Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 24STCV04009, Date: 2024-09-16 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV04009 Hearing Date: September 16, 2024 Dept: 40
Superior
Court of California
County
of Los Angeles
Department 40
LEO DAVID TUMANYAN, by and through his Guardian Ad Litem Lilit Tumanyan; and
LILIT TUMANYAN Plaintiff, v. USC CARE MEDICAL GROUP INC.; USC PERINATAL GROUP; KECK MEDICINE
OF USC; KECK HOSPITAL OF USC; MARC H. INCERPI, M.D.; SOCAL OBYGYN ASSOCIATES;
JOON CHOI, M.D., APC; JOON CHOI, M.D.; and DOES 1-100 inclusive, Defendants. |
Case No.: 24STCV04009 Hearing Date: September
16, 2024 Trial Date: May
13, 2025 [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Plaintiff’s Motion
for Trial Preference |
I. Background
A.
Pleadings
On February 16, 2024, Plaintiffs Leo David Tumanyan (Leo), by and through his guardian
ad litem Lilit Tumanyan, and Lilit Tumanyan (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed a
Complaint against Defendants USC Care Medical Group, Inc, USC Perinatal Group,
Keck Medicine of USC, Keck Hospital of USC, Marc H. Incerpi, MD, SoCal OBGYN
Associates, Joon Choi, MD, APC, Joon Choi, MD and Does 1-100, (collectively,
Defendants) alleging causes of action for (1) Medical Malpractice, (2) Wrongful
Life, and (3) Wrongful Birth.
B.
Motion Before the Court
On July 11, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the
instant motion for trial preference.
On September 3, 2024, Defendants SoCal
OBGYN Associates, Joon Choi, MD, APC, and Joon Choi, MD opposed the motion.
On September 9, Plaintiffs replied.
II. Motion
A.
Legal Standard
“A civil action to recover damages for wrongful death
or personal injury shall be entitled to preference upon the motion of any party
to the action who is under 14 years of age
unless the court finds that the party does not have a substantial interest in
the case as a whole...” (Code Civ. Proc., § 36, subd. (b).)
“Unless the court otherwise orders: (1) A party may file and serve a motion for
preference supported by a declaration of the
moving party that all essential parties
have been served with process or have appeared.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 36, subd.
(c).)
“Upon
the granting of a motion for preference pursuant to subdivision (b), a party in
an action based upon a health provider’s alleged professional negligence, as
defined in Section 364, shall receive a trial date not sooner than six months
and not later than nine months from the date that the motion is granted.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 36,
subd. (g).)
Priority is mandatory; the trial court has no
discretion to refuse the minor’s request for early setting. (Peters v.
Superior Court (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 218, 223-24.) However, early trial
setting may violate a defendant’s due process rights if there is inadequate
time to prepare for trial. (Id. at 227.)
B.
Analysis
During a Case Management Conference
on June 25, 2024, Plaintiffs and Defendants agreed to a trial date of May 13,
2025. Plaintiff now brings this motion for an order deeming the May 13, 2025, trial
date as a preferential trial date not subject to continuances, pursuant to
California Code of Civil Procedure, Section 36 subdivisions (b), (e), (h) and
(g).
Leo is 21 months old and was born with
multiple serious health conditions (Mot. Ex. 1 [detailing Leo’s health
conditions]; Ex. 3 [birth certificate showing date of birth as November 28,
2022].) Thus, Leo is under 14 years of age and clearly has a substantial
interest in the case as a whole. Plaintiffs argue that the Court should grant
this motion because Code of Civil Procedure section 36 subdivision (b) is
mandatory, and doing so serves the interests of justice due to the minor
Plaintiff's age and serious health issues.
In opposition, Defendants argue
that the motion should be denied because the Plaintiffs have been dilatory throughout
the litigation, and because the Defendants will suffer significant prejudice if
the trial date is deemed preferential due to the complexity of the case.
Defendants also argue that the Plaintiffs’ motion did not include a declaration
that all essential parties have been served with process or appeared, as stated
in Code of Civil Procedure, section 36 subdivision (c)(1).
In reply, the Plaintiffs argue that
they have diligently prosecuted the case and responded to discovery requests. They
also state that all necessary parties have been served (Harutyunyan Decl. ¶¶
3-4.) In addition, the Plaintiffs state that they are willing to set a
preferential trial date toward the outer limits of the six-to-nine-month time
period outlined in Code of Civil Procedure section 36 subdivision (g). Currently,
the trial is set for May 13, 2025. The hearing on this motion is scheduled for
September 16, 2024. Six to nine months from September 2024 is between March
2025 and June 2025. (In their motion, Plaintiffs inadvertently calculate nine
months from September 2024 as July 2025.)
Here, the Defendants have failed to
provide adequate defenses to mandatory trial preference. Leo is under 14 years
of age and has a substantial interest in the case. The Plaintiffs brought this
action within a reasonable time after Leo’s health problems were discovered and
the Court does not find Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs have been dilatory
to be supported. The Defendants’ argument that the case requires extensive
discovery fails because a party’s inability to conduct discovery or other
pretrial matters as to a party entitled to a preference is not a basis to deny
the motion in its entirety. (Swaithes v. Superior Court¿(1989) 212
Cal.App.3d 1082, 1085¿[“Failure to complete discovery or other pretrial matters
does not affect the absolute substantive right to trial preference for those
litigants who qualify for preference”].) By contrast, the cases cited by Defendants
do not support denial of the motion here. (Peters v. Superior Court
(1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 218, 227 [asking, but not answering the question whether
the preference statute violates due process]; Roe v. Superior Court
(1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 642, 643, fn. 2 [noting that the due process implications
of the preference statute have not been decided but noting that in this case “it
may not be possible to bring the matter to trial within the technical limits of
Code of Civil Procedure, subdivision (f)” where a request for trial priority
was made by the plaintiff after he filed a petition for writ of mandate to compel
the lower court to grant a motion to compel discovery]; Landry v. Berryessa (19995)
39 Cal.App.4th 691 [preference statute does not prevent Court from dismissing
case for delay in prosecution, where case was dormant for 7.5 months at one point,
and another 11 months at another point, and plaintiffs did not move for preference
until 4.5 years after case had been filed].)
Finally, although the Plaintiffs
did not include a Code of Civil Procedure, section 36 subdivision (c)(1)
compliant declaration in their motion, proofs of service on file with the Court
show that all parties have been served, and all parties have appeared in the
case.
One additional consideration bears
mentioning. The Court would like clarity on whether Defendants are arguing that
there will not be enough time for them to conduct discovery before the currently
scheduled trial date of May 13, 2025. This matter was set for trial at a June
25, 2024 Case Management Conference, wherein both parties agreed to set trial
that date, and both sets of Defendants’ CMC Statements checked the Box 6.b. that
the case would be ready for trial within 12 months of the date of the filing of
the complaint (which was on February 16, 2024). Because of the Court’s schedule
and upon stipulation of all counsel, the case was set for trial 15 months from
the date of the filing of the complaint, and about 13 months from the date of
service on Defendants. Even without the request for preference, this Court is
required to follow California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332 regarding continuances
of trials. That rule states that “[t]o ensure the prompt disposition of civil
case, the dates assigned for a trial are firm. All parties and their counsel
must regard the date set for trial as certain.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
3.1332, subd. (a).) A party seeking a continuance must do by way of noticed
motion or ex parte motion as soon as practicable once the necessity for
the continuance is discovered, and since continuances of trial are “disfavored,”
such a request may only be granted upon an affirmative showing of good cause,
as further explained in the rule. (Id. at subds. (b) and (c).) Thus, an
opposition to a motion for trial preference which apparently objects to the currently
scheduled trial date is a concern to this Court.
Accordingly, because the pleadings and evidence show that the minor Plaintiff is under the age of 14 and has a substantial interest in the case as a whole and because Defendants SoCal OBGYN Associates, Joon Choi, MD, APC, and Joon Choi, MD do not provide valid defenses to mandatory preference, the motion for trial preference is GRANTED. Once set, the trial date will not be subject to continuance, except as specified by California Code of Civil Procedure section 36 subdivision (f).
III. Conclusion
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Trial
Preference is GRANTED.
The Court will entertain at oral argument whether there is good cause to continue the current trial date from May to June, 2025, which would be at the far end of the 6-9 months.