Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 22STCV28634, Date: 2023-08-23 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 40 - JUDGE ANNE RICHARDSON - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
The Court issues tentative rulings on certain motions.The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) email Dept 40 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (smcdept40@lacourt.org) with a copy to the other party(ies) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no email is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. 

Case Number: 22STCV28634    Hearing Date: August 23, 2023    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

Background

Plaintiff Rukli, Inc. sues Defendant City of Baldwin Park and Does 1 through 50 pursuant to a September 1, 2022 Complaint seeking declaratory judgment providing that (1) a 2021 settlement agreement between the parties is void and unenforceable due to the City’s nonperformance of its contractual terms—e.g., failure to issue a cannabis cultivation and manufacturing license—for which reason the parties are returned to the positions they were in before the settlement agreement was executed and (2) in light of the City’s nonperformance, Rukli does not owe the City any fees for cannabis cultivation and manufacturing licenses mandated by the parties’ 2021 settlement agreement.

The City of Baldwin Park, in turn, sues Rukli pursuant to a November 4, 2022 First Amended Cross-Complaint.

In the morning of October 26, 2022, the Court—then assigned to Judge David Sotelo (Ret.)—heard argument on Rukli’s motion for preliminary injunction. Later that morning, the issued a minute order reflecting a ruling in favor of Rukli, Inc.

Later, in the afternoon of October 26, 2022 (at 3:36 p.m., to be exact), the Court issued a nunc pro tunc order amending the ruling on the preliminary injunction motion. The statements in the original order to be stricken by the nunc pro tunc order included:

“The City of Baldwin Park is prohibited from: (1) seeking any payments or monies from Rukli in connection with the $220,000 in fees mandated by the parties’ Settlement Agreement (as shown in 2022 invoice for Rukli); (2) seeking to enforce any provision of the Settlement Agreement not related to the remaining $115,000 in fees, to which the City of Baldwin appears to be lawfully entitled; and (3) interfering with the business of Rukli until final adjudication of this litigation, other than to collect the $115,000 in fees to which the City appears entitled and other lawfully entitled fees not related to the terms of the Settlement Agreement.”; and

“The City of Baldwin Park is prohibited from: (1) seeking any payments or monies from Rukli in connection with the $220,000 in fees mandated by the parties’ Settlement Agreement (as shown in 2022 invoice for Rukli); (2) seeking to enforce any provision of the Settlement Agreement not related to the remaining $50,000 in fees, to which the City of Baldwin appears to be lawfully entitled; and (3) interfering with the business of Rukli until final adjudication of this litigation, other than to collect the $50,000 in fees to which the City appears entitled and other lawfully entitled fees not related to the terms of the Settlement Agreement.”

(See 10/26/23 Nunc Pro Tunc Order, pp. 1-2; see also 10/16/23 Minutes, pp. 2 [first above quoted paragraph], 11-12 [second above quoted paragraph], emphasis added.)

The nunc pro tunc order changed both above statements to read:

“The City of Baldwin Park is prohibited from: (1) seeking any payments or monies from Rukli in connection with the $285,000 in fees mandated by the parties’ Settlement Agreement (as shown in 2022 invoice for Rukli); (2) seeking to enforce any provision of the Settlement Agreement not related to the remaining $50,000 in fees, to which the City of Baldwin appears to be lawfully entitled and counsel for Rukli conceded Rukli likely owes and will pay; and (3) interfering with the business of Rukli until final adjudication of this litigation, $50,000 fee to which the City appears entitled and other lawfully entitled fees not related to the terms of the Settlement Agreement.”

(See 10/26/23 Nunc Pro Tunc Order, pp. 2-3, emphasis added.)

The minutes and nunc pro tunc order directed Plaintiff Rukli to file a proposed order in conformity with the minutes and nunc pro tunc order.

On October 26, 2022, Plaintiff Rukli filed a proposed order for the October 26th ruling.

On October 27, 2023, the City of Baldwin Park filed its own proposed order, which states, in relevant part:

“The City of Baldwin Park is prohibited from: (1) seeking any payments of monies from Rukli in connection with the $220,000 in fees mandated by the parties’ Settlement Agreement (as shown in 2022 invoice for Rukli); (2) seeking to enforce any provision of the Settlement Agreement not related to the remaining $115,000 in fees, to which the City of Baldwin Park appears entitled; and (3) interfering with the business of Rukli until final adjudication of this litigation, other than to collect $115,000 in fees to which the City appears entitled and other lawfully entitled fees not related to the terms of the Settlement Agreement.”

(See 1/10/23 Order, p. 2.)

On January 10, 2023, the Court signed the proposed order filed by the City of Baldwin Park despite its inconsistency with the Court’s final ruling on the motion for preliminary injunction, as reflected in the October 26, 2022 minutes and modified by the October 26th nunc pro tunc order.

On January 18, 2023, Plaintiff Rukli filed an ex parte application to amend the January 10, 2023 order to conform with the changes made by the Court’s October 26, 2022 nunc pro tunc order.

On January 23, 2023, because Department 40 was dark, Department 32 heard the ex parte application and denied it.

In the early evening of January 23, 2023, Rukli filed a motion to correct the January 10, 2023 order to conform with the changes made by the October 26, 2022 nunc pro tunc order.

On May 30, 2023, the City of Baldwin Park opposed the January 23rd motion.

On June 1, 2023, Plaintiff Rukli replied to the opposition.

On June 12, 2023, the Court heard the motion to correct the January 10, 2023 order and granted the same, setting the January 10, 2023 order aside, and ‘signing and entering’ the proposed January 23, 2023 order by Plaintiff Rukli.

That same day, the Court issued a nunc pro tunc order, amending the Conclusion in the June 12th order to strike “[t]he proposed January 23, 2023 order is SIGNED and ENTERED” and add “[t]he proposed Order submitted by Rukli on October 26, 2022 is granted.”

The signed order reads:

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the City of Baldwin Park (‘City’) is prohibited from: (1) seeking any payments or monies from Rukli in connection with the $285,000 in fees mandated by the parties’ Settlement Agreement (as shown in 2022 invoice for Rukli); (2) seeking to enforce any provision of the Settlement Agreement not related to the remaining $50,000 in fees, to which the City of Baldwin appears to be lawfully entitled and counsel for Rukli conceded Rukli likely owes and will pay; and (3) interfering with the business of Rukli until final adjudication of this litigation, $50,000 fee to which the City appears entitled and other lawfully entitled fees not related to the terms of the Settlement Agreement. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an Undertaking be posted by Rukli in the amount of $10,000.00, no later than fourteen (14) calendar days from entry of this order.”

(See 6/12/23 Order, p. 2.)

On June 23, 2023, on various grounds, the City of Baldwin Park moved for reconsideration of the June 12, 2023 order.

On August 9, 2023, Plaintiff Rukli opposed the motion.

On August 16, 2023, the City of Baldwin Park replied to the opposition.

The motion for reconsideration is now before the Court.

Motion for Reconsideration

Legal Standard

A motion for reconsideration is used to ask the court to modify, amend, or revoke its earlier order on a prior motion to the court because of new or different facts, circumstances, or law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a).) Such an order may involve an interim or final order (see Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subds. (e), (h)), where an interim order is an intermediate ruling of some kind that requires further proceedings before the suit can be resolved, and where a final order is an order that finally disposes of the suit (see People v. DeLouize (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1223, 1231 [differentiating between interim and final orders]).

A motion for reconsideration may be brought by a party or by the court on its own motion. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subds. (a), (c).) The grounds for the motion vary depending on whether a party or the Court is making the motion. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subds. (a), (c), (e).)

A party may move for reconsideration based on: (1) new or different facts, (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a); see e.g., In re Marriage of LaMoure (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1473 [reconsideration motion granted on new evidence]); (2) new or different circumstances, (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a)); and (3) new or different law, (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a); Baldwin v. Home Sav. of Am. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1196.) However, a party cannot move for reconsideration based on the court’s erroneous order, i.e., the court’s misinterpretation of facts or law. (See Jones v. P.S. Dev. Co. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 707, 724, disapproved on other grounds by Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 531-532, 532 n. 4; Gilbert v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500.) Instead, a party can suggest to the court that it should reconsider its erroneous order on its own motion so long as the suggestion is not made ex parte. (Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1108; see e.g., In re Marriage of Spector (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 201, 214-15 [emails husband sent to court about erroneous order were not ex parte because wife was copied on all emails].)

By contrast, the Court has statutory authority to reconsider final orders and interim orders based on a change in law. (Civ. Proc., § 1008, subds. (c), (e).)

Order Granting Reconsideration: DENIED.

The City of Baldwin Park moves for reconsideration of the Court’s June 12, 2023 order based on two grounds: “different law” and “new and different facts.” (See 6/23/23 Reconsideration Mot., p. 11.)

After review, the Court finds that there is no reason why the issues raised by the City could not have been raised before the last hearing; but even assuming arguendo they could not, they are unavailing.

I. Diligence

A party’s presentation of “different facts” or “different law” in support of his or her motion for reconsideration of a prior judgment or order is insufficient to warrant reconsideration absent satisfactory explanation for the moving party’s failure to present the “different facts” or “different law” before the initial ruling. (See Baldwin v. Home Sav. of America (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1196-1200; see id. at p. 1199 (Baldwin) [For reconsideration based on new facts—and per Baldwin, new law—there is a “need to show a satisfactory explanation for failing to provide the evidence earlier, which can only be described as a strict requirement of diligence,” citation omitted].)

Here, the City of Baldwin Park seeks to raise “different law” and “different facts” as the grounds for its motion to reconsider the June 12, 2023 ruling by this Court. (See 6/23/23 Reconsideration Mot., p. 11.)

In its opposition to Plaintiff Rukli’s motion to correct the January 10, 2023 order (heard and ruled on June 12, 2023), the City of Baldwin Park failed to raise the arguments they now raise in their motion for reconsideration. (Compare 5/30/23 Opp’n, pp. 2-7, with 6/23/23 Reconsideration Mot., pp. 8-15.)

After a review of the City of Baldwin Park’s papers, the Court finds that such arguments could have been raised before the prior ruling, i.e., the June 12, 2023 order.

The City’s first ground for failure to bring their reconsideration arguments by the last hearing is that, at the June 12th hearing, Judge Richardson allegedly stated that the transcript of the October 26, 2022 hearing on the preliminary injunction motion left no clear ruling on that motion, which “surprised” City’s counsel so much that she “failed to point out that the lack of a clear oral ruling would preclude the remedy of CCP § 473(d).” (6/23/23 Reconsideration Mot., Sylva Decl., ¶ 8.) Such “surprise” based on a court’s ruling on a matter that is directly before it does not show a “satisfactory explanation for failing to provide the evidence earlier.” (Baldwin, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 1199.) This issue of what the Court ruled that day and whether it took the matter under submission was squarely presented by the City’s own papers which both attached and referred to the court’s transcript on 10/26/22. (See the City’s Opposition Brief filed May 30, 2023, at pp. 4-5.) If the basis for a section 1008 motion could be surprise that the Court ruled against a party, every motion would be subject to reconsideration.

The City’s next ground for failure to bring their reconsideration arguments by the last hearing is that the Court did not post a tentative ruling for the June 12th hearing one day prior thereto, for which reason City’s counsel was “surprised” by the Court’s determination that Judge Sotelo (Ret.) took the entire motion for preliminary injunction under submission on October 26, 2022,  and, had counsel known what the Court’s tentative ruling was going to be, City’s counsel would have given a different interpretation of the “under submission” comments made by Judge Sotelo (Ret.) at the October 26, 2022 hearing. (6/23/23 Reconsideration Mot., Sylva Decl., ¶ 9; see 5/30/23 Opp’n, Sylva Decl., Ex. A, pp. 8:27-9:5 [relevant portion of October 26, 2022 hearing transcript].) This argument is also without basis. There is no Code of Civil Procedure, California Rules of Court rule, or local rule requiring the posting of a tentative. As with the “surprise” argument, if the Court were to accept this “tentative ruling” argument, the floodgates would open for reconsideration whenever a Court did not post a tentative prior to a hearing. Moreover, it was incumbent City’s counsel to make all arguments relevant to the motion that was before the Court on June 12, 2023. And in any event, the minute order for the June 12, 2023 Order indicates at page 1 that, in fact, the Court did post its tentative ruling online in advance of the hearing (though not required to do so.)

The City makes the further argument that it failed to bring their reconsideration arguments before the last hearing because City’s counsel did not know before the Court’s June 12, 2023 ruling that the Court would sign a new order in relation to the preliminary injunction motion, which did not explain how a $50,000 police fee would be paid by Rukli to the City, making the order not sensible. (6/23/23 Reconsideration Mot., Sylva Decl., ¶ 10.) This argument lacks coherence since this Court was being asked not to rule on the initial preliminary injunction but rather, simply to rule on whether a correction to the Order was appropriate. It also fails on the merits. First, the City had a copy of the proposed order that the Court eventually signed because the proposed order was filed by Rukli on October 26, 2022 and was consistent with the Court’s nunc pro tunc order. (See 10/26/22 Proposed Order, Rukli.) Second, it is clear that if the City prevails in this action, then it will be able to request that the Court set aside any injunction and/or allow the City to collect due compensation.

The City’s next argument for failure to bring their reconsideration arguments by the last hearing is actually an argument that the Court should strike a non-dispositive portion of its June 12, 2023 ruling reading: “Any arguments made by the City of Baldwin Park in its opposition that the January 10, 2023 order should stand amount to nothing more than attempts to have this Court reconsider its October 26, 2022 ruling. The Court declines to so reconsider the determinations made in the nunc pro tunc order. Moreover, any reconsideration of the October 26, 2022 ruling is far beyond the 10-day statutory deadline set out in Code of Civil Procedure section 1008.” (See 6/12/23 Minutes, p. 4 [quoted language]; see also 6/23/23 Reconsideration Mot., Sylva Decl., ¶ 11 [challenging the quoted language].) The Court finds no reason to strike the quoted portions of its June 12, 2023 ruling. The Court agrees with the reasoning even now: an attempt by the City to argue that the initial October 26, 2022 minute order reflected Judge Sotelo’s ruling on the motion for preliminary injunction, as opposed to the October 26, 2022 minute order as modified by the nunc pro tunc order made that same day, is a request that this Court reconsider Judge Sotelo’s October 26, 2022 ruling, as modified by the nunc pro tunc order. And whether the 10 day period runs from October 26, 2022, or January 10, 2023, the time had clearly run by the time the City made these arguments for the first time in their opposition brief in May, 2023.

The City’s last argument for failure to bring their reconsideration arguments by the last hearing is that, only after the Court made its ruling on June 12, 2023 did the City’s counsel think to raise the argument that the October 26, 2022 minutes and nunc pro tunc order were not a “judgment or order directed” for the purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d) (the statutory basis for the Rukli’s January 23, 2023 motion to correct order before the Court on June 12, 2023). (6/23/23 Reconsideration Mot., Sylva Decl., ¶ 12.)  The Court sees no good reason advanced by counsel for why she did not raise that argument in the May 30, 2023 opposition or at the June 12, 2023 hearing. The issue was available at that time.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the City of Baldwin Park raised no grounds for determining that it acted with diligence in only now raising the “different law” and “different facts” grounds before the Court.

The Court therefore has ample grounds to deny this motion for this reason alone.

II. Merits

Nonetheless, the Court will consider the merits and concludes that the purported “different law” and purported “new and different” facts raised by the City of Baldwin Park do not compel a different result from that made by the Court on June 12, 2023.

“An order is the direction of a court or judge made or entered in writing and not included in a judgment. [Citation.]” (Kindig v. Palos Verdes Homes Assn (1939) 33 Cal.App.2d 349, 355.)

Here, on October 26, 2022, the Court took a motion under submission and thereafter issued a ruling on Plaintiff Rukli’s motion for preliminary injunction against the City of Baldwin Park’s attempt to collect $350,000 in fees from Rukli. This ruling was an order. (Ibid.)

Later that same day, the Court modified its order on the preliminary injunction motion through a nunc pro tunc order, which reflected the Court’s final disposition as to the motion for preliminary injunction.

On January 10, 2023, the Court entered a formal Order on the motion for preliminary injunction, which was filed by the City of Baldwin Park and failed to reflect the Court’s October 26, 2022 nunc pro tunc order, instead reflecting a portion of the order in the original October 26, 2022 minutes that the Court had specifically stricken in its nunc pro tunc order.

On January 23, 2023, Plaintiff Rukli moved to correct the January 10, 2023 order based on the Court’s October 26, 2022 nunc pro tunc order and pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d).

At the June 12, 2023 hearing, the Court granted Rukli’s motion, noting that the January 10, 2023 order—which was drafted by the City of Baldwin Park—did not reflect the Court’s final disposition as reflected by the Court’s nunc pro tunc order on October 26, 2022.

Put simply, on January 10, 2023, the Court posted an incorrect order that conflicted with the October 26, 2022 nunc pro tunc order, and the Court corrected that error on June 12, 2023 when it granted Plaintiff’s January 23, 2023 motion.

The City of Baldwin Park makes varied arguments for why the Court’s June 12, 2023 ruling should be reconsidered. (See 6/23/23 Reconsideration Mot., p. 11.) The Court disagrees with all these points.

As to points A through C—allegedly raising “different law” and essentially arguing that the October 26, 2022 minutes and nunc pro tunc order legally do not amount to a court order—the Court disagrees. The October 26, 2022 minutes and nunc pro tunc order comprised this Court’s order as to the motion for preliminary injunction. The order signed by the Court on January 10, 2023 was simply supposed to reflect the October 26, 2022 minutes and nunc pro tunc order. (See 10/26/22 Minutes, p. 12 [“Plaintiff Rukli is ORDERED to file a Proposed Order in conformity with this Minute Order in one (1) court day”]; 10/26/22 Nunc Pro Tunc Order [making modifications to disposition reached in 10/26/22 Minutes and ordering that “Plaintiff Rukli … file a Proposed Order in conformity with this Minute Order in one (1) court day”]; see also Kindig v. Palos Verdes Homes Assn, supra, 33 Cal.App.2d at p. 355.) The City’s comparison to Estate of Goldberg is unavailing because that case did not find that any minute order cannot reflect an order of the Court. (See Estate of Goldberg (1938) 10 Cal.2d 709.)

Point D, that a motion for reconsideration will run from the date of the formal order also purports to raise “different law.” However, at most, that argument is relevant only to whether a motion for reconsideration is timely, which is irrelevant to the question of whether the January 10, 2023 order signed by the Court did not correctly reflect the October 26, 2022 order of the Court, consisting of the minutes as modified by the nunc pro tunc order. (See 6/23/23 Reconsideration Mot., pp. 11 [argument summarized], 14 [argument elaborated].) The City never filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s 10/26/22 order, which was signed on 1/10/23. The Court concludes that the instant motion for reconsideration brought by the City is timely, even if otherwise meritless.

Points E and F—purporting to raise “new or different facts”—raise no new or different facts. The first of these ‘facts’—Point E arguing for a differing interpretation of Judge Sotelo’s comments related to taking the motion for preliminary injunction under submission—was available before the June 12, 2023 hearing and was not raised. (See 6/23/23 Reconsideration Mot., p. 11.) Moreover, the City fails to convince this Court that it did not correctly read the transcript for the October 26, 2022 hearing, at which time Judge Sotelo clearly indicated that the Court took under submission the global determination as to whether the City of Baldwin Park could seek to collect $350,000 from Rukli pursuant to the parties’ settlement agreement, and whether, if the City could not so collect this sum, Rukli should post bond. (See 5/30/23 Opp’n, Sylva Decl., Ex. A, pp. 8:27-9:5.) The second “fact”—Point F arguing a lack of minutes showing Judge Sotelo took the preliminary injunction motion under submission—is flat out incorrect. (See 6/23/23 Reconsideration Mot., pp. 11; see also 10/26/22 Minutes, p. 1 [“The Court having fully considered the arguments of all parties, both written and oral, as well as the evidence presented, takes the matter under submission” and “[l]ater, without counsel present the Court makes the following orders”].)

Point G—purporting to raise “new or different facts”—argues that the June 12, 2023 order is nonsensical because it did not explain how a $50,000 police fee would be paid by Rukli to the City. (See 6/23/23 Reconsideration Mot., pp. 11.) Point G fails for the same reason discussed above in Section I: (1) the City had a copy of the proposed order that the Court eventually signed because the proposed order was filed by Rukli on October 26, 2022 (see 10/26/22 Proposed Order, Rukli); and (2) it is clear that if the City prevails in this action, then it will be able to request that the Court set aside any injunction and/or allow the City to collect due compensation.

Finally, the Court has made a further review of the transcript from the October 26, 2022 hearing, the two minute orders issued that day, as well as the two proposed orders submitted by the parties in 2022. All the evidence shows that in fact Judge Sotelo did intend to order that Rukli would be ordered to pay the $50,000 security fee – not two years’ worth, or $100,000. (See Transcript at p. 1:23 – 2:26 [court informing the parties that “where the court is is that the court would grant the injunction in terms of the amount being requested and only allow the amount to be $15,000 plus $50,000 at least one of the two years. . . . That seems right in this case. . . .”]) This very same section of the transcript was cited by this Court on pages 4-5 of its 6/12/23 minute order, and continues to be ignored by the City.

In short, the Court continues to conclude that Judge Sotelo’s intent was to order only the $50,000 as best indicated by his own sua sponte second order on 10/26/22, and that is why the Court granted the motion to correct the order that he signed on 1/10/23, which was inconsistent with his own, corrected minute order. 

Conclusion

Because the City of Baldwin Park did not raise any arguments that could not have been raised before the original hearing on this matter, and because a review of the arguments shows that they are nevertheless unavailing, the Court DENIES Defendant City of Baldwin Park’s motion for reconsideration.

Defendant City of Baldwin Park’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.