Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 23STCV23851, Date: 2024-04-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV23851    Hearing Date: April 10, 2024    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

 

STEPHANIE RAMIREZ, an individual,

                        Plaintiff,

            v.

GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, A Delaware Limited Liability Company; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive,

                        Defendants.

 Case No.:          23STCV23851

 Hearing Date:   4/10/24

 Trial Date:        2/25/25

 [TENTATIVE] RULING RE:

Plaintiff Stephanie Ramirez’s Motion to Compel the Deposition of Defendant General, LLC’s Person(s) Most Knowledgeable, with Production of Documents.

 

I. Background

A. Pleadings

Plaintiff Stephanie Ramirez sues Defendants General Motors, LLC and Does 1 through 20 pursuant to an October 2, 2023, Complaint alleging claims of (1) Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability under The Song-Beverly Act and (2) Breach of Express Warranty under The Song-Beverly Act.

The claims arise from allegations that on March 28, 2023, Plaintiff purchased a 2023 Chevrolet Traverse (Subject Vehicle or Vehicle), pursuant to which Plaintiff received written and other express and implied warranties from GM relating to the condition and fitness of the Vehicle, with GM and its authorized repair facilities failing to conform defects that arose in the Vehicle during the warranty period back to warranty after a reasonable number of attempts.

B. Relevant Procedural History

On November 27, 2023, Plaintiff Ramirez served a notice of deposition of GM’s person most knowledgeable (PMQ for person most qualified), with production of documents, on GM. The deposition notice contains 14 categories of examination and nine requests for production of documents.

On December 7, 2024, GM served responses to Plaintiff’s November 27th PMQ deposition notice, which primarily consisted of objections but agreed to produce a PMQ for nine categories of examination, as well as some documents.

On December 11, 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel emailed GM’s counsel a meet and confer letter that cites authority in support of the PMQ deposition, with production of documents, and requested dates for the PMQ deposition to take place within seven days of the date of the meet and confer letter.

On December 22, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel left GM’s counsel a voicemail requesting available dates for a PMQ deposition.

Neither party has represented communications between the parties between December 22, 2023, and February 15, 2024.

C. Motion Before the Court

On February 15, 2024, Plaintiff Ramirez filed a motion to compel the deposition of GM’s PMQ, with production of documents. No monetary sanctions are requested.

On March 27, 2024, GM filed an opposition to Ramirez’s motion.

On April 3, 2024, Plaintiff Ramirez filed a reply to GM’s opposition.

Plaintiff Ramirez’s motion is now before the Court.

 

II. Motion to Compel Deposition Attendance and Production of Documents: GRANTED.

A. Legal Standard

If, [1] after service of a deposition notice, [2] a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person designated by an organization that is a party under Section 2025.230, [3] without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, [4] fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, [5] the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent’s attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (a) [Arabic numerals added for clarity].)

If the deponent named is not a natural person, the deposition notice shall describe with reasonable particularity the matters on which examination is requested. In that event, the deponent shall designate and produce at the deposition those of its officers, directors, managing agents, employees, or agents who are most qualified to testify on its behalf as to those matters to the extent of any information known or reasonably available to the deponent. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.230.)

The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (b)(1).)

The motion shall also be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040, or, when the deponent fails to attend the deposition and produce the documents, electronically stored information, or things described in the deposition notice, by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (b)(2).)

If the proposed deponent made some response to the deposition notice, then a separate statement must accompany any motion to compel deposition attendance or production. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345, subd. (b).)

B. Analysis

1. Procedural Requirements

a. Separate Statement [Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345]

Here, the moving papers attach a separate statement that addresses all fourteen categories of examination and nine requests for production. (Mot., Separate Statement, pp. 2-34.)

The opposition attaches a responsive separate statement that similarly addresses all fourteen categories of examination and nine requests for production. (Opp’n, Separate Statement, pp. 2-30.)

This statutory requirement is therefore satisfied. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345.)

b. Meet and Confer or Follow Up [Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (b)(2)]

Here, the moving party—Plaintiff Ramirez—has filed evidence showing that GM objected to some categories of examination and requests for production but not others, with that assent at times conditioned on more information from Plaintiff. Plaintiff Ramirez has also shown that her counsel sent a meet and confer letter to GM’s counsel on December 11, 2023, and further left GM’s counsel a meet and confer voice mail on December 22, 2023, but that GM’s counsel has not met and conferred regarding Plaintiff’s arguments. (Mot., Lara Decl., ¶¶ 7-11, Exs. 2-3.) GM’s opposition attaches a declaration from counsel that confirms the moving papers’ representation of the facts—including by failing to dispute GM’s counsel’s failure to responsively meet and confer with Plaintiff’s counsel. (Opp’n, Pappas Decl., ¶¶ 3-6, Es. 2-3.)

Under these circumstances, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has met the statutory requirement here. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (b)(2).)

2. Substantive Requirements

a. Standing for Motion [Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (a)]

Here, Plaintiff Ramirez shows that [1] on November 27, 2023, Plaintiff served [2] a deposition notice on GM for a deposition of GM’s PMQ as to 14 categories of examination and nine requests for production, to take place on December 11, 2023, and that [4] the GM PMQ failed to appear for the noticed December 11, 2023, deposition. (Mot., Lara Decl., ¶¶ 4-11, Exs. 1-3.)

The remaining standing question for standing pursuant to this statutory section is whether a proper objection was stated to the categories of examination and production requests.

i. Categories of Examination and Production Requests

Here, the categories of examination (COE) and production requests (RPD) involve:

(1) Information directly related to the Subject Vehicle, including (a) repairs to the Subject Vehicle, e.g., diagnostic reports (COE No. 1; RPD Nos. 1-2), (b) the reasons for Defendants’ failure to repurchase the Vehicle (COE No. 7; RPD No. 5), and (c) warranties applicable to the Subject Vehicle (COE No. 9-10; RPD No. 2);

(2) Technical service bulletins (TSBs) applicable to the Subject Vehicle, the reasons for the issuance of those TSBs, and why those TSBs were issued (COE Nos. 2-4; RPD No. 3);

(3) Recalls applicable to the Subject Vehicle and reasons for why those recalls were issued (COE Nos. 5-6; RPD No. 4);

(4) GM’s general policies and procedures, e.g., relating to (a) investigation whether to repurchase or replace a vehicle under “California Lemon Law” (COE No. 8; RPD No. 6) and (b) the repair procedures and (c) diagnostic procedures followed while diagnosing defects in the Subject Vehicle (COE Nos. 11-12; RPD Nos. 7-8);

(5)(a) All communications regarding “TAC Case No. 9-10443305031” (COE No. 13) and (b) information relating to how a TAC is issued (COE No. 14; RPD No. 9).

(Mot., Lara Decl., Ex. 1; Mot., Separate Statement, pp. 2-34.)

ii. Initial Objections by GM

GM responded to these requests with:

(1) 11 general objections;

(2) Specific objections to certain categories of examination and production requests, with limited agreement as to nine of the categories of examination and parts of the nine production requests (Mot., Lara Decl., Ex. 2, Response to COE Nos. 1-4, 7-8, 11-14 & RPD Nos. 1-3, 5-9), with some of those requests conditioned on greater clarity as to the subject matter of the category of examination (Mot., Lara Decl., Ex. 2, Response to COE Nos. 3-4 & RPD No. 3) or on limitations to the scope of the category of examination (Mot., Lara Decl., Ex. 2, Response to COE No. 9, 11-14; 5-9);

(3) A statement indicating the existence of no relevant information in certain areas (Mot., Lara Decl., Ex. B, Response to COE Nos. 5-6 & RPD No. 4 [no recalls were ever issued for the Subject Vehicle, as confirmed by a GM record]);

(4) Agreement to produce a witness relating to warranties that were in place at the time of purchase (Mot., Lara Decl., Ex. B, Response to COE No 10 & RPD No. 1.)

iii. Parties Arguments’

The moving papers cite to the separate statement for reasons why the 14 categories of examination and nine production requests are relevant and why the objections to this discovery are not warranted.

The separate statement, in turn, offers various—and often overlapping—reasons for the relevancy of the sought discovery and the non-applicability of the stated objections to the PMQ deposition, with production requests.

The opposition argues that an insufficient meet and confer process preceded this motion and insufficient good cause exists for document production. The opposition otherwise elaborates its argument for lack of good cause and, for the first time raises the trade secret privilege objection, which the Court notes appears nowhere in GM’s December 7, 2023, objections. (See Mot., Lara Decl., Ex. 2, pp. 1-14.)

GM’s separate statement offers individualized but sometimes overlapping arguments regarding the categories of examination while offering a single argument against any production. These objections mostly center on lack of relevance between matters that go beyond the repair history and defects in the Subject Vehicle alone, the proper scope of discovery, vagueness, and burden of discovery on GM, among others.

In reply, Plaintiff argues in favor of the relevance of the sought-after discovery by citing Santana v. FCA US LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334 for case law permitting discovery of the condition of other vehicles with the same defective component. Plaintiff also argues that discovery is broad in California, and here, the requested evidence relates to whether Plaintiff’s repurchase request was properly denied. Plaintiff last argues that GM has failed to substantiate its objections and otherwise failed to move for a protective order, and it is GM, not Plaintiff, that has refused to meet and confer in good faith.

iv. Court’s Determination

The Court finds in favor of Plaintiff Ramirez.

I. Relevance and Limitations

First, the information here is relevant as it relates to (1) rear-view mirror defects raised in the Complaint and (2) defects, nonconformities, etc. in other components of the Subject Vehicle, as shown in GM’s or its authorized repair facilities’ documents related to the Subject Vehicle purchased by Plaintiff Ramirez.

Relevant evidence is defined by the Evidence Code as evidence that has “any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” (Evid. Code, § 210.) The Complaint only explicitly identifies a single issue that arose in the Vehicle’s warranty period: “defects, malfunctions, misadjustments, and/or nonconformities related to the rear-view mirror camera display doing blue on three (3) separate occasions.” (Complaint, ¶ 11.) The Complaint otherwise speaks of general defects and nonconformities without identifying what those defects or nonconformities were. (Complaint, ¶¶ 7-8, 12-13, 18, 27.)

Thus, the Court determines that within the context of the pleadings and the repair history for the Subject Vehicle, the universe of relevant evidence is limited to defects or nonconformities relating to the “rear-view camera display” or other defects or nonconformities that appear in the Vehicle’s service repair history.

Moreover, information relating to these defects and nonconformities is relevant, even if that information involves defects in the same components as used in other vehicles of the same year, make, and model. Such evidence can tend to prove or disprove knowledge of a vehicle component that was used not only in the Subject Vehicle but in other GM vehicles, e.g., show that GM’s relevant decisionmakers had knowledge of a nonconformable defect in a component used in the Subject Vehicle through use and problems with the same component in other vehicles of the same year, make, and model.

II. Merit of Objections

Second, the Court finds insufficient merit to the objections raised by Defendants.

The general objection for unilateral setting of a deposition is not a valid wholesale objection to a deposition or production in relation to it. That objection merely relates, at most, to a civility question addressed by this Court’s Local Rules, where “[i]n scheduling depositions, reasonable consideration should be given to accommodating schedules o[f] opposing counsel and of the deponent, where it is possible to do so without prejudicing the client’s rights.” (Sup. Ct., Los Angeles Cty. Loc. R., appen, § 3.A., subd. (e)(2).)

The general objection relating to scope of discovery is undercut by the relevance discussion above.

The general objections based on compound form, overbreadth, vagueness, and lack of relevance are not convincing. A plain reading of the categories of examination and production requests shows their clarity, as summarized above in Section II.B.2.b.i.

The general objections based on the attorney-client and work product privileges are insufficiently elaborated and/or supported by the opposition. The privilege objections are facially irrelevant where the information sought by Plaintiffs relates to the defects in Vehicles deriving from diagnostic and other information not pertinent to the work of an attorney. Moreover, there is no privilege log attached to the objections. (Mot., Lara Decl., Ex. B.) Neither does a protective order appear in the record, nor has GM requested one. The privilege is thus insufficiently raised though the Court notes that no waiver has occurred; instead, the privilege was simply insufficiently elaborated.

The general objection based on undue burden also fails. For example, the oppositions points and authorities argue that the information relating to COE Nos. 11-12 and RPD Nos. 7-8 may relate to privileged, confidential, proprietary, and trade secret information. (Opp’n, p. 8.) However, these grounds for objecting to discovery are not more greatly elaborated. The trade secret objection was not raised in the original objections to the PMQ deposition notice, foreclosing its use now. (Mot., Lara Decl., Ex. 2.) Elsewhere, the opposition points and authorities only cursorily argue burden. (Opp’n, pp. 5-7.) As for the opposition separate statement, the Court notes that GM fails to elaborate on undue burden other than arguing that Plaintiff, in seeking the discovery not at issue, seeks to create a burden on GM to locate responsive information possibly from all other the globe, which would not be fair based on the burden imposed on GM. (See, e.g., Opp’n, Separate Statement.) However, such an argument fails to recognize that if the GM decisionmakers that refused to replace or repurchase the Subject Vehicle knew or should have been of nonconformable defects in the components of the Subject Vehicle, then GM could be held liable for breach of various warranties and willful noncompliance with the Song Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Neither does GM’s separate statement elaborate on a less burdensome alternative of discovery or discuss a balancing of the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation to the needs of the case. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2019.030, subds. (a)(1)-(2).)

The general objections of speculation, third party information, open-ended requests, assumption of facts not in evidence, and insufficient time to respond to the requests are also rejected. As to open-endedness, the Court notes that the purchase of the Vehicle in 2023 imposes a general timeframe for the relevant discovery. And even if components that were used in a 2023 vehicle were created by GM long before 2023, GM’s knowledge as to the quality and condition of that component is relevant to this action. As far as time to respond, the Court notes that any Court order can be conditioned on sufficient time to respond.

The specific objections to the categories of examination and production requests have been discussed above and are rejected on those grounds. (See Mot., Lara Decl., Ex. 2, pp. 3-14.)

There are thus no valid objections to the GM PMQ deposition notice, with production requests, and good cause exists for such a deposition and production.

The Court also notes that the meet and confer objection raised in the opposition has no merit. GM’s own counsel’s declaration shows that GM failed to respond to Plaintiff’s counsel’s correspondence, which highlighted Plaintiff’s position for the merit of the scope of the GM PMQ deposition notice. (Opp’n, Pappas Decl., ¶¶ 2-6.)

b. Good Cause for Production [Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (b)(1)]

The Court adopts its good cause discussion in Section II.B.2.a.iv. above to determine that Plaintiff has shown good cause in support of the nine production requests in the November 27, 2023, deposition notice.

3. Final Determination

Plaintiff Ramirez’s motion is procedurally and substantively meritorious and is thus GRANTED.

The Court notes that the parties may consider entering a protective order for the discovery at issue here.

III. Conclusion

Plaintiff Stephanie Ramirez’s Motion to Compel the Deposition of Defendant General, LLC’s Person(s) Most Knowledgeable, with Production of Documents is GRANTED. The Deposition with production of documents should be scheduled within the next 45 days or as otherwise mutually agreed in writing.