Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 22STCV37900, Date: 2023-09-15 Tentative Ruling
DEPARTMENT 40 - JUDGE ANNE RICHARDSON - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
The Court issues tentative rulings on certain motions.The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) email Dept 40 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (smcdept40@lacourt.org) with a copy to the other party(ies) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no email is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call.
Case Number: 22STCV37900 Hearing Date: February 7, 2024 Dept: 40
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GLORIA FRANKLIN, an individual, Plaintiff, v. SPECTRUM LABORATORY PRODUCTS, INC., a California corporation;
SPECTRUM CHEMICAL MANUFACTURING CORP., a California corporation; and DOES 1 through
25, inclusive, Defendants. |
Case No.: 22STCV37900 Hearing Date: 2/7/24 Trial Date: 7/2/24 [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Plaintiff Gloria
Franklin’s Motion for Terminating Sanctions or, Alternatively, Evidentiary
Sanctions, Issue Sanctions, and Monetary Sanctions in the Amount of
$11,995.30 Against Defendant and Its Counsel. |
Pleadings
Plaintiff Gloria Franklin sues Defendant Spectrum Laboratory Products,
Inc. (Spectrum Labs), Spectrum Chemical Manufacturing Corp. (Spectrum
Chemical), and Does 1 through 25 pursuant to a December 5, 2022 Complaint
alleging claims of (1) Discrimination based on Disability and/or Perceived
Disability (Gov. Code §12940 (a)); (2) Failure to Reasonably Accommodate Disability
(Gov. Code §12940 (m)); (3) Failure to Engage in Interactive Process (Gov. Code
§ 12940 (n)); (4) Discrimination based on Gender (Gov. Code §12940 (a)); (5)
Hostile Work Environment Harassment (Gov. Code §12940 (a), (c)); (6)
Retaliation in Violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code §§
12940 (h) & (m)(2)); (7) Failure to Prevent Discrimination (Gov. Code §
12940 (k)); (8) Violations of the California Family Rights Act (CFRA); (9)
Retaliation in Violation of Labor Code § 1102.5; (10) Wrongful Termination in
Violation of Fundamental Public Policy; and (11) Failure to Timely Pay All
Wages at Termination (Lab. Code §§ 201-203).
Motion Before the Court
On January 11, 2023, Plaintiff
Franklin filed a motion for terminating sanctions or, in the alternative, issue
and evidence sanctions. Plaintiff also requests monetary sanctions. The motions
are premised on Defendant Spectrum Labs’ alleged failure to comply with this
Court’s September 15, 2023 order.
On January 25, 2024, Defendant
Spectrum Labs opposed Plaintiff’s motion.
On January 31, 2024, Plaintiff
replied to Spectrum Labs’ opposition.
Plaintiff Franklin’s motion is now
before the Court.
Legal
Standard
Code
of Civil Procedure section 2023.030 permits California courts to impose
terminating, evidence, issue, and monetary sanctions for discovery misuses,
which are defined by section 2023.010 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Misuses
of the discovery process include, but are not limited to, the following:
(a)
Persisting, over objection and without substantial justification, in an attempt
to obtain information or materials that are outside the scope of permissible
discovery.
(b)
Using a discovery method in a manner that does not comply with its specified
procedures.
(c)
Employing a discovery method in a manner or to an extent that causes
unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and
expense.
(d)
Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery.
(e)
Making, without substantial justification, an unmeritorious objection to
discovery.
(f)
Making an evasive response to discovery.
(g)
Disobeying a court order to provide discovery.
(h)
Making or opposing, unsuccessfully and without substantial justification, a
motion to compel or to limit discovery.
(i)
Failing to confer in person, by telephone, or by letter with an opposing party
or attorney in a reasonable and good faith attempt to resolve informally any
dispute concerning discovery, if the section governing a particular discovery
motion requires the filing of a declaration stating facts showing that an
attempt at informal resolution has been made.
(Code
Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subds. (a)-(i); see, e.g., Vallbona v. Springer
(1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1545 [court imposed evidentiary sanctions when defendants
misused discovery process by not responding to authorized method of discovery];
In re Marriage of Eustice (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1308-1309 [respondent
was sanctioned for willfully violating order to produce accounting and
financial documents].)
“The
discovery statutes evince an incremental approach to discovery sanctions,
starting with monetary sanctions and ending with the ultimate sanction of
termination.” (Padron v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York,
Inc. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1246, 1259-1260 (Padron).) Discovery
sanctions “should be appropriate to the dereliction, and should not exceed that
which is required to protect the interests of the party entitled to but denied
discovery.” (Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 793.) Moreover,
“[d]iscovery sanctions must be tailored in order to remedy the offending
party’s discovery abuse, should not give the aggrieved party more than what it
is entitled to, and should not be used to punish the offending party.” (Karlsson
v. Ford Motor Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1217.) An order imposing
discovery sanctions is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. (New
Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1422.) The
court’s inherent power to curb abuses and promote fair process extends to the
preclusion of evidence. (Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Superior Court
(1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 272, 288.)
Order
Granting Sanctions: DENIED without prejudice as to terminating, evidence,
and issue sanctions; GRANTED as to monetary sanctions.
I. Terminating Sanctions
Terminating
sanctions are drastic sanctions that should be imposed sparingly and only when
it is clear that the party to be sanctioned has left no viable alternatives.
(See Dept. of Forestry & Fire. Prot. v. Howell (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th
154, 191, disapproved on other grounds in Presbyterian Camp & Conf.
Ctrs, Inc. v. Superior Court (2021) 12 Cal.5th 493; Lopez v. Watchtower
Bible & Tract Soc’y (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 604.)
The
court should consider the totality of the circumstances before ordering
terminating sanctions, including (1) whether the conduct of the party was
willful, (2) the detriment to the party propounding discovery, and (3) the
number of formal and informal attempt to obtain the discovery. (Los
Defensores, Inc. v. Gomez (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 377, 390.) The Court is
not required to find that a party acted in bad faith before imposing
terminating sanctions. (See Creed-21 v. City of Wildomar (2017) 18
Cal.App.5th 690, 703.)
If
terminating sanctions are warranted, the Court may make an order striking all
or parts of the pleadings (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (d)(1); Doppes
v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 992; Van Sickle v.
Gilbert (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1519 [trial court struck defendant’s
answer]), an order dismissing all or part of a party’s action (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 2023.030, subd. (d)(3); Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc., supra,
at p. 992; see, e.g., Crawford v. JPMorgan Chase Bank (2015) 242
Cal.App.4th 1265, 1271 [dismissal proper when party threatened to use pepper
spray and taser on opposing counsel at deposition and was openly contemptuous
of trial court]), and an order rendering a default judgment against a party
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (d)(4); Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc.,
supra, at p. 992; see, e.g., Electronic Funds Solutions, LLC v.
Murphy (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1183-1184 [defendant’s pervasive and
consistent misuse of discovery process supported court’s dismissal of answer
and entry of default judgment]).
Here,
the Court finds that terminating sanctions are not warranted.
Sanctions
must be imposed in an incremental approach. (Padron, supra, 16
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1259-1260.) Here, the Court has only issued monetary
sanctions in relation to the discovery at issue. (See 9/15/23 Minutes, pp.
10-11; Mot., Separate Statement, pp. 1-43 [Form Interrogatory 15.1 and Requests
for Production Nos. 2, 14-17, 19-23, 25-26, 48, 52-61].) The Court has not
imposed issue or evidence sanctions relating to that discovery. Moreover, the
Court is not convinced that no viable alternatives exist. Indeed, Plaintiff
Franklin’s motion requests issue and evidence sanctions. (See Mot., pp. 7-9.) Last,
the Court notes that it can also impose further monetary sanctions on Defendant
Spectrum Labs.
Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED as to terminating sanctions.
II. Evidence and/or Issue Sanctions
Next,
the Court determines, without prejudice, that evidentiary and/or issue
sanctions are not warranted. (The issue and evidentiary sanctions requested are
virtually the same sanctions, where the evidentiary sanctions are merely stated
as an order prohibiting the Defendant from presenting any evidence as to the various
issues enumerated. (See Notice of Motion at pp. 1-3.) Thus, the Court will
refer to them sometimes simply as issue sanctions below.)
“The
trial court should consider both the conduct being sanctioned and its effect on
the party seeking discovery and, in choosing a sanction, should attempt to
tailor the sanction to the harm caused by the withheld discovery.” (Padron,
supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1259-1260, citations and quotations omitted.)
Here,
the moving papers insufficiently elaborate on the connection between the relief
requested (issue/evidentiary sanctions) and the discovery at issue (Form
Interrogatory 15.1 and Requests for Production Nos. 2, 14-17, 19-23, 25-26, 48,
52-61). (See Mot., pp. 1-10; Mot., Separate Statement, pp. 1-43.)
Plaintiff’s
separate statement functions more like a separate statement to compel a further
discovery response than a separate statement supporting issue or evidentiary sanctions.
Indeed, while the separate statement explains why it deems Spectrum Labs’
responses as deficient (Mot., Separate Statement, pp. 1-43), Plaintiff does not
explain how each of the 11 issue/evidentiary sanctions relates to one or more
of the defective discovery responses—most of which the Court agrees are
deficient.
The
Court notes that it finds no merit to the opposition argument that this motion
is a motion for summary judgment of the Amended Answer in disguise. (Opp’n, pp.
14-15.) As Spectrum Labs knowingly recognizes, it has served supplemental responses
to Interrogatory 15.1 vis-à-vis the 21st, 26th and 28th affirmative defenses
and such responses limit themselves to responding that discovery is ongoing,
and production will be made when discovered. (Opp’n, p. 14.) Yet, the Court is
entitled to impose sanctions for just such conduct. (Cf. Liberty Mutual Fire
Ins. Co. v. LcL Administrators, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1105
[finding no merit to argument that no terminating sanctions should be imposed
because discovery violations “did not prejudice [the propounding party’s]
ability to go to trial” where “after numerous extensions of time and more than
a year’s worth of delay, [the responding party] could still not provide an
intelligible factual basis for their defenses and counterclaims”].)
Returning
to the merits of this motion, the Court notes that the separate statement and
points and authorities do not seem to indicate how the 11 requested issue
sanctions relate to one or more of the discovery requests raised in the
separate statement as a basis for this motion, e.g., no chart is provided to
clarify how each of the 11 issue sanctions arises from specific discovery
requests or groups of discovery requests. (Compare Mot., Notice, pp. 1-2, with
Mot., pp. 1-10; Mot., Separate Statement, pp. 1-43.) Absent that information,
the Court cannot determine that the requested issue sanctions are “tailor[ed]
to the harm caused by the withheld discovery.” (Padron, supra, 16
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1259-1260.) By contrast, issue or evidentiary sanctions
precluding Defendant from introducing any evidence to support its 21st, 26th or
28th affirmative defenses would seem to be related to the inadequate responses to
the discovery asking about such evidence– except that Plaintiff did not request
such relief, at least not until the Reply brief.
The
Court also briefly notes that the moving papers unconvincingly cite several
other discovery requests served by Plaintiff on Spectrum Labs as bases for
issue sanctions. (See Mot., p. 4.) The Court agrees that a sanctioned party’s
history as a repeat offender is not only relevant, but also significant, in
deciding whether to impose sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 2023.030. (See, e.g., Mileikowsky v. Tenet Healthsystem (2005)
128 Cal.App.4th 262, 279-280 (Mileikowsky ) [“But where a violation is
willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less
severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the
trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate [terminating] sanction”; Collisson
& Kaplan v. Hartunian (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1618 (Collisson)
[“Defendants chose to ignore the many attempts, both formal and informal, made
by plaintiff to secure fair responses from them”]; Laguna Auto Body v.
Farmers Ins. Exchange (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 481, 491 490 (Laguna Auto
Body) [“We reiterate, however, in this case it was continued wilful
violations of the discovery statutes embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure
which prompted the court’s order dismissing the action”], disapproved on a
different ground in Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 478, fn.
4 (Garcia).)
However,
those discovery requests have not been before the Court and no orders to compel
have been issued, for which reason the Court is inclined to agree that issue,
evidence, and terminating sanctions are not ripe as to that discovery. (See
Opp’n, p. 17.) Indeed, if sanctions are to be granted in an incremental
approach (Padron, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1259-1260), there
is no sense in going from alleged discovery abuses to issue, evidence, or
terminating sanctions without first addressing monetary sanctions or motions to
compel as to these other discovery requests. Moreover, as with Form
Interrogatory 15.1 and the Requests for Production, the moving papers do not
sufficiently explain how the requested issue sanctions specifically arise from
Spectrum Labs’ response(s) or non-response(s) to that other discovery.
Plaintiff’s
motion is thus DENIED as to issue sanctions. The Court notes that this denial
is without prejudice in that the conduct complained of in this motion may
constitute part of a future request, if appropriate.
IV. Monetary Sanctions
The
Court finds that ample grounds exist to impose monetary sanctions.
Spectrum
Labs argues: “Here, the imposition of … further monetary sanctions would be a
penal act against Spectrum and the Court should not permit Plaintiff to
weaponize this Court’s past orders to avoid a trial on the merits. Spectrum has
fully complied with this Court’s September 15 Order. It paid the monetary
sanctions to Plaintiff and provided further responses to the Requests for
Production and Form Interrogatories. Spectrum’s further responses to Form
Interrogatories and Requests for Production are compliant and not sanctionable.”
(Opp’n, p. 13.)
Yet,
Spectrum Labs also concedes that it did not comply with this Court’s September
15, 2023 order by failing to produce discovery responses within the time
specified in the Court’s order. (See Opp’n, pp. 4-11; Opp’n, Mirsch Decl., ¶¶
2-21.)
Moreover,
the Court finds that Spectrum Labs’ discovery responses and production have
been insufficient. For example, as addressed in the moving papers and reply,
here, Spectrum Labs has altogether failed to produce attorney work product
documents, the privilege for which was waived through nonresponse to the
initial discovery requested within the permissible response time. (See Mot., p.
9; Reply, p. 7; see also McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 115
Cal.App.3d 1229, 1239 [“Waiver of work product protection . . . is generally
found under the same set of circumstances as waiver of the attorney-client
privilege – by failing to assert the protection [etc.]”].) Moreover, the Court
adopts its discussion in Section III above to explain why the responses
relating to the 21st, 26th and 28th affirmative defenses are deficient. Last,
the Court notes that, in light of the litigation history between the parties
and the proceedings that have taken place before this Court, the Court finds
little merit to the statements of compliance offered in Spectrum Labs’
supplemental responses. It is difficult to credit that after more than a year
of litigation between the parties, Spectrum Labs has not been able to locate
information that is responsive to the discovery requests cited in the separate
statements, or cannot simply state that it has no such responsive documents.
(The Court notes that it understands that this discovery was not served at the
inception of this case. The Court merely points to the fact that this
litigation is more than a year old and, even so, Spectrum Labs continues to
allege that discovery and investigation continue and that Spectrum will supplement
its responses, even as the trial date approaches.)
While
family emergencies are a valid reason for leeway in litigation and the Court
sympathizes with defense counsel’s father’s dire health condition (see Opp’n,
pp. 5-6), such emergencies do not contravene or override the Court’s orders.
Defense counsel could have filed an ex parte application asking for an
extension to produce discovery per the Court’s September 15, 2023 order but did
not do so, despite the fact that more than one attorney represents Spectrum
Labs. Moreover, the family emergency was not communicated to Plaintiff’s
counsel until September 29, 2023, four days past the 10-day cutoff to comply
with the Court’s September 15, 2023 order. (Opp’n, Mirsch Decl., ¶ 4; 9/15/23
Minutes, pp. 10-11.)
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS monetary sanctions but in the reduced amount of amount of $4,515.30, consisting of 8 hours instead of 18 at the rate of $550 per hour for meeting and conferring, filing this motion, reviewing the opposition, filing a reply, and appearing at the hearing, and including the requested $61.65 and 53.65 in costs. The Court finds this reasonable as to fee rate, time expended, and costs. (Mot., Hosseini Decl., ¶¶ 36-41; see Excelsior Union High Sch. Dist. of L.A. Cnty. v. Lautrup (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 434, 448 [The Court is considered “an expert in the matter of attorney fees” since “[t]he value of attorney’s services is a matter with which a judge must necessarily be familiar”; “[w]hen the court is informed of the extent and nature of such services, its own experience furnishes it with every element necessary to fix their value”].)
Plaintiff Gloria Franklin’s Motion
for Terminating Sanctions or, Alternatively, Evidentiary Sanctions, Issue
Sanctions, and Monetary Sanctions in the Amount of $11,995.30 Against Defendant
and Its Counsel is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:
(1) DENIED as to terminating,
evidence, and issue sanctions, without prejudice; and
(2) GRANTED as to monetary
sanctions in the amount of $4,515.30.
Defendant Spectrum Laboratories
Products, Inc. and its counsel, Julie W. O’Dell and Drake A. Mirsch of
Armstrong Teasdale LLP, are ORDERED to remit payment within 30 days of this
order.