Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 23STCV15040, Date: 2024-03-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV15040    Hearing Date: March 21, 2024    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

I. Background

A. Pleadings

Plaintiffs Elisa Morales Sanchez and Luis Aguilar Galvan sue Defendants General Motors LLC (GM) and Does 1 through 10 pursuant to a June 8, 2023, Complaint alleging claims of (1) Violation of Subdivision (d) of Civil Code Section 1793.2, (2) Violation of Subdivision (b) of Civil Code Section 1793.2, (3) Violation of Subdivision (a)(3) of Civil Code Section 1793.2, (4) Breach of Express Written Warranty, Civil Code Section 1791.2 Subdivision (a); Section 1794; and (5) Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability, Civil Code Section 1791.1; Section 1794.

The claims arise from the following allegations. On October 2, 2020, Plaintiffs purchased a 2020 Chevrolet Traverse (Vehicle) that was manufactured and/or distributed by Defendant GM. Plaintiff received an express written warranty in which Defendant GM undertook to preserve or maintain the utility or performance of the Vehicle or to provide compensation if there was a failure in utility or performance for a specified period of time. After Plaintiff took possession of the Vehicle and during the warranty period, the Vehicle contained or developed defects that substantially impair the use, safety, and/or value of the Vehicle, including but not limited to defective body, powertrain, safety, electrical, braking, and noise systems. Plaintiff provided Defendant GM sufficient opportunity to service or repair the Vehicle, but GM was unable and/or failed to service or repair the Vehicle within a reasonable number of attempts while failing to promptly replace or repurchase the Vehicle.

B. Motion Before the Court

On October 6, 2023, Plaintiffs served Requests for Production of Documents (RPDs), Set One, on Defendant GM.

On November 11, 2023, Defendant GM served responses to RPDs, Set One, which are comprised of two groups: (1) objections coupled with statements indicating that GM will not produce responsive documents (RPDs, Set One, Nos. 7-8, 10, 12-17, 19-21, 23, 25-27, 29-30, 34-47, 49-57); and (2) objections coupled with unverified statements of compliance (RPDs, Set One, Nos. 1-6, 9, 11, 18, 22, 24, 31-33, 48).

Between October 6, 2023, and December 18, 2023, Plaintiffs’ counsel sent various meet and confer letters to GM’s counsel, in which Plaintiffs’ counsel sought to confer about electronically stored information (ESI) involved in RPDs, Set One, GM’s allegedly boilerplate objections and limited discovery responses, and the narrowing of databases involved in the ESI production at issue.

On December 27, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel further responses and production from GM relating to RPDs, Set One, Nos. 16-21.

On March 8, 2024, GM filed an opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion.

No reply from Plaintiffs appears in the record.

Plaintiffs’ motion is now before the Court.

The Court briefly notes that neither the moving papers nor the opposition seek monetary sanctions.

II. Motion to Compel Further Production: GRANTED.

A. Legal Standard

A motion to compel a further response is used when a party gives unsatisfactory answers or makes untenable objections to interrogatories, demands to produce, or requests for admission. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a); Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 403.)

To request further production, a movant must establish: (1) good cause for the production (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1); Sinaiko, supra, at p. 403); and (2) that a further response is needed because (a) the responding party’s statement of compliance with the demand to produce is incomplete Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a)(1)), (b) the responding party’s representation that it is unable to comply is inadequate, complete, or evasive (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a)(2)), (c) the responding party’s objection in the response is without merit or is too general (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a)(3); Catalina Island Yacht Club v. Superior Court (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1127), or (d) if the responding party objected to the production of ESI on the ground that it is not reasonably accessible the movant can show that the (i) ESI is reasonably accessible or (ii) there is good cause for production of the ESI regardless of its accessibility (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (e)).

B. Analysis

1. Production Requests at Issue

RPDs, Set One, defines “[t]he term ‘SAFETY DEFECT’ shall be understood to mean such defects which result in symptoms including, but not limited to: driver’s side door does not lock or unlock; driver door lock latch internal signal circuit failure; replace door lock latch internal signal circuit; premature failure of door lock latch; Intermittent Door Locks Inoperative; #21-NA-183; second row middle seat does not lock in place; second row seat makes a rattle noise when going over bumps; second row seat loose; #21-NA-040; Squeak, Rattle or Creak Noise Originating from Second Row Seat Area; and any other concern identified in the repair history for the subject 2020 CHEVROLET TRAVERSE; Vehicle Identification Number 1GNERGKW1LJ305311.” (Mot., Lee Decl., Ex. 4, p. 3, ¶ 5.)

RPDs, Set One, No. 16 requests: “All DOCUMENTS, including but not limited to electronically stored information and electronic mails, concerning or relating to any internal analysis or investigation by YOU or on YOUR behalf regarding the SAFETY DEFECT in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE. [This request shall be interpreted to include, but not be limited to, any such investigation to determine the root cause of such SAFETY DEFECT, any such investigation to design a permanent repair procedure for such SAFETY DEFECT, any such investigation into the failure rates of parts associated with such SAFETY DEFECT, any cost analysis for implementing a proposed repair procedures, any savings analysis not implementing a proposed repair procedures, etc.]”

RPDs, Set One, No. 17 requests: “All DOCUMENTS, including but not limited to electronically stored information and electronic mails, concerning or relating to any communications YOU have had regarding SAFETY DEFECT in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE.”

RPDs, Set One, No. 18 requests: “All DOCUMENTS, including but not limited to electronically stored information and electronic mails, concerning or relating to any decision to issue any notices, letters, campaigns, warranty extensions, technical service bulletins and recalls concerning the SAFETY DEFECT in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE.”

RPDs, Set One, No. 19 requests: “All DOCUMENTS, including but not limited to electronically stored information and electronic mails, concerning customer complaints, claims, reported failures, and warranty claims related to SAFETY DEFECT, in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE, including but not limited to any databases in YOUR possession with information from dealers, service departments, parts departments, or warranty departments, and all documents concerning YOUR response to each complaint, claim or reported failure.”

RPDs, Set One, No. 20 requests: “All DOCUMENTS, including but not limited to electronically stored information and electronic mails, concerning failure rates of vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE as a result of SAFETY DEFECT.”

RPDs, Set One, No. 21 requests: “All DOCUMENTS, including but not limited to electronically stored information and electronic mails, concerning or relating to any fixes for SAFETY DEFECT in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE.”

(Mot., Lee Decl., Ex. 4, pp. 6-8.)

2. GM’s Objections

On November 11, 2023, Defendant GM served responses to RPDs, Set One, which are comprised of two groups: (1) objections coupled with statements indicating that GM will not produce responsive documents (RPDs, Set One, Nos. 7-8, 10, 12-17, 19-21, 23, 25-27, 29-30, 34-47, 49-57); and (2) objections coupled with unverified statements of compliance (RPDs, Set One, Nos. 1-6, 9, 11, 18, 22, 24, 31-33, 48).

(Mot., Lee Decl., Ex. 5, pp. 1-43.)

GM’s objections to RPDs, Set One, Nos. 16-21 fall into the following categories:

(1) Vagueness and ambiguity in terms;

(2) Requests improperly assume defect;

(3) Requests are overbroad, lack relevance, and ask for information that is not relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence because the sought-after evidence is not limited to the Subject Vehicle;

(4) Requests are unduly burdensome and oppressive based on the needs of the case because whether Plaintiffs are entitled to relief under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act is entirely unrelated and incommensurate to the scope and breadth of Plaintiffs’ requests;

(5) Requests involve confidential, proprietary, and trade secret information; and

(6) Information is protected by the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work-product doctrine.

(See Mot., Separate Statement, pp. 3-4, 11-12, 19-20, 27-28, 35-36, 43-44.)

3. Merits of Objections and Production

First, the Court determines that RPDs, Set One, Nos. 16-21 seek relevant information that is not overbroad. The Song-Beverly Act provides for civil penalties through two separate means: (1) where the manufacturer’s non-compliance with the Act is willful (i.e., intentional violation of the Act); and (2) penalties where the manufacturer violates its express warranty obligations. (Civ. Code, § 1794, subds. (c), (e)(1)-(5).) Here, the Complaint alleges safety defects, which are the subject of RPDs, Set One, Nos. 16-21. (Complaint, ¶ 11(c); Mot., Lee Decl., Ex. 4, pp. 3, 6-8.) The moving papers attach copies of Plaintiff’s authorized repair facility visits and two technical service bulletins, which show repairs or reference bulletin numbers that Plaintiffs defined as “safety defects” in RPDs, Set One. (Cf. Mot., Lee Decl., Ex. 4, p. 3, ¶ 5 [safety defects defined], with Mot., Lee Decl., Exs. 1 [copies of repair visit history] & 2-3 [technical service bulletins].) A finding of willful noncompliance with the SBA could arise from a determination that GM had knowledge of nonconformable defects in the safety system or based on information relating to the above service bulletins, which could have provided GM a basis for knowing that it could not conform the Vehicle as a result of the effect of these defects on the safety system or of a more global safety failure that affected multiple components in the Vehicle’s safety system. This makes the discovery relevant, even if it involves third party complaints. (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (c).)

Second, the Court briefly disposes of the vagueness and ambiguity objections based on the clarity of the definition of the safety system and the specific components alleged to have been affected here. (Compare Mot., Lee Decl., Exs. 1-3, with id. at Ex. 4, p. 3, ¶ 5.)

Third, the (1) undue burden and oppression, (2) attorney-client privilege and attorney work-product, and (3) assumes-a-defect objections are not availing. These objections are not more than cursorily elaborated in GM’s initial objections (see Mot., Separate Statement, pp. 3-4, 11-12, 19-20, 27-28, 35-36, 43-44), and are insufficiently elaborated in the separate statement (see Opp’n, Separate Statement, pp. 2-5, 7, 9-13, 14, 15, 16) and the opposition points and authorities (see Opp’n, pp. 3-8).

Fourth, the Court determines that sufficient meet and confer efforts preceded the filing of this motion. (Mot., Lee Decl., ¶¶ 17-27.) The fact that the parties strongly disagree as to the scope of discovery is not tantamount to a failure to meet and confer, nor is the failure to modify the production requests prior to filing a motion to compel that discovery. (See Opp’n, Kay Decl., ¶ 5.)

Last, the Court finds some merit to the trade secret arguments advanced by GM, though insufficient evidence has been filed in support of this argument. (Opp’n, pp. 7-8.)

As argued by GM, “the documents Plaintiffs seek may relate to and contain confidential communications between GM employees and GM’s suppliers and/or sub-suppliers concerning technical, mechanical, and commercial issues and analyses,” which is information “often used by GM when assessing root cause analyses and what actions, if any, may need to be taken to address a particular component- or service-related issue.” As a result, “these documents affect GM’s design decision, and its design decisions are how it separates itself from other competitors in the market. These analyses are commercially sensitive business information that GM does not make available to the general public, the disclosure of which would cause GM competitive harm.” (Opp’n, pp. 7-8.)

However, the Lu declaration that serves as the basis for the above quoted statements from GM is not a declaration that was drafted in support of this specific action or dispute, but rather, involves a declaration signed by Huizhen Lu in October 2018 in what appears to be a separate action. Indeed, the declaration was executed well before this action was filed on June 8, 2023. (Opp’n, Kay Decl., Ex. A.) The lack of a relationship between this action and the Lu declaration undermines its use in these proceedings.

 Moreover, the Court notes that the trade secret privilege does not protect information from discovery when protecting that information would work an injustice. (Evid. Code, § 1060; Hypertouch, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1527, 1554-1555; Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1389-1390 (Bridgestone/Firestone).) For example, the trade-secret privilege cannot be used to prevent disclosure of information to a plaintiff if the information is directly relevant to a material element of the plaintiff’s cause of action and nondisclosure of the information would put the plaintiff at an unfair disadvantage in the suit. (Bridgestone/Firestone, supra, at p. 1392.) The question of whether nondisclosure will work an injustice requires the court to balance the interests of the parties in light of the circumstances of the suit. (Id. at p. 1393.)

Additionally, a discovering party can argue that the information protected by the trade-secret privilege is discoverable based on necessity and fairness. The party must make a prima facie, particularized showing that (1) the information is relevant and necessary to a material element of its cause of action or defense and (2) the information is reasonably essential to a fair resolution of the suit. (Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1, 13, disapproved on other grounds, Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310; Bridgestone/Firestone, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 1393.)

Here, if GM had knowledge of nonconformable defects in the safety system used in cars of the same make, year, and model as the Vehicle purchased by Plaintiffs and nevertheless refused to replace or repurchase Plaintiffs’ Vehicle, it could be an injustice to prevent disclosure of such discovery based on the trade secret privilege, particularly where such discovery may be essential to a fair resolution of the suit’s willfulness component under the SBA.

The Court rejects the opposition arguments related to RPDs, Set One, No. 18. (Opp’n, pp. 6-7.) The request is facially broad, but whether the request is overbroad is a question framed by the needs of the litigation. As discussed above, information relating to GM’s knowledge of nonconformable defects in the Vehicle here—as gleaned from complaints or repair histories of other cars of the same make, year, and model—could assist a determination of SBA penalties, making the discovery relevant. RPDs, Set One, No. 18 fits within that type of information because it relates to GM’s knowledge of safety defects in cars like the Vehicle here and the use of that information in issuing technical service bulletins and other publications.

Last, to the extent that Defendant GM again raises privilege objections, e.g., trade secrets, the Court ORDERS GM to provide a privilege log in conformity with Hernandez v. Superior Court (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 285, 291, fn. 6—provided, of course, that no protective or other order is already in place to address privilege concerns in discovery.

Based on the above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion as to RPDs, Set One, Nos. 16-21, so long as the search for responsive documents is limited to the same source code and technical bulletins at issue in this case and without production of any attorney/client or work product privileged documents. 

III. Conclusion

Plaintiffs Elisa Morales Sanchez and Luis Aguilar Galvan’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents, Set One, is GRANTED.
The Court declines to sign the proposed order filed by Plaintiffs based on its overbroad requests for relief, e.g., striking or waiving Defendant General Motors LLC’s objections.
Defendant General Motors LLC is ORDERED to, within 30 days of this order, comply with production as directed above.