Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 22STCV39291, Date: 2023-06-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV39291    Hearing Date: November 9, 2023    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

Background

On July 6, 2023, after the Court issued an order sustaining a demurrer to the First Amended Complaint on June 22, 2023, Plaintiff Jane Doe filed a Second Amended Complaint (SAC) suing Defendants Los Angeles Southwest College (LASC), Los Angeles Community College District (the LACCD), Pedro Cristia, and Does 1 to 100 pursuant to claims of: (1) Sexual Assault/Battery, (2) False Imprisonment, and (3) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) against Defendant Cristia; (4) Negligence and (5) Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention of Employee against LASC, the LACCD, and Does 11 through 100; and (6) Negligence against Does 31-60 as entities or businesses who had control of Defendant Cristia.

The claims arise from allegations that on January 2, 2019, Plaintiff visited the LASC Student Health Center for a routine physical examination and that during that visit, Defendant Cristia—a nurse working for the LASC, a community college within the LACCD system—informed that Plaintiff needed to return for additional vaccinations on January 8, 2019. Plaintiff is alleged to have returned to the Student Health Center on January 8, 2019—which was closed for operations at the time—at which time Defendant Cristia admitted Plaintiff to the Center, informing her that he wanted to complete her vaccinations before the Clinic got busy. Plaintiff alleges that after Defendant Cristia administered the vaccinations, he informed Plaintiff that she needed to undergo a further physical evaluation. Under this pretext, Defendant Cristia is alleged to have sexually abused Plaintiff, including by touching Plaintiff’s breasts, massaging her legs, and inserting two fingers inside of Plaintiff, insisting that these actions were requirements of the physical evaluation when Plaintiff pushed Defendant Cristia’s hand away and told him to stop what he was doing. After paying in cash for the visit at Defendant Cristia’s insistence, Plaintiff requested copies of the reports for her examination, which Defendant Cristia said he could not provide at that time based on the need to write up the reports, and which Defendant Cristia did not provide to Plaintiff the next day because he did not have them and had “submitted [them] to the office.” After discussing the visit with a classmate, Plaintiff filed a police report and made a written claim with LASC and the LACCD.

On August 7, 2023, Defendant Cristia demurred to the SAC’s second to sixth causes of action. The SAC’s first cause of action is not challenged by the demurrer.

On September 8, 2023, the Court held a case management conference (CMC), at which time the Court noted that Defendant Cristia’s demurrer and a different demurrer to the SAC by LASC and the LACCD were coming up. The Court also continued the CMC to November 13, 2023, the same date set for the hearing on LASC and the LACCD’s demurrer.

On October 27, 2023, Plaintiff Doe dismissed the SAC as to Defendants LASC and the LACCD, with prejudice.

Later that day, Plaintiff Doe opposed the August 7, 2023 demurrer by Defendant Cristia.

The record fails to reflect a reply by Defendant Cristia.

Defendant Cristia’s demurrer is now before the Court.

Demurrer

Preliminary Note

To the extent that the demurrer requests that the Court strike damages (e.g., attorney’s fees) or other matters from the SAC, the Court notes that such relief is not appropriate pursuant to a demurrer. (Demurrer, p. 4, ¶ 4.) A motion to strike to be heard concurrently with this demurrer should have been filed.

Demurrer Sufficiency Standard

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747; see Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) This device can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) To sufficiently allege a cause of action, a complaint must allege all the ultimate facts—that is, the facts needed to establish each element of the cause of action pleaded. (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 212, superseded by statute as stated in Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235, 242.) Thus, “[t]o survive a [general] demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) In testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-67.) A demurrer, however, “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228, disapproved on other grounds, Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1162.) The face of the complaint includes exhibits attached to the complaint. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.) If facts appearing in the exhibits contradict those alleged, the facts in the exhibits take precedence. (Holland v. Morse Diesel Intern., Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1447, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in White v. Cridlebaugh (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 506, 521.)

Uncertainty Legal Standard 

A demurrer to a pleading lies where the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (f).) “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616, disapproved on other grounds in Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 46 [holding claims for unfair business practices need not be pled specifically, impliedly disapproving Khoury].) As a result, a special demurrer for uncertainty is not intended to reach failure to incorporate sufficient facts in the pleading but is directed only at uncertainty existing in the allegations already made. (People v. Taliaferro (1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 822, 825, disapproved on other grounds in Jefferson v. J.E. French Co. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 717, 719-720 [statute of limitations question].) Where complaint is sufficient to state a cause of action and to apprise defendant of issues he is to meet, it is not properly subject to a special demurrer for uncertainty. (See ibid.; see also Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643 [“A special demurrer [for uncertainty] should be overruled where the allegations of the complaint are sufficiently clear to apprise the defendant of the issues which he is to meet”].)

I.

SAC, Second Cause of Action [False Imprisonment]: OVERRULED.

Defendant Cristia demurs to the Complaint’s second cause of action on five grounds: (1) sufficiency of pleading; (2) uncertainty in pleading; (3) claim duplicative of first cause of action; (4) statute of limitations based on Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision (c); and (5) statute of limitations based on Penal Code section 801. (Mot., pp. 1-2, 5-7.)

After review, the Court overrules the demurrer as to the second cause of action, as alleged against Defendant Cristia.

A. Sufficiency and Uncertainty

The California Penal Code defines false imprisonment as “the unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another.” (Pen. Code, § 236.) The tort of false imprisonment requires (1) the nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, and (3) for an appreciable period of time, however brief. (Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp.¿(2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 485, 496 (Easton); see also Scofield v. Critical Air Medicine, Inc. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 990, 1001, fn. 11 (Scofield) [“‘The essential elements of a claim for false imprisonment … are: [¶] 1. The defendant intentionally and unlawfully exercised force or the express or implied threat of force to restrain, detain or confine the plaintiff; [¶] 2. The restraint, detention or confinement compelled the plaintiff to stay or go somewhere for some appreciable time, however short; [¶] 3. The plaintiff did not consent to such restraint, detention or confinement …[;] [and] [¶] 4. The restraint, detention or confinement ... caused plaintiff to suffer injury, damage, loss or harm.’ (Italics added.)” Quoting jury instructions at FN12 BAJI No. 7.60.].)

Here, the Court finds that the SAC is clear as to the grounds for false imprisonment: the confinement of Plaintiff Doe for the purpose of a supposed physical evaluation by Defendant Cristia, with Defendant Cristia wrongfully insisting that the physical contact with Plaintiff was necessary for the evaluation, forcing Plaintiff Doe to suffer Defendant Cristia to touch her breasts and legs and insert his fingers inside of her, under circumstances where Plaintiff Doe appeared to be unsure about whether she could leave. (SAC, ¶¶ 10-17, 40-44.)

The Court also notes that the demurrer only elaborates on its statute of limitations and duplicativeness grounds without elaborating on sufficiency of pleading and uncertainty in pleading generally. (Demurrer, pp. 5-7.)

Defendant Cristia’s demurrer therefore cannot be sustained on these grounds.

B. Duplicativeness

A general demurrer for sufficiency may be sustained against duplicative claims. (Palm Springs Villas II Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Parth (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 268, 290 [“a cause of action for breach of governing documents [that] appear[ed] to be duplicative of [a] cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty” is “recognized … as a basis for sustaining a demurrer”]; Rodrigues v. Campbell Industries (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 494, 501 [finding demurrer was properly sustained without leave to amend as to cause of action that contained allegations of other causes and “thus add[ed] nothing to the complaint by way of fact or theory of recovery”]; see also Award Metals, Inc. v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1128, 1135 [demurrer should have been sustained as to duplicative causes of action].) 

Defendant Cristia argues that “the gravamen of Plaintiff’s [second cause of action] is the first cause of action’s … [allegations of] sexual assault allegedly occurring [on] January 8, 2019[,]” such that the SAC’s “false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence [claims] … do[] not add any new theory of recovery [and] … [do not arise from] facts unrelated to the sexual assault. (See FAC, 38, 45, 68.)” (Demurrer, p. 7.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the false imprisonment, IIED, and negligence claims are not duplicative of the first cause of action for sexual assault/battery because all six claims involve different legal elements and because “Plaintiff’s claims are based on different facts and provide separate theories of recovery,” as confirmed by jury instructions. (Opp’n, p. 6.)

The Court determines that the second cause of action for false imprisonment—as well as the third cause of action for IIED, with no comment on the negligence claims—are not duplicative of the sexual assault/battery claim. False imprisonment focuses on the unlawful and nonconsensual restraint of one individual by another through force or threat of force (Easton, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 496; Scofield, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1001, fn. 11), and IIED focuses on the intentional infliction of emotional distress through extreme and outrageous conduct (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051), whereas assault and battery arise from an individual touching or putting another individual in apprehension of harmful or offensive contact (So v. Shin (2013) 121 Cal.App.4th 652, 668-669, as modified on denial of reh’g (Jan. 28, 2013)). These torts connote different wrongs based on the state of mind necessary and the conduct upon which liability turns.

Defendant Cristia’s demurrer therefore cannot be sustained on this ground.

C. Statute of Limitations

Unless a complaint affirmatively discloses on its face that the statute of limitations has run, the general demurrer on these grounds must be overruled. (See Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 881 (Lockley) [“It must appear clearly and affirmatively that, upon the face of the complaint, the right of action is necessarily barred”].) Instead, “[t]he proper remedy ‘is to ascertain the factual basis of the contention through discovery and, if necessary, file a motion for summary judgment ….’ [Citation.]” (Roman v. County of Los Angeles (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 316, 325.) Generally, a “statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff suspects or should suspect that her injury was caused by wrongdoing, that someone has done something wrong to her” (the “discovery rule”). (Bernson v. Browning–Ferris Industries (1994) 7 Cal.4th 926, 932.) “[A] cause of action accrues at ‘the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements.’” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806-807.) However, if the complaint alleges wrongful conduct commencing at a time now barred by the statute of limitations, but continuing until a date not barred, the last over act supporting the tort controls the trigger date for the statute of limitations. (See Wyatt v. Union Mortg. Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 773, 786 [holding that the statute of limitations on continuing tort cause of action does not begin to run until commission of last overt act].)

Defendant Cristia demurs to the second cause of action on the ground that false imprisonment is subject to a one-year statute of limitations and that the limitations period has run on the second cause of action because the alleged conduct giving rise to false imprisonment occurred on January 8, 2019, well more than a year before this action was filed on December 19, 2022. Defendant Cristia also preemptively argues that Code of Civil Procedure section 340.16 does not revive and extend the limitations period on false imprisonment claims because “sexual assault” as defined in that statute does not include false imprisonment. (Demurrer, pp. 5-6.)

In opposition, Plaintiff Doe relies on Jane Doe #21 (S.H.) v. CFR Enterprises, Inc. (Jun. 29, 2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1199 for the purpose of arguing that section 340.16 should include revival and extension of the limitations period for claims of false imprisonment arising from sexual assault, as alleged in the SAC. (Opp’n, pp. 3-5.)

After review, the Court overrules the demurrer as to the second cause of action, as alleged against Defendant Cristia on Cristia’s statute of limitations argument.

Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision (c) imposes a one-year statute of limitations on civil claims for false imprisonment. (Cf. Pen. Code, § 801 [statute of limitations for criminal false imprisonment charge is three years after offense].) Here, the SAC alleges that the false imprisonment occurred on January 8, 2019. (SAC, ¶¶ 10-17, 40-44.) However, this action was not brought until December 19, 2022, almost four years later. Thus, the SAC affirmatively shows on its face that the second cause of action is beyond its statute of limitations, thus supporting the demurrer. (Lockley, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 881 [“It must appear clearly and affirmatively that, upon the face of the complaint, the right of action is necessarily barred” to sustain a statute of limitations demurrer]; see Demurrer, pp. 5-6 [statute of limitations argument based on Code Civ. Proc., § 340, subd. (c).)

However, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that in this case, Code of Civil Procedure section 340.16 revives and extends the statute of limitations on Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim arising from sexual assault. (See Opp’n, pp. 3-5.) Code of Civil Procedure section 340.16, subdivision (a) provides that “[i]n any civil action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of sexual assault, where the assault occurred on or after the plaintiff’s 18th birthday, the time for commencement of the action shall be the later of the following: (1) Within 10 years from the date of the last act, attempted act, or assault with the intent to commit an act, of sexual assault against the plaintiff[] [or] (2) [w]ithin three years from the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that an injury or illness resulted from an act, attempted act, or assault with the intent to commit an act, of sexual assault against the plaintiff.”

In Jane Doe #21 (S.H.) v. CFR Enterprises, Inc. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1199 the court of appeal remanded the question of whether certain claims—including IIED claims—could benefit from the revival and statute of limitations extension in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.16. (Jane Doe #21 (S.H.) v. CFR Enterprises, Inc. (Jun. 29, 2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1199, 1205, 1210.) The court of appeal noted that section 340.16 did not limit itself to sexual assault and battery alone, but also “applies to ‘any civil action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of sexual assault.’” (Id. at p. 1209.) The court notes that plaintiff’s other claims, from negligence to fraud, had admittedly “sought damages as a result of sexual assault.” (Id. at p. 1209.) The court remanded the case back to the trial court to determine which of those claims arose from sexual assault within the meaning of the statute, because the parties’ briefs did not address the application of the recently amended to these claims. (Id. at p. 1210.)

Here, Plaintiff’s second cause of action clearly seeks damages under the claim for false imprisonment based on the sexual assault. (Complaint at ¶¶ 29-30.) Thus, the Court finds, with the guidance of Jane Doe #21, supra, that the statute of limitations extension applies to this claim.

Defendant Cristia’s demurrer is thus OVERRULED as to the second cause of action.

II.

SAC, Third Cause of Action [IIED]: OVERRULED.

“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.’ A defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ And the defendant’s conduct must be ‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’” (Hughes v. Pair, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 1050-1051.)

Defendant Cristia demurs to the Complaint’s third cause of action on four grounds: (1) sufficiency of pleading; (2) uncertainty in pleading; (3) claim duplicative of first cause of action; and (4) statute of limitations based on Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1. (Mot., pp. 2, 5-7.)

After review, the Court OVERRULES the demurrer as to the third cause of action, as alleged against Defendant Cristia.

A. Sufficiency and Uncertainty

The Court briefly notes that the sufficiency and uncertainty arguments raised against the third cause of action are not availing because the SAC sufficiently pleads factual grounds for an IIED claim. (SAC, ¶¶ 10-17, 45-49.)

B. Duplicativeness

The Court also briefly notes that the Court has already determined that the IIED claim is not duplicative of the SAC’s first cause of action for sexual assault/battery. (See Section I.B. discussion supra.)

C. Statute of Limitations

The demurrer is overruled as to the third cause of action based on a statute of limitations argument as well.

Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1 imposes a two-year statute of limitations on civil claims involving assault, battery, or an injury to an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, which includes IIED. As with the false imprisonment claim, the IIED claim was not brought within its proper statute of limitations. The factual grounds for IIED are alleged to have taken place on January 8, 2019 (SAC, ¶¶ 10-17, 45-49), but this action was not brought until December 19, 2022, more than two years later. As such, it “appear[s] clearly and affirmatively that, upon the face of the [SAC], the right of action is necessarily barred” for the third cause of action. (Lockley, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 881.)

However, the opposition’s argument that Code of Civil Procedure section 340.16 extends the statute of limitations on an IIED claim arising from damages sustained as a result of sexual assault is persuasive for the same reason as discussed above in Section I.C. (See Opp’n, pp. 3-5.) Here, the third cause of action for IIED also seeks damages for sexual assault. (Complaint at ¶¶ 36-37.)

Defendant Cristia’s demurrer is thus OVERRULED as to the third cause of action.

III.

SAC, Fourth to Sixth Causes of Action [Negligence, Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention of Employee, and Negligence]: IMPROPER.

The Court finds that the demurrer is IMPROPER insofar as it challenges the fourth to sixth causes of action because the demurrer challenges claims that are not alleged against Defendant Cristia. (See Opp’n, p. 6.) The fourth and fifth causes of action are only alleged against the now-dismissed LASC and the LACCD, and against Does 11-100. (See SAC, ¶¶ 50-54, 55-64.) The sixth cause of action is alleged against Does 31-60 alone. (SAC, ¶¶ 65-71.) 

Conclusion

Defendant Pedro Cristia’s Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint is OVERRULED, in Part, and IMPROPER, in Part, as follows:

(1) OVERRULED as to the SAC’s second and third causes of action; and

(2) IMPROPER as to the SAC’s fourth to sixth causes of action.