformance, Rukli does not owe the City any fees for cannabis cultivation
and manufacturing licenses mandated by the parties’ 2021 settlement agreement.
The City of Baldwin Park, in turn,
sues Rukli pursuant to a November 4, 2022 First Amended Cross-Complaint (FAXC)
alleging claims of (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Maintenance of Nuisance, (3)
Declaratory Relief – Length or Term of 2021 Settlement Agreement, (4)
Declaratory Relief – Determination of Distribution Permit Fee Under the [2021]
Settlement Agreement, (5) Declaratory Relief – Determination of Ongoing
Validity of [2018] Development Agreement, if Plaintiff [Rukli] is Entitled to
Void the [2021] Settlement Agreement, and (6) Declaratory Relief –
Determination of Meaning of Term “Distributor” Under the [2021] Settlement
Agreement.
On January 28, 2023, the City of
Baldwin Park served Plaintiff Rukli with Request for Production, Set 2.
Plaintiff Rukli failed to respond
thereto within the statutorily prescribed time of 30 days.
On March 16, 2023, Rukli served
verified responses to Request for Production, Set 2.
On the same day, Rukli made a
motion for relief from waiver of objections to Request for Production, Set 2
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 473 and 2031.300.
On April 21, 2023, the City of
Baldwin Park opposed the motion.
On April 27, 2023, Rukli replied to
the April 21st opposition.
The motion for relief from waiver
of objections is now before the Court.
I. Waiver Pursuant to
Code Civ. Proc., § 473
Legal Standard
California courts must vacate any
default, default judgment, dismissal, or other proceeding entered against an
attorney’s client whenever an application for relief is made no more than six
months after entry of the relevant order, is in proper form, and is accompanied
by the attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or neglect, unless the court finds that the fault was
not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
neglect. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).)
The broad language of Section 473,
subdivision (b)—i.e., “judgment, dismissal, order, or other
proceeding”—includes discovery proceedings. (See Zellerino v. Brown
(1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1097, 1104-1106.) However, where California Discovery Act
provisions apply to issues relating to “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
neglect,” relief cannot be obtained under Section 473, subdivision (b) because
the Legislature’s use of Section 473’s language indicates its intent that
relief be obtained under Discovery Act provisions and not under Code of Civil Procedure
Section 473, subdivision (b). (Id. at p. 1107; Scottsdale Ins. Co. v.
Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 263, 274-275.) For example, the
Discovery Act provides for relief like that provided by Section 473,
subdivision (b) in relation to a responding party’s failure to timely respond
to a propounding party’s request for responses to interrogatories (Code Civ.
Proc., §§ 2030.290, subds. (a)(1)-(2)), requests for production (2031.300,
subds. (a)(1)-(2)), or a request for admission (2033.290, subds. (a)(1)-(2)).
Analysis
Relief pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) is not here available because relief
pursuant to this statutory section is not available for discovery proceedings
where similar relief is provided by the Discovery Act. (Zellerino v. Brown,
supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 1107; Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Superior
Court, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at pp. 274-275.) Similar relief is
provided by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.300. (Code Civ. Proc., §
2031.300, subds. (a)(1)-(2).) This motion is therefore DENIED insofar as it is
premised on Code of Civil Procedure section 473.
II. Waiver Pursuant
to Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300
Legal Standard
A party that fails to timely
respond to interrogatories, requests for production, or requests for admission
waives all objections to these discovery requests. (Code Civ. Proc., §§
2030.290 [interrogatories], subd. (a), 2031.300, subd. (a) [production],
2033.290, subd. (a) [admission requests].) The court, on motion, may relieve
that party from its waiver on the court’s determination that: (1) the party has
subsequently served a response that is in substantial compliance with the
Discovery Act, and (2) the party’s failure to serve a timely response was the
result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. (Code Civ. Proc., §§
2030.290, subds. (a)(1)-(2) [interrogatories], 2031.300, subds. (a)(1)-(2)
[production], 2033.290, subds. (a)(1)-(2) [admission requests].)
Analysis
Plaintiff argues that while the
responses to the requests for production are late, the Court should grant
relief from waiver of objections, on the grounds that 1) the failure to respond
was an oversight and that plaintiff’s attorney Mr. Russo was in the middle of
meeting and conferring about a prior document request when a second set came
in; 2) that the second set of document requests was sent to him only and did
not copy his secretary, in contrast to “all the other emails” between the
parties in this case; 3) plaintiff’s counsel failed to forward the email to his
secretary; 4) the second set contains 92 new requests, many of which are
redundant of the first 35 requests; and 5) he subsequently served a set of
responses that substantially comply with the discovery code.
In opposition, the City argues that
1) the responses are not substantially compliant in a variety of ways; 2) Rukli’s
counsel’s “‘mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect’ is not justifiable”
because by his own admission, he “ignored” the email, blamed the City for not
copying his secretary, and was reminded about the discovery responses on March
2 and on subsequent occasions but failed to serve responses for another 14
days.
In reply, Rukli reiterates that the
failure to respond was inadvertent and notes that he filed substantially
compliant responses once he realized the mistake, rather than filing a motion
for protective order against what he believed to be excessive requests.
The Court will grant relief from
waiver of objections. There are times when it may be appropriate to hold a
party to their waiver of objections – where conduct is repeated, evasive, or in
bad faith -- but this is not that case. Indeed
the words and phrase “inadvertent,” “mistake,” and “excusable neglect” well
define what happened here: counsel made a mistake, which he quickly corrected. Filing
the responses within a two-week time period of being notified of his error is
more than reasonable. It can take time to speak with one’s client and formulate
a reasonable response, especially given that a lawyer seldom has only a single
case to attend to. Had Mr. Russo been required to respond more quickly he
likely would have been forced to simply file objections which the City
certainly would not have taken kindly.
Moreover, while the City points to
failings in Rukli’s responses that did not mirror the language required by the
Code, the Court agrees with Mr. Russo that he did provide substantially compliant
responses that permitted the City to know what his position was with respect to
each request. The fact that the City met and conferred and followed up to get further
responses does not translate to the kind of conduct that would justify denial
of this motion.
The Court must interpret the discovery code consistent with the spirit of the law and in a matter that serves the interests of justice and the policy favoring trial on the merits. (St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 783-784.) Any doubts as to the showing of mistake, inadvertence or neglect must be resolved in favor of the moving party. (New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1420 [in the context of motion for relief from admissions to RFAs].) With such a standard in mind, the Court will grant the motion.
Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Rukli, Inc.’s Motion Pursuant to CCP 473 and CCP Section 2031.300 for Relief from Waiver of Objections to Request for Production is GRANTED.