Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 24STCV01587, Date: 2024-06-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV01587    Hearing Date: June 13, 2024    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

I. Background

A. Pleadings

Plaintiff Jorge Ayala Mendoza aka George Mendoza sues Defendants Morehouse Foods, Inc., Southeast Employee Leasing Services, Inc., and Does 1 through 20 pursuant to a January 22, 2024, Complaint alleging claims of (1) Discrimination in Violation of Gov’t Code § 12940 et seq., (2) Retaliation in Violation of Gov’t Code § 12940 et seq., (3) Failure to Prevent Discrimination, and Retaliation in Violation of Gov’t Code § 12940(k), (4) Failure to Engage in a Good Faith Interactive Process in Violation of Gov’t Code § 12940 et seq., (5) Failure to Engage in a Good Faith Interactive Process in Violation of Gov’t Code § 12940 et seq., (6) Declaratory Judgment, (7) Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy, (8) Failure to Pay Wages (Cal. Labor Code §§ 201, 1194), (9) Failure to Provide Meal and Rest Periods (Cal. Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512), (10) Failure to Provide Itemized Wage and Hour Statement (Cal. Labor Code § 226, et seq., (11) Waiting Time Penalties (Cal. Labor Code §§ 201, 203), and (12) Unfair Competition (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.).

The Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) claims arise from the following allegations. In his employment with Morehouse Foods, first as a maintenance mechanic and then, after an accommodation, as a sanitation worker, Plaintiff Ayala Mendoza experienced discrimination based on his disability—a toe amputation resulting from diabetes affecting one or more major life activities. Plaintiff Ayala Mendoza twice asked for accommodations based on doctor’s notes imposing restrictions on Plaintiff’s work duties. Morehouse Foods accommodated the first request, transferring Plaintiff Ayala Mendoza from mechanic to sanitation work around March 2022. However, after Plaintiff Ayala Mendoza made his second request for accommodation, Morehouse Foods terminated Plaintiff’s employment on the ground that it could not grant the accommodation, which was belied by the fact that Plaintiff Ayala Mendoza was able to perform the essential job duties of his position or another position “with or without accommodations,” thus amounting to a termination and retaliation based on Plaintiff’s disability and requests for accommodation.

The Labor Code claims arise from allegations that Morehouse Foods engaged in conduct amounting to various violations of Plaintiff Ayala Mendoza’s Labor Code rights, specifically in relation to rest and meal periods, itemized wage and hour statements, and waiting time penalties.

The unfair competition claim is derivative of the above FEHA and Labor Code claims.

B. Motion Before the Court

On April 23, 2024, Morehouse Foods filed a motion to strike punitive damages allegations and a punitive damages prayer from the Complaint at “¶¶ 36, 49, 61, 67, 75, 83, and 101, and Prayer for Relief at ¶ 9.”

On May 31, 2024, Plaintiff Ayala Mendoza filed an opposition to Morehouse Foods’ motion.

On June 6, 2024, Morehouse Foods filed a reply to Plaintiff’s opposition.

Morehouse Foods’ motion is now before the Court.

II. Motion to Strike: DENIED.

A. Opposition Request for Judicial Notice

The Court declines to take discretionary judicial notice of the Complaint in this action per the request for such relief in Plaintiff Ayala Mendoza’s opposition. (Opp’n, RJN, Ex. 1; Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 453, subds. (a)-(b)) as unnecessary.

Documents are only judicially noticeable to show their existence and what orders were made such that the truth of the facts and findings within the documents are not judicially noticeable. (Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 885 (Lockley).) To the extent the below analysis accepts the Complaint’s well-pleaded allegations as true for the purposes of a motion to strike, that analysis conforms with Atwell Island Water Dist. v. Atwell Island Water District (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 624, 628 (Atwell), cited in the Legal Standard in subsection C below. However, the existence of the Complaint is not in dispute, and judicial notice is not a vehicle to accept as true the facts alleged in the Complaint. (Lockley, supra, at p. 885.) Thus, the purpose of the request is unclear, supporting the Court’s discretionary decision to deny taking judicial notice.

B. Reply Objection to Opposition Request for Judicial Notice

Morehouse Foods’ objection is MOOT based on the determination in the preceding subsection.

C. Legal Standard, Motion to Strike

The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (a) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (b) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subds. (a), (b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].)

In analyzing a motion to strike, California courts “accept as true the well-pleaded allegations” in the challenged pleadings, as well as “well-pleaded allegations admitted in” the responsive “answer.” (Atwell, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 628; Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255 [California courts “read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth”].)

D. Analysis

1. Relevant Law

“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a); College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725 (College Hospital) [explaining amendments requiring “despicable” conduct for malice and oppression].)

Under the Civil Code, “[a]n employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).) Moreover, “corporate employers[] […] may not be liable for punitive damages unless ‘the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice [is] on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.’ [Citation.]” (White v. Ultramar (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 566, fn. 1.)

2. Parties’ Arguments

In its motion, Morehouse Foods’ full substantive argument reads: “… Plaintiff Complaint [sic] is based upon an alleged failure to accommodate an injury that required modified work duty and an ensuing termination. Certainly, this is a far cry from the ‘cruel,’ ‘unjust,’ or ‘despicable’ conduct required by C.C.P 3294. In fact, Plaintiff’s sole attempt at alleging punitive damages entails boilerplate conclusory statements that Defendant acted with oppression, fraud, and malice. Without more, Plaintiff fails to show that Defendant acted with the requisite ‘despicable conduct’ to support punitive damages.” (Mot., p. 6.)

In opposition, Plaintiff Ayala Mendoza’s full substantive argument reads: “Plaintiff alleges multiple intentional wrongs, not non-deliberate wrongs, which are supported by pleading that the wrong was committed willfully or was maliciously by Defendant. The allegations against the Defendant are more than sufficient to overcome any pleading sufficiency argument simply based on the fact that the wrongful conduct was committed by the Defendant’s agents and managing agents. Importantly, Defendant ratified the conduct by failing to take action. Such allegations are made in multiple places throughout the operative complaint. Here, there are clearly sufficient allegations of ‘[m]alice’ given the allegation of malicious conduct and the conscious disregard on the part of the Defendant failing to take action.” The opposition otherwise summarizes and cites the Complaint at paragraphs 17, 23 to 27, 29 to 32, and 36 to identify specific factual allegations supporting punitive damages. (Opp’n, pp. 2-3 [cites], 6 [quoted language].)

In reply, Morehouse Foods argues that the Complaint’s allegations in support of punitive damages are conclusory and merely mimic the language of the legal standards supporting punitive damages without sufficient factual allegations in support.

3. Court’s Determination

The Court finds in favor of Plaintiff Ayala Mendoza.

Allegations involving an employer’s failure to accommodate an injury that required modified work duty and an ensuing termination can support punitive damages. (Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 211, 221 [“[I]n a civil action under the FEHA, all relief generally available in noncontractual actions, including punitive damages, may be obtained”].)

Here, the Complaint sufficiently alleges that when Plaintiff Ayala Mendoza requested a second accommodation in relation to his disability, and despite the fact that Plaintiff was able to perform his duties in his current position or another position with or without accommodations, Morehouse Foods represented that it could not accommodate Plaintiff and terminated Plaintiff’s employment. (Complaint, ¶¶ 26, 30.)

Such decisions—whether to accommodate and termination—necessarily involved ratification by Morehouse Foods decisionmakers. Thus, ratification for punitive damages is sufficiently alleged.

Moreover, if Morehouse was able to accommodate Plaintiff and instead terminated Plaintiff’s employment in connection to Plaintiff being a disabled employee, such conduct could rise to, at the least, “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others” or “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights,” where Plaintiff’s alleged rights here were protected by the FEHA. (Code Civ. Proc., § 3294, subd. (c)(1)-(2); see Colucci v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 442, 455 [substantial evidence to support jury verdict of malice or oppression in retaliation claim based on complaints regarding medical condition and accommodation request, although amount of punitive damages reduced on appeal].)

The Court thus DENIES Morehouse Foods’ motion to strike. 

III. Conclusion

Defendant Morehouse Foods, Inc.’s Motion to Strike Punitive Damages from Plaintiff’s Complaint is DENIED.