Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 24STCV12055, Date: 2024-09-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV12055    Hearing Date: September 18, 2024    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

I. Background

A. Pleadings

Plaintiff Christina Yousefi (Yousefi) sues Defendants Pacific Premier Bank, Saaid El-Hendi (erroneously sued as Saide Elhendi), Mark Walsh (erroneously sued as Mark Welch), and Gary Scott Peterson (erroneously sued as Scott Peterson), and Does 1-100 pursuant to a May 14, 2024 Complaint alleging causes of action for: (1) Harassment on the Basis of Sex/Pregnancy (Hostile Work Environment) in Violation of the FEHA; (2) Discrimination on the Basis of Sex/Pregnancy in Violation of the FEHA; (3) Retaliation on the Basis of Sex/Pregnancy in Violation of the FEHA; (4) Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process in Violation of the FEHA; (5) Failure to Accommodate in Violation of the FEHA; and (6) Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy.

Yousefi worked for Pacific Premier Bank from December 2019 until April 18, 2023 (Compl. ¶¶ 11, 15.) Yousefi alleges that she performed her job duties in an exemplary manner throughout the course of her employment. (Compl. ¶ 12.) During her employment with Defendants, Yousefi became pregnant and informed Defendants of her pregnancy as well as complications with her pregnancy. (Compl. ¶ 13.) Yousefi alleges that between December 2022 and April 2023, she requested accommodations to work from home as she feared getting sick at work and was suffering from pregnancy related ailments, but that Defendant El-Hendi denied these requests. (Compl. ¶ 14(b).)  On April 3, 2023, Yousefi became sick with bronchitis and Defendant’s Human Resources department granted her request for a week off, with a return date set for April 11. (Compl. ¶ 14(d).) On April 7, 2023, Yousefi contacted El-Hendi to express her concerns about attending a conference scheduled for late April 2023. (Compl. ¶ 14(e).) She explained that she was not feeling well, and because the event would have many attendees, and she was experiencing a high-risk pregnancy, she was fearful of getting sick again. (Compl. ¶ 14(e).) Yousefi states that she never heard back regarding her request. (Compl. ¶ 14(e).) On April 18, 2023, Defendants El-Hendi, Welch, and Peterson informed Yousefi that she was laid off due to an elimination of her position following a reduction in workforce. (Compl. ¶ 15(a).) Yousefi alleges that she was the only employee impacted in the Los Angeles region and that recently a male employee has assumed her previous role. (Compl. ¶ 15(b).)

B. Motion Before the Court

On August 12, 2024, Defendants filed the instant motion to compel arbitration and for stay of the action pending arbitration.

On September 5, 2024, Yousefi opposed the motion.

On September 11, 2024, Defendants replied.

The Defendants’ motion is now before the Court.

II. Motion

A. Requests for Judicial Notice

Pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (a), (c) and (d), the Court may take judicial notice of “(a) …the resolutions and private acts of the Congress of the United States…”, (c) [o]fficial acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States” and “(d) [r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States”. The court however may not take judicial notice of the truth of the contents of the documents. (Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.) Documents are only judicially noticeable to show their existence and what orders were made such that the truth of the facts and findings within the documents are not judicially noticeable. (Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 885.) 

Defendants request judicial notice of the following: (1) United States House of Representatives Judiciary Committee Report Regarding the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021: Section-by-Section Analysis, dated January 28, 2022; (2) United States House of Representatives Judiciary Committee Report Regarding the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021; (3) Order regarding Starbucks Corporation’s Motion to Compel Arbitration in the matter entitled Princess Hodges v. Starbucks Corporation et al., Los Angeles County Superior Court, Case No. 23STCV02667, issued on June 16, 2023; and (4) Order regarding Pacific Premier Bank’s Motion to Compel Arbitration in the matter entitled Max Nguyen v. Pacific Premier Bank et al., Orange County Superior Court, Case No. 30-2022- 01272874-CU-WT-CJC, issued on February 9, 2023.

The Court takes judicial notice to the extent of the documents’ existence, but not as to the truth of any matters asserted therein.

Yousefi requests judicial notice of the following: (1) Order Granting Defendants Robinhood Markets, Inc. and Hemal Doshi’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings, Erkan v. Robinhood Markets, Inc., et al., Case No. CGC-22-600149, dated October 17, 2022; (2) Government Code § 12940(j)(4)(C); (3) Order Denying Defendants Meta Platforms, Inc., Ethan Hillel Lubka and Ian Robert Laiks’ Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings, Kennedy v. Meta Platforms, Inc., et al., Case No. CGC-23-604370, dated April 28, 2023; (4) Tentative Ruling and Order Denying Defendants House Ninja, Brett Marz and Ramit Varma’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings, Burkholder v. House Ninja, et al., Case No. 23STCV02678, dated June 26, 2023; and (5) Order Denying Defendants Motion to Compel Arbitration, Karla Lissette Martinez v. EBS Foods, LLC, et al., Case No. 24STCV13488, dated August 23, 2024.

Again, the Court takes judicial notice to the extent of the documents’ existence, but not as to the truth of any matters asserted therein.

B. Legal Standard

Under both the Federal Arbitration Act and California law, arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except on such grounds that exist at law or equity for voiding a contract. (Winter v. Window Fashions Professions, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 943, 947.) The party moving to compel arbitration must establish the existence of a written arbitration agreement between the parties. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 1281.2.) This is usually done by presenting a copy of the signed, written agreement to the court. “A petition to compel arbitration or to stay proceedings pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1281.2 and 1281.4 must state, in addition to other required allegations, the provisions of the written agreement and the paragraph that provides for arbitration. The provisions must be stated verbatim, or a copy must be physically or electronically attached to the petition and incorporated by reference.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.) The moving party must also establish the other party’s refusal to arbitrate the controversy. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 1281.2.)

C. Analysis

Defendants present a valid arbitration agreement and evidence that Yousefi refuses to arbitrate. (Donaldson Decl. Ex. I [Arbitration Agreement]; LaBriola Decl. ¶¶ 5, 7-8, 10, and Exs. B, D, E, G [evidencing Yousefi’s refusal to arbitrate].)  Yousefi does not dispute the existence or validity of the Arbitration Agreement. Yousefi argues that the Arbitration Agreement exclusively applies to Pacific Premier Bank and not to the other individual Defendants; however upon review, the Arbitration Agreement expressly states that it encompasses disputes against Pacific Premier Bank employees (Donaldson Decl. Ex A at p. 4, ¶ 3.)   

The primary contention between the parties is whether the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA) applies. Defendants argue that the EFAA does not apply to this case because the EFAA pertains to sexual assault or sexual harassment claims, but not to pregnancy harassment claims. (Mot. p. 8.) The Defendants request that if the Court finds that Yousefi’s pregnancy harassment claim falls within the scope of the EFAA, it should sever this claim from the Arbitration Agreement and compel Yousefi to arbitrate her remaining non-harassment claims. (Mot. p. 8.) In opposition, Yousefi argues that all her claims arise from a sexual harassment dispute as defined in the EFAA and that accordingly her claims cannot be arbitrable and should not be severed. (Opp. pp. 9-10.)  

The EFAA gives individuals asserting sexual assault or sexual harassment claims under federal, state or tribal law the option to bring those claims in court even if they had agreed to arbitrate such disputes before the claims arose. (H.R. 4445) Yousefi brings her claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). Under FEHA, “‘harassment’ because of sex includes sexual harassment, gender harassment, and harassment based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” (Gov. Gode. § 12940 subd. (j)(4)(C).)

The FEHA defines sexual harassment claims to include harassment based on pregnancy and its related medical conditions. The EFAA applies to sexual harassment claims brought under state law. Thus, the EFAA applies to Yousefi’s pregnancy harassment claims alleged in this action. Accordingly, Yousefi may bring these claims in court despite signing the Arbitration Agreement.    

Defendants further argue that Yousefi’s remaining claims are not “related to” her pregnancy harassment claims. (Reply p. 8.) The Defendants argue that Yousefi’s harassment claim should be severed, and that she should be compelled to arbitrate her remaining causes of action for discrimination, retaliation, failure to engage in the interactive process, failure to accommodate, and wrongful termination. (Reply pp. 7-10.) Defendants argue that Yousefi’s harassment claim involves “a single supervisor and Plaintiff’s alleged interactions with that individual.” Defendants argue that “[i]n contrast, the crux of Plaintiff’s remaining claims is that she was wrongfully terminated, retaliated against, discriminated against, and harassed because she disclosed her pregnancy and requested time off for her pregnancy.” (Reply p. 8). Defendants argue that because these claims are not related to the harassment claim, Yousefi should be compelled to arbitrate them.  

The EFAA provides that “no predispute arbitration agreement…shall be valid or enforceable with respect to a case which is filed under Federal, Tribal, or State law and relates to the … sexual harassment dispute.” (9. U.S.C. § 402 subd. (a).)

To support their arguments, both Yousefi and the Defendants rely on persuasive authority from New York, where this specific question of interpretation has been much more substantially litigated than it has in California. Yousefi relies on Johnson v. Everyrealm, Inc. (S.D.N.Y 2023) 657 F.Supp.3d 535 for the contention that “[w]here the claim in a case alleges ‘conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute’ as defined, the EFAA, at the election of the party making such an allegation, makes pre-dispute arbitration agreements unenforceable with respect to the entire case relating to that dispute.” (Johnson, supra, 657 F.Supp.3d 535 at p. 561.)

Alternatively, the Defendants rely on Mera v. SA Hosp. Grp., LLC (S.D.N.Y. 2023) 675 F.Supp.3d 442 in which the Court compelled a plaintiff to arbitrate his wage and hours claims but denied the motion to compel as to the plaintiff’s harassment claims within the scope of the EFAA. In Mera, the Court found that the wage and hour claims did “not relate in any way to the sexual harassment dispute…” (Mera, supra, at p. 448.)  

Unlike Mera, in this case, all of Yousefi’s causes of action arise from her treatment related to her pregnancy. Yousefi alleges that her supervisor made comments insinuating that she would not return to work after giving birth (Compl. p. 4.), that her requests for reasonable accommodations due to pregnancy-related ailments were denied or ignored (Compl. p. 5.), and that she was terminated under the pretext of reductions in workforce, but that her position was subsequently filled by a male employee. (Compl. p. 6.)

Thus, because all Yousefi’s causes of action in this case relate to her pregnancy harassment allegation, the entire case falls under the EFAA. Accordingly, the Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration is DENIED.

III. Conclusion

Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration and for Stay of the Action Pending Arbitration is DENIED.