Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 22STCV40023, Date: 2023-07-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV40023    Hearing Date: July 21, 2023    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

Background

Plaintiffs Julio Galvez and Marta Galvez sue Defendants Robert Illescas and Does 1-100 pursuant to an August 29, 2022 Complaint alleging claims of: (1) Violation of Civil Code § 1942.4; (2) Tortious Breach of the Warranty of Habitability; (3) Private Nuisance; (4) Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq.; (5) Negligence; (6) Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment; (7) Intentional Influence to Vacate; (8) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (9) Fraud and Deceit; (10) Violation of City of Los Angeles Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance; (11) Violation of Los Angeles Retaliatory Eviction and Anti-Harassment Ordinance; (12) Termination of Estate, Civil Code § 789.3, and (13) Violation of the Los Angeles Municipal Code § 151.00, et seq. (Rent Stabilization Ordinance).

The claims arise from allegations that during their tenancy of a dwelling owned by Defendant Illescas—1558 S. Hobart Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90006  (Premises)—Plaintiffs experienced substandard habitability conditions—which included cockroach infestations, deteriorated and worn walls and ceilings, lack of a proper heating system, burdensome disruption of utilities (including gas), an inoperable stove (a result of disconnection and the gas being turned off by Defendants), inconsistent hot water supply, unsanitary and unsafe common areas, and inadequate security—and that despite reporting these conditions to Defendant Illescas, they were not remedied and remain ongoing.

The claims also arise from allegations that Defendant Illescas retaliated against Plaintiffs by, among other things: issuing a Notice to Quit and Unlawful Detainer action against Plaintiffs; reducing or eliminating housing services required by a lease, contract or law, including the elimination of Plaintiffs’ use of their gas stove and kitchen; failing to perform, and timely complete, necessary repairs and maintenance required by State, County, or local housing, health, or safety laws; threatening to terminate the tenancy based on facts that Illescas had no reasonable cause to believe to be true; refusing to acknowledge or accept receipt of the lawful rent payment for December 2022; refusing to cash or process a rent check or other form of acceptable rent payment for over thirty (30) days after it was tendered; and misrepresenting to Plaintiffs that they were required to vacate their rental unit and trying to entice them to vacate their rental unit through an “intentional misrepresentation or the concealment … of fact” related to the unlawful detainer action and failure to accept rent.

On March 1, 2023, Defendant Illescas demurred to the Complaint’s first through fourth and seventh through thirteenth causes of action.

On July 10, 2023, Plaintiffs opposed the demurrer.

The record does not reflect a reply to the opposition.

Defendant Illescas’s demurrer is now before the Court.

Demurrer

Demurrer Sufficiency Standard

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747; see Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) This device can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a [general] demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) In testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-67.) A demurrer, however, “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228, disapproved on other grounds, Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1162.) The face of the complaint includes exhibits attached to the complaint. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.) If facts appearing in the exhibits contradict those alleged, the facts in the exhibits take precedence. (Holland v. Morse Diesel Intern., Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1447, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in White v. Cridlebaugh (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 506, 521.)

Uncertainty Legal Standard 

A demurrer to a pleading lies where the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (f).) “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616, disapproved on other grounds in Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 46 [holding claims for unfair business practices need not be pled specifically, impliedly disapproving Khoury].) As a result, a special demurrer for uncertainty is not intended to reach failure to incorporate sufficient facts in the pleading but is directed only at uncertainty existing in the allegations already made. (People v. Taliaferro (1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 822, 825.) Where a complaint is sufficient to state a cause of action and to apprise defendant of issues he is to meet, it is not properly subject to a special demurrer for uncertainty. (See ibid.; see also Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643 [“[a] special demurrer [for uncertainty] should be overruled where the allegations of the complaint are sufficiently clear to apprise the defendant of the issues which he is to meet”].)

I.

Complaint, First Cause of Action, Violation of Civil Code § 1942.4: OVERRULED.

“A landlord of a dwelling may not demand rent, collect rent, issue a notice of a rent increase, or issue a three-day notice to pay rent or quit pursuant to subdivision (2) of Section 1161 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if all of the following conditions exist prior to the landlord’s demand or notice:

(1) The dwelling substantially lacks any of the affirmative standard characteristics listed in Section 1941.1 or violates Section 17920.10 of the Health and Safety Code, or is deemed and declared substandard as set forth in Section 17920.3 of the Health and Safety Code because conditions listed in that section exist to an extent that endangers the life, limb, health, property, safety, or welfare of the public or the occupants of the dwelling.

(2) A public officer or employee who is responsible for the enforcement of any housing law, after inspecting the premises, has notified the landlord or the landlord’s agent in writing of his or her obligations to abate the nuisance or repair the substandard conditions.

(3) The conditions have existed and have not been abated 35 days beyond the date of service of the notice specified in paragraph (2) and the delay is without good cause. For purposes of this subdivision, service shall be complete at the time of deposit in the United States mail.

(4) The conditions were not caused by an act or omission of the tenant or lessee in violation of Section 1929 or 1941.2.”

(Civ. Code, § 1942.4, subds. (a)(1)-(4).)

The first cause of action alleges violation of Civil Code section 1942.4 based on allegations that Defendant Illescas collected rent on the Premises from Plaintiffs despite affirmative standard characteristics listed in Civil Code section 1941.1 or violating section 17920.3 of the Health and Safety Code, including cockroach infestations, burdensome disruption to utilities, including plumbing and gas, and inconsistent and irregular hot water supply. (Complaint, ¶¶ 49 [rent], 50-52 [cause of action].)

Defendant Illescas’s demurrer argues that the claim is insufficiently or uncertainly pleaded because “Plaintiffs’ complaint does not state that the property was inspected by a public officer,” “does not state that the property was cited by a public officer,” and “does not state that the conditions failed to be abated beyond 35 days of notice of the substandard conditions.” (Demurrer, p. 6.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that they sufficiently allege affirmative standard characteristics listed in Civil Code section 1941.1 or violations of section 17920.3 of the Health and Safety Code, including Defendant Illescas “unlawfully remov[ing[ the kitchen stove, fail[ing] to eradicate the cockroach infestation, and disrupt[ing] Plaintiffs’ utilities, including inconsistent plumbing and gas and irregular hot water supply.” (Opp’n, pp. 5-6.)

The Court finds that the allegations at paragraphs 49 to 52 sufficiently allege violations of section 17920.3 of the Health and Safety Code, including a “[l]ack of hot … water to plumbing fixtures” in the Premises and “[i]nfestation of insects” (cockroaches). (See Health & Saf. Code, § 17920, subds. (5), (12).)

Defendant Illescas’s demurrer to the first cause of action is thus OVERRULED.

II.

Complaint, Second Cause of Action, Tortious Breach of the Warranty of Habitability: OVERRULED.

The elements of an affirmative cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability are (1) a material defective condition affecting the habitability of the premises, (2) notice to the landlord within a reasonable time after the tenant’s discovery of the substandard condition, (3) the landlord was given a reasonable time to remedy the condition, and (4) resulting damages. (Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1297.)¿ 

The second cause of action incorporates prior allegations—e.g., cockroach infestations, deteriorated and worn walls and ceilings, lack of a proper heating system, burdensome disruption of utilities (including gas), an inoperable stove (a result of disconnection and the gas being turned off by Defendants), inconsistent hot water supply, unsanitary and unsafe common areas, and inadequate security (Complaint, ¶¶ 17-23, 53 [incorporation])—to support a breach of habitability claim. (Complaint, ¶¶ 53-61.)

Defendant Illescas argues that this claim is deficient because, in essence, “Plaintiffs have failed to properly plead the existence of a lease pursuant to which the implied warranty of habitability could even attach in the first place.” (Demurrer, pp. 5-6.)

The Court rejects this argument.

The first two paragraphs of the Complaint allege Plaintiffs’ tenancy of and lease for the Premises and Defendant Illescas’s ownership thereof. (See Complaint, ¶¶ 1-2.) Moreover, the conditions’ incorporation into the second cause of action properly plead materially defective conditions affecting the habitability of the Premises (Complaint, ¶¶ 17-23), which were reported to Defendant Illescas (Complaint, ¶ 26), with Illescas failing to remedy the conditions (Complaint, ¶ 26), and damages to Plaintiffs (Complaint, ¶ 61).

Defendant Illescas’s demurrer to the second cause of action is thus OVERRULED.

III.

Complaint, Third Cause of Action, Private Nuisance: OVERRULED.

“A nuisance may be either a negligent or an intentional tort.” (Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 920.) In order to state a claim for private nuisance, Plaintiff must allege (1) “an interference with his use and enjoyment of his property,” (2) “the invasion of the plaintiff’s interest in the use and enjoyment of the land must be substantial, i.e., that it causes the plaintiff to suffer substantial actual damage,” and (3) “the interference with the protected interest must not only be substantial, but it must also be unreasonable [], i.e., it must be of such a nature, duration or amount as to constitute unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the land.” (Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners, LLC (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 248, 262-263, brackets, emphasis, and quotation marks omitted.) 

The third cause of action alleges nuisance based on incorporated allegations and direct allegations that the “ongoing” “conditions of the Subject Property that … Defendants caused constitute a private nuisance within, but not limited to the meaning of Civil Code Section 3479 because the defective conditions were injurious to the health and safety of Plaintiffs, indecent and offensive to the Plaintiffs and interfered substantially with the Plaintiffs [sic] comfortable enjoyment of the Subject Property.” (Complaint, ¶ 63; see Complaint, ¶¶ 17-23, 62-70.)

Defendant Illescas demurs to the nuisance claim on the grounds that “[t]here are no specific allegations thoroughly describing the alleged nuisances that Plaintiffs[] were dealing with, when they complained to Defendant, how they complained to Defendant, and what Defendant’s response was.” (Demurrer, pp. 7-8.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the nuisance is properly pleaded at paragraphs 37 to 40, 51, and 64 of the Complaint. (Opp’n, pp. 6-7.)

The Court finds that the Complaint sufficiently pleads nuisance.

The Court adopts its discussion as to the first and second causes of action, as well as references to portions of the Complaint that allege uninhabitable conditions in the Premises to support an interference with Plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of the Premises that is substantial (ongoing) and unreasonable (not remedied).

Defendant Illescas’s demurrer to the third cause of action is thus OVERRULED.

IV.

Complaint, Fourth Cause of Action, Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq.: OVERRULED.

To state a cause of action for unfair business practices, a plaintiff must establish defendant engaged in “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.) This section establishes three types of unfair competition, prohibiting “practices that are either ‘unfair,’ or ‘unlawful,’ or ‘fraudulent.’” (Pastoria v. Nationwide Ins. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1496.) Thus, “[a]n act or practice may be actionable as “unfair” under the unfair competition law even if it is not ‘unlawful.’” (Chavez v. Whirlpool Corp. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 363, 374.) A violation of other laws is deemed independently actionable under the UCL. (See Law Offices of Mathew Higbee v. Expungement Assistance Servs. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 544, 554.) “‘Virtually any law—federal, state or local—can serve as a predicate for a section 17200 action.’” (Ibid., quoting Aleksick v. 7-Eleven, Inc. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1185.)¿

Despite the broad scope of Business and Professions Code section 17200, its remedies are limited to equitable relief and damages are not recoverable. (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1144.)¿ 

The unfair business practices claim in the Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs are entitled to restitution of rents paid by Plaintiffs for their lease of the Premises, as well as an affirmative injunction to remedy the conditions on the therein, based on the unlawful business practice of demanding rent for a property in which the landlord has failed to abate known habitability conditions. (Complaint, ¶¶ 71-80; see also Complaint, ¶¶ 17-23 [uninhabitable conditions].)

Defendant Illescas argues on demurrer that “Plaintiff does not allege what illegal or fraudulent representations were” and that “Defendant is not a business,” for which reason “this entire statute is not applicable to him.” (Demurrer, p. 8.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the unfair business practices claim properly incorporates the unlawful collection of rent despite known lack of habitability conditions and cite to statutory authority providing that “[a]ny person who engages, has engaged, or proposes to engage in unfair competition may be enjoined in any court of competent jurisdiction.” (Opp’n, pp. 7-8, citing Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17203.)

The Court finds that the knowing collection of rent for premises that contain substandard conditions, as set forth in Section 17920.3 of the Health and Safety Code (see First Cause of Action discussion supra; see also Complaint, ¶¶ 17-24, 49), supports a finding of unlawful business practices, and that the Business and Professions Code may be applied to Defendant Illescas, even if he is an individual, as long as the claim is predicated on his personal participation in the unlawful practices. (People v. Toomey (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 1, 14-15; People v. McKale (1979) 25 Cal.3d 626, 634.)

Defendant Illescas’s demurrer to the fourth cause of action is thus OVERRULED.

V.

Complaint, Seventh Cause of Action, Intentional Influence to Vacate: SUSTAINED, With Leave to Amend.

It is unlawful for a landlord to, for the purpose of influencing a tenant to vacate a dwelling: 

(1) Engage in conduct that violates subdivision (a) of Section 484 of the Penal Code. 

(2) Engage in conduct that violates Section 518 of the Penal Code. 

(3) Use, or threaten to use, force, willful threats, or menacing conduct constituting a course of conduct that interferes with the tenant’s quiet enjoyment of the premises in violation of Section 1927 that would create an apprehension of harm in a reasonable person. Nothing in this paragraph requires a tenant to be actually or constructively evicted in order to obtain relief. 

(4) Commit a significant and intentional violation of Section 1954. 

(5) Threaten to disclose information regarding or relating to the immigration or citizenship status of a tenant, occupant, or other person known to the landlord to be associated with a tenant or occupant. This paragraph does not require a tenant to be actually or constructively evicted in order to obtain relief.

(Civil Code, § 1940.2, subds. (a)(1)-(5).)

The Complaint’s seventh cause of action alleges violation of Civil Code section 1940.2 based on Defendant Illesca using “force, willful threats and menacing conduct, including issuing a false and baseless Notice to Quit and Unlawful Detainer action, constituting a course of conduct that interferes with the Plaintiffs quiet enjoyment of the premises in violation of Section 1927 and creating an apprehension of harm in a reasonable person,” where “Defendants harassed, intimidated, and punished Plaintiffs so extensively as to render tenancy in the Property entirely unbearable” and “made false and fraudulent claims, served false notices, and filed a frivolous unlawful detainer action” all “based on false claims in an effort to influence Plaintiffs to … depart the Subject Property.” (Complaint, ¶ 103; see Complaint, ¶¶ 99-106.)

Defendant Illescas demurs to this claim on the grounds that (1) the cited law (altogether different Municipal Code article 5.3, section 45.30 et seq.) came into being on August 6, 2021 and is not retroactive, but the Complaint fails to detail the date on which the alleged violations took place, and (2) Plaintiffs failed to notify Defendant Illescas of the alleged violations that occurred before bringing this claim. (Demurrer, pp. 8-9.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs cite to paragraphs 103 to 106 to support the claim. (See Opp’n, pp. 8-9.)

The Court finds that this claim is not sufficiently pleaded.

Retroactivity and date of injuries aside, the Court finds that the Complaint does not plead the types of harm contemplated in subdivision (a)(1) to (5) of Civil Code section 1940.2. Penal Code section 484 involves petty theft, Penal Code section 518 involves blackmail and extortion, and Civil Code section 1954 involves a landlord’s entry into a tenant’s premises. The Complaint fails to plead such violations. The Complaint further fails to plead use or threats of use of force, threats, or menacing conduct to interfere with Plaintiffs’ quiet enjoyment of the Premises or disclosure of immigration status.

Defendant Illescas’s demurrer to the seventh cause of action is thus SUSTAINED, With Leave to Amend.

Complaint, Eighth Cause of Action, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: OVERRULED.

“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.’ A defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ And the defendant’s conduct must be ‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051.)

The Complaint’s eighth cause of action pleads IIED based on Defendant Illescas: “failing to maintain the Property in a habitable condition; refusing to abate numerous disgusting and dangerous conditions and hazards; blatantly ignoring Plaintiffs’ repair requests and complaints; lying to Plaintiffs about repairs and maintenance[;] [and] issuing a false and baseless Notice to Quit and Unlawful Detainer Action, all while collecting full rent despite having actual knowledge that the conditions of the Property were affecting the physical and mental health of their residents.” (Complaint, ¶ 108; see Complaint, ¶¶ 107-113.)

Defendant Illescas demurs against the IIED claim on the grounds that “Plaintiffs fail to even clarify what conduct is purportedly outrageous” and that the IIED claim adds nothing to the Complaint because “there is no distinguishable difference between the[] conduct giving rise to this [claim and] the issues that separate and distinct liability … creates, [making] the whole cause of action … superfluous and unnecessary.” (Demurrer, p. 9.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs refer to paragraphs 37 to 40, 51, and 108 to 113 as supporting the IIED claim. (See Opp’, pp. 9-11.)

The Court finds that the IIED claim is sufficiently pleaded.

The uninhabitable conditions alleged in the Premises (Complaint, ¶¶ 17-23), and knowing yet ongoing failure to remedy the same for a sustained period of time (Complaint, ¶ 26, 64), can, to this Court, constitute outrageous conduct supporting an IIED claim.

Defendant Illescas’s demurrer to the eighth cause of action is thus OVERRULED.

Complaint, Ninth Cause of Action, Fraud and Deceit: SUSTAINED, With Leave to Amend.

Intentional misrepresentation involves (1) a knowingly false (2) representation by the defendant, (3) made with an intent to deceive or induce reliance, (4) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff, and (5) resulting damages.” (Service by Medallion, Inc. v. Clorox Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1807, 1816.)

Allegations of fraud “must be pled with more detail than other causes of action.” (Apollo Capital Fund, LLC v. Roth Capital Partners, LLC (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 226, 240.) “Every element of the cause of action for fraud must be alleged … factually and specifically[,] and the policy of liberal construction of the pleadings … will not ordinarily be invoked to sustain a pleading defective in any material respect. [Citations.]” (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216, superseded by statute as stated in Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235, 242.) “[G]eneral and conclusory allegations do not suffice.” (Small v. Fritz Cos., Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184 [citations omitted].) Fittingly, a plaintiff pleading fraud must plead facts showing “how, when, where, to whom, and by what means” the allegedly fraudulent representations were tendered. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.)

The Complaint’s ninth cause of action alleges fraud against Defendant Illescas based on allegations that “[o]n October 22, 2022[,] Defendants falsely served the Plaintiffs with an invalid and baseless ‘3 day Notice to Quit’ alleging that they had installed a stove in the rental unit and that the stove and the kitchen area must be removed” and that “[o]n November 2, 2022, Defendants filed an unlawful detainer action against Plaintiff Julio Galvez based on this same false and baseless accusation,” where “[t]he assertion of the information in these notices and lawsuit by Defendants was an assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true by Defendants.” (Complaint, ¶¶ 116-117; see Complaint, ¶¶ 114-119.)

Defendant Illescas demurs to this claim on various grounds, including that: “[t]he Complaint does not allege that either Plaintiff relied on any representation made by any Defendant”; the “Complaint does not state the amount of damages suffered as a result of this alleged misrepresentation”; insufficient detail surrounding the ‘when’ and ‘how’ of the alleged misrepresentations; the Complaint fails to specify the facts underlying the claim, likely to avoid a defense and an anti-SLAPP motion, where the maintenance of an unlawful detainer action is protected activity for SLAPP purposes, as is service of a notice to quit; and the litigation privilege applies to a notice to quit and unlawful detainer action. (Demurrer., pp. 10-11.)

Plaintiffs’ opposition argues that the notice to quit and unlawful detainer action contained false representations as to the need for removal of and propriety of having a stove in the rental unit. (Opp’n, p. 11.)

The Court finds that the intentional misrepresentation claim is not sufficiently or certainly pleaded.

It is unclear to the Court how the representations of rental violations in the notice to quit or the unlawful detainer action were false. Moreover, the Complaint fails to properly plead how the conduct complained of is not subject to the litigation privilege other than offering conclusory allegations of falsity.

Defendant Illescas’s demurrer to the ninth cause of action is thus SUSTAINED, With Leave to Amend.

Complaint, Tenth Cause of Action, Violation of City of Los Angeles Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance: OVERRULED.

Article 5.3 of Chapter IV the Los Angeles Municipal Code prohibits tenant harassment. (LAMC, § 45.33 [defining harassment].) “An aggrieved tenant under this article, or any person, organization, or entity who will fairly and adequately represent the interests of an aggrieved tenant(s) under this article, may institute civil proceedings as provided by law, against any landlord violating any of the provisions of this article and any person who aids, facilitates, and/or incites another to violate the provisions of this article, regardless of whether the rental unit remains occupied or has been vacated due to harassment.” (LAMC § 45.35(A).)

The Complaint’s tenth cause of action alleges harassment against Defendant Illescas based on allegations that Defendant harassed Plaintiffs by: reducing or eliminating housing services such as use of the gas stove and kitchen; failing to perform repairs and maintenance; misrepresenting Plaintiffs’ need to vacate the Premises; threatening to terminate the tenancy; interfering with the use and enjoyment of the Premises; and engaging in activity prohibited by law. (Complaint, ¶¶ 123(a)-(f); see Complaint, ¶¶ 120-126.)

Defendant Illescas demurs to this claim on the grounds that (1) the cited law came into being on August 6, 2021 and is not retroactive, but the Complaint fails to detail the date on which the alleged violations took place, and (2) Plaintiffs failed to notify Defendant Illescas of the alleged violations that occurred before bringing this claim. (Demurrer, pp. 8-9.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs cite to the fraud allegations (notice to quit and unlawful detainer action) as support for this harassment claim. (Opp’n, pp. 11-12.)

The Court finds that, at the very least, parts of the tenth cause of action are sufficiently pleaded, for which reason the entire claim survives demurrer. (Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1047 [“A demurrer cannot rightfully be sustained to part of a cause of action or to a particular type of damage or remedy”].)

Portions of the Complaint that adequately plead harassment pursuant to Municipal Code section 45.33 include those alleging failure to timely complete maintenance of the Premises (Complaint, ¶¶ 17-23, 26, 126), failure to bring the Premises up to habitability, e.g., roach infestations (Complaint, ¶¶ 17-23, 26, 126), and failure to accept rent payments (Complaint, ¶ 35), allegations which support respective violations of LAMC section 45.33, subdivisions 2, 7, and 8. To the extent that the Complaint does not allege the dates for failure to maintain or bring the Premises up to habitability, the Complaint includes the date for non-acceptance of rent (December 2022), which followed August 6, 2021.

Defendant Illescas’s demurrer to the tenth cause of action is thus OVERRULED.

Complaint, Eleventh Cause of Action, Violation of Los Angeles Retaliatory Eviction and Anti-Harassment Ordinance: OVERRULED.

The Los Angeles County Code of Ordinances prohibits retaliatory eviction and harassment in properties subject to the Rent Stabilization Ordinances (RSO). (See L.A. County Code of Ordinances, tit. 8, div. 3, ch. 8.52, § 8.52.130.)

The Complaint alleges violation of this ordinance based on allegations that the Premises fall under the City of Los Angeles RSO and that Defendants violated section 8.52.130 by: interrupting, terminating, and failing to provide Housing Services required by the Rental Agreement or by federal, State, County, or local housing, health, or safety laws, including utilities and parking; failing to perform repairs and maintenance required by Rental Agreement or by federal, State, or local laws; failing to exercise due diligence in completing repairs and maintenance once undertaken; refusing to acknowledge or accept receipt of the lawful rent payment as set forth in a Rental Agreement, by usual practice of the parties; refusing to cash or process a rent check or other form of acceptable rent payment for over thirty (30) days after it is tendered; failing to maintain a current address for delivery of rent payments; and issuing a false and baseless Notice to Quit and filing a baseless Unlawful Detainer Action. (Complaint, ¶ 130; see Complaint, ¶¶ 127-136.)

The demurrer fails to raise points related to this claim despite including it in the demurrer’s notice. (See Demurrer, pp. 11-12 [arguments related to tenth and twelfth causes of action without including arguments for eleventh cause of action in between].)

This shortcoming is raised in Plaintiffs’ opposition. (Opp’n, p. 12.)

Defendant Illescas’s demurrer to the eleventh cause of action is thus OVERRULED.

The Court nevertheless notes that the same allegations supporting violation of the statute in the tenth cause of action would support violations of the ordinance in the eleventh cause of action—i.e., failure to timely complete maintenance of the Premises (Complaint, ¶¶ 17-23, 26, 126), failure to bring the Premises up to habitability, e.g., roach infestations (Complaint, ¶¶ 17-23, 26, 126), and failure to accept rent payments (Complaint, ¶ 35)—conduct which violates Ordinance 8.52.130, subdivisions (B)(2)(a) and (e).

Complaint, Twelfth Cause of Action, Termination of Estate, Civil Code § 789.3: OVERRULED.

A landlord shall not with intent to terminate the occupancy under any lease or other tenancy or estate at will, however created, of property used by a tenant as his residence willfully cause, directly or indirectly, the interruption or termination of any utility service furnished the tenant, including, but not limited to, water, heat, light, electricity, gas, telephone, elevator, or refrigeration, whether or not the utility service is under the control of the landlord.

(Civ. Code, § 789.3, subd. (a).)

The Complaint’s twelfth cause of action alleges violation of Civil Code section 789.3 based on allegations that Defendant Illescas violated this statutory section by “indirectly, and repeatedly caus[ing] the termination and interruption of the hot water supply and gas to the Subject Property for days, weeks, and months.” (Complaint, ¶ 139; see Complaint, ¶¶ 137-142.)

Defendant Illescas demurs to this cause of action on the ground that “Plaintiffs’ complaint does not offer any facts [that] tend to show a violation of Civil Code section 789.3” insofar as “Plaintiffs do not state how Defendant blocked access to the subject property, or when Defendant’s engaged in such conduct,” “[m]erely reiterat[ing] the text of the Civil Code but … [failing to] offer any specific facts.” (Demurrer, pp. 11-12.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that they adequately plead that “Defendants willfully caused the interruption of Plaintiffs’ utility services” by “disconnect[ing] Plaintiffs’ gas line in the kitchen, and turn[ing] off Plaintiffs’ hot water,” citing paragraph 139 for these allegations. (Opp’n, p. 12.)

The Court finds this claim is sufficiently pleaded based on paragraph 139 alleging that Defendant Illescas “indirectly, and repeatedly caused the termination and interruption of the hot water supply and gas to the Subject Property for days, weeks, and months.”

Defendant Illescas’s demurrer to the twelfth cause of action is thus OVERRULED.

Complaint, Thirteenth Cause of Action, Violation of the Los Angeles Municipal Code § 151.00, et seq. (Rent Stabilization Ordinance): OVERRULED.

The Los Angeles Rent Control Stabilization Ordinance (LARSO) provides protections to tenants living in rest stabilized dwellings. (See LAMC, §151.00 et seq.)

The thirteenth cause of action alleges violation of the LARSO based on allegations that “Defendant[’s] knowing[], repeated[], and consistent[] diminish[ment] [of] Plaintiffs[’] use of the hot water and gas” in the Premises effected an “increase in rent” that is impermissible under the LAMC section 151.04. (Complaint, ¶¶ 144-147; see Complaint, ¶¶ 143-149.)

Defendant Illescas demurs to this cause of action on the ground that Plaintiff lacks standing to enforce the LARSO because such authority is vested only in public agencies. (Demurrer, p. 12.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant fails to cite any authority for his arguments on demurrer. (Opp’n, p. 12.)

The Court finds that the claim is sufficiently pleaded.

“Any person who demands, accepts or retains any payment of rent in excess of the maximum rent or maximum adjusted rent in violation of the provisions of this chapter, or any regulations or orders promulgated hereunder, shall be liable in a civil action to the person from whom such payment is demanded, accepted or retained for damages of three times the amount by which the payment or payments demanded, accepted or retained exceed the maximum rent or maximum adjusted rent which could be lawfully demanded, accepted or retained together with reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs as determined by the court.” (LAMC, § 151.10.)

A tenant thus has standing to enforce RSO provisions.

The Complaint also alleges that “Defendant knowingly, repeatedly, and consistently diminished Plaintiffs[’] use of the hot water and gas.” (Complaint, ¶ 146.)

Last, the Complaint correctly references the Rent Adjustment Commission Regulations, which provide that “landlords who reduce housing services without a corresponding reduction in rent effectuate an increase in rent.” (Los Angeles Housing + Community Investment Department, Rent Adjustment Comm’ Regs (Nov. 17, 1982, amended Jul. 1, 2019) § 410.03; see Complaint, ¶ 144.)

Defendant Illescas’s demurrer to the thirteenth cause of action is thus OVERRULED.

Conclusion

Defendant Robert Illescas’s Demurrer to Complaint is SUSTAINED, in Part, and OVERRULED, in Part, as follows:

(1) SUSTAINED, With Leave to Amend, as to the Complaint’s seventh and ninth causes of action; and

(2) OVERRULED as to the Complaint’s first through fourth, eighth, and tenth through thirteenth causes of action.

Plaintiff is permitted 14 days leave to amend the pleadings.