Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 23STCV09720, Date: 2023-11-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV09720    Hearing Date: November 2, 2023    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

Background

Plaintiff Samantha Chapman sues Defendants 1516 Hobart Investments, LP, Concord Real Estate, and Does 1 through 50 pursuant to a May 1, 2023 Complaint alleging claims of (1) Breach of Warranty of Habitability (Violation of Civil Code § 1941.1), (2) Breach of Warranty of Habitability (Health & Safety Code § 17920.3), (3) Breach of Warranty of Habitability (Violation of Civil Code § 1942.4), (4) Negligence - Premises Liability, (5) Nuisance, (6) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, (7) Breach of Contract, (8) Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment, and (9) Fraud/Deceit/Intentional Misrepresentations of Fact.

The claims arise from allegations that Plaintiff Chapman leased residential premises from Defendants—1516 N. Hobart Blvd., Unit 301, Los Angeles, CA 90027 (Premises)—and that during her tenancy, Plaintiff has experienced various uninhabitable conditions, which Defendants have failed to remediate despite notice. The conditions include but are not limited to mold infestations, vermin infestations, massive water intrusions that caused damage to Plaintiff’s unit, and defects relating to waterproofing, weather protection, window sealing, gas facilities, electrical systems, toilet and bath, and smoke and carbon monoxide detectors. Plaintiff has alleged varied forms of physical and emotional harm as a result.

On August 2, 2023, Defendant 1516 Hobart Investments, LP (1516 Hobart) demurred to the Complaint’s first to third and fifth to ninth causes of action.

That same day, 1516 Hobart moved to strike punitive damages and attorney’s fees from the Complaint.

On October 20, 2023, Plaintiff Chapman opposed the demurrer and motion to strike.

On October 26, 2023, 1516 Hobart replied to the oppositions.

The demurrer and motion to strike are now before the Court.

Demurrer

Demurrer Sufficiency Standard

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747; see Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) This device can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) To sufficiently allege a cause of action, a complaint must allege all the ultimate facts—that is, the facts needed to establish each element of the cause of action pleaded. (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 212, superseded by statute as stated in Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235, 242.) Thus, “[t]o survive a [general] demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) In testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-67.) A demurrer, however, “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228, disapproved on other grounds, Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1162.) The face of the complaint includes exhibits attached to the complaint. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.) If facts appearing in the exhibits contradict those alleged, the facts in the exhibits take precedence. (Holland v. Morse Diesel Intern., Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1447, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in White v. Cridlebaugh (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 506, 521.)

Uncertainty Legal Standard 

A demurrer to a pleading lies where the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (f).) “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616, disapproved on other grounds in Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 46 [holding claims for unfair business practices need not be pled specifically, impliedly disapproving Khoury].) As a result, a special demurrer for uncertainty is not intended to reach failure to incorporate sufficient facts in the pleading but is directed only at uncertainty existing in the allegations already made. (People v. Taliaferro (1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 822, 825, disapproved on other grounds in Jefferson v. J.E. French Co. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 717, 719-720 [statute of limitations question].) Where complaint is sufficient to state a cause of action and to apprise defendant of issues he is to meet, it is not properly subject to a special demurrer for uncertainty. (See ibid.; see also Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643 [“A special demurrer [for uncertainty] should be overruled where the allegations of the complaint are sufficiently clear to apprise the defendant of the issues which he is to meet”].)

I.

Complaint, First to Third Causes of Action [Breach of Warranty of Habitability (Violation of Civil Code § 1941.1), Breach of Warranty of Habitability (Health & Safety Code § 17920.3), Breach of Warranty of Habitability (Violation of Civil Code § 1942.4)]: OVERRULED.

The Complaint’s first to third causes of action allege Breach of Warranty of Habitability under three different statutory sections. (Complaint, ¶¶ 67-89, 90-94, 95-105.)

 In its demurrer, 1516 Hobart argues that the Complaint insufficiently alleges the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship pursuant to a residential lease, which is a necessary component of the first to third causes of action. In one instance, 1516 Hobart argues that there is no “evidence” of a lease agreement. 1516 generally seeks “the exact date the alleged leasehold began, the actual parties to the agreement, or the terms governing Plaintiff’s tenancy.” (Demurrer, pp. 6-7.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that she has alleged sufficient ultimate facts to support the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship and that the Complaint specifically alleges that Plaintiff executed a multi-page, written standard residential lease agreements for Plaintiff’s tenancy at the Premises. Plaintiff also argues that she has sufficiently alleged the statutory prerequisites for violations of the three statutes from which the first to third causes of action arise. (Demurrer Opp’n, pp. 4-6.)

In reply, 1516 Hobart Investments reiterates its position on demurrer. (Demurrer Reply, p. 4.)

The Court finds in favor of Plaintiff Chapman.

Plaintiff Chapman points at a paragraph in the Complaint that explicitly alleges the execution of a residential lease agreement. (See FAC, ¶ 22.) Plaintiff otherwise establishes a landlord-tenant relationship through its allegations relating to the relationship between the parties. The Complaint alleges causes of action arising from statutes dealing with landlord-tenant relationships, as well as allegations that Plaintiff informed Defendants of uninhabitable conditions in the Premises.

1516 Hobart appears to instead want a copy of the lease agreement attached to the pleadings or the allegation of specific terms in the lease agreement. However, the Court notes that the breach of habitability claims advanced by Plaintiff arise from statutes involving a landlord-tenant relationship. The specific terms of the agreement are not an element of these causes of action. Instead, sufficient facts supporting the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship are what must be alleged, which the Complaint successfully does.

It is true that a contract must be pled verbatim in the body of the complaint, be attached to the complaint and incorporated by reference, or be pleaded according to its legal effect. (Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-99 [“In an action based on a written contract, a plaintiff may plead the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise language.”]; Bowden v. Robinson (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 705, 718.) “In order to plead a contract by its legal effect, plaintiff must ‘allege the substance of its relevant terms.’” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 993.)

However, the first three causes of action are not claims of breach of contract. They are instead premised on violations of the Civil Code and the Health and Safety Code. Even if they were, the Court finds below that the Plaintiff has adequately pled the legal effect of the contract in its discussion of the seventh cause of action for breach of contract. While the actual document is of course relevant, it can be sought in discovery and need not be attached.

1516 Hobart’s demurrer is thus OVERRULED as to the Complaint’s first to third causes of action.

II.

Complaint, Fifth Cause of Action, Nuisance: OVERRULED.

“Anything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway, is a nuisance.” (Civ. Code § 3479.)

The Complaint’s fifth cause of action alleges nuisance against Defendants based on the uninhabitable conditions on the Premises discussed above violating Civil Code section 3479. (Complaint, ¶¶ 117-128.)

In its demurrer, 1516 Hobart argues that the nuisance claim is duplicative of the fourth cause of action for negligence. (Demurrer, p. 8.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the fifth cause of action has an intent element to it, which makes it stands separate and apart from the fourth cause of action. Plaintiff also argues that nuisance is not duplicative of negligence here. (Demurrer Opp’n, pp. 6-7.)

In reply, 1516 Hobart Investments reiterates its position on demurrer. (Demurrer Reply, pp. 4-5.)

The Court finds in favor of Plaintiff Chapman.

“Given ‘the broad definition of nuisance,’ the independent viability of a nuisance cause of action ‘depends on the facts of each case.’ (El Escorial Owners’ Assn. v. DLC Plastering, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1348[] ….) ‘Where negligence and nuisance causes of action rely on the same facts about lack of due care, the nuisance claim is a negligence claim.’ (Id. at p. 1349[] ….) The nuisance claim ‘stands or falls with the determination of the negligence cause of action’ in such cases. (Pamela W. v. Millsom [(1994)] 25 Cal.App.4th [950,] 954, fn. 1[] ….)” (Melton v. Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521, 542.)

Here, the fifth cause of action alleges nuisance based on what could be negligent or intentional behavior on the part of 1516 Hobart. (See, e.g., Complaint, ¶¶ 127 [willful conduct allegation, which supports not only punitive damages, but also intentional nuisance]; Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 920 [“A nuisance may be either a negligent or an intentional tort”].) Because the nuisance claim has an intentional nuisance component to it, the claim goes beyond the same facts supporting the fourth cause of action for negligence. Facts relating to negligence are necessarily different from facts relating to intentional conduct, which has a state of mind component to it. The nuisance claim is therefore not duplicative of the negligence claim alleged as the fourth cause of action.

Moreover, to the extent the fourth cause of action also involves a negligence component through incorporation of prior allegations in the Complaint, a demurrer cannot be sustained to that component because a demurrer must dispose of a cause of action in its entirety. (Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1047.) Here, the intentional nuisance component of the fifth cause of action survives a duplicative pleading challenge on demurrer. The negligence portion therefore survives as well. Instead, a motion to strike was the proper procedural vehicle for such relief because motions to strike reach defects in a pleading that are not subject to demurrer. (Pierson v. Sharp Memorial Hospital, Inc. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 340, 342.)

1516 Hobart’s demurrer is thus OVERRULED as to the Complaint’s fifth cause of action.

III.

Complaint, Sixth Cause of Action, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: OVERRULED.

“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.’ A defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ And the defendant’s conduct must be ‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051.)

The Complaint’s sixth cause of action alleges that “Defendants’ conduct in dealing with Plaintiff, in their failure to take reasonable measures to eliminate all sewage backup, contaminated waste water, mold contamination, and to remediate the toxic mold contamination, was so extreme and outrageous as to go beyond all bounds of decency.” (Complaint, ¶ 130; see also Complaint, ¶¶ 129-134.) The Complaint also incorporates prior defective condition allegations in the Complaint. (Complaint, ¶ 129.)

In its demurrer, 1516 Hobart argues that Plaintiff Chapman makes a mere allegation that she suffered severe emotional distress, without facts indicating the nature or extent of any mental suffering resulting from the defendant’s alleged outrageous conduct. 1516 Hobart also argues that the alleged conduct is not outrageous because this is a simple habitability action sounding in negligence, and that its conduct is not severe, as based on boilerplate allegations and buzzwords of emotional distress. (Demurrer, pp. 8-10.)

In opposition, Plaintiff Chapman argues that 1516 Hobart’s conduct, as alleged in the Complaint, is extreme and outrageous beyond the bounds of decency, citing to paragraphs 130 and 132 of the Complaint in support. Plaintiff also argues that the Complaint alleges emotional distress, discomfort, and annoyance resulting from 1516 Hobart’s conduct. (Demurrer Opp’n, pp. 7-8.)

In reply, 1516 Hobart Investments reiterates its position on demurrer. (Demurrer Reply, p. 5.)

The Court finds in favor of Plaintiff Chapman.

In Stoiber v. Honeychuck, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at p. 922, the Court held that a tenant had stated sufficient facts to allege a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in a sufficiently similar case. There, the tenant alleged a defendant’s knowing, intentional and willful failure to correct defective conditions of the premises. The conditions were not merely inconvenient, but unhealthy and unsafe: leaking of sewage, defective and dangerous electrical wiring, structural weaknesses in the wall, deteriorated flooring, falling ceiling, leaking roof, dilapidated doors, broken windows. (Id. at p. 912.) In the face of such allegations, the Court said that whether these met the standard of extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient for an IIED claim was a factual question for the trier of fact. (Id. at p. 922.) 

Here, the Complaint sufficiently alleges the knowing and willful failure to correct defective conditions on the Premises, including failure to remediate sewage backup, contaminated wastewater, and mold contamination. (See, e.g., Complaint, ¶¶ 123 [defective conditions], 127 [willfulness], 129 [incorporation into sixth cause of action], 130 [defective conditions redux].)

Moreover, the Complaint sufficiently alleges emotional distress. (Complaint, ¶¶ 12, 129.)

1516 Hobart’s demurrer is thus OVERRULED as to the Complaint’s sixth cause of action.

IV.

Complaint, Seventh Cause of Action, Breach of Contract: OVERRULED.

“A contract is a voluntary and lawful agreement, by competent parties, for a good consideration, to do or not to do a specified thing.” (Robinson v. Magee (1858) 9 Cal. 81, 83.) “To prevail on a cause of action for breach of contract, the plaintiff must prove (1) the contract, (2) the plaintiff’s performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damage to the plaintiff.” (Richman v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186.) Implicit in the element of damage is that the defendant’s breach caused the plaintiff’s damage.” (Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1352, italics omitted.)

The Complaint alleges breach of a lease agreement between the parties based on Defendants’ failure to provide habitable premises and failure to repair, maintain, and remediate uninhabitable conditions. (Complaint, ¶¶ 139-140; see Complaint, ¶¶ 135-143.)

In its demurrer, 1516 Hobart argues that the breach of contract claim fails to comply with the pleading conventions applicable to contract claims, e.g., fails to allege the exact date the alleged leasehold began, the actual parties to the agreement, or the terms governing Plaintiff’s tenancy. (Demurrer, pp. 6-7.)

In opposition, Plaintiff Chapman argues that she has alleged all the elements of a breach of contract claim, including the statutory duty to keep Premises habitable. (Demurrer Opp’n, pp. 8-9.)

In reply, 1516 Hobart Investments reiterates its position on demurrer. (Demurrer Reply, pp. 2-4.)

The Court finds in favor of Plaintiff Chapman.

The Complaint alleges entry into a contract, Plaintiff’s timely payment of rent, Defendants’ failure to “provide Plaintiff with a habitable residence that was compliant with legal requirements, and failing to repair, maintain, and remediate the non-compliant aspects of the Premises,” and damages. (Complaint, ¶¶ 98 [Plaintiff timely paid rent], 135 [incorporation of prior allegations], 139 [quoted language], 142-143 [damages].) Even though the lease agreement itself is not attached to the Complaint, its legal effect is, including the term that Defendants were provide habitable Premises in relation to Plaintiff’s lease. (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 993 [“In order to plead a contract by its legal effect, plaintiff must ‘allege the substance of its relevant terms’”].)

1516 Hobart’s demurrer is thus OVERRULED as to the Complaint’s seventh cause of action.

V.

Complaint, Eighth Cause of Action, Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment: OVERRULED.

The implied covenant of quiet enjoyment implies a term in a contract, and breach of the covenant gives rise to an action in contract. (Ginsberg v. Gamson (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 873, 896.) The implied covenant of quiet enjoyment is breached when there is an eviction, actual or constructive, of the tenant. (Marchese v. Standard Realty & Dev. Co. (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 142, 148.) Actual eviction occurs when there is an expulsion or ouster of the tenant by the landlord. (Giraud v. Milovich (1938) 29 Cal.App.2d 543.) Constructive eviction occurs when there is a substantial and material interference with the tenant’s beneficial use and enjoyment of the premises, causing the tenant to either vacate the premises (Stoiber v. Honeychuck, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at p. 926), or elect to stand upon the lease, remain in possession, and sue for breach of contract damages as well as injunctive relief (Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 578, 590). Minor inconveniences and annoyances are not actionable. (Id. at pp. 589-90.) 

The Complaint’s eighth cause of action incorporates prior allegations to support breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment. (Complaint, ¶¶ 144-150.)

In its demurrer, 1516 Hobart makes the same argument directed to the first to third and seventh causes of action: Plaintiff did not plead sufficient allegations relating to a lease agreement between the parties or a specific term breached, for which reason this claim fails on demurrer. (Demurrer, p. 7.)

In opposition, Plaintiff Chapman argues that the allegations from which the prior claims arise support a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. (Demurrer Opp’n, p. 9.)

In reply, 1516 Hobart Investments reiterates its position on demurrer. (Demurrer Reply, p. 4.)

The Court finds in favor of Plaintiff Chapman.

The Court has already found that the Complaint sufficiently pleads a contract in relation to the first to third and seventh causes of action. (See §§ I, IV discussions supra.) Moreover, the Complaint sufficiently alleges various uninhabitable conditions in the Premises and Defendants’ failure to remediate despite notice. (See, e.g., Complaint, ¶¶ 3 [vermin], 6 [vermin and mold], 8 [notice], 123 [sewage backup, contaminated wastewater, and mold contamination], 127 [willfulness], 130 [failure to remedy mold], 144 [incorporation of prior allegations].)

1516 Hobart’s demurrer is thus OVERRULED as to the Complaint’s eighth cause of action.

VI.

Complaint, Ninth Cause of Action, Fraud/Deceit/Intentional Misrepresentations of Fact: OVERRULED.

“[T]he elements of an action for fraud and deceit based on a concealment are: (1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage.” (Boschma v. Home Loan Center, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 230, 248; see also Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 665-666.)

Allegations of fraud “must be pled with more detail than other causes of action.” (Apollo Capital Fund, LLC v. Roth Capital Partners, LLC (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 226, 240.) “Every element of the cause of action for fraud must be alleged … factually and specifically[,] and the policy of liberal construction of the pleadings … will not ordinarily be invoked to sustain a pleading defective in any material respect. [Citations.]” (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216, superseded by statute as stated in Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235, 242.) “[G]eneral and conclusory allegations do not suffice.” (Small v. Fritz Cos., Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184 [citations omitted].) Fittingly, a plaintiff pleading fraud must plead facts showing “how, when, where, to whom, and by what means” the allegedly fraudulent representations were tendered. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.)

The Complaint alleges fraud based on intentional misrepresentations and omissions by a manager of 1516 Hobart, Alyssa Silva, who concealed toxic mold conditions in the Subject Premises from Plaintiff Chapman despite knowledge thereof. (Complaint, ¶¶ 152(a), 152(b) [concealments in October 2020 and May 2021]; see Complaint, ¶¶ 151-161.)

In its demurrer, 1516 Hobart argues that the Complaint is devoid of any specificity regarding how, where, and by what means the purported misrepresentations/concealment were made to Plaintiff and of any alleged misrepresentation made by Ms. Silva. 1516 Hobart also argues that Plaintiff has likewise failed to plead the reliance or causation elements with particularity. (Demurrer, pp. 10-11.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that she has pleaded all the elements of this claim based on intentional misrepresentation. Plaintiff relies on the concealment portion of the ninth cause of action, as well as other paragraphs of this claim in support. (Demurrer Opp’n, pp. 9-10, citing Complaint, ¶¶ 157-158 [supporting intent and reliance].)

In reply, 1516 Hobart Investments reiterates its position on demurrer. (Demurrer Reply, pp. 5-6.)

The Court finds in favor of Plaintiff Chapman.

Here, the Complaint pleads concealments by a manager of 1516 Hobart, Alyssa Silva, the dates of the concealment (October 1, 2021 and May 1, 2021), and the nature of the material fact concealed (mold). The Complaint alleges duty through the landlord-tenant relationship. The Complaint alleges intent through knowledge of the mold problem and its concealment and through the profit motive for the concealment, i.e., payment of rent. The Complaint alleges Plaintiff’s lack of awareness of the concealment and that Plaintiff would have prosecuted her rights had she known of the presence of mold. The Complaint also pleads damages. (Complaint, ¶¶ 12 [harm suffered by Plaintiff], 98 [Plaintiff timely paid rent], 151 [incorporation], 152(a), 152(b) [knowing concealment, and lack of awareness by Plaintiff], 156-158 [Plaintiff would have acted differently, i.e., reliance], 159-160 [damages].) These allegations were made with sufficient particularity to survive demurrer.

1516 Hobart’s demurrer is thus OVERRULED as to the Complaint’s ninth cause of action.

Motion to Strike

Legal Standard

The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (a) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (b) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subds. (a), (b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].)

For the purposes of a motion to strike pursuant to Sections 435 to 437 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the term “pleading” generally means a demurrer, answer, complaint, or cross-complaint, (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (a)), and an immaterial allegation or irrelevant matter in a pleading entails (1) an allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense, (2) an allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense, or (3) a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subds. (b)(1)-(3), (c)).

Order Striking Punitive Damages: DENIED.

“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) 

When the defendant is a corporation, ‘[a]n award of punitive damages … must rest on the malice of the corporation’s employees’” specifically, “the oppression, fraud, or malice perpetrated, authorized, or knowingly ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation,” where a managing agent “include[s] only those corporate employees who exercise substantial independent authority and judgment in their corporate decisionmaking so that their decisions ultimately determine corporate policy.’” (Wilson v. Southern California Edison Co. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 123, 164, citations omitted.) 

In its motion, 1516 Hobart argues that Plaintiff Chapman has only conclusorily alleged conduct supporting punitive damages pursuant to Civil Code section 3294, that the Complaint only rises to the level of negligent not malicious conduct, and that punitive damages cannot arise from breach of contract. (MTS, pp. 5-9.)

In opposition, Plaintiff Chapman argues that she has alleged sufficient factual grounds for punitive damages and that the claims for breach of quiet enjoyment, IIED, and fraud justify punitive damages. (MTS Opp’n, pp. 5-7.)

In reply, 1516 Hobart reiterates its points in the motion to strike and goes into detail as to why the above claims cannot support punitive damages here. (MTS Reply, pp. 2-5.)

The Court finds in favor of Plaintiff Chapman.

Punitive damages stand based on allegations of uninhabitable conditions in the Premises, Plaintiff Chapman’s notice of the same to Defendants, and Defendants’ failure to remediate the conditions. These allegations, discussed at length above, support outrageous conduct that amounts to oppression and perhaps malice if intent is shown. (See Stoiber v. Honeychuck, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at p. 920 [where a tenant alleged that defendant had actual notice of defective conditions in the premises including leaking sewage and other unsafe and dangerous conditions, the tenant had “pleaded sufficient facts to support her prayer for exemplary damages”].) Moreover, these allegations support the inference that despite complaints by Plaintiff Chapman relating to the uninhabitable conditions, a person or person amounting to an officer, director, or managing agent of Defendants failed to act or intentionally did not act to remediate these conditions. In addition, the Complaint pleads actions by a “manager,” i.e., Alyssa Silva, in failing to remediate known conditions. (Complaint, ¶ 152.)

Moreover, the Court notes that all the Complaint’s claims survived demurrer and that some of those claims do not sound in contract, but rather, sound in tort, i.e., IIED and fraud (concealment).

The motion to strike is thus DENIED as to striking punitive damages.

Order Striking Attorney’s Fees: DENIED.

In its motion, 1516 Hobart argues that the Complaint does not plead a contractual basis for the fees, nor a statute under which Plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees. The motion appears to attempt distinguishing Civil Code section 1021.5 but not Civil Code section 1942.4. (MTS, pp. 9-10.)

In opposition, Plaintiff Chapman argues that fees are proper pursuant to Civil Code sections 1021.5 and 1942.4. Plaintiff also argues that the Complaint alleges that the lease agreement had an attorney’s fees clause, pointing to paragraph 143 of the Complaint. (MTS Opp’n, pp. 2-4.)

In reply, 1516 Hobart argues that the first and third causes of action are not sufficiently pleaded and thus cannot support recovery of fees. 1516 Hobart also argues that the contract is not sufficiently pleaded or attached to the Complaint to support recovery of fees as part of any lease agreement. (MTS Reply, pp. 1-2.)

The Court finds in favor of Plaintiff Chapman.

Attorney’s fees are properly supported by the Complaint’s allegations, which include reference to Civil Code sections 1021.5 and 1942.4, subdivision (b)(2), and to the existence of an attorney’s fees clause in the Complaint. (Complaint, ¶¶ 84 [statutory basis for fees—Civ. Code, § 1021.5—alleged in the surviving first cause of action for statutory breach of warranty of habitability], 96, 104 [statutory basis for fees—Civ. Code, § 1942.4—alleged in the surviving first cause of action for statutory breach of warranty of habitability], 143 [contractual basis for fees in the surviving breach of contract claim, i.e., the seventh cause of action].)

The motion to strike is thus DENIED as to striking attorney’s fees. 

Conclusion

Defendant 1516 Hobart Investments, LP’s Demurrer to Complaint is OVERRULED.

Defendant 1516 Hobart Investments, LP’s Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint is DENIED.