Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 22STCV38045, Date: 2024-01-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV38045    Hearing Date: April 15, 2024    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

I. Background

A. Pleadings

Plaintiffs Rene Hernandez and Maria Velasquez sue Sierra LA CDJR LLC dba Los Angeles Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram (Sierra LA), FCA US LLC (FCA), and Does 1 through 10 pursuant to A December 6, 2022, Complaint alleging claims of (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty against FCA and (2) Negligent Repair against Sierra LA.

The claims arise from the following allegations. On February 6, 2021, Plaintiffs entered a warranty contract with FCA regarding a 2019 Dodge Journey (Vehicle). Defects and nonconformities manifested themselves within the applicable warranty period, including but not limited to engine and suspension defects. FCA and Sierra LA were not able to conform the Vehicle to warranty after a reasonable number of attempts. Nevertheless, FCA failed to repurchase or replace the Vehicle. This conduct violated the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, and entitles Plaintiffs to penalties, fees, costs, and other relief.

B. Motion Before the Court

On January 26, 2024, FCA filed a motion for summary judgment of the sole cause of action alleged against it: Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty.

On March 29, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to FCA’s motion.

On April 11, 2024, FCA filed a reply to Plaintiffs’ opposition.

FCA’s motion is now before the Court.

II. Evidentiary Objections

A. Relevant Law

In granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion. Objections to evidence that are not ruled on for purposes of the motion shall be preserved for appellate review. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).)

B. Opposition Objections to Motion Evidence

Objection Nos. 1-3: OVERRULED.

C. Reply Objections to Evidence

Objection Nos. 1-7: Not ruled on as not material to disposition of motion.

III. Motion for Summary Judgment: GRANTED

A. Legal Standard

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact for trial or that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make prima facie showing no triable material fact issues. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) This burden on summary judgment or adjudication “is more properly one of persuasion rather than proof, since he must persuade the court that there is no material fact for a reasonable trier of fact to find, and not to prove any such fact to the satisfaction of the court itself as though it were sitting as the trier of fact.” (Id. at p. 850, fn. 11.) If the moving party meets this burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a rebuttal prima facie showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Id. at p. 849.) “[I]n ruling on motions for summary judgment courts are to ‘“liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”’ [Citations].” (Cheal v. El Camino Hospital (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 736, 760.)

B. Analysis

1. Relevant Law

The Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civil Code sections 1790 et seq.) (SBA) provides enhanced remedies to consumers who buy new consumer goods accompanied by a manufacturer’s express warranty. (Civ. Code, § 1793.2; see Kiluk v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 334, 336 (Kiluk).) Persuasive California authority holds that vehicles sold used without a new or full warranty are not “new consumer goods” for SBA purposes. (Rodriguez v. FAC US, LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 209, 219-224, review granted Jul. 13 2022, S274625, 512 P.3d 654.)

Express warranty protections also apply to the sale of used goods accompanied by an express warranty insofar as the distributor or retail seller of the vehicle is bound by their warranty as opposed to the manufacturer. (Civ. Code, § 1795.5; Kiluk, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 336.) Manufacturers can also be liable under section 1795.5 when the manufacturer has “partnered with a dealership to sell used vehicles directly to the public by offering an express warranty as part of the sales package” such that the manufacturer has “stepped into the role of a [distributor or] retailer and [is] subject to the obligations of a [distributor or] retailer under section 1795.5.” (Kiluk, supra, at pp. 339-340; see, e.g., Ruiz Nunez v. FCA US LLC (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 385, 399 (Ruiz Nunez) [“[P]laintiff presented no evidence that defendant was ‘a distributor or retail seller of used consumer goods’ (§ 1795.5), or in any way acted as such”].) 

2. Allegations and Discovery Framing Issues

The Complaint alleges a single count against FCA: Violation of the Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty. (Complaint, ¶¶ 14-26.) The claim is not premised on a specific portion of the SBA, nor does it specify a new or used vehicle status at the time of purchase. (Complaint, ¶¶ 1-13 [jury trial demand and general allegations], 14-26 [breach of express warranty claim].) Instead, the claim is premised on “Civil Code sections 1790 et seq.” generally. (Complaint, ¶¶ 10, 14.)

3. Parties’ Arguments, Objections, and Untimely Reply

The parties’ papers disagree as to whether vehicles that are purchased used—i.e., a used car with an unexpired warranty sold by a third-party reseller—can qualify within the meaning of “new” motor vehicle for the purposes of the SBA. The parties’ arguments largely revolve around Rodriguez, supra, and Jensen v. BMW of N. Am., Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112 (Jensen), among other authorities.

Plaintiffs have objected to FCA’s use of documents evidencing that Plaintiffs purchased the Vehicle used from “SC Car Zone,” a used vehicle dealership, which the Court has overruled. (Section II.B. discussion supra.)

The reply was filed one calendar day late, i.e., four days before the hearing rather than five as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(4), for which reason the Court does not consider the reply.

4. Court’s Determination

The Court finds in favor of FCA.

a. Note on Scope of the First Cause of Action

The first cause of action is brought “[p]ursuant to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (herein after the ‘Act’) Civil Code sections 1790 et seq.” as a qualifying “consumer good[].” (Complaint, ¶¶ 10, 14.) The first cause of action does not limit itself to “new” or “used” vehicle status. (Complaint, ¶¶ 1-26.) Thus, it follows that the first cause of action is, when read in context, conceivably comprised of relief pursuant to section 1793.2 (express warranties, new vehicles) and section 1795.5 (express warranties, used vehicles).

b. The Court Agrees with the Reasoning in Rodriguez as a Matter of Law

For the purposes of this motion, the Court agrees with the FCA in determining that vehicles purchased “used” with remaining balance on their warranties are not the type of “new motor vehicles” contemplated in Civil Code section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2).

A review of Jensen shows that it held that a vehicle leased to a consumer as a demonstrator was deemed a new motor vehicle for SBA purposes because the definition of new motor vehicle in Civil Code section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) included demonstrator or other motor vehicles if they were “sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty.” (Jensen v. BMW of N. Am., Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 123, emphasis added.) This holding has lent itself to confusion insofar as the Jensen court also stated that “the words of section 1793.22 are reasonably free from ambiguity and cars sold with a balance remaining on the manufacturer’s new motor vehicle warranty are included within its definition of ‘new motor vehicle.’” (Ibid.) However, the Court reads this latter statement within the framing provided by the courts in Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC and Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 905, 923 (Dagher). These cases comment that the “remaining balance” statement in Jensen should be limited to a reading that only demonstrators or other motor vehicles accompanied by new or full warranties upon sale—and not used vehicles sold with some balance remaining on their warranties—should be considered new motor vehicles under the SBA. (Rodriguez, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 223-224, quoting Dagher, supra, at p. 923.) The reasoning provided by Rodriguez and Dagher is that Jensen’s holding “must be read in light of the facts then before the court and [should be] limited in that respect,” where “th[e] facts [before the Jensen court] included a car leased with a full manufacturer’s warranty issued by the manufacturer’s representative, [indicating that] the [Jensen] court was not asked to decide whether a used car with an unexpired warranty sold by a third party reseller qualifies as a ‘new motor vehicle.’” (Rodriguez, supra, at pp. 223-224, quoting Dagher, supra, at p. 923.) 

c. No Triable Issues Exist as to New Motor Vehicle Status for Section 1793.22, subd. (e), Purposes, Undercutting the First of Two SBA Express Warranty Bases for Liability

In support of their argument that the Vehicle was purchased “used” and thus, lies outside of section 1793.2 protections, FCA presents a copy of the purchase agreement for the Vehicle. (Mot., p. 4, citing Mot., Separate Statement (Sep. St.), Undisputed Material Fact (UMF) No. 2, in turn citing Mot., Smith Decl., Ex. B.)

The Court has overruled Plaintiffs’ objection to use of this evidence (see Section II.B. discussion supra) and finds that this evidence carries FCA’s burden.

A review of the prima facie evidence of the purchase agreement for the Vehicle shows that it involved a “USED” “2019” “DODGE” “Journey” with an “Odometer” reading of “34[,]744.” (Mot., Smith Decl., Ex. B.) Because the Court has determined that vehicles sold “used” cannot qualify as new vehicles under section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) (see Section III.B.4.b. discussion supra), FCA’s evidence tends to show that Plaintiff is seeking relief for warranties related to the purchase of a used vehicle beyond the ambit of section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2).

The burden thus shifts to Plaintiffs.

In opposition, Plaintiffs focus almost exclusively on why Rodriguez is wrong and why this Court should find that a vehicle with a remaining balance on the new car warranty should qualify for section 1793.2’s express warranty provisions. Plaintiffs do not cite evidence showing that the Vehicle was purchased “new” or with a “new car warranty.” Thus, Plaintiffs do not cite evidence supporting “new motor vehicle” status for SBA purposes.

Plaintiffs consequently fail to carry their burden as to breach express warranty pursuant to Civil Code section 1793.2.

d. No Triable Issues Exist as to a Manufacturer-Dealer Relationship for Section 1795.5 Purposes, Undercutting the Remaining SBA Basis for Express Warranty Liability

The papers are framed around whether the vehicle here qualifies as a vehicle for which relief is available pursuant to Civil Code section 1793.2 but do not directly address relief pursuant to section 1795.5. (See Mot., pp. 4-8; Opp’n, pp. 4-16.)

However, in the points and authorities and separate statement, the moving papers cite undisputed evidence that is dispositive of any section 1795.5 component in the first cause of action.

The Court may consider arguments not made explicitly in the moving papers provided that the opposing party is given an opportunity to identify triable issues of material fact regarding those arguments. (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59 [A trial court has discretion “to grant a motion for summary judgment upon a ground of law not explicitly tendered by the moving party, i.e., a ground of law identified by the trial court rather than by the movant, if application of that law to an undisputed material fact put in issue by the parties' separate statements of undisputed material facts is dispositive of a cause of action presented by the pleadings,” provided that the opposing party is given “an opportunity to identify triable issues of fact material to the ground relied upon by the trial court”].)

Here, the points and authorities cite to UMF No. 3 to cite the declaration of Tuan Nguyen, Customer Relations Manager for the FCA California Business Center. That declaration shows that “SC Car Zone is not an authorized FCA US dealership and is not permitted to sell new vehicles manufactured by FCA US.” (Mot., p. 4 at § II, citing Mot., Sep. St., UMF No. 3, in turn citing Mot., Nguyen Decl., ¶ 4.)

UMF No. 3 is undisputed by Plaintiffs. (Opp’n, Sep. St., Response to UMF No. 3.)

No triable issues of material fact therefore exist as to the fact that FCA did not partner with SC Car Zone to sell used vehicles directly to the public by offering an express warranty as part of the sales package. For this reason, no triable issues of material fact exist as to whether FCA stepped into the role of a distributor or retailer and thereby made itself subject to the obligations of a distributor or retailer under section 1795.5. (Kiluk, supra, at pp. 339-340; Ruiz Nunez, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 399.)

e. Disposition

Because no triable issues of material fact exist as to the sole two grounds for Plaintiffs’ SBA breach of express warranty claim, FCA’s motion is GRANTED. 

IV. Conclusion

Defendant FCA US LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.