SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 

 

 

Plaintiff Maria I. Torres moves for $322,796.40 in attorney fees under Civil Code section 1780, subdivision (e).   

Procedural History 

On October 16, 2018, plaintiff filed her initial complaint alleging five causes of action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Song-Beverly Act), a sixth cause of action for fraud by omission, and a seventh cause of action for “fraudulent inducement – intentional misrepresentation.”  Plaintiff filed her first amended complaint (alleging the same seven causes of action) on January 17, 2019.   

In 2021, defendant Kia America, Inc., formerly known as Kia Motors America, Inc. (Kia) moved for summary adjudication of the sixth and seventh causes of action.  On May 17, 2021, the court denied summary adjudication of the sixth cause of action and granted summary adjudication of the seventh.   

In 2022, defendant moved for summary adjudication on the first five causes of action under the Song-Beverly Act.  On March 10, 2022, the court granted defendant’s motion.  Only plaintiff’s sixth cause of action for fraud by omission remained.  Plaintiff also moved for reconsideration, which the court denied. 

Plaintiff then moved for leave to file a second amended complaint to add a cause of action for violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA).  On May 2, 2022, the court granted the motion.  Finally, in June 2022, plaintiff accepted defendant’s offer to compromise under Code of Civil Procedure section 998.   

Requests for Judicial Notice 

Plaintiff requests judicial notice of 30 exhibits.  All 30 requests are denied.   

Evidentiary Objections 

Defendant Kia makes 33 objections to the declaration of Payam Shahian.  Objection Nos. 1-5 are overruled.  Objection Nos. 6-33 are sustained. 

Plaintiff makes five objections to the declaration of Patrick J. Raue.  All five objections are sustained. 

Lodestar 

Plaintiff seeks attorney fees based on the following hours and rates: 

Hourly Rates 

For hourly rates, “the trial court is in the best position to value the services rendered by the attorneys.”  (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 436.)  Courts may rely on their “own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees, the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied, and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases.” (Id. at p. 437, citations omitted.) 

Based on its knowledge of the legal market, its review of the credentials and experience of plaintiff’s attorneys, and the particular tasks performed by counsel, the court reduces the rates for plaintiff’s counsel as shown below: 

Hours 

A. Inefficiency and Duplication 

In calculating the lodestar, the court must determine whether the tasks performed by an attorney were necessary and whether the amount of time billed for each task was reasonable.  (Baxter v. Bock (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 775, 793.)  The moving party has the burden of proof on these issues.  (Ibid.)  The number of hours billed may be unreasonable if the case is “overstaffed” with too many lawyers, resulting in redundant or unnecessary work.  (Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424, 434.)  A reduced award is justified when a case is “overlitigated” and the bills are “padded.”  (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America¿(2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 38 (Morris).)  “ ‘[J]ust as there can be too many cooks in the kitchen, there can be too many lawyers on a case.’ ”  (Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 272.) 

For a “voluminous fee application,” courts may “make across-the-board percentage cuts either in the number of hours claimed or in the final lodestar figure.”  (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc.¿(2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 41; accord Morris, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 40 [“The court could properly have made an across-the-board reduction of 30 percent”].)   

After reviewing the detailed billing records (Shahian Decl., Exs. 31-32), the court finds many hours of plaintiff’s counsel’s work were unreasonable or inefficient.  Plaintiff overstaffed the case with 19 lawyers, which resulted in inefficient or duplicative work.  Plaintiff brought in a second law firm, whose attorneys billed for: a “strategy meeting with Strategic Legal Practices regarding association as trial counsel” (Shahian Decl., Ex. 32, p. 1) and “review[ing] strategy correspondence from co-counsel” (id., p. 5), administrative tasks such as “create[ing] a new matter in client management software” (ibid.) and “updat[ing] client management software” (id., p. 5), and auditing, reviewing, and analyzing the client file (id., pp. 1-3).   

The billing records also show inefficient work or padded bills.  The court will provide several examples.  Plaintiff’s bills include excessively large entries for routine tasks that could have been done by a paralegal in the first place.  For instance, on June 18, 2019, counsel billed 0.5 hours for drafting notice of the ruling on a motion.  (Shahian Decl., Ex. 31, p. 4.)  On January 14, 2020, counsel billed 0.6 hours to draft a notice of withdrawal of a motion.  (Ex. 31, p. 5.)  On April 21, 2020, counsel billed 1.2 hours to draft and “deliver” a stipulation to continue the hearing on a motion for summary adjudication.  (Id., p. 7.)  On November 1, 2021, counsel billed 0.5 hours to “[f]inalize stipulation to continue trial.”  (Id., p. 11.)    

Plaintiff also billed excessive amounts of time for work on relatively simple motions.  On June 16 and 17, 2021, for example, counsel spent a total of 11.2 hours drafting the opposition to defendant’s ex parte application to seal records.  (Shahian Decl., Ex. 31, pp. 10-11.)  Counsel billed a perplexing total of 36.1 hours on its motion for leave to amend from April 4 to April 25, 2022.  (Id., pp. 12-13.)  Counsel spent 21.1 hours drafting the reply alone.  (Id., p. 13.)  Counsel thus billed over 50% more time on the motion for leave to amend than they did for opposing the motion for summary adjudication in 2022.  These motions should not have taken nearly that much time.     

The court exercises its discretion to cut plaintiff’s hours claimed by 15 percent across the board.   

B. Apportionment 

Defendant argues plaintiff should only recover attorney fees beginning on May 3, 2022, when she filed the second amended complaint to add her CLRA claim to the unsuccessful Song-Beverly Act claims and the common-law claim for fraud, which does not permit recovery of attorney fees.  The court finds a more limited apportionment is appropriate.  “If a plaintiff has prevailed on some claims but not others, fees are not awarded for time spent litigating claims unrelated to the successful claims, and the trial court ‘should award only that amount of fees that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained.’ ”  (Chavez v. City of Los Angeles¿(2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 989.) 

“ ‘When a cause of action for which attorney fees are provided by statute is joined with other causes of action for which attorney fees are not permitted, the prevailing party may recover only on the statutory cause of action.’ ”  (Santana v. FCA US, LLC¿(2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, 349 (Santana).)  “However, ‘[s]uch fees need not be apportioned when incurred for representation on an issue common to both causes of action in which fees are proper and those in which they are not.’ ”  (Ibid.)  “Moreover, ‘[a]pportionment is not required when the claims for relief are so intertwined that it would be impracticable, if not impossible, to separate the attorney’s time into compensable and noncompensable units.’ ”  (Ibid.)   

In Santana, the court held that the plaintiff’s cause of action under the Song-Beverly Act was intertwined with the cause of action for fraud.  (Santana, supra, at p. 349.)  “[T]he principal distinction between the two causes of action was that the fraud claim required proof of what Chrysler knew prior to the sale of Santana’s vehicle.  But there was very little evidence on that front.  Instead, most of the evidence focused on whether there was a defect at all, and whether Chrysler knew about the defect—issues that are equally¿relevant to the fraud and Song-Beverly Act claim.”  (Ibid.) 

Here, the successful CLRA cause of action was inextricably intertwined with plaintiff’s sixth cause of action for fraud, which plaintiff alleged in the initial complaint.  The court therefore will not apportion all fees incurred before plaintiff filed the second amended complaint.   

But while there were overlapping issues between the fraud and CLRA causes of action and plaintiff’s unsuccessful causes of action, the issues are not inextricably intertwined.  Defendant filed two separate motions for summary adjudication: one on the fraud claims, which was granted in part, and one on the Song-Beverly Act claims, which was granted in full.  The first concerned only what defendant knew and did prior to the sale of plaintiff’s vehicle.  The second concerned only whether defendant: repaired plaintiff’s vehicle within a reasonable number of attempts or within 30 days, provided sufficient literature to its authorized service facilities, and whether plaintiff’s vehicle conformed to the express warranty or implied warranty of merchantability after she bought it.   

Nothing in the second motion was related to plaintiff’s CLRA cause of action.  Plaintiff’s time spent opposing the latter motion and moving the court to reconsider its ruling are entirely attributable to her unsuccessful causes of action under the Song-Beverly Act.  The court therefore will not award plaintiff fees for the 23.6 hours spent opposing the motion for summary judgment (20.2 by Pardo and 3.4 by Dolin) or the 20.5 hours spent moving for reconsideration (16 by Yu and 4.5 by Pardo).  (Shahian Decl., Ex. 31, pp. 11-12.)     

Multiplier 

Plaintiff seeks a 1.35 multiplier to the lodestar.  The court will instead apply a negative multiplier.  “ ‘Once the court has fixed the lodestar, it may increase or decrease that amount by applying a positive or negative “multiplier” to take into account other factors, including the quality of the representation, the novelty and complexity of the issues, the results obtained, and the contingent risk presented.’ ”  (Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 833 (Thayer), quoting Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 26.)  There is no “hard-and-fast rule” limiting the factors the court may consider; it should consider all relevant factors.  (Thayer, at p. 834; Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.) 

This case did not involve novel or difficult questions.  It was one among the legion of consumer warranty and fraud cases plaintiff’s counsel litigates. 

Counsel provided significantly lower quality representation than in their typical cases.  The court has seen many vehicle cases under the Song-Beverly Act and the CLRA.  The result here stands out as one of the least successful.  The court has seen no other case where the plaintiff lost all her Song-Beverly Act claims on summary adjudication.  A successful result would have been to persuade defendant to repurchase the vehicle or otherwise compensate the plaintiff three years earlier.  As the saying goes, “ ‘Justice¿delayed¿is¿justice¿denied.’ ”  (Bouvia v. Superior Court¿(1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1127, 1135.)  Plaintiff’s counsel Strategic Legal Practices, APC routinely achieves early settlements. 

Moreover, the settlement was for “$46,000 in exchange for the Vehicle plus attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses.”  (Linnell Decl., ¶ 149, Ex. 13.)  That means for nearly four years, plaintiff has kept—and has either been driving or storing—a vehicle she alleges is dangerous because its engine is likely to catch fire or explode.  Quality representation would have relieved her of that burden much sooner.  This case did not resolve as quickly as it could have because plaintiff spent years pursuing meritless Song-Beverly Act claims.   

In addition to the result, the process of the representation also shows a lower quality than usual.  When plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the order granting summary adjudication on those claims, the court’s order noted, “Plaintiff provides no explanation of why she could not have presented this evidence earlier. …  Plaintiff thus has no excuse for her failure to timely file this evidence.”  (April 18, 2022 Minute Order, p. 4.)  When the court granted plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, it stated, “The court agrees with defendant Kia Motors America, Inc. that Torres inexcusably delayed in bringing the proposed amendment.”  (May 2, 2022 Minute Order, p. 2.)  For years, plaintiff’s counsel litigated this case primarily by advancing causes of action disposed of on summary adjudication.  Plaintiff’s counsel finally moved to add the CLRA cause of action nearly three and a half years after filing the initial complaint.  

Also relevant is that counsel’s representation frustrated the purpose of the CLRA.  The law’s purpose is “to protect consumers against unfair and deceptive business practices and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection.”  (Civ. Code, § 1760.)  The Court of Appeal has held “[i]t is neither efficient nor economical to engage in protracted litigation and to run up attorney fees when an appropriate correction has been offered at the very outset.”  (Benson v. Southern California Auto Sales, Inc.¿(2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1212.)   

Although defendant did not offer the appropriate correction from the outset here, plaintiff’s conduct unnecessarily increased the cost of litigation.  Plaintiff engaged in protracted litigation pursuing meritless Song-Beverly Act claims before serving the CLRA notice required under Civil Code section 1782 on June 1, 2020, and before amending the complaint to add a cause of action for violating the CLRA in May 2022.  Soon after plaintiff amended her complaint to add a CLRA cause of action, the case settled.  Litigating the case this way was inefficient and inconsistent with the CLRA’s purpose. 

After considering all relevant factors, the court exercises its discretion to apply a negative multiplier of 0.8. 

DISPOSITION 

Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees is granted in part.  After accounting for the reductions described above, the court calculates the award as follows:  

Plaintiff Maria I. Torres shall recover $138,810.27 in attorney fees and expenses from defendant Kia America, Inc. 

 

  IT IS SO ORDERED 

 

Date: December 12, 2022 

_______________________________________ 

Armen Tamzarian 

JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT