Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 23STCV10563, Date: 2023-11-27 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV10563 Hearing Date: December 21, 2023 Dept: 40
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STEPHEN GROLLNEK, Plaintiff, v. MONROVIA POLICE DEPARTMENT, a Government Entity; ARCADIA POLICE DEPARTMENT,
A Government Entity; T. ORTEGA, an Individual, and Detective Foulks, an Individual,
and DOES 1 through 15 Inclusive, Cross-Defendants. |
Case No.: 23STCV10563 Hearing Date: 12/21/23 Trial Date: N/A [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Defendants City
of Monrovia and T. Ortega’s Demurrer
to Complaint and Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint. |
Plaintiff Stephen Grollnek—in pro
per—sues the City of Monrovia (sued as the Monrovia Police Department; Monrovia
PD), Arcadia Police Department (Arcadia PD), T. Ortega (a Monrovia PD employee),
Detective Foulks (an Arcadia PD employee), and Does 1 through 15 pursuant to an
August 16, 2023 First Amended Complaint (FAC) alleging claims of (1)
Negligence, (2) Breach of Promise, and (3) Emotional Distress.
The claims arise from allegations
that, after Defendant Grollnek ran over a pedestrian with his motor vehicle that
died, the Department of Motor Vehicles set a hearing regarding Defendant
Grollnek’s driver’s license. At that hearing, a report by Defendant Ortega of
the Monrovia PD was introduced into evidence, which resulted in the revocation
of Plaintiff’s driver’s license, thus causing damages to Plaintiff—e.g.,
transportation costs during the period it was revoked—until Plaintiff was able
to institute a Superior Court action that ordered a vacatur of his license
revocation.
On September 15, 2023, Monrovia and
Monrovia PD officer T. Ortega demurred to the FAC’s three causes of action.
That same day, Monrovia and Ortega filed
a motion to strike punitive damages from the FAC.
The demurrer and motion to strike
are unopposed by Plaintiff and are now before the Court.
The Court takes judicial notice of
the Plaintiff’s claim of damages with Monrovia, Monrovia’s rejection notice,
and a conformed claim of damages by Plaintiff. (Demurrer, RJN; see Evid. Code,
§§ 452, subd. (b), 453, subds. (a)-(b).)
Plaintiff is self-represented.
Self-represented litigants are held to the same standards that apply to
licensed attorneys. (Harding v. Collazo (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1044,
1056; see Lombardi v. Citizens Nat’l Trust & Sav. Bank (1955) 137
Cal.App.2d 206, 208-209 [Self-represented litigants are “restricted to the same
rules of evidence and procedure as is required of those qualified to practice
law before our courts”].)
Demurrer Sufficiency Standard
A demurrer for sufficiency tests
whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007)
147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747; see Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) This
device can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the
pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially
noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) To sufficiently allege a cause of action,
a complaint must allege all the ultimate facts—that is, the facts needed to
establish each element of the cause of action pleaded. (Committee on
Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197,
212, superseded by statute as stated in Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan
Assn. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235, 242.) Thus, “[t]o survive a
[general] demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a
cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the
plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High
School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) In testing the sufficiency of the
cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly
pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962,
966-67.) A demurrer, however, “does not admit contentions, deductions or
conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d
695, 713.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally
and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power
(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228, disapproved on other grounds, Jones v.
Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1162.) The face
of the complaint includes exhibits attached to the complaint. (Frantz v.
Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.) If facts appearing in the exhibits
contradict those alleged, the facts in the exhibits take precedence. (Holland
v. Morse Diesel Intern., Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1447, superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in White v. Cridlebaugh (2009) 178
Cal.App.4th 506, 521.)
FAC, First to Third Causes of
Action, Government Code Immunity: SUSTAINED, without leave to amend.
In their demurrer, the City of
Monrovia and Ortega argue that the three claims in the FAC are not sufficiently
alleged because, in relevant part, the conduct of Defendant Ortega complained
of in the FAC is subject to immunity pursuant to Government Code section 821.6,
for which reason no liability can be stated against the City of Monrovia
pursuant to Government Code section 815.2. (Demurrer, pp. 12-13.)
No opposition is in the record.
The Court agrees with the City of
Monrovia and Ortega.
Government Code section 815.2 only
“makes a public entity vicariously liable for its employee’s negligent acts or
omissions within the scope of employment;” it does not create an independent
basis for liability against a public agency. (Eastburn v. Regional Fire
Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1180.)
However, Government Code section 821.6
provides that “[a] public employee is not liable for injury caused by his
instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the
scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable
cause.” (Gov. Code, § 821.6.)
Here, the conduct for which the
City of Monrovia and Ortega are being sued involves the admission of an
incident report drafted by Ortega on behalf of the Monrovia PD at the DMV
hearing, which supported a decision to revoke Plaintiff’s license and led to
Plaintiff’s alleged damages. (See FAC, ¶¶ 22-36.) Plaintiff’s allegations
demonstrate that there was an investigation in which the Monrovia PD participated.
Yet, Defendant Ortega’s immunity as a public employee extends to investigations
as part of judicial and administrative proceedings. (Kemmerer v. County of
Fresno (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1426, 1436-1437, disapproved on other grounds
in Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 798,
808 [immunities not jurisdictional; can be waived].) This immunity includes participation
in judicial and administrative actions against the plaintiff, including
proceedings to have a license revoked or suspended. (Richards vs. Department
of Alcoholic Beverages Control (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 304, 317.)
Detective Ortega is shown from the
pleadings to have been acting within the scope of his employment for the
Monrovia PD. (See FAC, ¶ 33.) The absolute immunity provided under section 821
applies to “conduct within the scope of employment.” (Richardson-Tunnell v.
School Insurance Program for Employees (SIPE) (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1056, 1063,
disapproved on other grounds in Leon v. County of Riverside (Jun. 22,
2023) 14 Cal.5th 910, 930-931 [Section 821.6 deals with malicious prosecution,
not with purely investigative conduct, which does not qualify for section 821.6
purposes absent filing of any charges].) Public employees have a duty to
participate in administrative investigations; acting within “the scope of
employment” is work performed for the benefit of the employer and not for the
employee’s own purposes. (Ibid.) This immunity extends to any kind of
civil or administrative proceedings and to investigations that accompany
potential proceedings. (Id. at pg. 1062.) For those reasons, and because
the report by Defendant Ortega was tied to an actual administrative proceeding
against Plaintiff, the Court finds that the immunity in Government Code section
821.6 applies here, undercuts liability against Defendant Ortega, and thus
undercuts liability against the City of Monrovia.
The City of Monrovia and Ortega’s
demurer is thus SUSTAINED, without leave to amend.
Legal
Standard
The
court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it
deems proper: (a) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted
in any pleading; or (b) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or
filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of
the court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subds. (a), (b); Stafford v. Shultz
(1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the
claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or
disregarded”].)
For
the purposes of a motion to strike pursuant to Sections 435 to 437 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, the term “pleading” generally means a demurrer, answer,
complaint, or cross-complaint, (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (a)), and an
immaterial allegation or irrelevant matter in a pleading entails (1) an
allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense, (2) an
allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise
sufficient claim or defense, or (3) a demand for judgment requesting relief not
supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint (Code Civ.
Proc., § 431.10, subds. (b)(1)-(3), (c)).
Order
Striking Punitive Damages: MOOT.
Having sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, the City of Monrovia and Ortega’s motion to strike is MOOT.
Defendants City of Monrovia and T. Ortega’s Demurrer to Complaint is SUSTAINED, without leave to amend.
Defendants City of Monrovia and T. Ortega’s Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint is MOOT.