Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 23STCV04847, Date: 2024-10-14 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 40 - JUDGE ANNE RICHARDSON - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
The Court issues tentative rulings on certain motions.The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) email Dept 40 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (smcdept40@lacourt.org) with a copy to the other party(ies) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no email is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. 

Case Number: 23STCV04847    Hearing Date: October 14, 2024    Dept: 40

     Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

Procedural History

This action involves a multiple motor vehicle accident that occurred on or about May 9, 2021, between Defendants Hyuk Ro, Uber Technologies, Inc., Rasier, LLC, Rasier-CA, LLC (the Uber Defendants), Stephen Spencer Morris and Plaintiffs Munkberg and Smith, wherein Plaintiffs sustained injuries. Plaintiffs also allege Defendants State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and The Standard Fire Insurance Company failed to pay uninsured motorist benefits and/or underinsured motorists benefits to Plaintiffs under their insurance policies.

Defendant/Cross-Complainant The Standard Fire Insurance Company’s (“SFI”) filed a Cross-Complaint alleging causes of action for (1) equitable indemnity; (2) apportionment; (3) contribution; and (4) declaratory relief.

Defendant/Cross-defendant Stephen Spencer Morris now demurs to the Cross-Complaint, which SFI has not opposed.

After review, the Court SUSTAINS without leave to amend the Demurrer because Defendant/Cross-defendant Stephen Spencer Morris has been improperly joined as a Cross-defendant in the Cross-Complaint.

Background Allegations

This case arises from allegations that Uber, its driver Hyuk Ro, and its affiliates (collectively the Uber Defendants) and Stephen Spencer Morris (Morris), the driver of a separate car, failed to use a degree of care, caution, and prudence in driving, operating, and controlling each of their respective vehicles, creating a roadway obstruction in an active lane of the I-10 E/B Freeway. (Compl., ¶¶11, 22-28.) Specifically, Hyuk Ro initially stopped his own vehicle in an active lane of the 1-10 Freeway, and a second driver Morris in a private car crashed into that vehicle. (Compl., ¶ 10.) The Uber Defendants and Morris also failed to adequate safety measures to warn other vehicles of impending danger and/or roadway obstructions. (Compl., 24.) As a result, Plaintiffs suffered severe and serious injuries due to a multiple vehicle collision. (Compl., ¶25.) Insurance Defendants breached the insurance policies held by Plaintiffs by failing to pay uninsured motorist benefits and/or underinsured motorists benefits to Plaintiffs. (Compl., ¶¶3, 8-9, 30-34, 37-42.)

The Cross-Complaint, filed by Defendant and Cross-Complainant Standard Fire Insurance Co. (SFI), alleges claims for 1) equitable indemnity, 2) apportionment, 3) contribution, and 4) declaratory relief against Morris and the Uber Defendants.

Demurrer

Legal Standard: “The primary function of a pleading is to give the other party notice so that it may prepare its case [citation], and a defect in a pleading that otherwise properly notifies a party cannot be said to affect substantial rights.” (Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 240.)¿¿

“A¿demurrer¿tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a complaint.” (Ivanoff v. Bank of America, N.A.¿(2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 725.) The Court looks to whether “the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action or discloses a complete defense.” (Id.) The Court does not “read passages from a complaint in isolation; in reviewing a ruling on a demurrer, we read the complaint ‘as a whole and its parts in their context.’ [Citation.]” (West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 804.) The Court “assume[s] the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded and matters of which judicial notice has been taken.” (Harris, supra, 56 Cal.4th p. 240.) “The court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citation.]” (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.)¿¿

A general demurrer may be brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e) if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted or under section 430.10, subdivision (a), where the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading. All other grounds listed in Section 430.10, including uncertainty under subdivision (f), are special demurrers. Special demurrers are not allowed in limited jurisdiction courts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 92, subd. (c).)¿¿

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.)¿ The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.)¿¿¿

Meet and Confer

Before filing a demurrer or motion to strike, the moving party must meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading to attempt to reach an agreement that would resolve the objections to the pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41, 435.5.) “Any determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(4).) A demurrer and motion to strike have similar meet and confer requirements. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41, 435.5.)

Morris advances the declaration of his counsel of record, who attests that he met and conferred with SFI’s counsel via telephone before filing the present demurrer. (Chalamidas Decl., ¶6, ex. A.) The parties could not resolve the matter informally. (Id.)

Merits of Demurrer

Defendant/Cross-defendant Morris demurs to the entire Cross-Complaint on the ground that he and Defendant/Cross-Complainant SFI are not joint tortfeasors in this case. Specifically, Morris argues SFI has subjected him to misjoinder where there is no contractual privity between him and SFI; no contractual privity between him and Plaintiffs; he was sued for negligence and motor vehicle negligence; and he has nothing to do with Plaintiffs’ first party coverage action against its insurers including SFI.

Here, two types of joinder exists: compulsory joinder (CCP § 389) and permissive joinder (CCP § 379, formerly cited as sections 379a, 379b, and 379c). The Court finds that neither Code sections support joining Morris as a Cross-defendant in this instant case.

The Cross-Complaint alleges that “Plaintiff’s [sic] damages, if any, were proximately caused by the actions and primary negligence of CROSS-DEFENDANTS herein, and each of them, in that CROSS-DEFENDANTS, and each of them are partially or completely, and solely liable for the damages sought by Plaintiffs in their Complaint filed in this action, and that the conduct, if any, of Cross-Complainant, was passive, secondary, remote, and/or nonexistent.” (Cross-Compl., ¶¶8, 16, 18, 20.)

“The salutary procedure afforded by sections 379a, 379b, and 379c of the Code of Civil Procedure is clearly intended to be available upon a showing either that the negligence of two or more persons, whether joint, independently concurrent, or successive, contributed proximately to cause the injury for which recovery is sought, or that the injury for which recovery is sought was proximately caused by the negligence of one or another or several of two or more persons and, as to each person who is not charged absolutely, that a reasonable uncertainty, requiring determination of some factual or legal issue, exists in respect to alternative or quantitative liability. [Cleaned up].” (Landau v. Salam (1971) 4 Cal.3d 901, 906.)

In the operative Complaint, Plaintiffs assert a sole cause of action for negligence against Morris. (Compl., ¶¶16, 24-28.) By contrast, Plaintiffs assert a different cause of action for breach of contract against SFI. (Compl., ¶¶9, 37-42.)  As such, Plaintiffs do not seek recovery against Morris and SFI for the same injury because Plaintiffs allege physical injuries against Morris on the basis of negligence liability, but financial injuries against SFI on the basis of contract liability. Although these injuries arise from the same subject accident, the Complaint alleges different bases of liability against Morris and SFI. Also, the Complaint is devoid of any allegations that Morris caused or contributed to the breach of insurance contract between Plaintiffs and SFI. Furthermore, the Cross-Complaint makes no such allegations. (Cross-Compl., ¶¶7-16, 18.) Likewise, neither the Complaint nor Cross-Complaint allege that Morris was a party to the insurance contracts. (Id.) Nor has any opposition been filed. Thus, the Court finds that Morris is not a “indispensable” or “conditionally necessary” party to the Cross-Complaint.

Finally, there is no indication or rebuttal argument made showing that this defect can be cured by amendment.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court SUSTAINS without leave to amend the Demurrer to the Cross-Complaint as to Cross-Defendant Morris only.