Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 23STCV12612, Date: 2023-09-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV12612    Hearing Date: January 24, 2024    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

Background

Pleadings

Plaintiffs Yesenia Reyes, Veronica Romero, and Sam Barrad sue Defendants South Cord Holdings, LLC (SCH), Doe 1 562 Discount Med Inc., Doe 2 316 Florence Holdings, LLC, Doe 3 Ryan Cameron Rayburn Collective, Inc., Doe 4 Portlock Holdings, LLC, Doe 5 South Cord Management, LLC, Does 6 through 10 pursuant to a June 2, 2023 Complaint alleging claims of (1) Harassment, (2) Gender Discrimination, (3) Retaliation, (4) Retaliation (Labor Code § 1102.5), (5) Negligent Hiring, Supervision, or Retaliation of Employee, (6) Failure to Prevent Harassment and/or Discrimination, and (7) Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy.

The claims arise from allegations that in their employment with SCH, Plaintiffs experienced the above statutory and tortious violations.

Prior Arbitration History

On July 11, 2023, SCH moved to compel arbitration pursuant to (1) a collective bargaining agreement allegedly covering Plaintiffs and (2) an arbitration agreement signed by Plaintiff Reyes and specific as to her alone.

On September 6, 2023, Plaintiffs opposed the motion.

On September 11, 2023, SCH replied to the opposition.

On September 19, 2023, the Court granted SCH’s motion as to Plaintiff Reyes but denied the motion as to Plaintiffs Romero and Barrad.

Motion Before the Court

On November 15, 2023, SCH made a renewed motion to compel arbitration against Plaintiff Romero. The motion is premised on an arbitration agreement not attached to the July 11, 2023 motion to compel arbitration.

On January 11, 2024, Plaintiff Romero opposed SCH’s motion.

On January 16, 2024, SCH replied to Romero’s opposition.

Defendant SCH’s motion to compel arbitration is now before the Court.

Renewed Motion to Compel Arbitration

Legal Standard

A party who originally made an application for an order which was refused in whole or part, or granted conditionally or on terms, may make a subsequent application for the same order upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, in which case it shall be shown by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown. For a failure to comply with this subdivision, any order made on a subsequent application may be revoked or set aside on ex parte motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (b).)

For renewed motion purposes, a moving party must provide not only new evidence but also a satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce that evidence at an earlier time. (See California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. Virga (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 30, 46-48 (Virga) [affirming trial court order denying what amounted to a renewed motion for attorney fees “in the absence of a sufficient explanation why appellants did not rely on the federal statute [new law] in their original motion”]; accord. Baldwin v. Home Savings of America (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1198, 1200-1201 (Baldwin) [reversing trial court order granting motion for reconsideration of an attorney fees award where “[c]ounsel [asking for reconsideration] made no effort whatsoever to explain the failure to previously present the case, then two years old, or the principle for which it stands, as an alternative basis for denial of appellants’ motion for attorney fees” pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a)].)

Renewed motions under section 1008, subdivision (b) differ in substance and procedures from motions for reconsideration under section 1008, subdivision (a). (Tate v. Wilburn (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 150, 160.) Unlike a motion for reconsideration, a renewed motion does not ask the court to modify, amend, or revoke the prior order, but instead it is a pure renewal of the first motion. (California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. Virga (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 30, 42-43). A renewal motion is proper even if the moving party concedes that the court’s initial ruling was correct but is now erroneous in light of changed circumstances. (Deauville Restaurant, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 843, 848 (Deauville Restaurant).)

Other key differences between a motion for reconsideration and a renewed motion is that a renewed motion can only be brought by the party whose original motion was denied in whole or in part, has no time limit for filing, and need not be considered by the same judge who denied the original motion. (Deauville Restaurant, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 851.) However, statutory or jurisdictional deadlines attached to the underlying motions remain applicable. (See, e.g., Kunysz v. Sandler (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1540, 1543 [motion to renew an anti-SLAPP motion, brought nine months after the first amended complaint was filed, was untimely because it was outside the 60-day statutory period for filing an anti-SLAPP motion]; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 660 [court cannot reconsider an order denying a motion for new trial after the jurisdictional 60-day period for the court to grant or deny that motion has passed]; Jones v. Sieve (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 359, 370 [“the power of a trial court to rule on a motion for a new trial is constrained by the jurisdictional 60–day limitation period of section 660, which is a specific statute, and cannot be extended or expanded by the procedural device of moving under section 1008, a general statute, for reconsideration of an order granting or denying a new trial motion, which necessarily involves a request to correct judicial error”].)

Order Granting Renewed Motion to Compel Arbitration: DENIED.

In opposition to SCH’s motion, Plaintiff Romero argues that the motion should be denied as a renewed motion to compel arbitration for which there is no showing of reasonable diligence. (Opp’n, pp. 2-6.) The Court agrees.

A trial court may construe a motion bearing one label as a different type of motion. (Austin v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 918, 930.) “‘The nature of a motion is determined by the nature of the relief sought, not by the label attached to it. The law is not a mere game of words. … The principle that a trial court may consider a motion regardless of the label placed on it by a party is consistent with the court’s inherent authority to manage and control its docket.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.; see, e.g., Deauville Restaurant, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th 843, 849-850 [construing a second application for writ of attachment based on additional evidence and new circumstances as a renewed motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (b)].)

Here, on July 11, 2023, SCH filed a motion to compel arbitration against all three Plaintiffs based on two arbitration agreements, the first a collective bargaining agreement involving all three Plaintiffs, and the second involving Plaintiff Reyes and SCH alone. On September 19, 2023, after full briefing from the parties, the Court denied the motion to compel arbitration as to Plaintiff Romero. SCH now comes before the Court, again asking for an order compelling Plaintiff Romero’s claims into arbitration. This renewed motion is based on an arbitration agreement between Romero and SCH alone that was not attached to SCH’s July 11, 2023 motion or considered by the Court on September 19, 2023. The Court construes these circumstances as a renewed motion to compel arbitration against Plaintiff Romero, as it is based on additional evidence not previously filed with the Court. (Cf. Deauville Restaurant, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 849-850.)

SCH does not properly explain why the purported Romero-SCH arbitration agreement was not attached to the July 11, 2023 motion. (See Mot., Augustini Decl., ¶¶ 3-6 [explaining how co-counsel only recently discovered the existence of this agreement when responding to discovery from Plaintiff Romero].) SCH argues that the explanation cannot be “more detailed … [because] it might require counsel to invade both the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product doctrine.” (Reply, p. 4.) While the Court sympathizes with SCH’s counsel’s late discovery of this agreement, a review of that agreement shows that it was purportedly signed on August 20, 2021, meaning it was in SCH’s possession for nearly two years prior to July 11, 2023, when SCH filed its initial motion to compel arbitration. (Mot., Halushka Decl., Ex. A.) Counsel’s declaration does not justify this prior delay, which is fatal because, given that SCH has had possession of the agreement since August 2021, there is no satisfactory explanation for SCH’s failure to argue or include the Romero-SCH agreement in the initial July 11, 2023 motion to compel arbitration. (See Mot., Augustini Decl., ¶¶ 1-6; cf. Virga, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 46-48; Baldwin, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1198, 1200-1201.)

SCH’s motion is thus DENIED.  

Conclusion

Defendant South Cord Holdings, LLC’s Motion to Compel Arbitration Against Plaintiff Veronica Romero is DENIED.