Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 24STCV08900, Date: 2024-10-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV08900    Hearing Date: October 10, 2024    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

      I.          Background

A.    Pleadings

Plaintiff John HH Doe, by and through his guardian ad litem, Francisca Guzman, sues Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) and Does 1 through 50, pursuant to a April 9, 2024, Complaint alleging causes of action for: (1) Negligence, (2) Negligent Supervision, (3) Negligent Failure to Warn, Train or Educate, and (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

Doe is a child with autism and a student at John Burroughs Middle School, an LAUSD school. The claims arise from allegations that Doe was bullied, physically and verbally abused as well as sexually harassed, assaulted, battered, abused, and molested by a fellow student at John Burroughs Middle School. The Complaint alleges that the abuses occurred while Does was under the supervision of LAUSD and that LAUSD generally failed to properly supervise its students or take reasonable steps to protect Doe from the alleged abuses.  

B.    Motion Before the Court

On June 11, 2024, LAUSD demurred to all four causes of action in the Complaint on the grounds of sufficiency and uncertainty.

On September 26, 2024, Doe opposed the motion.

On October 3, 2024, LAUSD replied.

    II.          Motion

A.    Requests for Judicial Notice

Pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (a) and (c), the Court may take judicial notice of “(a) …the resolutions and private acts of the Congress of the United States…”, (c) [o]fficial acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States.”

The court however may not take judicial notice of the truth of the contents of the documents. (Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.) Documents are only judicially noticeable to show their existence and what orders were made such that the truth of the facts and findings within the documents are not judicially noticeable. (Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 885.) 

            Doe requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following:

(1)   Assembly Floor Analysis, Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Regular Session) as amended August 30, 2019;

(2)   Senate Rules Committee, Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Regular Session) as amended August 30, 2019;

(3)   Senate Judiciary Committee, Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019- 2020 Regular Session) as amended March 25, 2019;

(4)   Assembly Floor Analysis Third Reading, Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Regular Session) as amended March 25, 2019; and

(5)   Exhibit 5: Assembly Committee on Judiciary, Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Regular Session) as introduced January 16, 2019.

The requests for judicial notice are GRANTED to the extent of the existence of the documents.

B.    Meet and Confer

LAUSD has satisfied the meet and confer requirement pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a)(3)(A). (Nelson Decl., ¶¶ 4-5.) 

C.    Legal Standard

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747; see Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) This device can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a [general] demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)

In testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-67.) A demurrer, however, “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228, disapproved on other grounds, Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1162.) The face of the complaint includes exhibits attached to the complaint. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.) If facts appearing in the exhibits contradict those alleged, the facts in the exhibits take precedence. (Holland v. Morse Diesel Intern., Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1447.)

A demurrer for uncertainty tests whether the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (f).) 

“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616, disapproved on other grounds in Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 46 [holding claims for unfair business practices need not be pled specifically, impliedly disapproving Khoury].) As a result, a special demurrer for uncertainty is not intended to reach failure to incorporate sufficient facts in the pleading but is directed only at uncertainty existing in the allegations already made. (People v. Taliaferro (1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 822, 825, disapproved on other grounds in Jefferson v. J.E. French Co. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 717, 719-720 [statute of limitations question].) 

D.    Analysis

LAUSD demurs to the entire Complaint on the grounds that Doe has not satisfied the requirements of the Government Claims Act and that LAUSD is immune from direct liability for all causes of action not supported by statutory authority.

1.     Government Claims Act

First, LAUSD argues that pursuant to Government Code sections 910-913.2, Doe was required to file a government tort claim “not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action” before Doe could file suit against LAUSD. (Demurrer, p. 10; Gov. Code § 911.2.) LAUSD further argues that while Doe brings this cause of action under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, that section does not cover sexual assault committed by a minor on another minor. (Demurrer, p. 11.) LAUSD argues that because “childhood sexual assault” is defined in section 340.1 through reference to various Penal Code sections and because individuals under the age of 14 cannot be held guilty for crimes under the Penal Code, section 340.1 does not apply to Doe’s causes of action. (Demurrer, pp. 11-12.)  

In opposition, Doe argues that claims brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 are exempt from the government tort claim filing requirement. (Opp. pp 8-10; Gov. Code § 905 subd. (m).) Doe also argues that Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 does apply to claims of childhood sexual assault perpetrated by minors. (Opp. pp. 10-13.)

Here, Doe’s causes of action fall under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1. In A.M. v. Ventura Unified School District (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1252, the Court of Appeal decided a case analogous to this one. There, the Court of Appeal stated that, “We recognize that the primary purpose of section 340.1 is to extend the statute of limitations for adults who discover they had been abused as children, but respondents cite no persuasive authority suggesting that section 340.1, subdivision (a)(2) does not apply to situations in which the abuse is discovered while the plaintiff is still a minor.” (A.M. v. Ventura Unified School District, supra at 1262.) Similarly, LAUSD does not provide any persuasive authority that suggests section 340.1 applies only to adult plaintiffs.

LAUSD asserts that section 340.1 does not apply to the instant action because acts committed by minors do not fall within the definition of childhood sexual assault in section 340.1, subdivision (c). That subdivision states: “‘Childhood sexual assault’ as used in this section includes any act committed against the plaintiff that occurred when the plaintiff was under the age of 18 years and that would have been proscribed by Section 266j of the Penal Code; Section 285 of the Penal Code; paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of Section 286 of the Penal Code; subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 288 of the Penal Code; paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of Section 287 or of former Section 288a of the Penal Code; subdivision (h), (i), or (j) of Section 289 of the Penal Code; any sexual conduct as defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (d) of Section 311.4 of the Penal Code; Section 647.6 of the Penal Code; or any prior laws of this state of similar effect at the time the act was committed. This subdivision does not limit the availability of causes of action permitted under subdivision (a), including causes of action against persons or entities other than the alleged perpetrator of the abuse.”

LAUSD argues that under Penal Code section 26 children under the age of 14 are only capable of committing a crime if there is “clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness.” (Penal Code § 26.) Similarly, LAUSD asserts that Penal Code section 288 “only applies where the harm was conducted with sexual intent.” LAUSD argues that the Complaint lacks facts that allege that the minors in question were aware of the wrongfulness of their conduct or that demonstrate that the act was done with sexual intent. (Reply pp. 4-5.)

At the demurrer stage, a plaintiff need only set forth the essential facts of their case. Doe alleges that another student “touched [Doe] over his pants in [Doe]’s groin area” (Complaint, ¶ 20.)  Prior to conducting discovery, Doe may not have access to information pertaining to the other student’s state of mind or intent. Thus, he has alleged facts sufficient to show an act of childhood sexual assault.

Accordingly, Doe’s claim falls under the purview of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, and he is exempted from the filing requirements of the Government Claims Act.

2.     Government Code Section 815 Immunity

Second, LAUSD argues that under Government Code section 815, public entities cannot be liable for common law theories of general negligence and that liability against the school district must be authorized by statute. (Demurrer, pp. 12-13; Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a).) LAUSD argues that it is thus immune from Doe’s claims of negligence, negligent supervision, negligent failure to warn, train or educate, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Demurrer, pp. 12-13.)

In opposition, Doe asserts that his claims are not barred by Government Code section 815 because LAUSD is liable for torts committed by its employees pursuant to Government Code section 815.2 subd. (a). (Opp. p. 13; Gov. Code, § 815.2 subd. (a).)

Here, LAUSD’s argument is unavailing. Government Code section 815.2 subdivision (a) provides that public entities are “liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative.” (Gov. Code, § 815.2 subd. (a).) The Complaint alleges that LAUSD staff breached their duties to Doe in the course and scope of their employment and that the various breaches of duty gave rise to the facts underlying Doe’s various causes of action. (Complaint ¶¶ 89, 108, 117, 130.)

Thus, Doe’s claims are supported by statutory liability and LAUSD is not immune based on Government Code section 815.

Accordingly, based on the above, LAUSD’s demurrer is OVERRULED. 

III. Conclusion

Los Angeles Unified School District’s Demurrer to Complaint for Damages is OVERRULED.