Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 23STCV25955, Date: 2024-04-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV25955    Hearing Date: April 8, 2024    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

 

WAQAR HASHIM, an individual,

                        Plaintiff,

            v.

FARADAY&FUTURE, INC., a California corporation; and DOES 1-100, inclusive,

                        Defendants.

 Case No.:          23STCV25955

 Hearing Date:   4/8/24

 Trial Date:        2/11/25

 [TENTATIVE] RULING RE:

Plaintiff Waqar Hashim’s Motion for Summary Adjudication.

 

I. Background

Plaintiff Waqar Hashim sues Defendants Faraday & Future, Inc. (Faraday) and Does 1-100 pursuant to an October 24, 2023, Complaint alleging claims of (1) Failure to Pay Wages in Violation of Cal. Labor Code § 201, et seq., (2) Unfair Business Practices in Violation of Cal. Business & Professions Code § 17200, and (3) Wrongful Constructive Discharge in Violation of Public Policy.

The claims arise from the following allegations. Defendants—which appear to operate as an electric vehicle company—enticed Plaintiff Hashim to leave his employment with an established auto manufacturer in the State of Michigan by offering Plaintiff Hashim employment as Faraday’s VP of Program Management. Faraday would pay Hashim an annual salary of $400,000, plus a $500,000 signing bonus and stock options in a holding company. Within two weeks of starting his employment in September 2018, Faraday reduced Hashim’s salary by half. By the end of Hashim’s employment in March 2023, Faraday had failed to pay Hashim a salary for several months. In March 2023, Plaintiff Hashim quit his employment at Faraday, which the pleadings characterize as a constructive discharge based on nonpayment of salary.

On December 28, 2023, Plaintiff Hashim filed an affirmative motion for summary adjudication of the Complaint’s first and second causes of action.

On March 25, 2024, Defendant Faraday filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion.

On March 29, 2024, Plaintiff Hashim filed a reply to Faraday’s opposition.

Plaintiff Hashim’s motion is now the Court.

 

II. Evidentiary Objections

In granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion. Objections to evidence that are not ruled on for purposes of the motion shall be preserved for appellate review. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).)

A. Plaintiff Hashim’s Reply Objections to Opposition Evidence

Objection to ¶ 4 of Yang Declaration: Not ruled on as not material to disposition of ruling.

Objection to ¶ 5 of Yang Declaration: OVERRULED.

B. Defendant Faraday’s Objections to Reply Evidence

Objection Nos. 2-3: Not ruled on as not material to disposition of ruling.

 

III. Motion for Summary Adjudication

A. Legal Standard

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact for trial or that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A party may also seek summary adjudication of select causes of action, affirmative defenses, claims for damages, or issues of duty, which may be made by a standalone motion or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and proceeds in all procedural respects like a motion for summary judgment, but which must completely dispose of the challenged cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for damages, or issue of duty. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (f)(1)-(2), (t).) The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make prima facie showing no triable material fact issues. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) This burden on summary judgment or adjudication “is more properly one of persuasion rather than proof, since he must persuade the court that there is no material fact for a reasonable trier of fact to find, and not to prove any such fact to the satisfaction of the court itself as though it were sitting as the trier of fact.” (Id. at p. 850, fn. 11.) If the moving party meets this burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a rebuttal prima facie showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Id. at p. 849.) “[I]n ruling on motions for summary judgment courts are to ‘“liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”’ [Citations].” (Cheal v. El Camino Hospital (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 736, 760.)

B. Analysis

1. Summary Adjudication, Complaint, First Cause of Action, Failure to Pay Wages in Violation of Labor Code § 201 et seq.: DENIED.

a. Relevant Law

Labor Code section 201 provides that, if an employer terminates an employee, it must pay all wages earned and unpaid at the time of discharge. (Lab. Code, § 201, subd. (a).) If an employee quits, all wages earned and unpaid are due and payable not later than 72 hours after quitting, unless the employee has given 72 hours previous notice of his or her intention to quit, in which case the employee is entitled to his or her wages at the time of quitting. (Lab. Code, § 202, subd. (a).) If an employer violates section 201 or 202, the employee may recover a penalty of up to 30 days of additional wages. (Lab. Code, § 203, subd. (a).)

b. Allegations

The first cause of action alleges that as of March 2023, when Plaintiff Hashim was constructively discharged from his employment at Faraday, Plaintiff Hashim was owed hundreds of thousands of dollars by Faraday, which have not been paid. (Complaint, ¶¶ 5-11.)

c. Moving Party’s Burden

In his motion, Plaintiff Hashim argues that no triable issues of material fact exist as to the Complaint’s first of action because Hashim provides evidence of a Faraday agent admitting that Faraday owes Plaintiff Hashim $322,986 as of March 7, 2023. (Mot., p. 3 at § I.A., citing Mot., Separate Statement (Sep. St.), Undisputed Material Fact (UMF) Nos. 3-4.)

A review of Plaintiff’s evidence shows that it fails to carry his burden on summary adjudication of the Complaint’s first cause of action.

Plaintiff Hashim’s evidence consists of his declaration, which is comprised of three paragraphs, stating that plaintiff resigned from his employment in “March 2023” and providing as an exhibit a printout of an email between Plaintiff Hashim and a Faraday employee establishing that as of March 7, 2023, Faraday owed Plaintiff Hashim $322,986, comprised of $192,500 owed as a signing bonus and $130,486 owed based on backpay tied to a reduction in salary. (Mot., Hashim Decl., ¶¶ 1-3, Ex. 1.)

This evidence does not prove that these wages were not paid within 72 hours of Plaintiff Hashim’s alleged constructive discharge, for which we do not have evidence of the actual date in March. Nor is there any evidence to clarify whether Faraday has paid Plaintiff Hashim any money, or how much, between March 7, 2023, and the present. The email does reflect that a Faraday employee acknowledged outstanding monies owed to Plaintiff as of March 7, 2023.

This evidence thus fails to carry Plaintiff’s burden as to the Complaint’s first cause of action.

Moreover, assuming arguendo that Plaintiff had met his burden through implication, Faraday has filed sufficient evidence to meet its responsive burden as to the Complaint’s first cause of action. For example, Faraday has filed evidence to show that Plaintiff was only entitled to a bonus after working for Faraday for five years (Opp’n, Yang Decl., ¶ 5, cited in Opp’n, Sep. St., Response to UMF No. 2), which Hashim failed to complete in part due to his taking a voluntary leave of absence and thereafter refusing two job positions. (Opp’n, Yang Decl., ¶¶ 6-11, cited in Opp’n, Sep. St., Response to UMF Nos. 2-4). Faraday argues that the March 7 email was sent in the context of a job offer, which he rejected. (Id. at ¶ 8; Response to UMF No. 3.) Again, the Court is required in ruling on a motion for summary adjudication to ‘“liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”’ (Cheal v. El Camino Hospital, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 760.)

d. Final Determination

Summary adjudication of this first cause of action is thus DENIED.

2. Summary Adjudication, Complaint, Second Cause of Action, Unfair Business Practices in Violation of Business & Professions Code § 17200: DENIED.

a. Relevant Law

To state a cause of action for unfair business practices, a plaintiff must establish defendant engaged in “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.)

b. Court’s Determination

Here, the Court DENIES summary adjudication of the Complaint’s second cause of action because liability on the second cause of action is derivative of liability on the first cause of action. (Compare Complaint, ¶¶ 12-14, with Complaint, ¶¶ 5-11.)

 

IV. Conclusion

Plaintiff Waqar Hashim’s Motion for Summary Adjudication is DENIED.