Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 23STCV23851, Date: 2024-04-10 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV23851 Hearing Date: April 10, 2024 Dept: 40
Superior
Court of California
County
of Los Angeles
Department 40
|
STEPHANIE RAMIREZ, an individual, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, A Delaware Limited Liability Company; and
DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, Defendants. |
Case No.: 23STCV23851 Hearing Date: 4/10/24 Trial Date: 2/25/25 [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Plaintiff
Stephanie Ramirez’s Motion to Compel the Deposition of Defendant General,
LLC’s Person(s) Most Knowledgeable, with Production of Documents. |
I. Background
A. Pleadings
Plaintiff Stephanie
Ramirez sues Defendants General Motors, LLC and Does 1 through 20 pursuant to
an October 2, 2023, Complaint alleging claims of (1) Breach of Implied Warranty
of Merchantability under The Song-Beverly Act and (2) Breach of Express Warranty
under The Song-Beverly Act.
The claims arise from
allegations that on March 28, 2023, Plaintiff purchased a 2023 Chevrolet
Traverse (Subject Vehicle or Vehicle), pursuant to which Plaintiff received
written and other express and implied warranties from GM relating to the
condition and fitness of the Vehicle, with GM and its authorized repair
facilities failing to conform defects that arose in the Vehicle during the
warranty period back to warranty after a reasonable number of attempts.
B. Relevant
Procedural History
On November 27, 2023,
Plaintiff Ramirez served a notice of deposition of GM’s person most
knowledgeable (PMQ for person most qualified), with production of documents, on
GM. The deposition notice contains 14 categories of examination and nine
requests for production of documents.
On December 7, 2024, GM
served responses to Plaintiff’s November 27th PMQ deposition notice, which
primarily consisted of objections but agreed to produce a PMQ for nine
categories of examination, as well as some documents.
On December 11, 2024,
Plaintiff’s counsel emailed GM’s counsel a meet and confer letter that cites
authority in support of the PMQ deposition, with production of documents, and requested
dates for the PMQ deposition to take place within seven days of the date of the
meet and confer letter.
On December 22, 2023,
Plaintiff’s counsel left GM’s counsel a voicemail requesting available dates
for a PMQ deposition.
Neither party has
represented communications between the parties between December 22, 2023, and
February 15, 2024.
C. Motion Before the
Court
On February 15, 2024,
Plaintiff Ramirez filed a motion to compel the deposition of GM’s PMQ, with
production of documents. No monetary sanctions are requested.
On March 27, 2024, GM
filed an opposition to Ramirez’s motion.
On April 3, 2024,
Plaintiff Ramirez filed a reply to GM’s opposition.
Plaintiff Ramirez’s
motion is now before the Court.
II. Motion to Compel Deposition
Attendance and Production of Documents: GRANTED.
A.
Legal Standard
If,
[1] after service of a deposition notice, [2] a party to the action or an
officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person
designated by an organization that is a party under Section 2025.230, [3]
without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, [4] fails to
appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any
document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the
deposition notice, [5] the party giving the notice may move for an order
compelling the deponent’s attendance and testimony, and the production for
inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible
thing described in the deposition notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd.
(a) [Arabic numerals added for clarity].)
If
the deponent named is not a natural person, the deposition notice shall
describe with reasonable particularity the matters on which examination is
requested. In that event, the deponent shall designate and produce at the
deposition those of its officers, directors, managing agents, employees, or
agents who are most qualified to testify on its behalf as to those matters to
the extent of any information known or reasonably available to the deponent.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.230.)
The
motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the
production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information,
or tangible thing described in the deposition notice. (Code Civ. Proc., §
2025.450, subd. (b)(1).)
The
motion shall also be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section
2016.040, or, when the deponent fails to attend the deposition and produce the
documents, electronically stored information, or things described in the
deposition notice, by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted
the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450,
subd. (b)(2).)
If
the proposed deponent made some response to the deposition notice, then a
separate statement must accompany any motion to compel deposition attendance or
production. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345, subd. (b).)
B.
Analysis
1. Procedural Requirements
a. Separate
Statement [Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345]
Here, the moving papers attach a
separate statement that addresses all fourteen categories of examination and
nine requests for production. (Mot., Separate Statement, pp. 2-34.)
The opposition attaches a
responsive separate statement that similarly addresses all fourteen categories
of examination and nine requests for production. (Opp’n, Separate Statement,
pp. 2-30.)
This statutory requirement is
therefore satisfied. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345.)
b. Meet
and Confer or Follow Up [Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (b)(2)]
Here, the moving party—Plaintiff
Ramirez—has filed evidence showing that GM objected to some categories of
examination and requests for production but not others, with that assent at
times conditioned on more information from Plaintiff. Plaintiff Ramirez has
also shown that her counsel sent a meet and confer letter to GM’s counsel on
December 11, 2023, and further left GM’s counsel a meet and confer voice mail
on December 22, 2023, but that GM’s counsel has not met and conferred regarding
Plaintiff’s arguments. (Mot., Lara Decl., ¶¶ 7-11, Exs. 2-3.) GM’s opposition
attaches a declaration from counsel that confirms the moving papers’
representation of the facts—including by failing to dispute GM’s counsel’s
failure to responsively meet and confer with Plaintiff’s counsel. (Opp’n,
Pappas Decl., ¶¶ 3-6, Es. 2-3.)
Under these circumstances, the
Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has met the statutory requirement here. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (b)(2).)
2. Substantive
Requirements
a. Standing
for Motion [Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (a)]
Here, Plaintiff Ramirez shows that
[1] on November 27, 2023, Plaintiff served [2] a deposition notice on GM for a
deposition of GM’s PMQ as to 14 categories of examination and nine requests for
production, to take place on December 11, 2023, and that [4] the GM PMQ failed
to appear for the noticed December 11, 2023, deposition. (Mot., Lara Decl., ¶¶
4-11, Exs. 1-3.)
The remaining standing question for
standing pursuant to this statutory section is whether a proper objection was
stated to the categories of examination and production requests.
i. Categories
of Examination and Production Requests
Here, the categories of examination
(COE) and production requests (RPD) involve:
(1) Information directly related to
the Subject Vehicle, including (a) repairs to the Subject Vehicle, e.g.,
diagnostic reports (COE No. 1; RPD Nos. 1-2), (b) the reasons for Defendants’
failure to repurchase the Vehicle (COE No. 7; RPD No. 5), and (c) warranties
applicable to the Subject Vehicle (COE No. 9-10; RPD No. 2);
(2) Technical service bulletins
(TSBs) applicable to the Subject Vehicle, the reasons for the issuance of those
TSBs, and why those TSBs were issued (COE Nos. 2-4; RPD No. 3);
(3) Recalls applicable to the
Subject Vehicle and reasons for why those recalls were issued (COE Nos. 5-6;
RPD No. 4);
(4) GM’s general policies and
procedures, e.g., relating to (a) investigation whether to repurchase or
replace a vehicle under “California Lemon Law” (COE No. 8; RPD No. 6) and (b)
the repair procedures and (c) diagnostic procedures followed while diagnosing
defects in the Subject Vehicle (COE Nos. 11-12; RPD Nos. 7-8);
(5)(a) All communications regarding
“TAC Case No. 9-10443305031” (COE No. 13) and (b) information relating to how a
TAC is issued (COE No. 14; RPD No. 9).
(Mot., Lara Decl., Ex. 1; Mot.,
Separate Statement, pp. 2-34.)
ii. Initial
Objections by GM
GM responded to these requests with:
(1) 11 general objections;
(2) Specific objections to certain categories
of examination and production requests, with limited agreement as to nine of
the categories of examination and parts of the nine production requests (Mot.,
Lara Decl., Ex. 2, Response to COE Nos. 1-4, 7-8, 11-14 & RPD Nos. 1-3, 5-9),
with some of those requests conditioned on greater clarity as to the subject
matter of the category of examination (Mot., Lara Decl., Ex. 2, Response to COE
Nos. 3-4 & RPD No. 3) or on limitations to the scope of the category of
examination (Mot., Lara Decl., Ex. 2, Response to COE No. 9, 11-14; 5-9);
(3) A statement indicating the
existence of no relevant information in certain areas (Mot., Lara Decl., Ex. B,
Response to COE Nos. 5-6 & RPD No. 4 [no recalls were ever issued for the
Subject Vehicle, as confirmed by a GM record]);
(4) Agreement to produce a witness
relating to warranties that were in place at the time of purchase (Mot., Lara
Decl., Ex. B, Response to COE No 10 & RPD No. 1.)
iii. Parties
Arguments’
The moving papers cite to the
separate statement for reasons why the 14 categories of examination and nine
production requests are relevant and why the objections to this discovery are
not warranted.
The separate statement, in turn,
offers various—and often overlapping—reasons for the relevancy of the sought
discovery and the non-applicability of the stated objections to the PMQ
deposition, with production requests.
The opposition argues that an
insufficient meet and confer process preceded this motion and insufficient good
cause exists for document production. The opposition otherwise elaborates its
argument for lack of good cause and, for the first time raises the trade secret
privilege objection, which the Court notes appears nowhere in GM’s December 7,
2023, objections. (See Mot., Lara Decl., Ex. 2, pp. 1-14.)
GM’s separate statement offers
individualized but sometimes overlapping arguments regarding the categories of
examination while offering a single argument against any production. These
objections mostly center on lack of relevance between matters that go beyond
the repair history and defects in the Subject Vehicle alone, the proper scope
of discovery, vagueness, and burden of discovery on GM, among others.
In reply, Plaintiff argues in favor
of the relevance of the sought-after discovery by citing Santana v. FCA US
LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334 for case law permitting discovery of the
condition of other vehicles with the same defective component. Plaintiff also
argues that discovery is broad in California, and here, the requested evidence
relates to whether Plaintiff’s repurchase request was properly denied.
Plaintiff last argues that GM has failed to substantiate its objections and
otherwise failed to move for a protective order, and it is GM, not Plaintiff,
that has refused to meet and confer in good faith.
iv. Court’s
Determination
The Court finds in favor of
Plaintiff Ramirez.
I. Relevance
and Limitations
First, the information here is
relevant as it relates to (1) rear-view mirror defects raised in the Complaint
and (2) defects, nonconformities, etc. in other components of the Subject
Vehicle, as shown in GM’s or its authorized repair facilities’ documents
related to the Subject Vehicle purchased by Plaintiff Ramirez.
Relevant evidence is defined by the
Evidence Code as evidence that has “any tendency in reason to prove or disprove
any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.”
(Evid. Code, § 210.) The Complaint only explicitly identifies a single issue
that arose in the Vehicle’s warranty period: “defects, malfunctions,
misadjustments, and/or nonconformities related to the rear-view mirror camera
display doing blue on three (3) separate occasions.” (Complaint, ¶ 11.) The
Complaint otherwise speaks of general defects and nonconformities without identifying
what those defects or nonconformities were. (Complaint, ¶¶ 7-8, 12-13, 18, 27.)
Thus, the Court determines that
within the context of the pleadings and the repair history for the Subject
Vehicle, the universe of relevant evidence is limited to defects or
nonconformities relating to the “rear-view camera display” or other defects or
nonconformities that appear in the Vehicle’s service repair history.
Moreover, information relating to
these defects and nonconformities is relevant, even if that information
involves defects in the same components as used in other vehicles of the same
year, make, and model. Such evidence can tend to prove or disprove knowledge of
a vehicle component that was used not only in the Subject Vehicle but in other GM
vehicles, e.g., show that GM’s relevant decisionmakers had knowledge of a
nonconformable defect in a component used in the Subject Vehicle through use
and problems with the same component in other vehicles of the same year, make,
and model.
II. Merit of
Objections
Second, the Court finds
insufficient merit to the objections raised by Defendants.
The general objection for unilateral
setting of a deposition is not a valid wholesale objection to a deposition or
production in relation to it. That objection merely relates, at most, to a
civility question addressed by this Court’s Local Rules, where “[i]n scheduling depositions, reasonable consideration should be
given to accommodating schedules o[f] opposing counsel and of the deponent,
where it is possible to do so without prejudicing the client’s rights.” (Sup.
Ct., Los Angeles Cty. Loc. R., appen, § 3.A., subd.
(e)(2).)
The
general objection relating to scope of discovery is undercut by the relevance
discussion above.
The
general objections based on compound form, overbreadth, vagueness, and lack of
relevance are not convincing. A plain reading of the categories of examination
and production requests shows their clarity, as summarized above in Section
II.B.2.b.i.
The
general objections based on the attorney-client and work product privileges are
insufficiently elaborated and/or supported by the opposition. The privilege
objections are facially irrelevant where the information sought by Plaintiffs
relates to the defects in Vehicles deriving from diagnostic and other
information not pertinent to the work of an attorney. Moreover, there is no
privilege log attached to the objections. (Mot., Lara Decl., Ex. B.) Neither
does a protective order appear in the record, nor has GM requested one. The
privilege is thus insufficiently raised though the Court notes that no waiver
has occurred; instead, the privilege was simply insufficiently elaborated.
The
general objection based on undue burden also fails. For example, the
oppositions points and authorities argue that the information relating to COE
Nos. 11-12 and RPD Nos. 7-8 may relate to privileged, confidential,
proprietary, and trade secret information. (Opp’n, p. 8.) However, these
grounds for objecting to discovery are not more greatly elaborated. The trade
secret objection was not raised in the original objections to the PMQ
deposition notice, foreclosing its use now. (Mot., Lara Decl., Ex. 2.)
Elsewhere, the opposition points and authorities only cursorily argue burden. (Opp’n,
pp. 5-7.) As for the opposition separate statement, the Court notes that GM
fails to elaborate on undue burden other than arguing that Plaintiff, in
seeking the discovery not at issue, seeks to create a burden on GM to locate
responsive information possibly from all other the globe, which would not be
fair based on the burden imposed on GM. (See, e.g., Opp’n, Separate Statement.)
However, such an argument fails to recognize that if the GM decisionmakers that
refused to replace or repurchase the Subject Vehicle knew or should have been
of nonconformable defects in the components of the Subject Vehicle, then GM
could be held liable for breach of various warranties and willful noncompliance
with the Song Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Neither does GM’s separate
statement elaborate on a less burdensome alternative of discovery or discuss a
balancing of the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation to the
needs of the case. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2019.030, subds. (a)(1)-(2).)
The
general objections of speculation, third party information, open-ended
requests, assumption of facts not in evidence, and insufficient time to respond
to the requests are also rejected. As to open-endedness, the Court notes that
the purchase of the Vehicle in 2023 imposes a general timeframe for the
relevant discovery. And even if components that were used in a 2023 vehicle
were created by GM long before 2023, GM’s knowledge as to the quality and
condition of that component is relevant to this action. As far as time to
respond, the Court notes that any Court order can be conditioned on sufficient
time to respond.
The
specific objections to the categories of examination and production requests
have been discussed above and are rejected on those grounds. (See Mot., Lara
Decl., Ex. 2, pp. 3-14.)
There are
thus no valid objections to the GM PMQ deposition notice, with production
requests, and good cause exists for such a deposition and production.
The Court
also notes that the meet and confer objection raised in the opposition has no
merit. GM’s own counsel’s declaration shows that GM failed to respond to
Plaintiff’s counsel’s correspondence, which highlighted Plaintiff’s position
for the merit of the scope of the GM PMQ deposition notice. (Opp’n, Pappas
Decl., ¶¶ 2-6.)
b. Good
Cause for Production [Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (b)(1)]
The Court adopts its good cause
discussion in Section II.B.2.a.iv. above to determine that Plaintiff has shown
good cause in support of the nine production requests in the November 27, 2023,
deposition notice.
3. Final
Determination
Plaintiff Ramirez’s motion is
procedurally and substantively meritorious and is thus GRANTED.
The Court notes that the parties may consider entering a protective order for the discovery at issue here.
III. Conclusion
Plaintiff Stephanie Ramirez’s Motion to Compel the Deposition of Defendant General, LLC’s Person(s) Most Knowledgeable, with Production of Documents is GRANTED. The Deposition with production of documents should be scheduled within the next 45 days or as otherwise mutually agreed in writing.