Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 23STCV31916, Date: 2024-06-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV31916    Hearing Date: June 28, 2024    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

I. Background

Plaintiffs J.S. and S.S, individual minors, by and through guardian ad litem, Rolando Zamora-Gonzalez, sue Defendants Los Angeles Unified School District and Does 1 through 20 pursuant to a December 28, 2023, Complaint alleging claims of (1) Negligence Per Se and (2) Negligence.

The claims arise from allegations that while students at an LAUSD school, J.S. and S.S. were separately sexually assaulted on various occasions by an older peer and that LAUSD, among other things, failed to supervise of stop the aggressor child despite the aggressor child exhibiting red flags, with LAUSD staff also failing to take reasonable steps to implement safeguards that would have protected J.S. and S.S. from assault.

On March 21, 2024, LAUSD filed a demurrer to the Complaint’s two claims.

On April 8, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an opposition, and on April 12, 2024, LAUSD filed a reply.

On April 17, 2024, Department 30 at the Spring Street Courthouse—the Department to which this action was originally assigned—referred this action to Department 1 at the Stanley Mosk Courthouse.

On April 18, 2024, Department 1 reassigned this action to Department 40 at the Stanley Mosk Courthouse (the Court).

On May 14, 2024, the Court noticed a set hearing date for the demurrer of June 28, 2024.

On May 21, 2024, LAUSD filed an amended notice setting forth the June 28, 2024, hearing date.

On May 24, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a notice of hearing for June 28, 2024.

LAUSD’s demurrer is now before the Court.

II. Demurrer: OVERRULED.

A. Legal Standard

1. Sufficiency

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747; see Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)

To sufficiently allege a cause of action, a complaint must allege all the ultimate facts—that is, the facts needed to establish each element of the cause of action pleaded. (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 212 (Committee on Children’s Television), superseded by statute as stated in Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235, 242.) “[E]ach evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872 (William S. Hart).)

In testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-67.) Courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228, disapproved on other grounds, Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1162.) A demurrer, however, “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)

2. Uncertainty

A demurrer to a pleading lies where the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (f).)

“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616, disapproved on other grounds in Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 46 [holding claims for unfair business practices need not be pled specifically, impliedly disapproving Khoury].) As a result, a special demurrer for uncertainty is not intended to reach failure to incorporate sufficient facts in the pleading but is directed only at uncertainty existing in the allegations already made. (People v. Taliaferro (1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 822, 825, disapproved on other grounds in Jefferson v. J.E. French Co. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 717, 719-720 [statute of limitations question].)

Where complaint is sufficient to state a cause of action and to apprise defendant of issues he is to meet, it is not properly subject to a special demurrer for uncertainty. (See ibid.; see also Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643 [“A special demurrer [for uncertainty] should be overruled where the allegations of the complaint are sufficiently clear to apprise the defendant of the issues which he is to meet”].)

B. Analysis

The Court finds in favor of Plaintiffs.

For the purposes of this analysis, the Court focuses on whether the Complaint alleges vicarious as opposed to direct liability against LAUSD. (See, e.g., Reply, 8:4-9 [clarifying nature of arguments in demurrer].)

LAUSD’s arguments are that (1) Government section 815 immunizes LAUSD from direct liability of common law torts as those alleged in the Complaint, (2) vicarious liability can only be alleged against LAUSD if the harm was foreseeable to LAUSD staff, and (3) the Complaint conclusorily alleges that Plaintiffs’ injuries were foreseeable to LAUSD staff.

Even if the Court were to accept that no direct liability can be alleged, liability can be alleged derivatively, and here, the Complaint sufficiently alleges basis for foreseeable harm to Plaintiffs. The Complaint alleges, for example, “that Plaintiff S.S. and Plaintiff J.S. exhibited distressed behavior that should have signaled to the LAUSD employees charged with their care that Plaintiffs had undergone a traumatic experience and triggered an investigation by LAUSD.” (Complaint, ¶ 19.) LAUSD’s demurrer argues that these allegations are insufficient because they are not alleged with particularity as to foreseeability given that the Complaint purportedly does not explain the nature of the distressed behavior or why that behavior should have alerted LAUSD staff that Plaintiffs had been victims of sexual assault. (Demurrer, pp. 8-9.) However, in analyzing a demurrer, a plaintiff need only alleged ultimate facts (Committee on Children’s Television, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 212); and “each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (William S. Hart, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 872.) The allegation regarding distressed behavior constitutes at least one sufficient ultimate fact that alleges with particularity how LAUSD should have become apprised of and exercised its duty to protect Plaintiffs from sexual assault. The evidentiary facts supporting this and the other alleged grounds for foreseeability can be clarified in discovery. For pleading purposes, however, sufficient facts have been alleged for foreseeability of harm.

The Court rejects the demurrer’s argument that Plaintiffs’ injuries could have not been reasonably foreseeable to LAUSD because the Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs’ own mother did not become aware of the assaults until after the assaults had already occurred. (Demurrer, pp. 8-9, 12-13.) This argument fails. The focus on this demurrer is whether the Complaint alleges grounds from which it was reasonably foreseeable to LAUSD staff that Plaintiffs would be or were being sexually assaulted, not whether it was foreseeable to Plaintiffs’ mother.

Last, the Court notes that it does not consider the mandatory duty arguments in page 11 of the demurrer because the reply clarifies that LAUSD “does not dispute that it had a general duty to supervise students and that, in appropriate circumstances, a school district may be liable for injuries sustained when a student assaults another student,” where a necessary component of that liability is “foreseeability of harm.” (See, e.g., Reply, 8:4-9.) Otherwise stated, LAUSD is challenging the foreseeability of harm component of Plaintiffs’ claims for derivative liability against LAUSD, not the existence of a duty.

Based on the above grounds, the Court OVERRULES LAUSD’s demurrer.

III. Conclusion

Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District’s Demurrer to Complaint for Damages [Res ID # 4214] is OVERRULED.