Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 22STCV39091, Date: 2023-10-13 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 40 - JUDGE ANNE RICHARDSON - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
The Court issues tentative rulings on certain motions.The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) email Dept 40 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (smcdept40@lacourt.org) with a copy to the other party(ies) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no email is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. 

Case Number: 22STCV39091    Hearing Date: October 13, 2023    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

Background

Plaintiff LL Jane Doe BC sues Defendants Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) and Does 2 through 100 pursuant to an August 8, 2023 Complaint alleging claims of (1) Negligence and (2) Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention.

The claims arise from allegations that, in the mid-1970s, Plaintiff Doe suffered childhood sexual abuse and exploitation at the hands of Defendants’ teacher, coach, and employee, Webster Johnson. The Complaint alleges that Defendants knew or should have known Mr. Johnson posed a danger to Plaintiff and other children—e.g., through complaints received by LAUSD regarding inappropriate conduct and other molestations by Mr. Johnson (alleged based on information and belief). The Complaint also alleges that, despite this knowledge, Defendants failed to take reasonable steps to protect Plaintiff from the danger of being sexually abused by Mr. Johnson, thus allowing Mr. Johnson to use his position as a teacher, coach, and employee with Defendants to repeatedly sexually abuse Plaintiff.

On August 14, 2023, LAUSD filed a meet and confer declaration.

On August 15, 2023 LAUSD filed its demurrer.

On September 21, 2023, LAUSD amended its demurrer.

On October 2, 2023, Plaintiff Doe opposed the demurrer.

On October 4, 2023, LAUSD filed a stipulation and proposed protective order executed by the parties.

On October 5, 2023, the Court granted the stipulation and signed the protective order.

On October 6, 2023, LAUSD replied to the opposition.

Requests for Judicial Notice

The Court takes judicial notice of Exhibit 2 attached to the demurrer and Exhibits 1 to 5 attached to the opposition, which are legislative documents subject to judicial notice. (RJN Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (c), 453; see Amended Demurrer, RJN, pp. 1-2; Amended Demurrer, Ex. 2; see also Opp’n, RJN, p. 1, Exs. 1-5.)

Demurrer

Demurrer Sufficiency Standard

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747; see Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) This device can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a [general] demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) In testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-67.) A demurrer, however, “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228, disapproved on other grounds, Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1162.) The face of the complaint includes exhibits attached to the complaint. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.) If facts appearing in the exhibits contradict those alleged, the facts in the exhibits take precedence. (Holland v. Morse Diesel Intern., Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1447, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in White v. Cridlebaugh (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 506, 521.)

First and Second Causes of Action, Unconstitutional Gift of Public Money: OVERRULED.

LAUSD’s demurrer boils down to a question of whether the causes of action stated in the Complaint are insufficiently stated because the claims are based on an unconstitutional law that violates a specific provision of the California Constitution related to gift of public funds and because the claims do not fit the applicable exception to that constitutional provision.

In its demurrer, LAUSD argues that, as a matter of law, to permit this case to go forward based on the legislature’s passage of AB 218 would constitute an unconstitutional gift of public funds pursuant to Article XVI, section 6 of the California Constitution (the gift clause). LAUSD cites various cases to argue that the legislature does not have the power to create a liability against the state for any past act of negligence given that the liability created would be a gift of public funds. LAUSD argues that AB 218 violates the gift clause because it retroactively strips statutory government immunity from public entities such as LAUSD by eliminating the claims presentation requirement (Gov. Code, § 905, subd. (m)) for childhood sexual assault claims brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1. LAUSD argues that because the claims presentation requirement is, per case law, a substantive element of the Plaintiffs’ claim, the revival in AB 218 is prohibited as a gift of public funds. (Amended Demurrer, pp. 5-6, 7-15.)

LAUSD also argues that the public purpose exception to the gift of public funds provision in the California constitution does not apply here because when the legislature created a liability for LAUSD and other public entities where one did not previously exist, the legislature created a private rather than public purpose for the purposes of gifts of public funds. (Amended Demurrer, pp. 5-6, 15-17.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that AB 218’s revival provision relating to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 and Government Code section 905 is constitutional based on the legislature’s power to determine how lawsuits can be brought against the State and based on the claims presentation requirement being a condition precedent to suit rather than an essential element of liability against LAUSD. (Opp’n, pp. 2-5.)

Plaintiff also argues that AB 218 is not a gift under the California constitution pursuant to Coats v. New Haven Unified School Dist. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415, 429 [“In Assembly Bill 218, the Legislature has again attempted to balance the competing concerns of protecting public entities from stale claims and allowing victims of childhood sexual abuse to seek compensation. This time, the Legislature came to a different conclusion, with an express revival provision for claims against public entities as well as those against private defendants”].) In the alternative, Plaintiff argues that even if AB 218 is a gift, it constitutes a public purpose, and that following LAUSD’s arguments would lead to absurd results. (Opp’n, pp. 5-10.)

In reply, LAUSD argues that Plaintiff must allege compliance with the claims-presentation requirement or an excuse for presentation. LAUSD distinguishes the opposition arguments. LAUSD also argues that a legislative appropriation for payment to an individual in a claim for damages for which the State is not responsible by law or by statute is a gift within the meaning of the California constitution, an argument made in the moving papers. LAUSD also distinguishes Plaintiff’s law as to this issue. Last, LAUSD rebuts the arguments that AB 218 fits within the public purpose exception to the California constitution’s gift clause. (Reply, pp. 3-11.)

After review, the Court finds in favor of Plaintiff Doe.

The Court relies on the documents submitted by Plaintiff for judicial notice and makes the determination that even if AB 218 functions as an appropriation gifting public funds—a determination the Court need not reach here—the public purpose exception applies.

The test for “whether or not a proposed application of public funds is to be deemed a gift within the meaning [of the gift clause], … is … whether the money is to be used for a public or a private purpose.” (City of Oakland v. Garrison (1924) 194 Cal. 298, 302.) “The determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a matter for the Legislature to determine, and its discretion will not be disturbed by the courts so long as that determination has a reasonable basis. [Citations.]” (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 746.) Legislative findings are to be “given great weight and will be upheld unless they are found to be unreasonable and arbitrary. [Citations.]” (California Hous. Fin. Agency v. Elliot (1976) 17 Cal.3d 575, 583.)

Here, the challenged portions of AB 218 (passed in 2020) appear to be two. First, the legislature removed a portion of a 2008 amendment to Government Code section 905 (the claims requirement statute) that eliminated the claims presentation requirement for childhood sexual abuse cases for conduct arising on or after January 1, 2009. Second, the legislature added a new subsection to Government Code section 905 making the changes to the statute retroactive. (Demurrer, pp. 10-11, citing Gov. Code, § 905, subds. (m), (p) as unconstitutional modifications enacted by AB 218.)

Plaintiff points to various expressly stated public purposes in passing these laws, such as legislative comments that the law was passed, in part, to help prevent future assaults by raising the cost for sexual assault of minors. Those same comments provide that another purpose of the law is for the law to protect victims of sexual assault rather than the perpetrators, who benefit from statutes of limitations. The comments also provide that another purpose of AB 218 is to “confront the pervasive problem of cover ups of sexual abuse in institutions, from schools to sports leagues, which result in continuing victimization and the sexual assault of additional children.” (Opp’n, RJN, Ex. 2, AB 218 Concur in Senate Amendments dated August 30, 2019, Comments.) Moreover, the comments provide that the law will create “an effective deterrent against individuals and entities who have chosen to protect the perpetrators of sexual assault over the victims.” (Id.) The Court finds that these sufficiently state public purposes for the passage of AB 218 by the Legislature.

In reply, LAUSD argues that creating liability that did not previously exist and thus involves an invalid claim serves no public purpose. LAUSD argues that AB 218 creates invalid claims by eliminating the substantive element of claim presentation for suits involving personal injury against a local public entity. However, the case law supported for this proposition is distinguishable. Conlin v. Board of Supervisors of City and County and San Francisco (1893) 99 Cal. 17, 19-20, 23, for example, involved circumstances where the plaintiff was attempting to collect payment from the city and county of San Francisco for contractual work performed pursuant to a California law permitting that collection. The Supreme Court of California found the law unconstitutional as violative of the gift clause because the law created liability under circumstances where the plaintiff’s contract clearly provided that the plaintiff proceeded with the contract with the “express condition that in no case would the city and county of San Francisco be liable for any portion of the expense of the said work or improvement, or for any delinquency of persons or property assessed.” Thus, the plaintiff in Conlin had no basis for expecting compensation from the city or County of San Francisco from before the time of injury, and the legislature simply created a liability that contradicted the terms of the plaintiff’s contract. Here, by contrast, any cause of action against Mr. Johnson accrued at the time the cause of action was complete with all of its elements. (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806-807.) Those elements, viewed in the light most favorable to the pleadings, accrued at the time of the alleged abuse in the 1970s. The exposure to LAUSD would have been created at the same time under a negligence or negligent supervision theory, such as here, subject to the claims presentation requirements at the time. Moreover, in Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, 213—a case cited by both parties—the court noted that if the legislature “intended to … revive … the claim representation requirement under the government claims statute, it could have easily said so,” implying the legislature’s ability to make the changes it did in AB 218 relating to subdivisions (m) and (p) in Government Code section 905.

LAUSD’s demurrer is thus OVERRULED.

Conclusion

Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District’s Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint is OVERRULED.