Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 23STUD14574, Date: 2024-02-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STUD14574    Hearing Date: February 15, 2024    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

Background

Pleadings Framing Motion

On November 8, 2023, Plaintiff Joseph Rechtman filed an Unlawful Detainer Complaint in this action (LASC No. 23STUD14574) against Defendants Richard McCoy and Does 1 to 5, which seeks possession of 3322 Barham Blvd., Los Angeles, California 90068 (Subject Premises), costs of suit, past due rent of $1,839.99, forfeiture of the lease agreement, and damages of $31 per day from November 1, 2023.

Motion Before the Court

On December 18, 2023, Defendant McCoy filed a motion for summary judgment in this unlawful detainer proceeding.

On January 16, 2024, Plaintiff Rechtman—in pro per—opposed the motion for summary judgment.

On February 5, 2024, Defendant McCoy replied to the opposition.

Defendant McCoy’s motion is now before the Court.

Request for Judicial Notice

Per Defendant McCoy’s request—and over Plaintiff Rechtman’s objections—the Court takes judicial notice of the January 31, 2023 and November 22, 2023 City of Los Angeles letters attached to the moving papers. (See Mot., RJN; Opp’n, Objections to RJN.)

Evidentiary Objections

In granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion. Objections to evidence that are not ruled on for purposes of the motion shall be preserved for appellate review. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).) Evidentiary objections not made either in writing or orally shall be deemed waived. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b).)

Opposition Objections to Motion’s Request for Judicial Notice

Objections: All OVERRULED [re: authentication, notice, and timeliness].

Motion for Summary Judgment

Preliminary Note – Notice of Related Case

Whenever a party in a civil action knows or learns that the action or proceeding is related to another action or proceeding pending, dismissed, or disposed of by judgment in any state or federal court in California, the party must serve and file a Notice of Related Case. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.300, subd. (b).) The party must file the Notice Related Case in “all pending cases listed in the notice.” (Id., subd. (d).)

Despite this requirement, neither Plaintiff Rechtman nor Defendant McCoy filed notices of related case in the first-filed unlawful detainer action, Case No. 23STUD05308, regarding the second unlawful detainer action that landed in Department 40, Case No. 23STUD14574. It is unclear from the record whether the first-filed unlawful detainer action remained pending as of the date the second unlawful detainer filed. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.300, subd. (d).) Neither did either party file a notice of related case in that second filed unlawful detainer action, which without doubt was pending. The parties are admonished to be careful to fully comply with their obligations by filing a notice of related case regarding all potentially related cases in all  pending cases.

Nevertheless, both parties agreed on December 19, 2023 as documented by the minute order of that date in the unlimited civil action, that the first unlawful detainer “had been resolved.” Thus this Court, as an unlimited jurisdiction civil court, only related the second unlawful detainer. (Id. at subd. (h)(1)(B).) That appears to still be the appropriate result, assuming the first unlawful detainer action is no longer pending.

Preliminary Note – Signatures

The Court briefly notes that the points and authorities and the declaration of counsel attached to the motion for summary judgment are not signed by counsel. (See Mot., pp. 9, 11.)

However, the Court notes may consider the points and authorities after giving Defendant McCoy notice of the defect and opportunity to correct the same. (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7, subd. (a); see, e.g., Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768 [unsigned pleading can be struck per Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b), but attorney should first be given opportunity to cure defect].)

Moreover, Plaintiff Rechtman opposed the motion for summary judgment on the merits and failed to object to the moving papers based on lack of signature. (See Opp’n, pp. 1-7 & Opp’n, Objections to RJN [failing to address lack of signatures]; cf. Arambula v. Union Carbide Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 333, 342-343 (Arambula) [“A party who appears at the hearing on a motion and contests the motion on the merits without objecting to a defect or irregularity in the notice of motion ordinarily is deemed to waive the defect or irregularity,” citations omitted];.)

Legal Standard

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact for trial or that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A party may also seek summary adjudication of select causes of action, affirmative defenses, claims for damages, or issues of duty, which may be made by a standalone motion or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and proceeds in all procedural respects like a motion for summary judgment, but which must completely dispose of the challenged cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for damages, or issue of duty. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (f)(1)-(2), (t).) The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make prima facie showing no triable material fact issues. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) This burden on summary judgment or adjudication “is more properly one of persuasion rather than proof, since he must persuade the court that there is no material fact for a reasonable trier of fact to find, and not to prove any such fact to the satisfaction of the court itself as though it were sitting as the trier of fact.” (Id. at p. 850, fn. 11.) If the moving party meets this burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a rebuttal prima facie showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Id. at p. 849.) “[I]n ruling on motions for summary judgment courts are to ‘“liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”’ [Citations].” (Cheal v. El Camino Hospital (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 736, 760.)

I.

Summary Judgment, Entire Complaint: GRANTED.

In his motion, Defendant McCoy—the tenant—argues that the unlawful detainer action is not proper because authority supports, and evidence shows that Plaintiff Rechtman—the landlord—cannot charge rent from Defendant McCoy until Plaintiff Rechtman secures an updated certificate of occupancy for multi-family use on the subject property and pays Defendant Rechtman relocation assistance monies. Defendant McCoy elaborates that because evidence shows that the Property is subject to the Rent Stabilization Ordinance (RSO) in Los Angeles, according to the Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC), prior to any termination of the lease, Plaintiff Rechtman must pay Defendant McCoy relocation assistance, which Plaintiff Rechtman has failed to do. (Mot., pp. 5-7, citing Mot., Rodriguez Decl., ¶ 2 & Mot., RJN, Ex. A & Salazar v. Maradeaga (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th Supp 1, 4-5 (Salazar); see Mot., Rodriguez Decl., ¶¶ 1-8.)

Defendant McCoy also argues that because the RSO requires that all units subject to the RSO must be registered with the Los Angeles Housing Department (LAHD) before a landlord can demand rent, and because evidence shows that Plaintiff Rechtman has failed to register the Subject Premises with the LAHD, the Subject Premises are an illegal dwelling, any rental contract is void and not enforceable, and the landlord (Plaintiff Rechtman) cannot collect rent or use the unlawful detainer proceedings to collect rent. (Mot., pp. 7-8, citing Mot., RJN, Ex. B & LAMC, §§ 151.04, 151.05.A, 151.11.B & Gruzen v. Henry (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 515 & North 7th Street Assocs. v. Constante (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th Supp 1, 5 (North 7th Street) & Levitz Furniture v. Wingtip Communications (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1038.)

The Court finds that this evidence and authority carries Defendant’s burden on summary judgment.

First, Defendant McCoy’s evidence prima-facie shows that Plaintiff Rechtman is under an obligation to pay Defendant McCoy relocation assistance prior to any eviction from the Subject Premises, 3322 Barham Blvd., Los Angeles, California. (See Mot., Rodriguez Decl., ¶¶ 1-8; Mot., RJN, Exs. A-B.)

In Salazar, the court of appeal stated that “the clear intent of [the RSO in the LAMC] is to preclude the landlord from terminating a tenancy and recovering possession in an unlawful detainer action where the tenant raises and establishes as an affirmative defense that the landlord has failed to pay relocation benefits, even if the basis of the eviction is an illegal use.” (Salazar, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at pp. 4-5.) Defendant McCoy’s evidence shows that the City of Los Angeles has determined that the Subject Premises are subject to the LAMC’s RSO, that the October 28, 2023 three-day notice to pay rent or quit upon which this unlawful detainer action is founded was void as violative of the RSO, and that Defendant McCoy is entitled to relocation assistance prior to being lawfully evicted from the premises, where the City estimates relocation costs to be between $9,500 and $24,650. (Mot., RJN, Exs. A [Jan. 19, 2023 Department of Building and Safety (LADBS) Letter re: Violations on 3324 N. Barham Blvd.], B [Nov. 22, 2023 Los Angeles Housing Department, Investigation and Enforcement Section Letter, notifying Plaintiff Rechtman of illegalities connected to Defendant McCoy’s lease at 3322 Barham Blvd., premised in part on the Jan. 19, 2023 letter].)

It should be noted that Defendant McCoy’s Answer does not cite relocation assistance as an affirmative defense. (See 11/14/23 Answer, Attach. 3w, p. 2, Local Rent Stabilization and Just Cause Laws, § A.8 [Answer fails to check off, “Plaintiff has failed to pay relocation assistance under LAMC § 151.09(G)]; cf. Salazar, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at pp. 4-5 [premised on relocation assistance under LAMC § 151.09, subd. (G)].) However, a defendant may move for summary judgment based on a defense the defendant did not raise in its answer if the plaintiff opposing summary judgment has notice and an opportunity to respond to the defense. (See, e.g., Jones v. Dutra Construction Co. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 871, 876-877 (Jones) [rejecting the claim that a statutory defense not raised in an answer was waived because “the parties litigated the summary judgment motion with no suggestion respondent’s reliance upon the [statutory defense] was improper” and “[a]ppellant obviously had notice of the defense upon which respondent was relying and, by so litigating the merits of the summary judgment motion, waived any right to claim on appeal that the answer was defective”]; see also State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Superior Court (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1130 (State Compensation) [citing Jones for proposition that “party waived claimed defect in answer by failing to object to defect below and responding to summary judgment motion on merits”]; Nieto v. Blue Shield of California Life & Health Ins. Co. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 60, 75 (Nieto) [defendant may raise unpled affirmative defense in motion for summary judgment if plaintiff receives notice and opportunity to respond].)

Here, Plaintiff Rechtman filed an opposition to Defendant McCoy’s motion for summary judgment and thus opposed summary judgment on the merits, for which reason the “relocation assistance” affirmative defense may properly be raised on summary judgment.

Second, the circumstances in this action are comparable to North 7th Street, supra. In relevant part, the appellate division there stated: “Due to the undisputed unlawful status of the premises rented by plaintiff to defendant, their rental agreement was void, and plaintiff was barred from collecting any rent or using the unlawful detainer procedures to enforce the collection of rent. (Gruzen, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at p. 518; Salazar v. Maradeaga (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 4.) Put differently, if plaintiff could not collect any rent from defendant, then defendant had no obligation to pay any rent to plaintiff. Furthermore, if defendant did not owe any rent to plaintiff, the three-day notice claiming $739.35 in past-due rent was necessarily an overstatement of defendant’s rental obligation, which could only be properly calculated as zero. Since the three-day notice which was the basis for this unlawful detainer action failed to comply with the strict statutory requirements, it was invalid and could not support the action. (Levitz Furniture v. Wingtip Communications, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 1038, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 656.) The trial court therefore did not err in finding that there was no triable issue of fact and in granting summary judgment to defendant.” (North 7th Street, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th Supp. at p. 5.)

Here, Defendant McCoy’s evidence shows that the City of Los Angeles has determined that Plaintiff Rechtman converted a single-family dwelling into a multi-family dwelling without the required permits, which makes the Subject Premises rented by Defendant McCoy an illegal dwelling in connection to which rent cannot be collected by a landlord. (Mot., RJN, Exs. A-B; North 7th Street, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th Supp. at p. 5.) Because the rental agreement has been declared void by the City based on the illegality of the dwelling (Mot., RJN, Exs. A-B), and because a landlord may not use the unlawful detainer procedures to enforce the collection of rent on an illegal contract (North 7th Street, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th Supp. at p. 5, citing Gruzen, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at p. 518 & Salazar, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th Supp. at p. 4), Defendant McCoy’s evidence prima-facie shows that Plaintiff Rechtman is prohibited from collecting rent from Defendant McCoy. (Mot., RJN, Exs. A-B; cf. North 7th Street, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th Supp. at p. 5; see also 11/8/23 Complaint, Ex. 2, Three-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit [based on nonpayment of rent in the amount of $1,839.99].)

In opposition, Plaintiff Rechtman—in pro per—makes various arguments, some of which are not sufficiently elaborated to undercut the arguments made in Defendant McCoy’s motion. These arguments are that:

(1) Defendant McCoy is a commercial tenant, not a residential tenant;

(2) Defendant McCoy permitted destruction to the Subject Premises in the form of rot and McCoy delayed in informing Plaintiff Rechtman of the same, causing increased costs based on delay;

(3) The “L.A. City citation” relates to a different tenant and involves issues that have since been remediated or concluded, making that citation unrelated to this case (referring to Mot., RJN, Ex. A [Jan. 19, 2023 LADBS Letter]); and

(4) Defendant McCoy may not raise a RSO defense because a prior unlawful detainer action between the parties—LASC No. 23STUD05308—considered the argument of whether the RSO prohibited payment of rent on the Subject Premises and nevertheless required that Defendant McCoy pay rent on the Subject Premises (3322 Barham Blvd.), meaning that res judicata bars relitigation of similar issues here. (Opp’n, pp. 3-7.)

In reply, Defendant McCoy argues that:

(1) The three-day notice to pay rent or quit underlying this action did not specify a commercial lease;

(2) The LADBS Letter specifies that the Subject Property was a single-family dwelling converted into a multi-family dwelling without proper permits, contradicting a commercial lease agreement;

(3) Plaintiff Rechtman fails to address the relocation assistance argument, and Defendant McCoy may pursue his civil action—LASC No. 23STCV20033—and simultaneously raise an affirmative defense of failure to pay relocation assistance;

(4) The LAHD has already determined that the RSO applies to the Subject Premises; and

(5) Gruzen and North 7th Street are factually comparable and show that no triable issues of material fact exist as to whether Plaintiff is entitled to past-due rent from Defendant McCoy where the three-day notice supporting this action was defective, i.e., it demanded rent to which Plaintiff McCoy was not lawfully entitled based on illegality of the lease agreement. (Reply, pp. 2-5.)

The Court finds that Plaintiff Rechtman has failed to carry his burden on summary judgment.

Plaintiff Rechtman does not address whether he lawfully converted the single-family property at issue into a different kind of dwelling, whether into a multi-family dwelling or dual residential-commercial dwelling. Indeed, Plaintiff Rechtman only attaches his declaration as evidence, and that declaration is limited to three paragraphs explaining that Defendant McCoy has filed a civil action against Plaintiff Rechtman (LASC No. 23STCV20033) and that Defendant McCoy’s lease involves a commercial, not residential lease. (Opp’n, Rechtman Decl., ¶¶ 1-3.) As a result, Plaintiff Rechtman does not advance any evidence to show that he is lawfully entitled to receive rent for the Subject Premises from Defendant McCoy.

The evidence advanced by Defendant McCoy (Mot., RJN, Ex. A, §§ 1-2 & Ex. B, p. 1), in contrast, makes a strong prima-facie showing that the City of Los Angeles has already determined that the Subject Property was, without proper permits, converted from a single-family dwelling into an illegal multi-family use dwelling, making the Subject Premises an illegal dwelling, invalidating any lease between the parties, and cutting off the landlord’s ability to collect rent. (11/8/23 Complaint, Ex. 2, Three-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit [based on nonpayment of rent in the amount of $1,839.99]; see North 7th Street, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th Supp. at p. 5 [cannot use unlawful detainer proceedings to collect rent on agreement for illegal dwelling, citing Gruzen, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at p. 518 & Salazar, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th Supp. at p. 4].) Plaintiff Rechtman’s failure to address this issue is fatal because even if Plaintiff Rechtman is correct in arguing that the Subject Premises involved a commercial lease, Plaintiff Rechtman has not shown by any evidence that he is entitled to lawfully received rent for a commercial lease on the Subject Premises.

The Court also notes that the remaining three grounds advanced by Plaintiff Rechtman’s opposition are not availing because:

(1) This action arises from a three-day notice to pay rent or quit that cites unpaid rent, not rot in the Subject Premises (see 11/8/23 Complaint, Ex. 2, Three-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit [based on nonpayment of rent in the amount of $1,839.99]);

(2) The January 19, 2023 LADBS Letter is connected to the Subject Premises, as shown by the November 22, 2023 LAHD Investigation and Enforcement Section Letter; and

(3) Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that res judicata applies to the RSO arguments as based on proceedings in the LASC No. 23STUD05308 action. The only evidence attached to Plaintiff Rechtman’s opposition is his declaration. No transcripts, minute orders, or other Court-issued documents from the first unlawful detainer proceeding are attached to or referenced in the opposition. As a result, the Court cannot determine whether Department 66 did in fact consider the January 19, 2023 LADBS Letter or the November 22, 2023 LAHD Letter. However, the Court notes that even if Department 66 had considered the January 19, 2023 LADBS Letter, it could not have considered the November 22, 2023 LAHD Letter because Department 66’s latest order in LASC No. 23STUD05308 was made on November 9, 2023. Last, the Court notes a material difference between the January 19, 2023 and November 22, 2023 Letters: The November 22, 2023 Letter directly addresses Defendant McCoy’s tenancy at the Subject Premises (3322 Barham Blvd.) and Plaintiff Rechtman’s RSO violations/inability to collect rent from Defendant McCoy, while the January 19, 2023 Letter addresses 3324 Barham Blvd. and does not name Defendant McCoy. Thus, whether this court considers the doctrine of res judicata as urged by the Plaintiff or the related doctrine of collateral estoppel, Plaintiff has not shown that the issue was identical to the issue to be precluded here; that it was actually litigated in the former proceeding; or that it was necessarily decided in the former proceeding. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.)

Moreover, a review of the pleadings in both cases shows that they are not for the same conduct. The complaint in Case No. 23STUD05308 attached a Notice to Pay Rent of Quit dated April 6, 2023 requested rent due for the month of April, 2023. The complaint in Case No. 23STUD14574 attached a Notice dated October 28, 2023 regarding rent due for August, September, and October. Accordingly, res judicata does not apply. (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896 [“[r]es judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties”].) Plaintiff here brought a second complaint for nonpayment of different months of rent that took place after the first complaint was filed. (Compare Hong Sang Market, Inc. v. Peng (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 474, 491 [“An unlawful detainer judgment has a limited res judicata effect because the claim preclusion aspect of the res judicata doctrine applies only to matters that were raised or could have been raised in the earlier action on matters that were litigated or litigable”].)

Summary judgment is thus GRANTED in Defendant McCoy’s favor. 

Conclusion

Defendant Richard McCoy’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.