Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 24STCV04210, Date: 2024-09-19 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 40 - JUDGE ANNE RICHARDSON - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
The Court issues tentative rulings on certain motions.The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) email Dept 40 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (smcdept40@lacourt.org) with a copy to the other party(ies) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no email is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. 

Case Number: 24STCV04210    Hearing Date: September 19, 2024    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

I. Background

A. Pleadings

Plaintiff Aghasi Smbatyan (Smbatyan) sued Defendant Loretta Antoinette Webb (Webb) pursuant to a February 20, 2024, Complaint alleging causes of action for (1) Motor Vehicle, (2) General Negligence, and (3) Intentional Tort.  The claims arise from a motor vehicle incident that occurred on February 27, 2022, at Fairfax Avenue and Beverly Boulevard, in Los Angeles, CA, 90036. Smbatyan alleges that Webb negligently owned and operated a vehicle and drove recklessly with disregard to high risk of injury to another, causing a collision with Smbatyan’s vehicle, intentionally causing injury and damage. (Compl., ¶¶ MV-1, MV-2, GN-1, IT-1.)

B. Motions Before the Court

On May 29, 2024, Webb filed a Motion to Strike and Demurrer to the Complaint’s third cause of action for Intentional Tort. According to the proof of service on file with the Court, Webb properly served both motions on Smbatyan’s counsel via overnight courier and electronic service on May 29, 2024.

No opposition or reply has been filed.

II. Motions

A.    Meet and Confer

The Court notes that Webb has met the meet and confer requirement pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41. (Margaryan Decl., ¶ 4.)

B.    Motion to Strike

Webb moves to strike the following portions from the Complaint:

1.     Paragraph 14.a.2., in its entirety, including the words: “punitive damages.”

2.     The words: “defendant intentionally caused the damage to plaintiff”, found in Paragraph IT-1, on page 6.

3.     The words: “recklessly and with disregard to high risk of injury to another.”

4.     Any and all references to punitive and/or exemplary damages, and related allegations.

Webb argues that allegations in the Complaint are insufficient to support a request for punitive or exemplary damages because “the factual and ultimate allegations presented fail to demonstrate the requisite elements of malice, oppression, and/or fraud required” (Mot. to Strike pp. 4-5.)

Based on the demurrer analysis below, Smbatyan has not presented facts sufficient to show that he is entitled to punitive or exemplary damages because he has not pleaded any facts demonstrating that Webb acted in a malicious or oppressive manner. Smbatyan has also not pleaded facts sufficient to show that Webb acted intentionally.  

Thus, Webb’s motion to strike is GRANTED.

C.    Demurrer

1)     Legal Standard

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747; see Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) This device can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a [general] demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)

In testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-67.) A demurrer, however, “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228, disapproved on other grounds, Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1162.) The face of the complaint includes exhibits attached to the complaint. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.) If facts appearing in the exhibits contradict those alleged, the facts in the exhibits take precedence. (Holland v. Morse Diesel Intern., Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1447, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in White v. Cridlebaugh (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 506, 521.)

2)     Analysis

The Complaint alleges the following regarding the third cause of action for Intentional Tort: “Plaintiff […] Aghasi Smbatyan alleges that defendant […] Loretta Antoinette Webb […] was the legal (proximate) cause of damages to plaintiff. By the following acts or omissions to act, defendant intentionally caused the damage to plaintiff […] Defendant(s), driving recklessly and with disregard to high risk of injury to another, caused a collision with with [sic] plaintiff’s vehicle, resulting in property damage and personal injuries to the plaintiff.” (Compl. ¶ IT-1.)

Webb demurs to the intentional tort cause of action on the grounds that Smbatyan has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action for an intentional tort. She argues that there is not a generic intentional tort cause of action and that Smbatyan fails to allege ultimate facts supporting a specific intentional tort claim. (Demurer p. 7.) Webb argues that “conclusory allegations that Defendant acted intentionally” do not suffice to establish the state of mind required for an intentional based claim. (Demurer p. 8.)

Here, the allegations in the Complaint do not identify a particular intentional tort. Under California Rule of Court, Rule 2.112(2), “[e]ach separately stated cause of action, count, or defense must specifically state its nature.” Additionally, Smbatyan has not alleged any facts that demonstrate Webb’s conduct was intentional.

There is no opposition to the motion.

Accordingly, Webb’s demurrer to the third cause of action for intentional tort is SUSTAINED, with leave to amend.

III. Conclusion

Defendant’s Demurrer to the Third Cause of Action – Intentional Tort is SUSTAINED, with leave to amend.

 Defendant’s Motion to Strike is GRANTED.