Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 23STCV15418, Date: 2024-02-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV15418    Hearing Date: February 9, 2024    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

Background

Pleadings

Plaintiff Apex Development, Inc. (Apex) sues Defendant The People of the State of California (the State), acting by and through the Department of Transportation (erroneously sued as “California Department of Transportation, a department of the State of California”) and Does 1 through 20 pursuant to a December 1, 2023 Complaint alleging claims of (1) Unjust Enrichment and (2) Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations.

The claims arise from the following allegations. Apex rents multiple airspace leases from the California Department of Transportation (CalTrans), which are typically adjacent to freeway on-ramps or under elevated portions of freeways, including a CalTrans lot located under the Interstate 10 freeway in Los Angeles, California at the intersection of 14th Street and Lawrence, Los Angeles 90021, subject an airspace lease [No. 07-LAX010-0012] (the Property). Apex alleged that it invested $139,899 to improve the Property, including by cleaning debris and other refuse from the Property, making repairs to the Property due to CalTrans freeway retrofitting, making safety repairs to paving and crack filler on the Property, and making repairs to the fence on the Property. Apex reported these issues to CalTrans prior to making repairs, but CalTrans failed to act and offered no contribution toward possible expenses, forcing Apex to incur the above costs. Apex later requested restitution for its expenses maintaining the Property, which CalTrans rejected. As a result, in May 2023, Apex filed a government claim. Shortly prior to this, in April 2023, as alleged in the complaint, a CalTrans employee named “Daryll” entered the Property without Apex’s permission and directed Apex’s tenants not to pay rent to Apex. Apex complained of Darryll’s actions with CalTrans, which dismissed Apex’s claims and continued to send Darryll and other employees to enter the Property without notifying Apex and instructing Apex’s tenants to not pay rent to Apex.

Motion Before the Court

On December 1, 2023, the State filed a demurrer to the first and second causes of action based on sufficiency of pleading.

On February 1, 2023, the State filed a notice of no opposition by Plaintiff Apex.

The State’s demurrer is now before the Court.

Request for Judicial Notice

The Court declines to take judicial notice of the lease between the parties as it is not material to the disposition of the Court. (See Demurrer, RJN.)

Demurrer

Legal Standard

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747; see Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) This device can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) To sufficiently allege a cause of action, a complaint must allege all the ultimate facts—that is, the facts needed to establish each element of the cause of action pleaded. (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 212, superseded by statute as stated in Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235, 242.) Thus, “[t]o survive a [general] demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) In testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-67.) A demurrer, however, “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228, disapproved on other grounds, Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1162.) The face of the complaint includes exhibits attached to the complaint. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.) If facts appearing in the exhibits contradict those alleged, the facts in the exhibits take precedence. (Holland v. Morse Diesel Intern., Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1447, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in White v. Cridlebaugh (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 506, 521.)

Demurrer, Complaint, First and Second Causes of Action, Unjust Enrichment and Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations: SUSTAINED, with leave to amend.

After review, the Court SUSTAINS the State’s demurrer.

The Court initially notes that the demurrer was served on Plaintiff Apex’s counsel via email to the same email address appearing in the Complaint. (Demurrer, Proof of Service [service by email to mdattaray@dattaraylaw.com]; cf. Complaint, p. 1 [caption page containing same email address for Plaintiff’s counsel].)

Despite service, no opposition has been filed.

Moving to the merits, the Court finds that as to both causes of action, the Complaint fails to cite a statute permitting Apex to sue a public entity for unjust enrichment or intentional interference with contractual relations. (See Demurrer, pp. 4-5, 7-8.) “Except as otherwise provided by statute,” “[a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” (Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a).) A review of the Complaint shows that no statute is referenced. Rather, the two counts stated in the Complaint are tort claims—and unjust enrichment is not a claim at all, as discussed below. It therefore follows that the Complaint’s claims are not sufficiently stated. This is particularly the case where “to state a cause of action against a public entity, every fact material to the existence of its statutory liability must be pleaded with particularity” (Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 795, citations omitted), including the existence of a statutory duty, where “[d]uty cannot be alleged simply by stating ‘defendant had a duty under the law’; that is a conclusion of law, not an allegation of fact” (Searcey v. Hemet Unified School Dist. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792, 902, citations omitted).

The State’s demurrer is thus SUSTAINED.

The Court gives Plaintiff Apex leave to amend to provide Plaintiff an opportunity to plead the statutory bases, such as they exist, for the claims stated against the State.

Last, the Court notes that insofar as an amended pleading is filed, “[t]here is no cause of action in California labeled ‘unjust enrichment.’” (City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 458, 477-478, citations omitted.) “‘Unjust enrichment is [simply] synonymous with restitution. [Citation.]’” (Levine v. Blue Shield of California (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1138, citation omitted.) Therefore, to the extent there is an amended pleading, a restitution claim may be stated in place of the unjust enrichment claim, but only if such claim can plead a statutory basis in order to avoid the State’s section 815 argument, above. 

Conclusion

Defendant The People of the State of California, acting by and through the Department of Transportation’s Demurrer to Complaint is SUSTAINED, with leave to amend.

Plaintiff Apex Development, Inc. SHALL file an amended pleading within 10 days of this order.

Failure to file an amended pleading within 10 days may result in dismissal of the cause by way of ex parte application. (Code Civ. Proc. § 581(f)(2); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1320(h).)