Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 23STCV23749, Date: 2024-11-07 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 40 - JUDGE ANNE RICHARDSON - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
The Court issues tentative rulings on certain motions.The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) email Dept 40 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (smcdept40@lacourt.org) with a copy to the other party(ies) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no email is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. 

Case Number: 23STCV23749    Hearing Date: November 7, 2024    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

I. Background

A. Pleadings

Plaintiff Mecca Morgan (Morgan) sues Defendants Alpha Beta Company dba Ralphs (ABC), the Kroger Company (Kroger), Dan Cronin (Cronin), and Does 1 through 10 pursuant to a January 31, 2024, First Amended Complaint (FAC) alleging claims of: (1) Discrimination; (2) Battery; (3) Negligent Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (4) Violation of California Civil Code Section 52.1, Interference with the Exercise of Civil Rights.

The claims arise from the following allegations. While visiting a Ralphs store as a customer, Plaintiff Mecca Morgan, an African American woman, was discriminated against by store employees. Specifically, Plaintiff Morgan was stopped inside the store by a Ralphs employee and then a security guard that accused Plaintiff of stealing, demanding proof of purchase. Plaintiff Morgan confirmed that she had a receipt but protested that she was not going to let the employees violate her rights, recording the incident as it occurred. Plaintiff Morgan attempted several times to use an exit to leave the store but had her path blocked by the store’s security guard. As a result, Plaintiff Morgan walked to a different exit in the store to leave the premises. However, as Plaintiff attempted to exit the store, she was attacked by the store manager, Ralph Cronin. The pleadings do not describe the alleged battery other than to generally describe offensive and unwelcome touching. These experiences have resulted in economic and non-economic damages, including affecting Plaintiff’s home broker/agent profession and income.

B. Motion Before the Court

On June 21, 2024, ABC filed the instant motion to strike Morgan’s claims for punitive damages as set forth in the FAC.

On July 8, 2024, Morgan opposed the motion.

On October 31, 2024, ABC replied.

On November 4, 2024, Morgan filed a reply to ABC’s reply.

II. Motion

A. Legal Standard

The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper, (a) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading, or (b) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subds. (a), (b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].)

For the purposes of a motion to strike pursuant to Sections 435 to 437 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the term “pleading” generally means a demurrer, answer, complaint, or cross-complaint, (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (a)), and an immaterial allegation or irrelevant matter in a pleading entails (1) an allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense, (2) an allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense, or (3) a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subds. (b)(1)-(3), (c)).

B. Analysis

As an initial matter, although at times the motion appears to challenge all the claims as to all defendants, in the conclusion, ABC states that they seek to strike such claims “as against Ralphs.” (Mot., compare pp. 1-3 with p. 12.) Moreover, although the Motion also raises a challenge to the FAC’s prayer for relief of statutory damages under Civil Code section 52 (Mot., p. 5), that issue is not raised in the Notice, is never argued, and does not appear in the conclusion. The Court will construe the motion as relating to the striking of punitive damages as to the corporate defendant only.

“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a); College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725 (College Hospital) [explaining amendments requiring “despicable” conduct for malice and oppression].) 

Under the Civil Code, “[a]n employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).) Moreover, “corporate employers[] […] may not be liable for punitive damages unless ‘the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice [is] on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.’ [Citation.]” (White v. Ultramar (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 566, fn. 1.) The statute was amended in 1980 to include the limitations in subdivision (b). (Ibid.) 

A motion to strike is properly granted when a complaint fails to allege facts to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages under the standards of the statute. (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) Alleging an intentional tort alone is not enough to support a claim for punitive damages, nor are conclusory allegations that merely parrot the language of the statute. (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166; Blegen v. Superior Court (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 959, 963.) 

ABC argues that Morgan has not alleged facts sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages because the FAC does not establish that Ralphs’ actions constituted oppression, fraud or malice. (Mot. pp. 7:19-10:4.) Further, ABC argues that Morgan has shown neither that Ralphs authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct, nor that Cronin had substantial discretionary authority over corporate policy such that his, or his subordinates’ actions could be imputed to ABC (Mot. pp. 10:5-11:17; See Wilson v. Southern California Edison Co. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 123, 164.)

In opposition, Morgan argues that ABC ratified Cronin’s conduct in that Cronin’s “reprehensible actions and decisions to use physical violence against the Plaintiff reflected the “state of mind” of the Corporation as he exercised substantial authority to protect its business by using force against [Morgan]…” (Opp. p. 5: 17-19.)  Morgan generally reasserts the claims made in the FAC such as that the “Defendants especially [sic] oppressive, malicious and intentional misconduct was willful with a total disregard for the safety and rights of [Morgan], therefore giving rise to a claim for punitive damages. Defendants intentionally chose to act with oppression, malice, recklessness, wickedness, fraud and discrimination which displayed their evil intent.” (Opp. p. 4:18-22.) The opposition otherwise summarizes and cites the Complaint at paragraphs 3-4, 8-9, 11-13, and 32 to identify the allegations supporting punitive damages. (Opp. pp. 4-9.)

In reply, ABC argues that Cronin, as an individual store manager, does not qualify as a managing agent under Code of Civil Procedure section 3294 subdivision (b) because he does not have discretional authority to affect corporate policy and the FAC does not show facts that suggest otherwise. (Reply p. 4:16-21.)

Here, the FAC insufficiently alleges oppression, fraud, or malice required to hold a corporate employer liable for punitive damages. The FAC alleges that Morgan was “accosted” by a store employee and a security guard. (Compl., p. 3, ¶ 8.) The Complaint describes that Morgan was “bumped up against” by the security guard which impeded her ability to move freely. (Compl. p. 6, ¶ 19.) The FAC further alleges that Morgan was “blindsided and aggressively attacked by Ralphs store manager, Dan Cronin.” (Compl., p. 6, ¶ 19.) The Complaint describes that Cronin “brought himself into offensive and unwelcome contact with [Morgan].” The facts as alleged in the FAC do not provide sufficient factual support for punitive damages as to Ralphs because they do not show malice, fraud or oppression on the part of the corporate defendant. The FAC does not allege that ABC had prior knowledge that any employee was unfit, or that it authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct. Further, even if the actions of the ABC employees rise to oppressive or malicious conduct, there is no evidence that any of the accused employees qualify as managing agents under Code of Civil Procedure section 3294 subdivision (b).
            Thus, the motion to strike is GRANTED, as to Ralphs, with leave to amend. 

III. Conclusion

Defendant Alpha Beta Company’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is GRANTED as to Ralphs only.

Plaintiff may amend her complaint only with respect to this issue within 14 days. (Any additional amendment would require a motion for leave to amend.)