Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 23STCP04635, Date: 2024-02-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCP04635    Hearing Date: February 26, 2024    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

Background

On December 28, 2023, Petitioner Natalie Tobar Oganesyan initiated this action by filing a petition for an order (1) quashing a subpoena served by Respondent North Light Specialty Insurance Company (North Light) on “Metlife Insurance Company c/o CT Corporation System” and which seeks Petitioner’s out-of-state insurance records in relation to an automobile accident insurance dispute between Petitioner and North Light and (2) order monetary sanctions against North Light and counsel in the amount of $28,250.

That same day, Petitioner Oganesyan filed a separate statement in support of the petition.

On December 29, 2023, the Court issued notice of hearing on the Petition, setting the same for February 26, 2024.

On January 5, 2024, Petitioner Oganesyan served the notice of hearing on the petition on counsel for Respondent North Light, specifically on Robert L. Reisinger, Esq. of Ford, Walker, Haggerty & Behar .

On January 8, 2024, Petitioner Oganesyan served the notice of hearing on the petition on Metlife Insurance Company and Metlife Services and Solutions, LLC.

On January 9, 2024, Petitioner Oganesyan served the notice of hearing on the petition on Complex Legal Services, Inc., the company identified as the intended recipient of the records to be produced from the deponent.

On February 22, 2024, Respondent North Light filed an untimely opposition to the petition to quash.

No reply appears in the record as of the drafting of this tentative ruling.

Petitioner Oganesyan’s petition is now before the Court.

Petition to Quash Subpoena

I.

Untimely Opposition

The Court notes that while the opposition was not timely filed, it raises valid points regarding the issues before the Court, for which reason the Court considers the arguments made by North Light in the opposition.

II.

Incorrect Name on Subpoena

Here, the Court notes that the appropriate remedy for the issue of the incorrect name on the subpoena duces tecum is to serve an amended subpoena.

However, the Court discusses the merits of the current subpoena as drafted, but as directed at MetLife Services.

III.

Legal Standard

A motion to quash a deposition subpoena or deposition notice is used to strike, modify, or impose conditions on a subpoena or notice that is procedurally or substantively defective. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1987.1, subd. (a), 2025.410, subd. (c); see, e.g., Far W. S&L Assn. v. McLaughlin (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 67, 71 [motion based on ground that subpoena was not properly served].)

A motion to quash may be made by (1) any party to the action (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (b)(1)), (2) a person (party or nonparty) whose consumer, governmental, or employment information or records have been subpoenaed (see Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1985.3, subd. (g) [party consumer], 1985.4 [state or local-agency employee or any other natural person], 1987.1, subd. (b)(3) [consumer]; see also Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1985.3, subd. (g)(2), 1985.6, subd. (f)(2) [nonparty consumer can make written objections instead of motion to quash]), or (3) the Court, on its own motion, after giving the parties notice and the opportunity to be heard (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a)).

A deposition subpoena is defective where it seeks to subpoena a nonresident to attend a deposition, trial, or hearing in California. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1878 [“witness” includes person whose declaration under oath is made by deposition], 1989 [witness is not required to attend unless she is resident of state at time of service]; see also Toyota Motor Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1118; cf. Twin Lock, Inc. v. Superior Court (1959) 52 Cal.2d 752, 761-762 [court could not sanction a nonresident party for refusing to produce nonresident employees in response to deposition notice].)

IV.

Order Quashing Subpoena: DENIED, without prejudice.

Petitioner Oganesyan’s petition seeks an order quashing the subpoena served on “Metlife Insurance Company c/o CT Corporation System” (hereafter, Metlife Ins. Co.). (Petition, Ghyczy Decl., Ex. 1 [copy of deposition subpoena].)

The subpoena seeks: “Any and all insurance records stored in any format, including but not limited to correspondence, payments, payment history, policy information, declarations page, complete claim files, records of any liens, color photos, and damage repair estimates, injury records or claim and any other documents contained within any insurance file or claim file” pertaining to “Natalie Tobar Oganesyan,” “Ana Tovar,” “Date of Birth: [Omitted], Social Security Number: [None],” and “Claim number: 100048600.” (Petition, Ghyczy Decl., Ex. 1 [copy of deposition subpoena].)

Petitioner’s petition is based on three general grounds:

(1) The subpoena is addressed to a nonexistent company because the correct name for the company that North Light seeks to subpoena is “MetLife Services and Solutions, LLC” (hereafter, MetLife Services);

(2) MetLife Services is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New York, states that have adopted the Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act (UIDDA); and

(3) North Light fails to satisfy the requirements (a) for taking an oral deposition of a nonresident in California (subpoena here seeks records, not oral deposition, and improper service) or (b) to effectuate service of the subpoena on MetLife Services pursuant to either Delaware or New York law, as required by the UIDDA.

(Petition, pp. 3-5.)

In opposition, North Light argues that the subpoena is valid and proper. North Light’s position revolves around the following points: (1) the MetLife entities are headquartered in Net York but conduct a significant portion of their business in California; (2) CT Corporation system is MetLife Services’ registered agent for service of process; (3) North Light duly served the agent for service of process; (4) courts have consistently upheld service of subpoenas on corporations authorized to conduct business in the state and that maintain an agent for service of process, citing Witkin v. Superior Court (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 882 in support; (5) MetLife Services is subject to service in California due to its licensure to transact insurance within the state and its significant business presence here; (6) MetLife Services’ registered agent for service of process, CT Corporation System, is duly authorized to accept legal process on behalf of MetLife Services under Corporations Code section 1502; (7) Code of Civil Procedure section 2020.220, subdivision (b) permits the service of a subpoena on any agent authorized by the organization to accept service of a subpoena, and here, service on CT Corporation System satisfied this statutory section; (8) MetLife Services’ extensive contacts with California justify service on CT Corporation System; and (9) given MetLife Services’ business activities in the state, it is reasonable to assume a majority of the documents at issue in this action will be situated in California. (Opp’n, pp. 2-4.)

No reply appears in the record at this time.

The Court finds in favor of Respondent North Light.

First, the Court determines that, as the consumer affected by the subpoena at issue, and as a party to the action, Petitioner Oganesyan has standing to file this motion. (Petition, Ghyczy Decl., Ex. 1 [copy of deposition subpoena seeking Petitioner’s records]; cf. Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1985.3, subd. (g) [party consumer], 1987.1, subd. (b)(1) [party].)

Second, the Court accepts Petitioner’s representation that “CT Corporation System” is merely a business that functions to receive service of process at CT’s registered offices on behalf of CT’s out-of-state customers. (Petition, p. 3, citing Petition, Ghyczy Decl., Ex. 3 [copy of PDF printout of CT Corporation System’s website].)

Third, the Court accepts that the subpoena directed at Metlife Ins. Co. appears to be actually meant to be directed at MetLife Services. (Petition, pp. 3-4, citing Petition, Ghyczy Decl., Exs. 4-5 [copy of PDF printout of MetLife Services’ website and its Statement of Information with the California Secretary of State].)

Fourth, the Court determines that an amended notice should be served with the correct business name at issue.

Fifth, the Court notes that “Witkin v. Superior Court (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 882,” as cited by North Light, does not yield an authority to that effect in WestLaw. The parties are admonished to check authorities before citing them to the Court. (Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3.3 subd. (a)(2) [“a lawyer shall not . . . knowingly misquote to a tribunal the language of a book, statute, decision or other authority”].)

Last, the Court determines that based on the evidence before the Court, the subpoena here at issue is not defective.

It is true that, most states, including California, have adopted the UIDDA. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2029.100-2029.900.) Under the model version of the UIDDA, a party can require an out-of-state deponent to attend a deposition by obtaining a subpoena in the underlying litigation and submitting it and a draft of a subpoena to a clerk in the deponent’s home state. (Unif. Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act § 3 & cmt. ¶ 4.) The clerk will then issue a subpoena for service on the deponent. (Id., § 3(b).) The deposing party is not required to hire counsel in the deponent’s state to have the subpoena issued or present the matter to a judge in the deponent’s state before the subpoena can be issued. (Id., § 3, cmt. ¶ 4.) A party to a California action who wants to depose an out-of-state nonparty under the UIDDA should refer to that state’s version of the model act for the specific procedure to use. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2026.010, subd. (c) [“If the deponent is not a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, a party serving a deposition notice under this section shall use any process and procedures required and available under the laws of the state, territory, or insular possession where the deposition is to be taken to compel the deponent to attend and to testify, as well as to produce any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing for inspection, copying, testing, sampling, and any related activity].)

Thus, it follows that where an organization is not created under California law and does not conduct any business in California, its records should not be subject to California’s regular subpoena jurisdiction. (See, e.g., Coopman v. Superior Court (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 656, 661-662 (Coopman).) For example, in Coopman, the court of appeal concluded that there was no subpoena jurisdiction over a Nevada corporation’s business records located in Nevada where the subpoena was served on a corporate officer who resided in California because: (1) the corporation did not conduct business in California; (2) the business records did not affect California; and (3) the officer served with the subpoena was not a California resident for business purposes.

However, in reaching this conclusion, the court of appeal observed that California courts have ordered the production of business records located outside of California where: (1) the records belonged to a party to the action; or (2) the owner of the records was doing business within the jurisdiction of the court. (Id. at p. 661.) The court also recognized that even where the corporation was doing business within the state, “some restraint has been exercised” where the records did not apply to transactions that occurred within the state. (Ibid., citing Ings v. Ferguson (2d Cir. 1960) 282 F.2d 149.)

Here, it is not clear where the documents subject to the subpoena decus tecum—documents related to “Claim: 100048600”—are stored. (See Petition, Ghyczy Decl., Ex. 1, Attach. 3.)

Arguendo, even if the documents are not located in California, as recognized by the Coopman court, California courts have permitted subpoenas seeking the production of out-of-state records where the records belong to a party in the action, or the owner of the records was doing business within the jurisdiction of the court. (Coopman, supra, 237 Cal.App.2d at pp. 661-662.)

Here, Petitioner Oganesyan is a party to this action and is represented by California counsel, raising questions as to whether Petitioner Oganesyan is a California resident as well, a question the moving papers do not clarify. (See Petition, Ghyczy Decl., Ex. 1, SUBP-025, Proof of Service, § 2 [service of subpoena on Petitioner Oganesyan’s counsel at Encino, California address].) Moreover, the documents at issue facially belong to Petitioner Oganesyan. (See Petition, Ghyczy Decl., Ex. 1, Attach. 3 [seeking “insurance records” that “pertain[]” to “Natalie Tobar Oganesyan” and her “100048600” claim].)

In the alternative, if MetLife Services is the owner of the records, there is evidence that MetLife Services operates within the State of California. (Opp’n, pp. 3-4; Opp’n, Wang Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. A [Secretary of State printout of search for MetLife entities]; accord Petition, Ghyczy Decl., Ex. 9 [MetLife Services’ counsel stating that MetLife Services is “an insurance company doing business [in] all states with an agent for service located in California [CT Corporation Systems],” emphasis added].) It is also unclear whether the insurance transaction at issue between Petitioner Oganesyan and Respondent North Light or claim “100048600” involves transactions that occurred in or involved California.

Thus, on this record—Petitioner Oganesyan has submitted herself to the jurisdiction of California courts and is a party to this action, there exists evidence that MetLife Services operates out of California, and the record is inconclusive as to whether the two insurance claims referenced in the papers occurred in or involve California—the Court fails to find sufficient grounds to quash the subpoena at issue.

Petitioner Oganesyan’s petition is thus DENIED, without prejudice.

V.

Order Granting Sanctions: DENIED, without prejudice.

Except as specified in subdivision (c), in making an order pursuant to motion made under subdivision (c) of Section 1987 or under Section 1987.1, the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney’s fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).)

The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1348, subd. (a).)

Here, Petitioner seeks recovery of $28,250 in sanctions against North Light and counsel, comprised of a fee rate of $2,500 per hour times 9.5 hours expended challenging the subpoena, for a total of $23,750, filing fees of $500 for the petition, any reply, and for notice of ruling, and $4,000 in service of process costs. (Petition, Ghyczy Decl., ¶ 10.)

The opposition argues that the sanctions sought by Petitioner Oganesyan are excessive and makes a cross-request for sanctions in the amount of $2,025. (Opp’n, pp. 4-5.)

No reply appears in the record as of the filing of this Tentative ruling.

The Court determines that based on the outcome and discussion in Section IV above, sanctions are not merited as requested by Petitioner Oganesyan or Respondent North Light.

Sanctions are thus DENIED, without prejudice. 

Conclusion

I.

Petitioner Natalie Tobar Oganesyan’s Petition for Order Quashing Respondent’s North Light Specialty Insurance Company’s Subpoena for Petitioner’s Out-of-State Insurance Records Pursuant to C.C.P. §§ 1987.1 et seq., and 1985.3(g) is DENIED, without prejudice.

II.

Petitioner Natalie Tobar Oganesyan’s Request for Monetary Sanctions in the Amount of $28,250 Against Respondent North Light Specialty Insurance Company and/or Their Attorneys of Record, Robert L. Reisinger, Esq. and/or Johnny T. Parseghian, Esq. and/or Ford, Walker, Haggerty & Behar Pursuant C.C.P. §§ 1987.2 et seq., and 2030.010, et seq. is DENIED, without prejudice.

Respondent North Light Specialty Insurance Company’s cross-request for sanctions is also DENIED, without prejudice.