Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 22STCV34637, Date: 2023-06-22 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV34637 Hearing Date: January 9, 2024 Dept: 40
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MICHAEL LOPEZ, Plaintiff, v. JULIANNE ALEXANDER ZARAGOZA ARRIAGA, etc., et al., Defendants. |
Case No.: 22STCV34637 Hearing Date: 01/09/24 Trial Date: 01/19/24 [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings |
Plaintiff Michael Lopez filed a Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiff’s first cause of action for
Violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act pursuant to California Civil Code § 51 et
seq. The motion is unopposed.
After review, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
This action arises from Plaintiff’s visit
to a restaurant on January 1, 2021, which did not comply with the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) standards. On October 28, 2022, Plaintiff Michael
Lopez (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Defendants Juliane Alexander
Zaragoza Arriaga, in individual and representative capacity as trustee of the
The 2015 DJD Family Irrevocable Trust dated December 11, 2015 (“Arriaga”) and
Mariscos El Camaron Express, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging causes
of action for: (1) Violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act and (2) Violation of
the California Disabled Persons Act.
Plaintiff alleges that, on January 1,
2021, he visited El Camaron Express (the “Restaurant”) located at or about 1198
Mirasol St., Los Angeles, California. (Complaint, ¶¶ 5, 10.) The Restaurant is
a facility open to the public, a place of public accommodation, and a business
establishment. (Id., ¶ 11.) Plaintiff alleges that he is a wheelchair
user and observed or encountered non-compliant ADA conditions at the
Restaurant. (Id., ¶¶ 13-21.) Plaintiff alleges that the Restaurant is
non-compliant with the ADA, and that he is currently deterred from returning to
the Restaurant. (Id., ¶¶ 25-26.)
Relevant Procedural History
On January 4, 2023, Defendants filed an
Answer to the Complaint.
On June 22, 2023, after hearing, the
Court granted Plaintiff’s unopposed motion to deem Plaintiff’s Requests for
Admission, Set One, served on Defendants, as admitted. (06/22/23 Minute Order.)
The Court stated that “[t]he truth of the RFAs are deemed admitted.” (06/22/23
Minute Order at p.3.) Defendants served no responses to Set One of Plaintiff’s
Requests for Admission. (06/22/23 Minute Order.)
On November 22, 2023, the Court held an
OSC re: Mediation Completion. Plaintiff’s counsel informed the Court at the
November 22, 2023 OSC that they were unsuccessful in attempting “to reach
Defendant’s counsel to schedule a mediation and suggests they may have
abandoned the case.” (11/22/23 Minute Order.) Plaintiff’s counsel represented
that they intended to file a motion for judgment on the pleadings and the Court
approved “the setting of [such] motion for January 9, 2024.” (11/22/23 Minute
Order.) The Court ordered Plaintiff’s counsel to give notice. (11/22/23 Minute
Order.)
On November 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed and
served a Notice of Ruling on the OSC re: Mediation Completion.
On December 18, 2023, Plaintiff filed
instant Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (the “Motion”). The Motion was
noticed with a hearing date of January 9, 2024; however, the Motion was served
on Defendants on December 14, 2023. The Motion is unopposed. Any opposition to
the Motion was required to have been filed and served at least nine court days
prior to the hearing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).) There is a facially
valid proof of service attached to the motion.
Judicial
Notice
“Under Evidence
Code section 452, a court may take judicial notice of [f]acts and propositions
that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and
accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable
accuracy.” (Chacon v. Union Pacific Railroad (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 565,
572 [citations omitted].) “A court may take judicial notice of the [e]xistence
of each document in a court file, but can only take judicial notice of the
truth of facts asserted in documents such as orders, findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and judgments.” (People v. Franklin (2016) 63
Cal.4th 261, 280 [citation omitted, internal quotations omitted].) “Courts can
take judicial notice of the existence, content and authenticity of public
records and other specified documents, but do not take judicial notice of the
truth of the factual matters asserted in those documents.” (Glaski v. Bank
of America (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1090 [citations omitted].)
The Court
GRANTS Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice as to Exhibits 1-7 in
Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice.
Meet
and Confer
“Before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings . . .
the moving party shall meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video
conference with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion
for judgment on the pleadings for the purpose of determining if an agreement
can be reached that resolves the claims to be raised in the motion for judgment
on the pleadings.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a).) “A determination by the
court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to
grant or deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
439, subd. (a)(4).)
Plaintiff’s counsel declares that his office attempted to
contact defense counsel several times over the last several weeks to discuss
Plaintiff’s intent to file a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Cote Decl.,
¶ 2.) Defense counsel failed to respond to any of Plaintiff’s counsel’s
invitations and attempts to meet and confer over the telephone or otherwise. (Id.)
The meet and confer requirement has not been met due to the
non-responsiveness of defense counsel. The Court, however, will still consider the
Motion on its merits but reminds the parties of the need to comply with the
Code of Civil Procedure.
Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings: GRANTED.
Legal Standard:
“A party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 438, subd. (b)(1).) “If the moving party is a plaintiff, [the motion
may be made on the grounds] that the complaint states facts sufficient to
constitute a cause or causes of action against the defendant and the answer
does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense to the complaint.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(A).) In assessing a motion for judgment
on the pleadings, a court “may consider matters that may be judicially noticed,
including a party’s admissions or concessions which can not reasonably be
controverted.” (Pang v. Beverly Hosp., Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 986, 990
[citation omitted].)
Analysis:
I. First Cause of
Action—Violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff contends that the Motion should be granted because
on June 22, 2023, the Court deemed admitted all of Plaintiff’s Requests for
Admission, Set One, propounded on Defendants as admitted. Plaintiff asserts
that all elements of Plaintiff’s causes of action have been established.
(Request for Judicial Notice, Exhibits 1-3.)
Under the Unruh Act, “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction
of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color,
religion, ancestry, national origin, or disability are entitled to the full
and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in
all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” (Jackson v.
Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 936, 940 [citations omitted, emphasis
in original].) “[A]ny violation of the ADA by a business establishment is
also a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.” (Brennon B. v. Superior
Court (2022) 13 Cal.5th 662, 692 [emphasis in original].)
“Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination by public accommodations.”
(Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc. (2007) 481 F.3d 724, 730.) “No individual
shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns,
leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” (Ibid.)
“Discrimination includes a failure to remove architectural barriers . . . in
existing facilities . . . where such removal is readily achievable.” (Ibid.
[citation omitted].) “Readily achievable means easily accomplishable and able
to be carried out without much difficulty or expense.” (Ibid. [citation
omitted].)
“To prevail on a Title III discrimination claim, the
plaintiff must show that (1) [he] or she is disabled within the meaning of the
ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a
place of public accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied public
accommodations by the defendant because of [his] or her disability.” (Ibid.
[citations omitted].) Decisions of a federal district court are not binding on
California state courts but are persuasive authority. (Rubin v. Ross (2021)
65 Cal.App.5th 153, 163 [citation omitted].)
Pursuant to the Court’s ruling which deemed Plaintiff’s RFAs
as admitted, Defendants have admitted that Plaintiff is disabled within the
meaning of the ADA. (RJN, Exhibits 2 and 3 at RFA No. 24.) Defendants have also
admitted that the Restaurant is a place of public accommodation. (RJN, Exhibits
2 and 3 at RFA No. 4.) Defendants have
also admitted that there have been alterations at the Restaurant since 2010 and
that Plaintiff encountered barriers at the Restaurant. (RJN, Exhibits 2 and 3
at RFA Nos. 2-3, 6-23.) Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice indicates that Defendant
Arriaga owns the real property located at 1198 Mirasol Street. (RJN, Exhibit 4.)
The Complaint alleges that Defendant Mariscos El Camaron Express, Inc. owns the
Restaurant. (Complaint, ¶ 5.) In addition to the RFAs, which have been deemed
admitted, and other judicially noticeable documents, the Complaint makes
sufficient allegations to state a cause of action for violation of the Unruh
Civil Rights Act. While neither the Complaint nor any judicial noticeable
document expressly states that Plaintiff was denied accommodations because of
his disability, liberally construing the facts alleged in the Complaint leads
to an inference that Plaintiff’s wheelchair use led to the denial of public
accommodations. (Mendoza v. Continental Sales Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th
1395, 1401-1402.) Therefore, the Complaint states a sufficient cause of action
for Violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.
Also, the Motion is unopposed which leads to the inference that it is meritorious under Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410. The Motion is therefore GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to the first cause of action for Violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act is GRANTED.