Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 23STCV01256, Date: 2023-09-20 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 40 - JUDGE ANNE RICHARDSON - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
The Court issues tentative rulings on certain motions.The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) email Dept 40 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (smcdept40@lacourt.org) with a copy to the other party(ies) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no email is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. 

Case Number: 23STCV01256    Hearing Date: September 20, 2023    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

Background

Plaintiff Alex Amaya, individually and on behalf of all other Aggrieved Employees, sues Defendants Swinerton Incorporated, M D Builders Inc., Doe 1 Swinerton Builders HC, Doe 2 Swinerton Builders, and Does 3 through 50 pursuant to a January 19, 2023 Complaint alleging a single claim of Violation of California Labor Code § 2698, et seq. (California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) of 2004).

The claim arises from allegations that Defendants engaged in various Labor Code violations affecting Plaintiff Amaya and other aggrieved employees of Defendants, including (1) failure to provide employment records, (2) failure to provide overtime/double time, (3) failure to provide meal and rest periods, (4) failure to pay minimum wages, (5) failure to keep accurate and provide itemized wage statements, (6) failure to pay reporting time, (7) failure to “split shift” premiums, (8) failure to timely pay wages during employment, (9) failure to timely pay wages upon termination, (10) failure to reimburse necessary business-related expenses and costs, and (11) failure to provide notice of paid sick time and accrual.

On May 15, 2023, Defendants Swinerton Incorporated, M D Builders Inc., Doe 1 Swinerton Builders HC, and Doe 2 Swinerton Builders (Defendants) moved for an order compelling arbitration of Plaintiff’s Labor Code claims and a stay of the remaining PAGA claims affecting other aggrieved employees. The motion was set for hearing on June 28, 2023.

On June 1, 2023, the parties filed a joint stipulation and proposed order to continue the hearing date on Defendants’ motion to September 20, 2023.

On June 6, 2023, the Court signed the stipulation’s proposed order.

On August 21, 2023, Defendants filed a notice of related case involving two different actions, one filed with the Superior Court of Orange County, and another filed with the Superior Court of San Bernardino.

On September 7, 2023, Plaintiff Amaya opposed Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings.

On September 13, 2023, Defendants replied to Plaintiff Amaya’s opposition.

Defendants’ motion is now before the Court.

Request for Judicial Notice

The Court declines to take judicial notice of the exhibits advanced for notice by Defendants because they are not dispositive in the Court’s determination for this motion. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 453; see Mot., RJN, Exs. 1-3.)

Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings

Legal Standard

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), while a federal statute, applies in California courts and requires state courts to enforce arbitration agreements as required by the federal common law developed under the FAA. (See Southland Corp. v. Keating (1984) 465 U.S. 1, 15-16; Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1066, 1074-78, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in Ferguson v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc. (9th Cir. 2013) 733 F.3d 928, 937.).) The FAA preempts and invalidates state law and state judicial decisions that disfavor arbitration or require arbitration provisions to pass higher scrutiny. (Southland Corp. v. Keating, supra, at p. 12; Perry v. Thomas (1987) 482 U.S. 483, 490.) If the parties designate the FAA applies, then California arbitration law is preempted. (See, e.g., Rodriguez v. American Techs., Inc. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1121-1122.) However, courts have found that where the FAA is found not to apply, the California Arbitration Act (Code Civ. Proc. § 1280 et seq.) applies. (See Valencia v. Smyth (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 153, 178.)

 A court’s inquiry is limited to a determination of (1) whether a valid arbitration agreement exists and (2) whether the arbitration agreement covers the dispute. (9 U.S.C. § 4; Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostics Systems, Inc. (9th Cir. 2000) 207 F.3d 1126, 1130; Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (2002) 537 U.S. 79, 84; see Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc. (9th Cir. 1999) 175 F.3d 716, 720 [if the finding is affirmative on both counts the FAA requires the Court to enforce the arbitration agreement in accordance with its terms].) “An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.” (United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. (1960) 363 U.S. 574, 582-583.) 

 Moreover, the general rule is that the FAA governs all agreements to arbitrate in contracts “involving interstate commerce.” (Higgins v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1247.) The term “involving” commerce “is broad and is indeed the functional equivalent of “affecting’ commerce.” (Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson (1995) 513 U.S. 265, 273-274.) The U.S. Supreme Court has held that this broad interpretation includes employment contracts. (See Circuit City Stores v. Adams (2001) 532 U.S. 105, 106.) The defendant bears the burden of proving applicability of the FAA by showing that its activities constitute interstate commerce. (Hoover v. Am. Income Life Ins. Co. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1207.) Failure to demonstrate that the employment agreement affects interstate commerce renders the FAA inapplicable. (See Lane v. Francis Capital Management LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 676, 687-688; Woolls v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 197, 212.)

Even where the FAA governs the interpretation of arbitration clauses, California law governs whether an arbitration agreement has been formed in the first instance. (Baker v. Osborne Development Corp. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 884, 893.) 

 The party seeking arbitration has the “burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 842.) “Once that burden is satisfied, the party opposing arbitration must prove by a preponderance of the evidence any defense to the petition.” (Lacayo v. Cataline Restaurant Group Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 244, 257.) “The trial court sits as the trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, and any oral testimony the court may receive at its discretion, to reach a final determination.” (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc., supra, at p. 842.) 

On a petition to compel arbitration, the court must grant the petition unless it finds (1) no written agreement to arbitrate exists, (2) the right to compel arbitration has been waived, (3) grounds exist for revocation of the agreement, or (4) litigation is pending that may render the arbitration unnecessary or create conflicting rulings on common issues. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2; see Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218-219.)

In determining the enforceability of an arbitration agreement, the court considers “two ‘gateway issues’ of arbitrability: (1) whether there was an agreement to arbitrate between the parties, and (2) whether the agreement covered the dispute at issue.” (Omar v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 955, 961.) If these issues are satisfied in favor of the movant, (3) the party opposing arbitration must prove by a preponderance of the evidence any defense to the petition. (Lacayo v. Cataline Restaurant Group Inc., supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 257.)

Order Compelling Arbitration and Staying Proceedings: GRANTED.

I.

Whether Arbitration Agreement Exists

“Parties are not required to arbitrate their disagreements unless they have agreed to do so. [Citation.] A contract to arbitrate will not be inferred absent a ‘clear agreement.’ [Citation.] When determining whether a valid contract to arbitrate exists, we apply ordinary state law principles that govern contract formation. [Citation] In California, a ‘clear agreement’ to arbitrate may be either express or implied in fact. [Citation.]” (Davis v. Nordstrom, Inc. (9th Cir. 2014) 755 F.3d 1089, 1092-93 [applying California law].) The court is only required to make a finding of the agreement’s existence, not an evidentiary determination of its validity. (Condee v. Longwood Management Corp., supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 219.)

Defendants argue that an arbitration agreement exists between Defendants and Plaintiffs because, on May 18, 2022, as part of his onboarding process, Plaintiff Amaya electronically signed an arbitration agreement that covers all the parties to this action. (Mot., pp. 7-8; see Mot., Kochis Decl., Exs. A [arbitration agreement], B [electronic confirmation of signature by Plaintiff Amaya].)

Plaintiff Amaya does not dispute his execution of the arbitration agreement in his opposition.

The Court finds that an agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties.

California case law has held that an electronic signature was properly authenticated when a declarant “detailed [the company’s] security precautions regarding transmission and use of an applicant’s unique username and password, as well as the steps an applicant would have to take to place his or her name on the signature line of the employment agreement …,” such that, “[b]ased on this procedure, [the declarant] concluded that the ‘name [of the employee] could have only been placed on the signature pages of the employment agreement … by someone using [the employee’s] unique user name and password,’” and that “ [g]iven this process for signing documents and protecting the privacy of the information with unique and private user names and passwords, the electronic signature was made by [the employee] on the employment agreement … at the date, time, and IP address listed on the documents.” (Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1062 (Espejo).)

Here, Defendants have attached a copy of the relevant arbitration agreement, as well as electronic confirmation that the agreement was signed by Plaintiff. (Mot., Kochis Decl., Exs. A-B.)

Defendants also provide the declaration of Michael Kochis, Manager of Business Solutions for Human Resources and Payroll for Swinerton Incorporated, which provides sufficient details establishing that the electronic signature advanced by Defendants belongs to Plaintiff Amaya. (Mot., Kochis Decl., ¶¶ 18; see also Drummond Decl., ¶¶ 1-3; Johnson Decl., ¶¶ 1-8.) This declaration satisfies the standard set out in Espejo.

The Court also notes that while the arbitration agreement facially only involves Plaintiff Amaya, Swinerton Incorporated, and Swinerton Builders, among others, the agreement is also applicable to Defendants M D Builders Inc. and Swinerton Builders HC. The arbitration agreement expressly provides that the arbitration agreement applies to specific types of claims made against “Swinerton Incorporated, Swinerton Builders, SOLV, Inc., Lindgren Development, SAK Builders, and TimberLab or one of its/their affiliates, subsidiaries or parent companies.” (Mot., Kochis Decl., Ex. A, § 1.) The declaration of Brenda Reimche establishes that “MD Builders, Inc., Swinerton Builders, Inc., and Swinerton Builders, HC are separate corporate subsidiaries of Swinerton, though Swinerton Builders, HC no longer operates and has no employees,” that “MD Builders was at all times Amaya’s sole employer,” and that “MD Builders is a general contractor based in Northern California that provides general contracting and trade subcontracting services on Swinerton’s projects.” (Mot., Reimche Decl., ¶¶ 2-3.) As such, Defendants M D Builders Inc. and Swinerton Builders HC are affiliates of Swinerton Incorporated and Swinerton Builders. (See Mot., p. 7, fn. 1 [“For purposes of this motion only, Defendants MD Builders, Swinerton, Swinerton Builders, and Swinerton Builders, HC are referred collectively as ‘Defendants.’ MD Builders and each of the other named defendants are separate and distinct corporate subsidiaries of Swinerton, and MD Builders was at all times Amaya’s sole employer. Declaration of Brenda Reimche (‘Reimche Decl.’) ¶ 2.”].)

Accordingly, an arbitration agreement exists between the parties.

II.

Scope of, and Defenses to, the Arbitration Agreement

“‘[P]arties may agree to have an arbitrator decide not only the merits of a particular dispute but also ‘“‘gateway’ questions of ‘arbitrability,’ such as whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate or whether their agreement covers a particular controversy.”’ [Citation.] But ‘[c]ourts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is “clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]” evidence that they did so.’ [Citation.] This is a ‘heightened standard,’ and it ‘pertains to the parties’ manifestation of intent, not the agreement’s validity.’ [Citation.]” (Najarro v. Superior Court (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 871, 879-880 (Najarro).) 

However, “[c]ourts have held that ‘there is no clear and unmistakable delegation to the arbitrator’ to decide arbitrability where the contract ‘includes a severability clause stating a court of competent jurisdiction may excise an unconscionable provision.’” (Id. at p. 880.) “In other words, pursuant to an exception …, if a severability clause states that a court may excise unconscionable provisions, the delegation clause does not meet the heightened standard necessary for enforcement, because it is no longer clear that only the arbitrator may decide issues such as unconscionability.” (Ibid. [emphasis in original].) 

Defendants argue that “with the exception of the requirement for individual arbitration in section 5, the Parties agreed to delegate ‘exclusive authority’ to the arbitration ‘to resolve any dispute relating to the validity, applicability, enforceability, unconscionability, or waiver of th[e] Agreement.’” (Mot., pp. 17-18, citing to Mot., Kochis Decl., ¶ 18, Ex. A, §§ 1, 5.)

Plaintiff Amaya’s opposition fails to address delegation.

However, the Court finds that it has the authority to address the scope of the arbitration agreement and defenses to its enforcement.

The parties’ arbitration agreement explicitly provides that “[t]he Class Action Waiver [and Collective Action Waiver in the arbitration agreement] shall be severable from th[e]Agreement if there is a final judicial determination that the Class Action Waiver [or Collective Action Waiver] is invalid, unenforceable, unconscionable, void or voidable” and that “[i]n such instances, the class [or collective] action must be litigated in a civil court of competent jurisdiction—not in arbitration.” (Mot., Kochis Decl., Ex. A, §§ 5(a), 5(b).)

The Court in Najarro held that a similar provision in an arbitration agreement resulted in the conclusion that the “delegation clause fail[ed] to meet the heightened standard [for delegation of arbitrability questions] because … the severability clause” in that arbitration agreement showed “that there [was] no clear and unmistakable delegation to the arbitrator to decide enforceability.” (Najarro, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 880.) The Najarro severability clause reads: “‘Except as expressly provided above in relation to class, group, or representative actions, if the arbitrator or any judge of competent jurisdiction determines that any provision of the JAMS Rules or this [a]greement is illegal, invalid, or unenforceable, such provisions shall be severed or modified so that the remainder of the [a]greement shall apply to the fullest extent permitted by law.’” (Ibid.) The Court finds that this language is sufficiently similar to the class and collective action severability clause in the arbitration agreement between the parties here, compelling a conclusion that this Court has the authority to determine the scope and defenses to enforcement of the arbitration agreement because the arbitration agreement at issue fails to show a “clear and unmistakable delegation to the arbitrator to decide enforceability.” (Ibid.)

Accordingly, the delegation clause in the arbitration agreement does not divest this Court’s power to make a determination of arbitrability relating to this motion.

III.

Scope of the Arbitration Agreement

“[T]he decision as to whether a contractual arbitration clause covers a particular dispute rests substantially on whether the clause in question is ‘broad’ or ‘narrow.’” (Bono v. David (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1055, 1067.) “‘A “broad” clause includes those using language such as “any claim arising from or related to this agreement”‘ [Citation] or ‘arising in connection with the [a]greement’ [Citation.]” (Rice v. Downs (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 175, 186 [italics omitted].) “But clauses requiring arbitration of a claim, dispute, or controversy ‘arising from’ or ‘arising out of’ an agreement, i.e., excluding language such as ‘relating to this agreement’ or ‘in connection with this agreement,’ are ‘generally considered to be more limited in scope than would be, for example, a clause agreeing to arbitrate “‘any controversy … arising out of or relating to this agreement[.]’” [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 186-87 [italics omitted].) “Several Ninth Circuit cases have held that agreements requiring arbitration of ‘any dispute,’ ‘controversy,’ or ‘claim’ ‘arising under’ or ‘arising out of’ the agreement are intended to encompass only disputes relating to the interpretation and performance of the agreement.” (Id. at p. 187.)

Defendants argue that the arbitration agreement covers the individual PAGA claims related to Plaintiff Amaya because the agreement provides that “‘[a]ll disputes covered by th[e] Agreement will be decided by a single arbitrator through final and binding arbitration and not by way of court or jury trial,’” where the disputes covered by the arbitration agreement involve “‘disputes arising out of or relating to … compensation, … minimum wage, expense reimbursement, overtime, breaks and rest periods,’” and “‘all other federal or state claims … arising out of or relating to [Plaintiff Amaya’s] … employment.’” (Mot., pp. 8-9, quoting Mot., Kochis Decl., Ex. A, § 1.) Defendants also clarify that the arbitration agreement “emphasizes that its broad scope includes only individual claims, providing that the parties will ‘bring any claim on an individual basis ….’” (Mot., p. 9, quoting Mot., Kochis Decl., Ex. A, § 5 [italics and bold lettering omitted].)

In opposition, Plaintiff Amaya argues that the arbitration agreement expressly sets out limitations on the agreement and that those limitations exclude “‘representative actions for civil penalties filed under the California Private Attorney General Act.’” (Opp’n, pp. 3-4, quoting Mot., Kochis Decl., Ex. A, § 2; see Opp’n, pp. 3-9.) Plaintiff Amaya also argues that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 142 S. Ct. 1906 (Viking River) does not affect this analysis because it is limited to abrogating Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348 (Iskanian) insofar as Iskanian “precluded parties from structuring arbitration agreements to split individual and non-individual PAGA claims and allowing for the arbitration of the individual PAGA claims.” (Opp’n, pp. 4-5; see Viking River, supra, at p. 1124 [“We hold that the FAA preempts the rule of Iskanian insofar as it precludes division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate. This holding compels reversal in this case.”].) Plaintiff elaborates by arguing that “Viking River simply has no[] application to the agreement at issue in this case because the agreement does not contain an unenforceable waiver of the right to arbitrate representative claims under PAGA that is outside of the paragraph that requires arbitration be on an individual basis.” (Opp’n, p. 5.)

In reply, Defendants argue that Plaintiff ignores that fact that Viking River held that “individual PAGA claims are, in fact, divisible from the claims arising from other alleged aggrieved employes and are arbitrable.” (Mot., p. 6.)

Defendants also argue that the arbitration agreement’s limitation on PAGA claims applies only to “representative” PAGA actions, not all PAGA claims, such as individual PAGA claims like Plaintiff Amaya’s. (Mot., pp. 7-8, citing Piplack v. In-N-Out Burgers (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1281, 1288-1289 (Piplack).) Otherwise stated, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s PAGA claims against Defendants constitute ‘an individual action for civil penalties filed under the California Private Attorney General Act,” which lies outside of the arbitration agreement’s limitation on “representative actions for civil penalties filed under the California Private Attorney General Act.” (Mot., Kochis Decl., Ex. A, § 2.)

The Court finds in favor of Defendants on this point.

The Court relies on Piplack for its determination. In Piplack, the arbitration agreement contained similar language waiving the right to bring a “private attorney general action,” providing that if the waiver was unenforceable “any private attorney general claim must be litigated” in court. (Piplack, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1288-1289.) Because the trial court found the waiver unenforceable, the plaintiff argued that his “private attorney general action” had to be litigated. The Court of Appeal disagreed, noting the dispute turned on the meaning of “private attorney general action.” (Ibid.) The Piplack court stated that following Viking River v. Moriana, a PAGA claim could be divided into individual and representative components. (Id. at p. 1287, citing Viking River, supra, 142 S. Ct. at p. 1925.) Thus, the Piplack Court severed the waiver and found the individual component arbitrable. (Id. at pg. 1289.)

Here, the Court does not need to reach the issue of whether the PAGA waiver in the arbitration agreement is an unenforceable wholesale waiver where an alternative, lawful interpretation of the waiver is possible. (See 14A Cal.Jur.3d Contracts § 216; Civ. Code, § 1643; Koenig v. Warner Unified School District (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 43, 55; Pappas v. Chang (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 975, 990.) The Court interprets the language of the waiver in line with Piplack and Viking River, which refers to Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claim as an aggrieved employee, and the representative claims he brings on behalf of aggrieved employees. Therefore, the representative action waiver is not grounds to deny Defendant’s motion because Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims lie outside of the Limitations section of the arbitration agreement, and Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims are arbitrable if they otherwise lie within the scope of the arbitration agreement, which the Court finds that they do.

If Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims are not encompassed by the Limitations section of the arbitration agreement, then they lie within the scope of the arbitration agreement. The arbitration agreement encompasses, as argued by Defendants, “‘disputes arising out of or relating to … compensation, … minimum wage, expense reimbursement, overtime, breaks and rest periods,’” and “‘all other federal or state claims … arising out of or relating to [Plaintiff Amaya’s] … employment.’” (Mot., pp. 8-9, quoting Mot., Kochis Decl., Ex. A, § 1.) Such a scope is broad and encompasses Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims to the extent that they are premised on Defendants’ alleged Labor Code violations involving (1) failure to provide employment records, (2) failure to provide overtime/double time, (3) failure to provide meal and rest periods, (4) failure to pay minimum wages, (5) failure to keep accurate and provide itemized wage statements, (6) failure to pay reporting time, (7) failure to “split shift” premiums, (8) failure to timely pay wages during employment, (9) failure to timely pay wages upon termination, (10) failure to reimburse necessary business-related expenses and costs, and (11) failure to provide notice of paid sick time and accrual. (See Complaint, ¶¶ 19-55, 59-73.)

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims are found to arise or relate to disputes that are encompassed within the arbitration agreement’s scope.

IV.

Interstate Commerce

A motion to compel arbitration based on the FAA must show not only that that the employer engaged in interstate commerce but also that “the employment relationship involved interstate commerce.” (Lane v. Francis Capital Management LLC, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at pp. 687-688.) Courts have found that where the FAA is found not to apply, the California Arbitration Act (Code Civ. Proc. § 1280 et seq.) applies. (See Valencia v. Smyth, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 178.)

Defendants argue that the FAA applies to this agreement because “Swinerton and Swinerton Builders are national commercial construction companies that provide construction services all over the United States, including in California[] [Citation[]],” “[a]ll Defendants purchase supplies from out-of-state for the construction projects on which laborers like Amaya work[] [Citation[]],” “Swinerton and MD Builders … maintain websites, and Swinerton advertises on national platforms,” which “activities constitute ‘interstate commerce’ under the FAA[] [Citation[]].” (Mot., p. 11, citing to Mot., Reimche Decl., ¶¶ 2-5.)

Plaintiff Amaya’s opposition fails to address interstate commerce.

The Court finds that Defendants’ business activities and Plaintiff Amaya’s employment involves interstate commerce.

V.

Defenses to the Arbitration Agreement

A “party opposing arbitration must prove by a preponderance of the evidence any defense to the petition” to compel arbitration in the matter. (Lacayo v. Cataline Restaurant Group Inc., supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 257.)

Here, Plaintiff Amaya’s opposition fails to raise any other defenses to the enforcement of the arbitration agreement outside of the argument that his individual PAGA claims are representative claims that are within the Limitations provision of the arbitration agreement and are not affected by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Viking River. (See Opp’n, pp. 3-9.)

To the extent that Plaintiff Amaya argues that he did not consent to arbitrating his individual PAGA claims, the Court is not persuaded. That argument is premised on Plaintiff’s reading of the definition of a “representative” PAGA action, which does not consider the reasoning of the holding in Piplack. The Court adopts its discussions in Sections I and III above to find that by entering the arbitration agreement, Plaintiff agreed to the terms of the parties’ arbitration agreement, which, as discussed above, encompasses his individual PAGA claims because those claims lie outside the “representative” PAGA action term in the arbitration agreement’s Limitations section.

Accordingly, the Court determines that Plaintiff has failed to raise any valid defense against enforcement of the arbitration agreement as to his individual PAGA claims.

VI.

Arbitration Conclusion

Defendants have carried their burden of showing that an arbitration agreement between the parties encompasses Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims, and Plaintiff Amaya has failed to carry his burden to show valid defenses to enforcement of the arbitration agreement.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.

VII.

Dismissal or Stay of Action

“If a court of competent jurisdiction, whether in this State or not, has ordered arbitration of a controversy which is an issue involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court of this State, the court in which such action or proceeding is pending shall, upon motion of a party to such action or proceeding, stay the action or proceeding until an arbitration is had in accordance with the order to arbitrate or until such earlier time as the court specifies.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4.)

“Defendants request that the Court stay the representative claims pending individual arbitration and the California Supreme Court’s ruling in Adolph” v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104 (Adolph). (Mot., p. 18.)

In opposition, Plaintiff Amaya notes that even if his individual PAGA claims are compelled into arbitration, he maintains standing as to the representative PAGA claims pursuant to Adolph. (Opp’n, p. 9.)

The Court agrees that, now that Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims have been compelled into arbitration, a stay is proper as to the action’s representative PAGA claims. (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1121 [“Standing under PAGA is not affected by enforcement of an agreement to adjudicate a plaintiff's individual claim in another forum”].)

Accordingly, the Court STAYS this action as to the representative PAGA claims until arbitration is had in accordance with this order to arbitrate or further order of the Court. 

Conclusion

Defendants M D Builders Inc., Swinerton Builders, Swinerton Builders HC, and Swinerton Incorporated’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings is GRANTED.

Plaintiff Alex Amaya’s individual PAGA claims are COMPELLED into arbitration.

The Court STAYS this action as to the representative PAGA claims until arbitration is had in accordance with this order to arbitrate or further order of the Court.