Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 22STCV34637, Date: 2023-06-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV34637    Hearing Date: January 9, 2024    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

 

MICHAEL LOPEZ,

                        Plaintiff,

            v.

JULIANNE ALEXANDER ZARAGOZA ARRIAGA, etc., et al.,

                        Defendants.

  Case No.:         22STCV34637

  Hearing Date:  01/09/24

  Trial Date:       01/19/24

 [TENTATIVE] RULING RE:

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings  

 

Plaintiff Michael Lopez filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiff’s first cause of action for Violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act pursuant to California Civil Code § 51 et seq. The motion is unopposed.

 

After review, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

 

Background

This action arises from Plaintiff’s visit to a restaurant on January 1, 2021, which did not comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) standards. On October 28, 2022, Plaintiff Michael Lopez (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Defendants Juliane Alexander Zaragoza Arriaga, in individual and representative capacity as trustee of the The 2015 DJD Family Irrevocable Trust dated December 11, 2015 (“Arriaga”) and Mariscos El Camaron Express, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging causes of action for: (1) Violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act and (2) Violation of the California Disabled Persons Act.

 

Plaintiff alleges that, on January 1, 2021, he visited El Camaron Express (the “Restaurant”) located at or about 1198 Mirasol St., Los Angeles, California. (Complaint, ¶¶ 5, 10.) The Restaurant is a facility open to the public, a place of public accommodation, and a business establishment. (Id., ¶ 11.) Plaintiff alleges that he is a wheelchair user and observed or encountered non-compliant ADA conditions at the Restaurant. (Id., ¶¶ 13-21.) Plaintiff alleges that the Restaurant is non-compliant with the ADA, and that he is currently deterred from returning to the Restaurant. (Id., ¶¶ 25-26.)

 

Relevant Procedural History

 

On January 4, 2023, Defendants filed an Answer to the Complaint.

 

On June 22, 2023, after hearing, the Court granted Plaintiff’s unopposed motion to deem Plaintiff’s Requests for Admission, Set One, served on Defendants, as admitted. (06/22/23 Minute Order.) The Court stated that “[t]he truth of the RFAs are deemed admitted.” (06/22/23 Minute Order at p.3.) Defendants served no responses to Set One of Plaintiff’s Requests for Admission. (06/22/23 Minute Order.)

 

On November 22, 2023, the Court held an OSC re: Mediation Completion. Plaintiff’s counsel informed the Court at the November 22, 2023 OSC that they were unsuccessful in attempting “to reach Defendant’s counsel to schedule a mediation and suggests they may have abandoned the case.” (11/22/23 Minute Order.) Plaintiff’s counsel represented that they intended to file a motion for judgment on the pleadings and the Court approved “the setting of [such] motion for January 9, 2024.” (11/22/23 Minute Order.) The Court ordered Plaintiff’s counsel to give notice. (11/22/23 Minute Order.)

 

On November 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed and served a Notice of Ruling on the OSC re: Mediation Completion.

 

On December 18, 2023, Plaintiff filed instant Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (the “Motion”). The Motion was noticed with a hearing date of January 9, 2024; however, the Motion was served on Defendants on December 14, 2023. The Motion is unopposed. Any opposition to the Motion was required to have been filed and served at least nine court days prior to the hearing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).) There is a facially valid proof of service attached to the motion.

 

Judicial Notice

“Under Evidence Code section 452, a court may take judicial notice of [f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Chacon v. Union Pacific Railroad (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 565, 572 [citations omitted].) “A court may take judicial notice of the [e]xistence of each document in a court file, but can only take judicial notice of the truth of facts asserted in documents such as orders, findings of fact and conclusions of law, and judgments.” (People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 280 [citation omitted, internal quotations omitted].) “Courts can take judicial notice of the existence, content and authenticity of public records and other specified documents, but do not take judicial notice of the truth of the factual matters asserted in those documents.” (Glaski v. Bank of America (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1090 [citations omitted].)

 

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice as to Exhibits 1-7 in Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice.

 

Meet and Confer  

“Before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings . . . the moving party shall meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion for judgment on the pleadings for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the claims to be raised in the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a).) “A determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to grant or deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a)(4).)

 

Plaintiff’s counsel declares that his office attempted to contact defense counsel several times over the last several weeks to discuss Plaintiff’s intent to file a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Cote Decl., ¶ 2.) Defense counsel failed to respond to any of Plaintiff’s counsel’s invitations and attempts to meet and confer over the telephone or otherwise. (Id.)

 

The meet and confer requirement has not been met due to the non-responsiveness of defense counsel. The Court, however, will still consider the Motion on its merits but reminds the parties of the need to comply with the Code of Civil Procedure.

 

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings: GRANTED.

           

 

Legal Standard:

“A party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (b)(1).) “If the moving party is a plaintiff, [the motion may be made on the grounds] that the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause or causes of action against the defendant and the answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense to the complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(A).) In assessing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court “may consider matters that may be judicially noticed, including a party’s admissions or concessions which can not reasonably be controverted.” (Pang v. Beverly Hosp., Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 986, 990 [citation omitted].)

 

Analysis:

 

I.  First Cause of Action—Violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act  

 

Plaintiff contends that the Motion should be granted because on June 22, 2023, the Court deemed admitted all of Plaintiff’s Requests for Admission, Set One, propounded on Defendants as admitted. Plaintiff asserts that all elements of Plaintiff’s causes of action have been established. (Request for Judicial Notice, Exhibits 1-3.)  

 

Under the Unruh Act, “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or disability are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” (Jackson v. Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 936, 940 [citations omitted, emphasis in original].) “[A]ny violation of the ADA by a business establishment is also a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.” (Brennon B. v. Superior Court (2022) 13 Cal.5th 662, 692 [emphasis in original].)

 

“Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination by public accommodations.” (Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc. (2007) 481 F.3d 724, 730.) “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” (Ibid.) “Discrimination includes a failure to remove architectural barriers . . . in existing facilities . . . where such removal is readily achievable.” (Ibid. [citation omitted].) “Readily achievable means easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense.” (Ibid. [citation omitted].)

 

“To prevail on a Title III discrimination claim, the plaintiff must show that (1) [he] or she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied public accommodations by the defendant because of [his] or her disability.” (Ibid. [citations omitted].) Decisions of a federal district court are not binding on California state courts but are persuasive authority. (Rubin v. Ross (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 153, 163 [citation omitted].)

 

Pursuant to the Court’s ruling which deemed Plaintiff’s RFAs as admitted, Defendants have admitted that Plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. (RJN, Exhibits 2 and 3 at RFA No. 24.) Defendants have also admitted that the Restaurant is a place of public accommodation. (RJN, Exhibits 2 and 3 at RFA No. 4.)  Defendants have also admitted that there have been alterations at the Restaurant since 2010 and that Plaintiff encountered barriers at the Restaurant. (RJN, Exhibits 2 and 3 at RFA Nos. 2-3, 6-23.) Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice indicates that Defendant Arriaga owns the real property located at 1198 Mirasol Street. (RJN, Exhibit 4.) The Complaint alleges that Defendant Mariscos El Camaron Express, Inc. owns the Restaurant. (Complaint, ¶ 5.) In addition to the RFAs, which have been deemed admitted, and other judicially noticeable documents, the Complaint makes sufficient allegations to state a cause of action for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. While neither the Complaint nor any judicial noticeable document expressly states that Plaintiff was denied accommodations because of his disability, liberally construing the facts alleged in the Complaint leads to an inference that Plaintiff’s wheelchair use led to the denial of public accommodations. (Mendoza v. Continental Sales Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1401-1402.) Therefore, the Complaint states a sufficient cause of action for Violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

 

Also, the Motion is unopposed which leads to the inference that it is meritorious under Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410. The Motion is therefore GRANTED. 

Conclusion

Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to the first cause of action for Violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act is GRANTED.