Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 24STCV00739, Date: 2024-04-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV00739    Hearing Date: April 16, 2024    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

I. Background

A. Pleadings

Plaintiffs Dean Harper, Alma Mendez Salazar, Augustine Adkins, Spencer Anderson, Jamaul White, Anthony Reginala, Kareen Davis, John Hillard, Khasay Tesfaghiorghis, Ronald Smith, Ladell Hill, Lee Maupin, Jose Trejo, Joann Gulley, Michael Standberry, James Powell, Elvis Matthews, Clemeth Banks, and Don Manuel sue Defendants St. Mark’s Fifth Street Partners, SRHT Property Management Company, and Does 1 through 30 pursuant to a January 10, 2024, Complaint.

The Complaint alleges claims of (1) Breach of Contract/Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment/Warranty of Habitability, (2) Tortious Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability, (3) Negligence, (4) Violation of California Civil Code Section 1942.4, (5) Violation of Unfair Business Practices, and (6) Tenant Harassment.

The claims arise from Defendants’ alleged failure to remedy slum-housing and untenantable conditions in premises rented by Plaintiffs by Defendants, including inadequate weather protection, inadequate plumbing, dampness and mold, inadequate sanitation, lack of heating and ventilation, vermin infestation, structural hazards, nuisance, inadequate mechanical equipment, failure to maintain premises in a good and safe condition, and harassment.

B. Motion Before the Court

On March 5, 2024, Defendants filed a motion to strike punitive damages allegations and prayers from the Complaint.

On April 3, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion to strike.

On April 9, 2024, Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiffs’ opposition.

Defendants’ motion to strike is now before the Court.

II. Motion to Strike

A. Legal Standard

The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (a) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (b) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subds. (a), (b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].)

For the purposes of a motion to strike pursuant to Sections 435 to 437 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the term “pleading” generally means a demurrer, answer, complaint, or cross-complaint, (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (a)), and an immaterial allegation or irrelevant matter in a pleading entails (1) an allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense, (2) an allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense, or (3) a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subds. (b)(1)-(3), (c)).

B. Motion to Strike, Complaint, Punitive Damages: DENIED.

1. Relevant Law

“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a); College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725 (College Hospital) [explaining amendments requiring “despicable” conduct for malice and oppression].)

When the defendant is a corporation, ‘[a]n award of punitive damages … must rest on the malice of the corporation’s employees’” specifically, “the oppression, fraud, or malice perpetrated, authorized, or knowingly ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation,” where a managing agent “include[s] only those corporate employees who exercise substantial independent authority and judgment in their corporate decisionmaking so that their decisions ultimately determine corporate policy.’” (Wilson v. Southern California Edison Co. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 123, 164, citations omitted.)

A motion to strike is properly granted when a complaint fails to allege facts to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages under the standards of the statute. (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) Alleging an intentional tort alone is not enough to support a claim for punitive damages, nor are conclusory allegations that merely parrot the language of the statute. (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166; Blegen v. Superior Court (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 959, 963.)

2. Court’s Determination

The Court finds in favor of Plaintiffs.

In Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 920, the court of appeal determined that where a tenant alleged that a defendant had actual notice of defective conditions in the premises, including leaking sewage and other unsafe and dangerous conditions, the tenant had “pleaded sufficient facts to support [a] prayer for exemplary damages.”

Here, the Complaint sufficiently alleges the knowing and willful failure to correct defective conditions on the Premises, including failure to remediate plumbing issues, mold contamination, and vermin infestations, despite inspections of the premises by county authorities. (See, e.g., Complaint, ¶¶ 33-49.)

And the Complaint’s allegations of Defendants’ failure to remedy untenantable conditions after notice from tenants and from county housing authorities implies the approval or ratification of the wrongful conduct by a decisionmaker at St. Mark’s Fifth Street Partners and SRHT Property Management Company. (Complaint, ¶ 35.)

Defendants’ motion is thus DENIED. 

III. Conclusion

Defendant St. Mark’s Fifth Street Partners and SRHT Property Management Company’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ Complaint is DENIED.