Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: BC611486, Date: 2024-11-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BC611486    Hearing Date: November 7, 2024    Dept: 40

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 40

I. Background

A. Pleadings

Plaintiff Gabriel Rueda (Rueda) sues Defendants Frederick (Freddie) Roach, Keith M. Davidson, Paramount Global (f/k/a ViacomCBS, f/k/a CBS Corporation), Showtime Networks, Inc. (Showtime), and Does 1-25 pursuant to a February 2, 2024, Third Amended Complaint (TAC). The TAC alleges claims of: (1) Breach of Oral Contract against the Showtime Defendants and Freddie Roach; (2) Omitted [Breach of Implied Contract; Dismissed by the Court]; (3) Common Counts for Labor, Work, and Services against the Showtime Defendants and Freddie Roach; (4) Quantum Meruit against the Showtime Defendants and Freddie Roach; (5) Fraud in the Inducement against Freddie Roach; (6) Fraudulent Misrepresentation against Freddie Roach; (7) Omitted [Unjust Enrichment; Dismissed by the Court]; (8) Omitted [Attempted Extortion; Dismissed by the Court]; and (9) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against the Showtime Defendants, Freddie Roach, and Defendant Davidson. The claims against Emmanuel Pacquiao have been dismissed.

The claims arise from allegations that Rueda, pursuant to an unpaid finder’s fee, introduced Leslie Moonves, the then-president of CBS Corporation and Showtime Networks, to Defendant Roach, who was the trainer and confidant of boxer Pacquiao. Moonves allegedly used the introduction to broker a bout between Pacquiao and boxer Floyd Mayweather Jr.—dubbed the “Fight of the Century”—that earned Pacquiao, Mayweather, and Showtime Networks more than $430 million. According to Rueda, he is entitled to 2% of the gross proceeds from the fight received by Roach, Pacquiao, and Paramount and Showtime.

B. Motion Before the Court

On October 4, 2024, Rueda filed the instant motion for additional time to complete the deposition of Leslie Moonves (Moonves).

On October 25, 2024, non-party Moonves filed an opposition to the motion.

On October 31, 2024, Rueda replied.

II. Motion

A. Legal Standard

The total time for deposition by all counsel is generally limited to seven hours. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.290, subd. (a).) However, a court shall allow additional time, beyond any limits imposed by this section, if needed to fairly examine the deponent or if the deponent, another person, or any other circumstance impedes or delays the examination. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.290, subd. (a).) Subdivision (a) and parts of subdivision (b) have been found by California courts to impose merely presumptive restrictions that are applicable only if the court does not order otherwise, thus giving courts ample discretion as to additional deposition time. (Certainteed Corp. v. Superior Court (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1060-1062 (Certainteed) [seven-hour limit and 14-hour limit in complex cases merely presumptive], superseded by statute on other grounds as discussed in Cahill Construction Co., Inc. v. Superior Court (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 777, 786-787 (Cahill) [Legislature responds to Certainteed by enacting law becoming Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.295].) 

B. Analysis

Rueda moves for an order granting 2.5 additional hours to depose Moonves on the grounds that he has not had a fair opportunity to fully and completely depose Moonves. Rueda asserts that he has not had an opportunity to question Moonves about (1) destruction of a document that contained evidence of the contract which showed Rueda was entitled to 2% from the gross proceeds, and (2) the motives of Moonves and CBS to subject Rueda to harassment. (Mot. pp. 4:22-5:1.) He argues that there is good cause for the additional time as he was not able to depose Moonves on these topics previously because counsel obstructed the deposition with excessive objections and impermissible coaching. (Mot. pp. 5:8-9:6.)

In opposition, Moonves argues that the motion should be denied because (1) the discovery and motion cutoff date has passed, (2) Rueda has had sufficient opportunity to examine Moonves on the above topics, and (3) the motion is a bad-faith attempt to harass Moonves.

Moonves asserts first that the motion is procedurally improper because the discovery and motion cut-off date was November 4 and this motion is set for hearing on November 7, and because Rueda has neither submitted a motion requesting leave to reopen discovery nor properly met and conferred with Moonves’ counsel. (Opp. pp. 7:5-8:18.) Second, Moonves argues that Rueda has already deposed Moonves for seven and a half hours, with an additional 90 minutes of questioning by other parties, that discovery on the contract claims ended in 2023, and Rueda had the opportunity to ask about the above-described topics but chose to examine Moonves on other topics, including asking questions on topics and exhibits in 2024 that had been covered in 2018. (Opp. pp. 8:21-11:20) Moonves also denies Rueda’s assertion that Defendants or Moonves’ counsel obstructed the previous deposition and asserts that any objections were reasonable and necessary. (Opp. pp. 11:23-14:2.) Third, Moonves asserts that the motion is an unwarranted waste of time because he is a nonparty to this action and has already provided significant testimony and documents in this action. (Opp. pp. 14:4-15:11.)

In reply, Rueda argues that the two issues he seeks to examine Moonves about were not known during Moonves’ first deposition in February 2018. (Reply, pp. 2:24-4:16.) He further argues that he did not delay in seeking Moonves’ deposition because the issues are relevant to his tort claims which were stayed for several years. (Reply, pp. 4:18-6:6.) Last, Rueda argues that the Court should exercise its discretion to hear the motion despite the November 4 discovery cut-off date because the motion was timely filed after Moonves’ second deposition transcript was completed and before the discovery cut-off date, but the first available hearing date on the Court’s calendar was not until November 7. (Reply, pp. 6:9-7:3.)

Here, the Court will exercise its discretion to hear the motion on its merits despite the discovery cut-off date. However, Rueda has not shown that an additional deposition is justified under these circumstances. The topics Rueda seeks to depose Moonves on do not concern new information that Rueda could not have examined Moonves about earlier. Both the contract claims and the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim were raised in this action in 2018. Thus, Rueda had the opportunity to question Moonves about facts relevant to these claims in either of the two previous depositions. To the extent Rueda argues that he did not know of the relevant issues prior to Moonves’ first deposition in February 2018, each of the articles Rueda references were published well before Moonves’s second deposition in August 2024. (See Reply, pp. 3-4 fns. 1-4.) Thus, Rueda could have questioned Moonves about them at that second deposition. Plaintiff has not made a convincing case why he was not able to ask all his questions of this witness in that time period, and why he believes an additional 2.5 hours are needed. For example, it is unclear how it would be helpful to have further deposition on the issue of Mr. Moonves’ phone number during the relevant time period, when he has already testified during the August 2024 deposition that he doesn’t know. (Reply, p. 3.)

Thus, the motion is denied. 

III. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s Motion for Additional Time to Complete Deposition of Leslie Moonves is DENIED.