Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 22STCV39980, Date: 2024-03-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV39980    Hearing Date: March 6, 2024    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

Background

Plaintiff Andy Martinez sued Defendants FCA US LLC, Russell Westbrook CDJR, and Does 1 through 50 pursuant to a December 23, 2022 Complaint alleging claims of (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty, (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied Warranty, (3) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2(b), and (4) Negligent Repair.

On December 6, 2023, Plaintiff Martinez filed a notice of conditional settlement of the entire case.

On December 7, 2023, the Court set an order to show cause (OSC) hearing regarding dismissal by way of settlement for April 3, 2024.

On January 4, 2024, Plaintiff Martinez filed a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs.

That same day, the clerk rejected the proposed order filed with Plaintiff’s motion.

On February 15, 2024, Plaintiff Martinez filed a standalone memorandum of costs.

On February 22, 2024, Defendant FCA opposed Plaintiff’s motion.

No reply appears in the record.

Plaintiff Martinez’s motion is now before the Court.

Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

I.

Order Granting Attorneys’ Fees: GRANTED, in part.

A.

Legal Standard 

A prevailing party is entitled to recover costs as a matter of right. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subds. (a)(4), (b).) Attorney’s fees are also recoverable as costs when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).) A prevailing buyer in a Song-Beverly Act action is entitled to recover their attorney’s fees and costs under the Act’s express terms. (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d); see Goglin v. BMW of North America, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 462, 464, 471.)

The Court begins this inquiry “with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (PLCM Group).) From there, the “lodestar figure may then be adjusted [according to a multiplier enhancement] based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (Ibid.) Relevant multiplier factors include “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

For purposes of determining a lodestar, absent a contrary showing, both the number of hours that the prevailing party’s attorney spent litigating the case and his or her regular hourly rate are presumed to be reasonable. (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 633-634, 639 (Serrano) [within context of Lab. Code, § 1021.5 private attorney general theory, absent a showing of “special circumstances” that would render such an award unjust, litigant was entitled to all hours actually spent, including those connected to fee-related matters, and those necessary to establish and defend the fee claim]; Mandel v. Lackner (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 747, 761 [“The value of an attorney’s time generally is reflected in his normal billing rate”], disapproved on other grounds in Serrano, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 630, fn. 12 [relating to whether term “antecedent litigation” was applicable between Mandel I and Mandel II].)

“In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488, quoting Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)

No specific findings reflecting the court’s calculations for attorney’s fees are required; the record need only show that the attorney’s fees were awarded according to the “lodestar” or “touchstone” approach. (Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1344, 1349, disagreed with on other grounds in In re Marriage of Demblewski (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 232, 236, fn. 7 [disagreement as to statement of decision requirements]; see Yu v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 636, fn. 6 [disapproving dictum In re Marriage of Demblewski re: whether motions may be filed before a referee’s decision is entered].)

Moreover, the Court is considered “an expert in the matter of attorney fees” since “[t]he value of attorney’s services is a matter with which a judge must necessarily be familiar.” (Excelsior Union High Sch. Dist. of L.A. Cnty. v. Lautrup (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 434, 448 (Excelsior).) Accordingly, “[w]hen the court is informed of the extent and nature of such services, its own experience furnishes it with every element necessary to fix their value.” (Ibid.)

It follows that the Court has broad discretion to determine the amount of a reasonable attorney’s fee award, which will not be overturned absent a “manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence.” (Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1393-1394.)

B.

Discussion

Here, Plaintiff seeks a court order granting $27,804 in lodestar fees and $1,591.39 in costs related to this action. (See Mot. Notice, p. ii; Mot., p. 10.)

1.

Reasonable Fees

The lodestar calculation begins with a determination of the “reasonable hourly rate,” i.e., the rate “prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095; see, e.g., Stratton v. Beck (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 483, 496 [finding no abuse of discretion in court setting attorney’s hourly rate based on comparison of rates from similarly experienced attorneys in same field and area]; Children’s Hospital & Medical Center v. Bonta (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 783 (Children’s) [affirming award where “the hourly rates allowed by the trial court are within the range of reasonable rates charged by and judicially awarded comparable attorneys for comparable work”], disapproved in Asanta v. California Dept. of Health Care Servs. (9th Cir. 2018) 886 F.3d 795, 802, fn. 14 [disapproving Commerce Clause interpretation in Children’s].)

The general rule is “[t]he relevant ‘community’ is that where the court is located. [Citations.]” (Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Systems Laboratory, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 26, 71; accord Marshall v. Webster (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 275, 285.) This fee rate determination centers on the reasonable market value of the services. (See, e.g., Serrano, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 640-643 [discussing arguments and determining trial court did not abuse discretion by applying fee rates for public interest counsel according to reasonable market value, not the “normal billing rate” for public interest attorneys suggested by defendants].) A judge may reasonably reduce an attorney’s requested rate if the judge finds that the matter was not complex, that it did not go to trial but was settled, that the attorney was a named partner who was doing work that could have been done by a lower billing attorney in the firm, or that the attorney did work that could have been done by a paralegal. (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 41; 569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 438-439 (569 East) [finding billing rate reduction of senior attorney was justified where the attorney did “the yeoman’s work” that would ordinarily be done by more junior associates with low billing rates].)

After review, the Court approves the requested hourly rate for counsel here at $695 per hour for Michael Saeedian (fifteen years’ experience), $525 per hour for Christopher Urner (eight years, of which five are in the area of lemon law cases), and $250 per hour for paralegal work.

These fee rate are supported by counsel’s experience and skills (see Mot., Saeedian Decl., ¶¶ 2-4), as well as the Court’s experience with fee rates in the Los Angeles area. (Excelsior, supra, 269 Cal.App.2d at p. 448.)

2.

Reasonable Hours

“Under the lodestar method, a party who qualifies for a fee should recover for all hours reasonably spent unless special circumstances would render an award unjust.” (Vo v. Las Virgenes Mun. Water Dist. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 440, 446, citing Serrano, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 632-633.) Time spent relating solely to the fee award is also compensable. (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1133.)

“‘Reasonably spent’ means that time spent ‘in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation.’” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 394 (Horsford), quoting Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1132-1133.) In assessing the reasonableness of the hours spent, “[t]he court can look to how many lawyers the other side utilized in similar situations as an indication of the effort required.” (Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 272, citation omitted.)

Here, the Court determines that the hours expended on this action were reasonable, with one exception for the time billed for work litigating against Russell Westbrook for a negligent repair claim for which fees are not recoverable. No reply brief was filed addressing this issue. The Court will reduce the award by the amount of $5112.00 for the time spent exclusively on that issue, plus an additional 25% of the remainder to cut out time that was not spent on claims for which fees are recoverable. Thus, $27,804 - $5112 = $22692 x 0.75 = $17,019.

While the opposition argues that various additional time entries are excessive based on the copy-and-paste, template nature of lemon law pleadings, discovery, and motions (Opp’n, pp. 5-7), the Court is satisfied that the hours requested here are reasonable for the tasks involved in the billing records. The Court notes that verified records are entitled to deference. (Horsford, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 395-397.) Last, the Court notes that the time entries reflect tasks for which a reasonable amount of time was expended, with most entries involving tasks of 0.3 hours or less. (Mot., Saeedian Decl., Ex. A.)

3.

Fees Conclusion

Fees are GRANTED, in part, in the amount of $17,019:

II.

Order Granting Costs: GRANTED.

A.

Legal Standard

In general, the “prevailing party” is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs for suit in any action or proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (b); Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 606; Scott Co. Of Calif. v. Blount, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1103, 1108.) Assuming the “prevailing party” requirements are met, the trial court has no discretion to order each party to bear his or her own costs of suit. (Michell v. Olick (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1198; Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 129.) The term “prevailing party” for costs purposes is defined by statute to include:  

(1) The party with a net monetary recovery;  

(2) A defendant who is dismissed from the action;  

(3) A defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant recovers anything; and  

(4) A defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).)

A verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services therein listed were necessarily incurred. (Rappenecker v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 256, 266.)

Any challenge to costs must be filed and served within 15 days of service of the memorandum of costs plus extra court or calendar days depending on the type of service. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700, subd. (b)(1).) Failure to challenge costs within this timeframe results in waiver of those rights. (Griffith v. Wellbanks & Co. (1915) 26 Cal.App. 477, 480; cf. Sanabria v. Embrey (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 422, 426 [citing case law derived from Griffith—first cited in Sepulveda v. Apablasa (1938) 25 Cal.App.2d 381, 389, with Sepulveda cited in Hydratec, Inc. v. Sun Valley 260 Orchard & Vineyard Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 924, 929, and Hydratec cited in Sanabria—to reverse trial court’s award of costs where costs memorandum was untimely filed].)

“A prematurely filed memorandum of costs is ‘“a mere irregularity at best” that does not constitute reversible error absent a showing of prejudice’ and is treated ‘as being timely filed.’” (Lowry v. Port San Luis Harbor District (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 211, 221; accord Haley v. Casa Del Rey Homeowners Assn. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 863, 880; Lange v. Fisher (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 113, 118].)

B.

Discussion

Here, no judgment has been entered in this action, for which reason the 15- or 180-day deadline to file a memorandum of costs has not been triggered. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(a)(1).)

Plaintiff Martinez has nevertheless filed a costs memo, which the Court may consider as timely filed. (See Lowry, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 221.)

No motion to strike or tax the costs memorandum appears in the record.

Neither does FCA’s opposition challenge costs. (See Opp’n, pp. 1-11.)

The clerk is thus entitled to enter costs as a matter of procedure. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(b)(1) & (4).)

Costs are thus GRANTED in the requested amount of $1,591.39.

Conclusion

Plaintiff Andy Martinez’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs is GRANTED, in part, as follows:

(1) GRANTED, in part, as to fees in the amount of $17,019; and

(2) GRANTED as to costs in the amount of $1,591.39.