Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 22STLC05097, Date: 2023-11-29 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 40 - JUDGE ANNE RICHARDSON - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
The Court issues tentative rulings on certain motions.The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) email Dept 40 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (smcdept40@lacourt.org) with a copy to the other party(ies) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no email is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. 

Case Number: 22STLC05097    Hearing Date: November 29, 2023    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

MOVING PARTY:               Defendant/Cross-Complainant Stephanie Eun Young So.

OPPOSITION:                     [None]

Background

Plaintiff Progressive West Insurance Company sues Defendants Alicia Cameron, Stephanie Eun Young So, and Does 1 to 20 pursuant to an August 3, 2022 Complaint alleging a claim of Motor Vehicle Negligence.

The claim arises from allegations that, as a result of the negligence of Defendants on February 12, 2021, Plaintiff’s insured, Marissa Ramos, suffered damages, which Progressive was required to pay to Marissa Ramos pursuant to her auto policy, with Progressive seeking to recoup those losses from Defendants, who caused Marissa Ramos’s damages. The Complaint alleges no more than $22,638.30 in compensatory damages, plus prejudgment interest at the rate of ten percent per annum pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 3291.

On April 24, 2023, Defendant Cameron filed a Cross-Complaint against Stephanie Eun Young So and Roes 1 through 10 pursuant to a Cross-Complaint alleging claims of Indemnity, Comparable Contribution, and Declaratory Relief. The Cross-Complaint also seeks fees, costs, and interest awards.

On June 16, 2023, Defendant Stephanie Eun Young So sued Defendants Alicia Cameron and Moes 1 through 10 pursuant to a Cross-Complaint alleging claims of Indemnification and Apportionment of Fault. This Cross-Complaint seeks compensatory damages according to proof, as corresponds to unlimited civil cases, and designated the jurisdiction for this action as “unlimited civil” but did not request that this case be “reclassified by th[e] cross-complaint.”

On August 10, 2023, the Clerk noticed the reclassification of this action from civil limited to civil unlimited. The reclassification is unclear as to the grounds for the reclassification.

That same day, the Clerk noticed the reassignment of this action from the Honorable Katherine Chilton of Department 25 to the Honorable Anne Richardson of Department 40.

On October 17, 2023, Department 40 set a case management conference for January 9, 2024.

On November 8, 2023, Defendant Stephanie So filed a motion to reclassify this action from unlimited civil to limited civil. There is a facially valid proof of service attached to the motion, certifying service by mail on counsel Rodolfo Gonzalez (counsel for defendant Alicia Cameron) and Mark Nivinskus (counsel for plaintiff Progressive West Insurance Co.)

The motion is unopposed and now before the Court.

Motion to Reclassify

Legal Standard

To prevail on a motion to reclassify a case as limited, the movant must show that the case is incorrectly classified as an unlimited civil case—that is, the case meets all the conditions for classification as a limited civil case. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., §§ 85, subds. (a)-(c), 422.30, subd. (b), 580, subds. (b)(1)-(4).)

If the movant seeks a reclassification because the amount in controversy is $25,000 or less, it must show a legal certainty that the damages award will not exceed $25,000. (Ytuarte v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 266, 277 (Ytuarte); see Hiona v. Superior Court (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 866, 872 [Hiona]; see also Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 270-271 (Walker) [courts should be cautious about changing case from unlimited to limited because it deprives plaintiff of chance to prove higher damages].)

“This standard of ‘legal certainty’ is not met when it appears a verdict within the unlimited court’s jurisdiction is ‘possible.’ (See Maldonado v. Superior Court[] [(2005)] 45 Cal.App.4th [397,] 402[] …; Chahal v. Superior Court (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 399, 399-400, 403[] … [the “possibility” the plaintiff's damages could exceed $25,000 demonstrated the trial court had abused its discretion in ordering the case transferred to municipal court].)” (Ytuarte, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 277.) Otherwise stated, it must be shown that a monetary award of more than $25,000 is “virtually unattainable.” (Walker, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 269 [test for jurisdictional transfers from superior to municipal court under prior law]; see Stern v. Superior Court (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 223, 230-231, 233-234 [Walker test continues to govern amount in controversy determination for reclassification as limited civil case].)

“Viewed from the perspective of the party opposing reclassification (from unlimited to limited), to defeat the motion (or oppose the OSC) the party must present evidence to demonstrate a possibility that the verdict will exceed $25,000. (See Singer v. Superior Court[] [(1999)] 70 Cal.App.4th [1315,] 1320 … [finding superior court abused its discretion in ordering case transferred to municipal court because the plaintiff sought damages for pain and suffering—claims which were not subject to precise pre-trial measurement, and thus, the possibility existed the plaintiff's total damages could exceed jurisdictional limit of the municipal court].)” (Ytuarte, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 277.)

Order Reclassifying Case: GRANTED.

In full, Defendant Stephanie So argues that: “[t]he case at bar belongs in limited jurisdiction rather than unlimited jurisdiction because the amounts in controversy in the case are below the $50,000[] threshold for unlimited jurisdiction and even the $25,000[] maximum for limited jurisdiction”; “[b]ased on the evidence provided to date, should this matter proceed to trial, plaintiff, if they prevail, would receive a verdict below the $25,000[] jurisdictional maximum for unlimited jurisdiction of the Superior Court”; “because this matter excludes bodily injury claim, it would be beyond improbable for plaintiff to receive a verdict any higher than $22,638.30”; “given that the damage to Plaintiff’s insured’s vehicle was a consequence of [Progressive]’s insured rear-ending defendant Stephanie Eun Young So, it is unlikely that Plaintiff will be able to recover the entirety of th[e] [$22,638.30] amount from defendant Stephanie Eun Young So if this matter were to proceed to trial”; and “[g]ood cause exists for seeking the reclassification at this juncture, because information regarding the plaintiff’s lack of documentation of estimated vehicle repairs and no claim of loss of earnings was unavailable to defendant at the time of the answer to the complaint, and only became apparent following ongoing discovery.” (Mot., pp. 3-5.)

A declaration from counsel supports the Walker motion and clarifies that “[r]eclassification of this case previously occurred due to a filing error that marked the incorrect classification of this matter as unlimited jurisdiction” and argues that “the case should appropriately be reclassified at this time because the information warranting classification only became apparent during ongoing discovery” and “was not available at the time of [D]efendant’s filing of the answer to the [C]omplaint.” (Mot., Chowdury Decl., ¶¶ 1-6.)

The motion is unopposed.

The Court finds in favor of Defendant Stephanie So.

The Court initially notes that this motion is completely unopposed by the two Defendants/Cross-Complainants. For that reason, there are no arguments before the Court advancing the position that damages in this action will exceed the $22,638.30. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1342 [“The failure of the opposing party to serve and file a written opposition may be construed by the court as an admission that the motion is meritorious, and the court may grant the motion without a hearing on the merits”].)

The Court also notes that to the extent that this action was reclassified based on the “unlimited civil action” box checked off by Defendant Stephanie So in her Cross-Complaint (6/16/23 Cross-Complaint, p. 1), that action was, according to her attorney, made in error. (Mot., Chowdury Decl., ¶ 6.)

The Court next turns to damages. Here, on June 21, 2023, Progressive filed a declaration from a claims representative showing damages limited to $22,638.30. (See 6/21/23 Declaration Pursuant to CCP Section 98.) The Cameron Cross-Complaint did not on its face seek a reclassification of this action or to add to damages other than to request fees, costs, and expenses, as well as other relief deemed appropriate by the Court, which do not raise the amount in controversy. (4/24/23 Cross-Complaint, pp. 1-5; see Code Civ. Proc., § 85, subd. (a) [“… ‘[A]mount in controversy’ means the amount of the demand, or the recovery sought, or the value of the property, or the amount of the lien, that is in controversy in the action, exclusive of attorneys’ fees, interest, and costs”]; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 86, subd. (a)(7)(A) [limited civil case arises where, by way of cross-complaint, the cross-complainant seeks indemnity with respect to relief in a complaint or cross-complaint that is otherwise a limited civil case].)

The So Cross-Complaint (erroneously) designated the action as involving an “unlimited civil case” but did not request a reclassification of the action from limited to unlimited. (6/16/23 Cross-Complaint, p. 1.) While the So Cross-Complaint requested “compensatory damages” “according to proof,” it did so within the context of claims alleging indemnification and apportionment of fault, claims that are necessarily derivative of the amount of liability recovered by Progressive, which is limited to $22,638.30 or less based on any fault Marissa Ramos (Progressive’s insured) had in the car accident at issue (Ramos rear ending So). (6/16/23 Cross-Complaint, pp. 2 [claims pleaded and damages, including indemnity, contribution, and compensatory damages]; Mot., p. 3 [Ramos rear ended So]; see Code Civ. Proc., § 86, subd. (a)(7)(A) [limited civil case arises where, by way of cross-complaint, the cross-complainant seeks indemnity with respect to relief in a complaint or cross-complaint that is otherwise a limited civil case].) Defendant Stephanie So’s briefing makes clear that any damages to be recovered from Defendants would not exceed $22,638.30. (See Mot., pp. 3-5, Chowdury Decl., ¶¶ 1-6; see also 6/21/23 Declaration Pursuant to CCP Section 98 [Progressive briefed same].) It is thus unclear what other compensatory damages are at issue to raise damages from those involved in a limited civil action to those involved in an unlimited civil action.

The Court also notes that the record fails to reflect that Progressive, Cameron, or So paid a reclassification fee. (Code Civ. Proc., § 403.060, citing to Gov. Code, § 70619 [$140 reclassification fee must be paid for limited to unlimited reclassification]; see 6/16/23 and 7/20/23 Notices of Posting of Jury Fees [So and Cameron respectively pay $150 Code Civ. Proc., § 631 jury fees, i.e., not reclassification fees]; see also Mackovska v. Viewcrest Road Properties LLC (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1, 12 [“The classification of a civil case does not affect the parties’ right to a jury trial. Indeed, even where the mandatory expedited jury trial provisions of section 630.20 and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1545 apply in a limited civil case, the parties still have the right to a jury trial (albeit by a ‘reduced jury panel’). (§ 630.21, subd. (a); see §§ 630.23, subd. (b) [‘The jury shall be composed of eight jurors and one alternate, unless the parties have agreed to fewer jurors[]’], 630.26, subd. (a) [‘A vote of six of the eight jurors is required for a verdict, unless the parties stipulate otherwise[]’]”], disapproved on other grounds in TriCoast Builders, Inc. v. Fonnegra (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 239, 246 [disapproval based on jury waiver].)

As a result, Defendant Stephanie So’s motion shows that, as this action currently stands, and as limited by the briefing (or lack of briefing) by the parties on these issues, any monetary recovery by Progressive, exclusive of attorney’s fees, costs, and interest sought by the parties, cannot possibly exceed $22,638.30, let alone $25,000, which would necessarily limit the recovery on any cross-complaint.

Defendant So’s motion is therefore GRANTED. 

Conclusion

Defendant/Cross-Complainant Stephanie Eun Young So’s Motion to Reclassify is GRANTED.

The Court ORDERS this action reclassified from unlimited civil to limited civil.