Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 22STCV37276, Date: 2023-12-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV37276    Hearing Date: December 14, 2023    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

Background

Plaintiff John Doe D.D. sues Defendants Doe #1, Doe #2, and Does 3 through 60 pursuant to a November 28, 2022 Complaint alleging claims of (1) Childhood Sexual Abuse, (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, (3) Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention of Unfit Employee, Government Code Sections 815.2 and 820, (4) Failure to Report Suspected Child Abuse (Government Code Sections 815.2, 815.6, and 820), (5) Negligent Supervision of a Minor, Government Code Sections 815.2 and 820, and (6) Negligence.

The claims arise from allegations that during his time as a student at the Los Angeles, California-based 54th Street Elementary School, Plaintiff John Doe D.D. was sexually assaulted on at least six occasions by his homeroom teacher, Defendant Doe #2. Defendants Doe #1 and Does 3-20 are public entities that at all relevant times maintained, operated, and employed administrators, teachers, staff, and personnel at 54th Street Elementary.

On October 4, 2023, Defendant Doe #1 demurred to the Complaint’s third to fifth causes of action on sufficiency of pleading and uncertainty in pleading grounds. The demurrer was set for hearing on December 14, 2023.

On December 1, 2023, Plaintiff Doe opposed the demurrer.

On December 7, 2023, Defendant Doe #1 replied to the opposition.

Defendant Doe #1’s demurrer is now before the Court.

Demurrer

Demurrer Sufficiency Standard

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747; see Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) This device can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) To sufficiently allege a cause of action, a complaint must allege all the ultimate facts—that is, the facts needed to establish each element of the cause of action pleaded. (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 212, superseded by statute as stated in Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235, 242.) Thus, “[t]o survive a [general] demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) In testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-67.) A demurrer, however, “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228, disapproved on other grounds, Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1162.) The face of the complaint includes exhibits attached to the complaint. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.) If facts appearing in the exhibits contradict those alleged, the facts in the exhibits take precedence. (Holland v. Morse Diesel Intern., Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1447, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in White v. Cridlebaugh (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 506, 521.)

Uncertainty Legal Standard 

A demurrer to a pleading lies where the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (f).) “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616, disapproved on other grounds in Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 46 [holding claims for unfair business practices need not be pled specifically, impliedly disapproving Khoury].) As a result, a special demurrer for uncertainty is not intended to reach failure to incorporate sufficient facts in the pleading but is directed only at uncertainty existing in the allegations already made. (People v. Taliaferro (1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 822, 825, disapproved on other grounds in Jefferson v. J.E. French Co. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 717, 719-720 [statute of limitations question].) Where complaint is sufficient to state a cause of action and to apprise defendant of issues he is to meet, it is not properly subject to a special demurrer for uncertainty. (See ibid.; see also Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643 [“A special demurrer [for uncertainty] should be overruled where the allegations of the complaint are sufficiently clear to apprise the defendant of the issues which he is to meet”].)

I.

Complaint, Third to Fifth Causes of Action: OVERRULED.

Defendant Doe #1 demurs to the Complaint’s third to fifth causes of action on the grounds that they are claims founded on Assembly Bill 218 (AB 218), which created liability where there previously was none by retroactively stripping statutory government immunity from public entities such as Doe #1 through the elimination of the claim presentation requirement (Gov. Code, § 905, subd. (m)) for childhood sexual assault claims. Doe #1 argues that this constitutes an unconstitutional gift of public funds because, prior to 2020, when AB 218 was passed, Doe #1 could not have been liable to Plaintiff Doe for the conduct of Doe #2, given that Plaintiff Doe had failed to submit a claim under the presentation requirement prior to its expiration. The elimination of the claim presentation requirement, argues Doe #1, creates liability where it did not previously exist, thus constituting an unconstitutional gift of public funds. In the alternative, Doe #1 argues that, for various reasons the public purpose exception to the gift clause in the California constitution does not apply to the Complaint’s allegations. (Demurrer, pp. 9-16.)

In opposition, Plaintiff cites to Coats v. New Haven Unified School District (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415 for the constitutionality of AB 218 and argues that the gift clause does not apply to the pleadings because the allegations do not show an actual appropriation of public funds. In the alternative, Plaintiff argues that a public purpose is served by AB 218. Plaintiff otherwise argues that none of Doe #1’s cited cases stand for the principle that reviving a lapsed claim or removing the claim presentation requirement creates or imposes liability against a public entity, and that Doe #1 is asking this Court to usurp the Legislature’s authority in making policy decisions regarding revival of sexual assault claims and removal of the claim presentation requirement for such claims. (Opp’n, pp. 4-12.)

In reply, Doe #1 argues that Coats is not applicable to Doe #1’s demurrer and that AB 218 created an appropriation for gift clause purposes. Doe #1 also argues that AB 218 gifts public funds without a public purpose and makes other arguments in favor of this Court enforcing the California Constitution and finding that AB 218 was unconstitutional. (Reply, pp. 2-10.)

The Court finds in favor of Plaintiff.

Here, the challenged portions of AB 218 (passed in 2020) appear to be two. First, the Legislature’s removal of a portion of a 2008 amendment to Government Code section 905 (the claims requirement statute) that eliminated the claims presentation requirement for childhood sexual abuse cases for conduct arising on or after January 1, 2009. Second, the Legislature’s addition of a new subsection to Government Code section 905 making the changes to the statute retroactive. (See Demurrer, p. 7, citing Gov. Code, § 905, subds. (m), (p) as unconstitutional modifications enacted by AB 218.)

Such modifications do not appear to amount to a gift of public funds.

The test for “whether or not a proposed application of public funds is to be deemed a gift within the meaning [of the gift clause], … is … whether the money is to be used for a public or a private purpose.” (City of Oakland v. Garrison (1924) 194 Cal. 298, 302.) “The determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a matter for the Legislature to determine, and its discretion will not be disturbed by the courts so long as that determination has a reasonable basis. [Citations.]” (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 746.) Legislative findings are to be “given great weight and will be upheld unless they are found to be unreasonable and arbitrary. [Citations.]” (California Hous. Fin. Agency v. Elliot (1976) 17 Cal.3d 575, 583.)

A review of the legislative history of AB 218 shows its public purpose. An August 30, 2019 Assembly discussion of AB 218 —at which AB 218 was voted on—shows that AB 218’s purposes are: to help prevent future assaults by raising the cost for sexual assault of minors; to protect victims of sexual assault rather than the perpetrators, who benefit from statutes of limitations; to confront cover ups of sexual abuse in institutions, thus preventing continuing victimization and the sexual assault of additional children; and to create an effective deterrent against individuals and entities who have chosen to protect the perpetrators of sexual assault over the victims. (Assm. Floor analysis AB 218 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Sep. 14, 2019) 2019 CA A.B. 218.) The Court finds that these comments sufficiently state the public purposes for the Legislature’s passage of AB 218, such that, even if AB 218 permits a private individual to recover individualized monetary relief based on sexual assault, that benefit serves the public by deterring sexual assault generally and protecting minors.

Conlin v. Board of Supervisors of City and County and San Francisco (1893) 99 Cal. 17 (Conlin) is distinguishable. There, plaintiff was attempting to collect payment from the city and county of San Francisco for contractual work performed pursuant to a California law permitting that collection. The Supreme Court of California found the law unconstitutional as violative of the gift clause because the law created liability under circumstances where the plaintiff’s contract clearly provided that the plaintiff proceeded with the contract with the “express condition that in no case would the city and county of San Francisco be liable for any portion of the expense of the said work or improvement, or for any delinquency of persons or property assessed.” (Conlin, supra, at p. 23.) Thus, the plaintiff in Conlin had no basis for expecting compensation from the city or county of San Francisco even before the time of injury, and the Legislature created a liability that contradicted the terms of the plaintiff’s contract. Here, by contrast, any cause of action against Doe #2 (the offending teacher) accrued at the time the cause of action was complete with all its elements. (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806-807.) Those elements, in the light most favorable to the pleadings, accrued at the time of the alleged abuse in 1988. The exposure to Doe #1 (as the District) would have been created at the same time under a negligence or negligent supervision theory, such as here, subject to the claims presentation requirements at the time. As such, unlike Conlin, liability initially existed and was simply revived by AB 218.

Moreover, it is worth noting that in dicta in Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, 213, the California Supreme Court stated that if the Legislature “intended to … revive … the claim representation requirement under the government claims statute, it could have easily said so,” implying the Legislature’s ability to make the changes it did in AB 218 relating to subdivisions (m) and (p) in Government Code section 905.

Doe #1’s demurrer is thus OVERRULED insofar as it is premised on the California Constitution’s gift clause.

II.

Complaint, Fourth Cause of Action, Failure to Report Suspected Child Abuse (Government Code sections 815.2, 815.6, and 820): OVERRULED.

Defendant Doe #1 next argues that the fourth cause of action fails because none of the statutes on which it is premised support mandated reporter liability against a school district like Doe #1. Doe #1 also argues that to the extent that liability is vicariously based on the conduct or omissions of its employees, such conduct or omissions are not sufficiently stated to survive demurrer. (Demurrer, pp. 16-18.)

The opposition and reply dispute the sufficiency of the vicarious liability allegations. (Compare Opp’n, pp. 12-13, with Reply, pp. 10-11.)

The Court finds in favor of Plaintiff.

The allegations in the Complaint allege sufficient ultimate facts triggering a mandated reporter duty. The allegations include, on information and belief, that “administrators, teachers, and staff at 54th Street Elementary and/or Defendant DOE #1 received prior complaints and warnings about Defendant DOE #2’s inappropriate behavior, including that Defendant DOE #2 spent significant amounts of unsupervised time alone with minor students on campus with no justification or authorization, that Defendant DOE #2 would act inappropriately or abusively towards minor students, that Defendant DOE #2 would inappropriately touch minor students, that Defendant DOE #2 would engage in inappropriate conversations with minor students, and other similar complaints of such nature.” (Complaint, ¶ 26.) Contrary to Doe #1’s arguments, these allegations provide substantial grounds upon which a mandated reporter could amass sufficient information to know that child abuse was occurring.

The Court is also unconvinced that the pleadings must specifically name the mandated reporter at issue, which are alleged as “administrators, teachers, and staff at 54th Street Elementary.” (Complaint, ¶ 26.) If Doe #1’s position is followed, claims such as Plaintiff’s would be futile before they are even filed because any claim would require that the plaintiff, in advance of discovery or even filing suit, know the identity of the mandated reporter and have knowledge of how the mandated reporter discovered the alleged abuse or had reasons to know of the alleged abuse. The Court is instead satisfied, consistent with C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 872, that only sufficient ultimate facts need be alleged at the demurrer phase, which is the case here, with allegations supporting vicarious liability pursuant to, at the very least, Government Code section 815.2. The identity of the mandated reporters can instead be resolved through discovery.

Doe #1’s demurrer is thus OVERRULED insofar as it is premised on Doe #1’s mandated reporter arguments. 

Conclusion

Defendant Doe #1’s Demurrer to Plaintiff John Doe D.D.’s Complaint is OVERRULED.