Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 24STCV07670, Date: 2024-10-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV07670    Hearing Date: October 28, 2024    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

I. Background

A. Pleadings

Plaintiff Brett Stettner (Brett), as Executor for the Estate of Suzi G. Stettner, pro se, sues Defendants Wesley Mitchell and Anna Snihs (erroneously sued as Anna Snih) (collectively Defendants) pursuant to a July 30, 2024 First Amended Complaint (FAC) alleging causes of action for: (1) Misuse or Misappropriation of Funds; (2) Selective Enforcement – Breach of Fiduciary Duty; (3) Unjust Enrichment; (4) Harassment; and (5) Wrongful Death.

To avoid confusion, the Court refers to parties by their first names. No disrespect is intended.

The claims arise from allegations that Suzi Stettner (Suzi) and the Defendants are residents and partial owners of a six-unit condominium property located at 1014 Hilldale Avenue in West Hollywood, Los Angeles, California. Brett asserts that the Defendants carried out extensive repairs to their unit, amounting to $180,000.00, which the HOA divided among the six units, assessing $31,000.00 per member. Brett alleges that HOA President John Vargas and Defendant Wesley Mitchell, the HOA Treasurer, threatened members with foreclosure if they did not pay the fees. Brett asserts that these threats led Tiffany Stettner, another HOA member and Suzi’s daughter, to take her own life. Brett further asserts that Tiffany’s death caused Suzi’s rapid health decline, ultimately leading to her death a few months later.  

B. Motion Before the Court

On September 9, 2024, Defendants filed the instant special motion to strike (Anti-SLAPP) all causes of action in the FAC.

Plaintiff has not filed an opposition.  

On October 16, 2024, the Defendants filed a Notice of Non-Receipt of Plaintiff’s Opposition.

Defendant’s Anti-SLAPP motion is now before the Court.

II. Motion

A. Legal Standard

Anti-SLAPP analysis under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 proceeds in two steps. In the first step, the defendant or moving party must make “a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one ‘arising from’ protected activity.” (Barry v. State Bar of California (2017) 2 Cal.5th 318, 321, quotations omitted (Barry).) In this context, the term “protected activity” refers to speech or petitioning activities. (Barry, 2 Cal.5th at p. 321.) A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim; otherwise stated, “the defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action [must] itself [be] … an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1063, quotations omitted (Park).) “[T]he focus is on determining what ‘the defendant’s activity [is] that gives rise to his or her asserted liability—and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.’” (Ibid.) In teasing out whether protected conduct exists, courts should consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability. (Ibid.) 

If the court finds the defendant or moving party succeeds at the first step, then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to “demonstrate[] a probability of prevailing on the claim.” (Ibid. [quotations omitted].) At the second step, courts “evaluate the defendants’ evidence only to determine if it defeats that submitted by the plaintiff as a matter of law.’ [Citation.] ‘[I]n order to establish the requisite probability of prevailing [citation], the plaintiff need only have “‘stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim.’” [Citation.] “Put another way, the plaintiff ‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’”‘ [Citation.] … That burden [is] not particularly high.” (Area 51 Productions, Inc. v. City of Alameda (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 581, 602 (Area 51 Productions, Inc.).) “Claims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 94 (Navallier).) If the cause of action satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute, then it is subject to being struck. (Barry, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 321.) 

As stated by our State’s highest Court: “This is a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure at an early stage of the litigation.’” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 192 (Varian).) 

B. Analysis

1. First-Prong Analysis 

a. Relevant Law 

A defendant meets his burden of showing that a plaintiff’s claim arises from that defendant’s exercise of free speech or petition rights by making a prima facie showing that the act or conduct underlying the plaintiff’s claims falls within one of the four categories found in Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16, subdivision (e). (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 88.) “Courts should analyze each claim for relief — each act or set of acts supplying a basis for relief, of which there may be several in a single pleaded cause of action — to determine whether the acts are protected [the first prong of the analysis] and, if so, whether the claim they give rise to has the requisite degree of merit to survive the motion [the second prong of the analysis].” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1010.) “[W]hen the allegations referring to an arguably protected activity are only incidental to a cause of action based essentially on non-protective activity, collateral allusions to protected activity should not subject the cause of action to the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Martinez v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 188 (Martinez).) 

Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16, subdivision (e) states: 

As used in this section, “act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue” includes:  

(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law,  

(2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law,  

(3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or  

(4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.  

(Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e) (italics added.) 

At the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the moving defendant bears the burden of identifying all allegations of protected activity, and the claims for relief supported by them. When relief is sought based on allegations of both protected and unprotected activity, the unprotected activity is disregarded for the first prong of the anti-SLAPP discussion. If the court determines that relief is sought based on allegations arising from activity protected by the statute, the second step is reached. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396 (Baral).) 

b. Discussion 

The Defendants allege that all the causes of action in the TAC arise from protected activity because the claims center on the HOA’s decision to levy a special assessment on the HOA members for fees associated with exterior repairs of one unit. The Defendants rely on Country Side Villas Homeowners Assn. v. Ivie (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1110 for their assertion that this constitutes an issue of public-interest within the meaning of the Anti-SLAPP statute. In Country Side Villas, the Court found that a defendant homeowner’s complaints about an HOA’s new policy that the HOA, as opposed to individual homeowners, was responsible for maintaining balconies and siding on individual units was a matter of public interest because the homeowners’ complaints affected all members of the HOA. (Country Side Villas, supra, at 1118.) Notably, in Country Side Villas, the defendant homeowner circulated a petition amongst homeowners objecting to the new maintenance requirements, she requested financial documents from the HOA which the HOA’s counsel refused to provide unless she signed a confidentiality agreement, the HOA’s counsel threatened to sue the homeowner if she continued to request the documents, and the homeowner and HOA participated in alternative dispute resolution. (Country Side Villas, supra, at 1113.) Subsequently, the HOA sued the homeowner and other residents seeking, among other things, declaratory relief as to interpretation of the contested maintenance requirements. (Ibid.)

There, the Court found that Plaintiff HOA’s action arose from the Defendant homeowner’s exercise of her free speech and petition rights against the maintenance requirements, and that speech and petition concerned a matter of public interest. (Country Side Villas, supra, at 1118 [“Here. . . Ms. Ivie spoke out against the members of the homeowners’ association board and management, on matters that affected all members of the association”].) Here, the converse occurred; the Defendant is the HOA and plaintiff’s complaint about the fees is this lawsuit.

Similarly, in Ruiz v. Harbor View Community Association (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1467, the court held that there were two letters sent by the defendant that constituted the exercise of the constitutional right of free speech in connection with an issue of public interest. Again, this case supports the concept that an anti-SLAPP motion can arise in the context of homeowner associations, but the statutes still requires that defendant be sued for an act in furtherance of the defendant’s right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e).)

Defendants contend that the complaint “centers on the Association’s decision to levy a special assessment on all homeowners for the fees associated with exterior repairs of one home within the Association.” (Mot. at p. 10.) However, Defendants cite no case for the proposition that a levy of a special assessment is an “act in furtherance of their free speech or petition rights.” Thus, while the HOA’s decision about assessing fees may be a matter of public interest, Defendants have not met the first element of ‘speech or petition’ and jump right to the assertion that, if the Defendants did exercise their free speech or petition rights, that speech would be a matter of public-interest. Thus, the Defendants have not met their burden to show that the complaint arises from protected activity.

2. Second-Prong Analysis 

Because the Defendants have not met the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the Court need not address whether Plaintiff would prevail on the merits.

However, the Court agrees that it is improper for Brett Stettner, in propria persona, to represent the Estate of Suzi G. Stettner in this action. (Mot., p. 6.) Outside the probate context, a personal representative, such as an executor, must have counsel to prosecute claims on behalf of the estate. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 6125; see also, Estate of Sanchez (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 331, 340.) 

III. Conclusion

Defendant’s Special Motion to Strike Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 is DENIED.

The Court will set an Order to Show Cause why the claims of the Estate of Stettner should not be dismissed for failure to have legal representation, to be heard on December 16, 2024 at 8:30 a.m.