Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 23STCV03089, Date: 2024-06-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV03089    Hearing Date: June 20, 2024    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

I. Background

On February 14, 2023, Plaintiffs Richard Castro and Jose Castro filed a Complaint suing Defendants Ford Motor Company (Ford), Norm Reeves Ford Superstore (Norm Reeves), and Does 1 through 50 pursuant to three counts of violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (SBA) and a single count of negligent repair.

On January 25, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a notice of settlement for the entire case.

On March 6, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs in this action.

That same day, Plaintiffs filed a memorandum of costs detailing the costs claimed in Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs.

On June 6, 2024, Ford filed an opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion, and on June 13, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a reply.

Plaintiffs’ motion is now before the Court.

II. Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs

A. Motion for Attorney’s Fees: GRANTED in part.

1. Legal Standard

A prevailing party is entitled to recover costs as a matter of right. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subds. (a)(4), (b).) Attorney’s fees are also recoverable as costs when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).)

The Court begins this inquiry “with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (PLCM Group).) From there, the “lodestar figure may then be adjusted [according to a multiplier enhancement] based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (Ibid.) Relevant multiplier factors include “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

For purposes of determining a lodestar, absent a contrary showing, both the number of hours that the prevailing party’s attorney spent litigating the case and his or her regular hourly rate are presumed to be reasonable. (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 633-634, 639 (Serrano) [within context of Lab. Code, § 1021.5 private attorney general theory, absent a showing of “special circumstances” that would render such an award unjust, litigant was entitled to all hours actually spent, including those connected to fee-related matters, and those necessary to establish and defend the fee claim]; Mandel v. Lackner (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 747, 761 [“The value of an attorney’s time generally is reflected in his normal billing rate”], disapproved on other grounds in Serrano, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 630, fn. 12 [relating to whether term “antecedent litigation” was applicable between Mandel I and Mandel II].)

No specific findings reflecting the court’s calculations for attorney’s fees are required; the record need only show that the attorney’s fees were awarded according to the “lodestar” or “touchstone” approach. (Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1344, 1349, disagreed with on other grounds in In re Marriage of Demblewski (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 232, 236, fn. 7 [disagreement as to statement of decision requirements]; see Yu v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 636, fn. 6 [disapproving dictum In re Marriage of Demblewski re: whether motions may be filed before a referee’s decision is entered].)

Moreover, the Court is considered “an expert in the matter of attorney fees” since “[t]he value of attorney’s services is a matter with which a judge must necessarily be familiar.” (Excelsior Union High Sch. Dist. of L.A. Cnty. v. Lautrup (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 434, 448.) Accordingly, “[w]hen the court is informed of the extent and nature of such services, its own experience furnishes it with every element necessary to fix their value.” (Ibid.)

It follows that the Court has broad discretion to determine the amount of a reasonable attorney’s fee award, which will not be overturned absent a “manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence.” (Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1393-1394.)

B. Analysis

2. Analysis

a. Preliminary Considerations

i. Whether Ford Complied with Its SBA Obligations

In its opposition, Ford argues that because it made an offer to repurchase the Vehicle shortly after the Complaint was filed, it complied with its SBA obligations consistent with Dominguez v. American Suzuki (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 53, 60 (Dominguez), for which reason no fees should be recoverable. (Opp’n, pp. 4-5.)

The Court disagrees. Dominguez is distinguishable. Dominguez involved a pre-litigation offer, which does not exist here. Consequently, the Court finds the Dominguez argument raised in the opposition unavailing. However, the Court agrees that the offer may figure into the reasonableness of fees expended.

ii. Whether Sought Fees are Unreasonable Based on § 998 Offers and Ultimate Success Obtained

The Court rejects the opposition argument that fees and costs should be denied because they were unreasonably incurred following the Code of Civil Procedure section 998 (§ 998) offers by Ford in this case. (Opp’n, pp. 5-6.)

It is an error of law for the trial court to reduce or deny an award of attorney fees in a civil rights or public interest case on the basis of a plaintiff’s rejection of a section 998 offer when the ultimate recovery has exceeded the rejected offer. (Reck v. FCA US LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 682, 697.)

Here, the final settlement was $101,717 plus fees. (Mot., p. 1; Opp’n, Proudfoot Decl., ¶ 10), which is a greater figure than the initial offer to repurchase ($91,097 (cf. Complaint, ¶ 11 [agreed price for vehicle]) or the second offer to pay $91,717.75 plus attorney’s fees. (Opp’n, Proudfoot Decl., ¶¶ 6-7, Exs. C-D.)

Ford’s argument is thus unavailing.

b. Reasonable Fee Rate

i. Relevant Law

The lodestar calculation begins with a determination of the “reasonable hourly rate,” i.e., the rate “prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095; see, e.g., Stratton v. Beck (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 483, 496 [finding no abuse of discretion in court setting attorney’s hourly rate based on comparison of rates from similarly experienced attorneys in same field and area]; Children’s Hospital & Medical Center v. Bonta (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 783 (Children’s) [affirming award where “the hourly rates allowed by the trial court are within the range of reasonable rates charged by and judicially awarded comparable attorneys for comparable work”], disapproved in Asanta v. California Dept. of Health Care Servs. (9th Cir. 2018) 886 F.3d 795, 802, fn. 14 [disapproving Commerce Clause interpretation in Children’s].)

The general rule is “[t]he relevant ‘community’ is that where the court is located. [Citations.]” (Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Systems Laboratory, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 26, 71; accord Marshall v. Webster (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 275, 285.) However, the court may also consider the level of skill necessary, time limitations, the amount to be obtained in the litigation, the attorney’s reputation, and the undesirability of the case. (Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 272.)

ii. Court’s Determination

The Court determines that the requested fee rates are reasonable for counsel, i.e., $695 per hour for Michael Saeedian, Esq., $525 per hour for Christopher Urner, Esq., and $250 per hour for Jorge L. Acosta (paralegal). (See Mot., Saeedian Decl., ¶ 24.)

The declaration of Michael Saeedian provides grounds for the Court to determine that counsel’s reputation and 15 years of experience (even if not all in lemon law), as well as the undesirability of the case (contingency), supports the requested fee rate. A blended rate of $250 per hour as requested by the opposition is far too low a fee rate for an experienced practitioner like Michael Saeedian and does not take into account the contingency nature of the practice. (Mot., Saeedian Decl., ¶¶ 2-3, 6-8.)

The Court makes the same determination for Christopher Ulmer, whose fee rate of $525 per hour is reasonable for an eight-year practitioner taking a case on contingency.

Last, the Court determines that a paralegal rate of $250 per hour is reasonable in light of the contingency nature of this case.

The Court notes that this determination is based on the Court’s experience as an expert on fee determinations for rates in the Los Angeles area and the declarations of counsel.

The Court also notes that the opposition provides no authority to support its argument that a fee rate of $695 is entirely unreasonable for even the most experienced attorneys in lemon law. (Opp’n, pp. 7-8.)

b. Reasonable Hours Expended

i. Relevant Law

“Under the lodestar method, a party who qualifies for a fee should recover for all hours reasonably spent unless special circumstances would render an award unjust.” (Vo v. Las Virgenes Mun. Water Dist. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 440, 446, citing Serrano, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 632-633.) Time spent relating solely to the fee award is also compensable. (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1133.)

“‘Reasonably spent’ means that time spent ‘in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation.’” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 394 (Horsford), quoting Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1132-1133.) In assessing the reasonableness of the hours spent, “[t]he court can look to how many lawyers the other side utilized in similar situations as an indication of the effort required.” (Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 272, citation omitted.)

“In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488 (Lunada), quoting Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)

ii. Court’s Determination

The Court disagrees that Plaintiffs should not be able to recover the 2.6 hours of work expended between October 7, 2022, and November 17, 2022. (Opp’n, p. 9.) Attorney’s fees under the Song-Beverly Act cover the reasonably incurred legal time in connection with the “commencement and prosecution” of the action on behalf of a California vehicle purchaser. (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).) Ford provides no authority for its interpretation. However, a case does not start at the time of the signing of an attorney-fee agreement. The prospective client must be interviewed and the evidence reviewed, in order for an attorney to perform their ethical obligation to investigate the facts. Under these circumstances, Ford has not carried its burden as set out in Lunada.

The Court also disagrees that recovery for clerical tasks is not possible. Necessary overhead support services that secretaries and paralegals provide to attorneys may be included in an attorney’s fees award. (City of Oakland v. McCullough (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1, 7.) Administrative tasks are recoverable at the trial court’s discretion. However, charging for purely clerical tasks at an attorney’s hourly rate is questionable. (See Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132 [fees are based, in part, on level of legal skills that justifies the fair market rate of such services].) Here, Ford’s challenge is vague. Its motion challenges 9.6 hours spent on this action by paralegal Jorge L. Acosta but does not specify which of the entries challenged in the verified time entries are at issue. (Opp’n, p. 9.) The verified time records indicate that paralegal Acosta spent 28.7 hours on this action. (Mot., Saeedian Decl., Ex. A [summary at final unnumbered page].) Ford thus appears to have made an across-the-board rather than line-by-line challenge to paralegal Acosta’s hours. This challenge is not sufficiently specific because it amounts to the type of general arguments rejected by the rule in Lunada.

However, the Court agrees that the hours spent on this action by counsel are excessive to some degree. When a voluminous fee application is made the court may make across-the-board percentage cuts either in the number of hours claimed or in the final lodestar figure. (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 40, citing Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 41.) A trial court is not required to state each charge it finds reasonable or unreasonable. A reduced award might be fully justified by a general observation that an attorney overlitigated a case. (Karton v. Ari Design & Construction, Inc. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 734, 744.) But the court must clearly explain its reasons for choosing the particular negative multiplier that it chose; otherwise, the reviewing court is unable to determine that the court had valid, specific reasons for its across-the-board percentage reduction. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 41.)

Here, the amount of time spent on most tasks is excessive in comparison to the nature of the task being performed. As argued by the opposition, for example, the hours expended on drafting the Complaint and drafting and reviewing discovery is excessive. A review of the pleadings shows a garden-variety lemon law case, with the Defendant almost immediately offering to buy the car back. And the discovery served in this action by Plaintiff is common to lemon law litigation and should not have taken as much time as shown in the time records. (Opp’n, Proudfood Decl., ¶ 8, Ex. E.) Thus, the Court applies a 50% reduction to the requested lodestar of $40,495, to $20,247.50.

c. Multiplier Enhancement

Here, no multiplier enhancement award is requested by Plaintiffs.

d. Disposition

Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED in part as to fees in the amount of $20,247.50.

B. Motion for Costs: GRANTED.

1. Legal Standard

In general, the “prevailing party” is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs for suit in any action or proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (b); Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 606; Scott Co. Of Calif. v. Blount, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1103, 1108; see Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).)

2. Analysis

Here, the $5,899.18 in costs sought by Plaintiffs are unopposed by Ford. The Court thus GRANTS these costs, as reflected on March 6, 2024, Plaintiffs’ memorandum of costs.

III. Conclusion

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Time Actually Expended and Reasonably Incurred [Res ID # 6657] is GRANTED in part in the amount of $20,247.50 in fees and $5,899.18 in costs.